UNIV. OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/edinburghreview29lond

The Edinburgh Review

or Critical Journal

JANUARY, 1918 ——— APRIL 1918

To be continued Quarterly

Edited by HAROLD COX

JUDEX DAMNATUR CUM NOCENS ABSOLVITUR
Publius Syrus

VOL. 227 147166
26|9|18

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras
LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY, New York
1918

Contents of Vol. 227

No. 463 — January, 1918

		PAGE
The Church of England	H. HENSLEY HENSON (Bishop-Designate of Hereford)	1
Town Life—Old and New	Dr. A. SHADWELL	25
Animism, Sorcery, and Spiritualism	Dr. CHARLES MERCIER	49
The Usages of War in Ancient Greece	H. R. JAMES	68
Theatrical Landmarks	T. H. S. ESCOTT	85
The Medici Archives	ARUNDEL DEL RE	97
Early Phases of Food Control	H. S.	108
Dominant Facts in Russia	ROBERT WILTON	131
The Finance of the War	EDITOR	146
Problems of Indian Administration	LOVAT FRASER	166
The Romance of the Battle-Line in France (Part I.)	J. E. C. BODLEY	188

No. 464 — April, 1918

The Problem of Democracy	Prof. W. ALISON PHILLIPS	209
Population and Food Supply	J. O. P. BLAND	232
The Riddle of After-Life	A. WYATT TILBY	253
Mr. Hardy's Lyrical Poems	EDMUND GOSSE, C.B.	272
The Theological Education of the Clergy	Rev. F. R. TENNANT	294
The Development of Italy	E. STRACHAN MORGAN	306
Alsace-Lorraine and Democracy	A FRENCH SOLDIER	322
The Disabled Soldier	SIR JOHN COLLIE, C.M.G., M.D.	343
Merchant Shipping and State Control	JOHN HILTON	359
The Power of the Press	EDITOR	383
The Romance of the Battle-Line in France (Part II.)	J. E. C. BODLEY	392

The Edinburgh Review

JANUARY, 1918 No. 463

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

1. **The Golden Days of the Early English Church from the Arrival of Theodore to the Death of Bede.** By Sir HENRY HOWORTH. John Murray. 1917.
2. **Church and State in England to the Death of Queen Anne.** By HENRY MELVILL GWATKIN, D.D. Longmans, Green & Co. 1917.
3. **Studies in English Franciscan History.** By A. G. LITTLE, M.A. Manchester: University Press. 1917.
4. **History of the Abbey of St. Alban.** By L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS. Longmans, Green & Co. 1917.
5. **Historical Introductions to the Rolls Series.** By WILLIAM STUBBS, D.D. Longmans, Green & Co. 1902.
6. **Venerabilis Baedae Opera Historica.** Edited by C. PLUMMER, A.M. Oxford. 1896.
7. **The Episcopate and the Reformation Our Outlook.** By the Rev. J. P. WHITNEY, B.D. Robert Scott. 1917.

IT is sometimes said that modern Englishmen have lost interest in ecclesiastical affairs, and there are many circumstances which give a large plausibility to the statement. There are however some facts which point in the opposite direction, and among these must be reckoned the appearance, even in the mid-course of a vast conflict, of many books treating of ecclesiastical history and politics. Publishers

All rights reserved.

must be supposed to know their own interest, and their evident expectation of readers may be taken as no untrustworthy indication of the set of the public mind. The Church of England is indeed a unique institution, and it has a unique history. Perhaps there is no more distinctively English factor in the whole system of our national polity, and at a time when 'reconstruction' is in the air, and projects for recasting the national Church are actually being advocated, it is well to put in a plea for a cautious handling of what is the oldest and most widely influential of existing institutions.

Those features of English Christianity which are most distinctive are precisely those which are traceable to its beginnings, and no man can hope to understand modern Anglicanism who is unfamiliar with the circumstances in which the national Church received its present shape. Abuses and paradoxes of course are none the less such for being ancient, and historical explanations are not always effective apologies; but no man can really be qualified to attempt the correction of anomalies who does not know how they came to be, who cannot perceive the titles they have been able to advance to the acceptance of good men, and who does not realise what deep roots they have in the soil of national experience. A special value therefore belongs at the present time to such researches in the ecclesiastical antiquities of England as those to which Sir Henry Howorth has devoted the later years of a life of varied distinction and remarkable intellectual activity. Of these researches the ripened fruit is presented to the public in three sumptuous volumes on the 'Golden Days of the Early 'English Church.' They constitute a work of genuine merit, disclosing a wealth of learning marshalled with skill and handled with acuteness and independence. We may add that the volumes are admirably illustrated with photographs and woodcuts, which are not only beautiful in themselves but very helpful to the reader. The story which the author sets out to tell is full of varied interest, alike for the student of human nature, for the artist, for the churchman, and for the patriot.

The history of the Church of England falls into three epochs, marked by the two great crises of the Norman Conquest in the eleventh, and the Reformation in the sixteenth, century. If specific years must be chosen to mark the beginning of these epochs, we cannot do better than accept the obvious

dates—597 which witnessed the landing of St. Augustine on these shores, 1066 which saw the violent entry of William the Norman, and 1532 in which the Submission of the Clergy was secured.

In England Christianity had a fairer field than elsewhere, and more favouring chances. Paganism, beyond more developed forms of religion, has its strength in local traditions and associations, in holy places, wells, trees, and hills charged with mysterious potencies. Migration from the ancient homes of the Teutonic tribes went far in the case of the conquerors of Roman Britain to cut the roots of pagan faith, with the result that the primitive English nowhere offered any very obstinate resistance to the Christian missionaries, and mostly accepted the new creed with an almost disconcerting promptitude. It is possible, indeed, that Christianity was not so unknown as the narrative of the Conversion suggests. Few now would maintain that the Britons had been so completely extirpated as was once supposed, and their survival must have created a situation in which some familiarity with Christian ideas and practices was present. The Mission of St. Augustine came with the large credentials of a distant but vaguely venerated authority, and it worked in a prepared soil. Conversion was more rapid than complete. An English king could determine by his example the religious profession of his subjects, and their loyal complaisance was assisted and rewarded by the judicious policy of the great Pope which made the most of all points of contact between the old habits and the new religion. It followed of course that reactions were frequent and facile, and that, when Christianity had finally established itself, there survived a mass of crude paganism in the acceptance of the people. On the whole, however, the student will be most impressed by the magnitude of the spiritual success which rewarded the efforts of the missionaries.

Of that success the extent and the quality may be perceived by considering the life and writings of the Venerable Bede, and comparing both with whatever is fairly comparable in other parts of Europe. Gregory of Tours (*c.* 538–594) may perhaps be placed beside the Northumbrian monk for the purpose of comparison, for though his career belonged to the preceding age, it was passed in a community which had been fully organised ecclesiastically for more than two centuries.

The monotonous record of savagery and licentiousness, which forms the staple of the 'History of the Franks,' presents a contrast as startling as it is suggestive with the 'Ecclesiastical 'History of the English People.'

The distinctive features of English Christianity are largely traceable to two circumstances, affecting respectively the method and the agents of the original conversion. The English were not, like the Franks and Visigoths, absorbed into a conquered Christian population equipped with a strong and complete ecclesiastical organisation, nor were they, like the Saxons and Prussians, Christianised 'at the sword's point,' and brought by their conquerors under a new hierarchical system; they were converted by independent missions sent to them from without. Again, the English owed their conversion principally to monks. To the first circumstance we may ascribe the fewness of the bishoprics, which originally represented not the requirement of ecclesiastical administration, but the extent of a national dominion. To the last, we may attribute the extraordinary power of monasticism in England. Bishop Stubbs, in his Introductions to the Rolls Series, has pointed out the fact and its importance:

'The conversion of England was accomplished principally, if not entirely, by monks either of the Roman or of the Irish school; and thus the monastic institution was not, as among the earlier converted nations, an innovation which rested its claims for reverence on the sanctity or asceticism of its professors: it was coeval with Christianity itself: it was the herald of the Gospel to kings and people, and added the right of gratitude to that of religious respect or superstitious awe. Hence the system occupied in England and in the countries converted by English missionaries a position more really honourable and better maintained than elsewhere. Although the monasteries of France and Italy were larger and politically more powerful than those of England, they did not enjoy the same place in the affections of the people, nor were they either so purely national, or nurseries of patriotic spirit in the same way' (p. 366).

There was good and bad in the nationalism of the monasteries. On the one hand, it created a bond of sympathy between the monks and the people, and thus assisted their influence on national character; on the other, it set a hedge about the abuses which insularity fostered, and so obstructed salutary reform. The Norman Conquest emphasised both

these consequences of monastic nationalism, for the monks had been protagonists in the national defence, which was overwhelmed at Hastings, and they felt to the full the woes of the vanquished. 'Lanfranc saw, in the monasteries, 'societies of degenerated Benedictines; William, nests of 'anti-Norman feeling.' Dislike of reformation and resistance to the alien went hand in hand. So long as the latter was a living sentiment the monasteries did not lack popular support, but as the Norman monarchy grew out of its alien phase, and became the instrument of social order and the embodiment of national feeling, the monasteries fell apart from public life, drew more closely to the papacy—from which they secured the exemptions so dear to their pride and so fatal to their character—shared its growing unpopularity, and finally fell with it. This Dissolution was not the penalty on internal abuses grown to be inveterate and proved to be intolerable, but the consequence of a situation which had ceased to be tenable. The religious atmosphere of Christendom was changing. Neither the reason nor the conscience of devout persons in the latest medieval period led them naturally to the cloister. Devotion was finding other modes of expression than those of ascetical piety. Economic changes disordered the finance of the great monasteries, and had brought them to the verge of bankruptcy when the conflict with the papacy emphasised their international character. Mr. Rushbrook Williams has illustrated the general story of English monasticism in his sympathetic and informing 'History of the 'Abbey of St. Alban,' recently issued from the press. In his enthusiasm for his subject, he has, perhaps, minimised the evidences of internal disintegration which the famous Admonition of Cardinal Morton to Abbot Wallingford (1490) provides, but he is certainly right in setting aside as exaggerated and unfair the traditional indictment of the great Abbey. He reviews the working of St. Alban's on the eve of the final disaster, and concludes that 'on the whole the Abbey may be 'said to have been earning its income at the time when it 'ceased to exist,' but that there were circumstances which compelled an end to the long history:

'None the less, dissolution appears to have been inevitable, if only on account of the inability of the financial resources of the House to support the strain placed upon them. If the Abbey was

to have continued in existence, the only course would have been to have endowed it upon a liberal plan, which would have enabled it to fulfil with ease the functions of hospitality and of education which now pressed so hard upon it. Such a course was wholly out of keeping with the ideas of the age, which, eminently distinguished as it was for hard practical tendencies, could not sympathise with the ideals of the life contemplative' (p. 236).

Mr. Williams in an earlier passage points out that there had been a sinister change in the character of the hospitality which up to the end the great Benedictine House had maintained:

'Evidently this hospitality was no longer, as once it had been, a source of profit. Those who visited the place were no longer pilgrims, eager to lay before the shrine of St. Alban oblations whose value more than compensated the House for any entertainment it might afford, so much as lords and merchants, passing and repassing along the great highway, claiming hospitality as a matter of right, rarely deigning to offer more than a perfunctory gift to the House' (p. 185).

The financial embarrassments of the monasteries were in many instances the direct result of the decline in the pious practice of making pilgrimages, which had played so large a part in the scheme of medieval religion. Far in the north this decline in popular favour, which was so conspicuous in the case of St. Alban's shrine, was equally conspicuous in the case of St. Cuthbert's. The archives of Durham Cathedral contain a record of the various sums of money received from the pilgrims to St. Cuthbert's shrine from 1378 to 1514. The earliest year records no less than £38 4*s.* 4*d.*, the latest records nothing. Canon Raine drew from the fact the only possible inference when he concluded 'that St. Cuthbert and his 'cause were fast falling into disrepute, long before the finishing 'blow was given them by King Henry VIII.'* Monasticism, which for a thousand years had played so great a part in the life of England, had become religiously obsolete, but it survived by reason of its incidental conveniences and the widely ramifying interests which had grown about it. When, however, the obsoleteness began to impede the conveniences, and the interests created by pillage grew plainly greater than those

* *Vide* 'Saint Cuthbert,' by James Raine, p. 177.

guaranteed by survival, its last title to continued existence failed, so that, when the course of national policy brought the position of these international institutions into sharp question, they were found to be without intelligible justification. Accordingly, they had no resisting power when at last the blow, long threatened and by the clearer thinkers long foreseen, did actually fall. It is deeply significant that neither the immense scandals of Edward VI.'s reign, nor the religious ardour of Mary, could secure a restoration of the monasteries. They belonged to a past which not even the counter-Reformation could resuscitate.

The history of the friars exhibits a curious parallel to that of the monks. Mr. Little's 'Ford Lectures,' delivered in Oxford in 1916, and recently published by the Manchester University Press, will be warmly welcomed by all students of Franciscan history. He has brought together a mass of curious information, and drawn a picture of the English Franciscans which is both clear in outline and rich in detail. In the main it is a pleasing picture, though it contains some repulsive features; but the moral is the same as that which emerges from the older history. Financial resources failed as the wave of religious feeling which carried the friars over Christendom began to ebb: the necessity of 'making both 'ends meet' forced the brethren into dubious courses; and these not only reacted mischievously on their own character, but also provoked against them the resentment of the general conscience.

'The English Franciscans were true to the vow of poverty in that the lands which they held (or which were held in trust for them) were insignificant, and that they lived mainly on voluntary alms. But the gradual rise in the standard of living—a subtle, sometimes unnoticed, and almost inevitable growth of expenditure—strained these resources to breaking point. The friars found themselves forced to devote a disproportionate amount of their energies to the mere maintenance of themselves and their establishments, with the result that their general tone was lowered and their social and spiritual usefulness impaired' (p. 55).

As the friars grew in popularity and importance, their buildings began to vie in scale, solidity, and magnificence with those of the monks. Kings and nobles became their guests, and the lodgings which were suitable for such visitors

hardly matched the profession of 'poverty' to which St. Francis had bound them.

'While expenses increased income tended to diminish. Though several smaller Orders were suppressed by the Council of Lyons in 1274, the four great Mendicant Orders continued to exist as rival claimants to the charity of the people. The Black Death diminished the number of givers and perhaps the resources of survivors; the number of friars was also of course diminished, probably permanently, and many convents found themselves saddled with larger establishments than they needed or could maintain. . . . To maintain themselves the friars in various ways broke the vow of poverty' (pp. 77, 78).

Poverty drove the friars to abandon poverty! The paradox is not less true than extravagant. They became serviceable, and reaped the reward of their services; but the time came when their services were no longer required. In the Universities, where they had been the leaders of scholastic thought, men's minds were turning away from scholasticism: in the parishes, where they had taken out of the hands of the parish priests most of the preaching and even of the pastoral ministry, they fell into disrepute as vagrants and vendors of quack spiritual remedies. Like the monks they were tied fast to the papacy, and perforce shared both its unpopularity and its ruin. Obsoleteness of religious type drawing penury in its train, and compelling ever more degrading efforts to pay their way, left the friars with no supports either in the religious regard of the people, or in any evident social utility. Politically they had become impossible. What is true of monks and friars is supremely illustrated in the history of the papacy, with which both had been so closely connected. Nowhere had its record been more creditable than in England, or its influence more beneficent, but nowhere was its downfall more complete and irreparable.

In recent years there has been a great revival of interest in the ecclesiastical antiquities of England. We have come to realise how ample and varied is the heritage which has been bequeathed to us from the past. The happy immunity from external danger, secured by our insular position combined with our command of the sea, has enabled the survival among us of much that in a continental country, subjected to frequent invasion, would necessarily have perished. For the student

of medieval architecture England is said to be the best of all schools, just because in the parish churches, which have survived in open villages, he will find better illustrations of his subject than in the supreme buildings which are the principal extant specimens of continental Gothic. The Reformation in England may have been a violent process, in which many precious things were destroyed, but it was not so violent or so destructive as the religious wars of France and Germany, to say nothing of the French Revolution. Historical materials, then, exist in this country in measure and variety which are unequalled. It is pleasing to be assured that they are now being handled with skill and appreciation. In every part of the island investigations are being carried on, monuments registered and described, documents deciphered, edited, and published. The Historical Schools in the Universities are training students of both sexes, thoroughly competent for the task, and inspired by a genuinely scientific spirit. It is sad indeed to remember that many of these promising students will not survive the tremendous struggle which has emptied the Universities of their undergraduates, and now carries from the Public Schools to the camps youths full of ardour and ability, who should have been entering their academic life with every assurance of a brilliant and fruitful career. A by-product of the Great War must needs be a lowering of the intellectual level of English life for a generation to come.

But a genuinely scientific spirit has not always marked the treatment of our ecclesiastical history. The Oxford Movement, which did stimulate historical studies within a limited range, was throughout steeped in the passions of controversy, and its historical work is everywhere marked by irrelevant prejudices. The late Dr. Bright, himself one of the ablest of the Tractarian historians, and an eminent authority on the earlier period of English Church history, lamented that modern narratives of the Conversion had 'largely superseded the 'study of Bede's own work.' We may observe that such neglect of 'the Father of English Ecclesiastical History' is inexcusable since the publication in 1896 of Dr. Plummer's admirable edition, which not only provides the reader with a critical text, but adds in the notes an astonishing wealth of illustrative learning. Dr. Bright was disposed to think

that the neglect of Bede by modern English Churchmen was 'suggested by the supposed requirements of Church defence,' because Bede's record bears too ample a witness to the services of the papacy to match the theories of some Anglican apologists. Even Bishop Lightfoot, carried away by a pardonable enthusiasm for the local traditions of his famous see, gave some countenance to this unfortunate tendency when he coined his terse but misleading antithesis: 'Not Augustine, 'but Aidan, is the true Apostle of England.' * Sir Henry Howorth also, though scrupulously honourable in handling his authorities, allows himself to adopt a grudging tone with respect to papal action, which is curiously unlike the warm enthusiasm which generally marks his writing. The popes have indeed made it difficult for modern English Churchmen to be fair to them, but the difficulty must be surmounted if the proportions of historic truth are to be preserved.

'Christianity came to the English from the papacy, and 'not from the empire,' † it has been said, and the significance of the fact lies precisely in the imperial character of the papacy. Only through the popes could the older world of Rome continue to bear sway in Europe. With St. Gregory on the chair of St. Peter, Hobbes' famous description of the papacy as 'the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned 'upon the grave thereof' was inadequate. Not a ghost, but a resurrection, was suggested by the masterful action of that great pontiff. This imperial touch was just what the English converts needed if indeed they were to be saved from the anarchic individualism of that Celtic Christianity to which they owed so much. When, therefore, at the Synod of Whitby (664) the King of Northumbria was led by the ardour of St. Wilfrid to decide for Rome against Iona, he was really determining the whole character of the English Church. England would not, like unhappy Ireland, lie outside the common disciplines and fortunes of Western Christendom, but would be brought into the main stream of European development. Five years later there was sent from Rome to these shores in Theodore one of the greatest organisers of that or of any age. He was a man of wide learning, of large designs, and

* *Vide* Leaders in the Northern Church, p. 9.
† *Vide* The Cambridge Medieval History, vol. ii. p. 515.

of an iron will, combining the tradition of his native East with the imperial policy of the West, a man in whom the genius of the ancient proconsuls and jurists blended with the ideals of a Christian pastor. During his primacy of twenty-one years (669–690) the system of the Church of England was established on lines which may, without abuse of language, be said to have persisted to the present day.

The relation of the newly organised English Church with the parent Church of Rome was far less formal and organic than it came to be at a later period. Anglican apologists have naturally fastened on the difference in order to justify their repudiation of the exorbitant papal claims which have been built on the earlier procedure, and none can dispute the force of their reasoning. But history is something more than an accumulation of precedents, for it records a process in which nothing continues in one stay. The relation between England and Rome was as close as the circumstances of the age permitted. Nothing could exceed the ardour of devout affection with which the English regarded the Apostolic See in what Sir Henry Howorth calls 'the golden days of the early 'English Church.' An unending succession of pilgrims passed to and fro between England and Rome, and conspicuous among them were princes and nobles. Kings resigned their crowns to spend their last days at the tombs of the apostles. Devotion was not the only motive which drew the pilgrims to Rome. 'There was also a constant moving to and fro of students and 'scholars in search of fresh methods of learning and teaching. 'Nuns rivalled monks in their pursuit of knowledge and their 'aptitude at composing classical verses.'

The result of this intercourse with the principal home of ancient civilisation was speedily apparent in the amazing development of artistic and literary activity in the monasteries of Northumbria and the schools of Canterbury and York. The British Islands led the West in the sacred arts and in the whole range of learning. That within a century of the landing of St. Augustine a Northumbrian monk should have produced the writings of the Venerable Bede is a phenomenon which can hardly be paralleled in the whole history of Christianity. Sir Henry Howorth has enriched his volumes with a careful description of the artistic treasures which have survived the ravage of the Danish wars and the destructive agencies of so

many centuries. No man of taste and feeling can view without wonder and delight the delicate beauty of the Irish illuminated manuscripts and metal work, the gracefully carved crosses which mark the scenes of Celtic Christianity, the vestments and ecclesiastical ornaments, the small but dignified churches. They confirm and complete the impression which the literary monuments of the time cannot but make.

For many centuries the papacy deserved well of England. In the infancy and childhood of the nation its services were very great, and far on into the age of national adolescence the balance of advantage to England from the connexion with Rome cannot be denied. But the signs of coming change were many and very significant. As the popes pursued a policy of their own in the life of Europe they became less and less competent to justify the dominion they claimed in the separate countries, with whose particular interests their own private ambitions did by no means always, or indeed often, agree. With the papacy seated at Avignon, moreover, the character of the Supreme Pontiff as the Father of Christendom was dangerously compromised in English eyes, and even came to bear a paradoxical aspect. As the English monarchy developed and acquired a legal character, the function of the popes as guardians of righteous government was taken out of their hands. Englishmen came to regard the king rather than the pope as the Lion of Justice.

When, moreover, the conflict for constitutional liberties broke out between the Plantagenets and their people, the popes were by no means clearly or consistently on the side of the latter. Their policy abroad was very expensive, and they found complaisance to monarchs a more financially remunerative course than the championship of popular rights. Besides, they were themselves temporal sovereigns and stood with their order. Accordingly, from the thirteenth century onwards anti-papal feeling in England grew continuously. Even the monasteries, exasperated by the financial extortions to which they were subjected, shared the popular sentiment, which finds memorable expression in the pages of Matthew Paris. The great scandals of the papacy gave a new direction to the political antagonism. Men were prepared to question the theory which was patient of such intolerable practice. Moral

repugnance and theological criticism combined in the anti-papal movement of Wicliffe and the Lollards. The papacy was felt to be burdensome, seen to be questionable, suspected to be false.

The condition of survival in the case of every institution, as well ecclesiastical as civil, must needs be the power of preserving relevance to the changing conditions of the national life. International institutions can with difficulty be reconciled with the interest or with the self-respect of an independent nation. The feudal nobility had already perished in the Wars of the Roses. The feudal claims of the pope were scornfully repudiated after long neglect a century earlier. The monasteries, organised as parts of international orders, were destroyed very early in the Reformation. The friars, organically bound to the papacy, shared the same fate. The Convocations were left unaltered so far as their constitution went, and they still perpetuate in the twentieth century the arrangements of the thirteenth; but they were cut off from their contact with the larger ecclesiastical polity to which they belonged, and which they presupposed. They survived as a subordinate body which parliament might or might not consult, and which could be permitted within strait limits to enact by-laws for the clergy. The Canon Law in like manner was nationalised, and its catholic reference deliberately abolished. This was the meaning of the Submission of the Clergy, a definite cutting the links which bound the national hierarchy to the older and larger polity of Western Christendom. If we use language strictly, we must say that the Reformation abolished the Catholic *Church*, and substituted the Catholic *religion* in a national Church. The whole emphasis was transferred from the polity to the faith of Christianity. For English Churchmen henceforth the only Catholic Church was that of the Creed and the Liturgy, where it was defined generously as 'all who profess and call themselves Christians,' or 'the blessed company of all faithful people.' The ecclesiastical organisation of a free nation was necessarily national. The monarchy and the parliament followed in due course. The process of nationalisation stretches from the Submission of the Clergy to the supremacy of king and parliament in 1532 down to the submission of king and parliament to the supremacy of the people by the Reform

Act in 1832. The key to the whole process is the nation's resolve to become master in its own house.

When Henry VIII. died the Reformation had not really advanced beyond the political stage.

'So far all that had been done was to sweep away the papal encroachments of the last four hundred years, and to replace the divided rule of Pope and King by a single authority which at all events had the merit of making order possible in the Church. But though this was a return to the past, it was not a simple return, for so many beliefs and institutions had grown up round the papal power that its overthrow necessarily involved further and far-reaching changes, whose full significance no man living could then foresee' (Gwatkin, p. 155).

This very clear statement of the primary work accomplished by Henry VIII. is taken from the late Professor Gwatkin's survey of English Church history. So much of the work as he had been able to complete has just been published, with a preface by Professor Watson under the title, 'Church and State in England to the Death of Queen Anne.' It is a valuable addition to our historical literature, and makes its appearance at a time when a just estimate of the relations of Church and State is peculiarly needed. We are not aware of any popular statement so lucid, well-informed, and well-balanced as this posthumous publication of Dr. Gwatkin. It was once said by Bishop Stubbs that only a master of an historical subject could write a small book on it, and certainly his own little masterpiece on 'The Early 'Plantagenets' went far to prove the soundness of his aphorism. Dr. Gwatkin's book is another and perhaps even more striking example of the same truth. Behind the vigorous and sometimes racy narrative the reader feels everywhere the sureness and precision of the master's hand. In a terse sentence or a brief paragraph he gives the fruit of that large learning and clear thinking which were the admiration of generations of Cambridge students. It is much to be desired that this admirable book should be widely read. It is by far the best summary of English Church history which we possess. What could be more illuminating and suggestive than the following explanation of the rapid development of the Reformation?

'The English Reformation began with a revolt of the laity, headed by the King, against the tyranny of an obsolete Church

system. The overthrow of the Pope's authority made reforms possible, but time was needed to make it clear that the abuses were not simply personal sins, but natural results of false doctrines. It is significant that the chief Reformers in England had given up nearly all the distinctive medieval doctrines before they began to doubt of Transubstantiation. But it is clear that the doctrine of the Church had very little hold on thousands who had no idea of disputing its authority. Belief in an authority is not the same as belief in a doctrine set forth by that authority. Indeed, belief upon authority is not belief at all, for there can be no real belief without a final appeal to reason and conscience to verify the authority and the doctrine. Systems which disdain to rest on reason can have no support but custom and fear of heresy and its temporal consequences. This is why the medieval Church crumbled away when custom was broken, and some freedom was allowed to reason, if not to conscience. It showed an imposing front, only because a vast amount of assent to authority was mistaken for belief in the doctrine set forth by authority.

'The one really dangerous enemy of the Church system was the study of the Bible. Political and literary criticism did not reach the vital questions, but there is no escape from words of Christ. Whatever the Master said, no Church can decently contradict. Now imagine a man brought up in the old system coming to read the Bible as a book he had never heard before, except in scraps of Lessons made unintelligible by continual responds and versicles. His first surprise is to find it so large a book: yet there is nothing about the Pope, not much about the Church, and the Blessed Virgin is not prominent. Purgatory and indulgences are nowhere mentioned, though there is a good deal about images, and something on the worship of angels. He finds warnings in abundance against pride and hatred and covetousness, but the deadly sin of heresy is seldom spoken of' (Gwatkin, p. 161).

This, then, is the deeper meaning of the Reformation, a passionate insistence on establishing a harmony between the ecclesiastical system and the version of Christ's religion which the New Testament disclosed. The medieval system looked like a caricature, nay, worse, a contradiction, of the original revelation, and its destruction took shape in men's minds as a religious duty. This view became morbid under persecution, and sank into a crude fanaticism in ignorant and prejudiced minds. But that it contained a core of truth could not be denied, and that it stirred men's consciences was everywhere apparent. Thus the Reformers were faced by a grave practical problem—the reconciliation of the ecclesiastical system and the New Testament. In England a tolerable solution was slowly worked out, not without episodes of violence and

reaction from violence, during the course of a century and a half, that is, from the Submission of the Clergy in 1532 to the Toleration Act in 1689. The whole process was implicit in the first decisive step, and therefore it is not unreasonable to connect the English Reformation with the name of Henry VIII., though he himself went but a little way. 'If great-'ness is to be measured by far-reaching and enduring work,' observes Dr. Gwatkin, 'Henry VIII. is without question the 'greatest of the kings that have reigned since Norman William.'

The authority which re-shaped the English Church was that of the nation as such. A Catholic or international organisation being out of the question, there was nothing left except a reconstitution on national lines. Accordingly the work was undertaken and carried through by the national authorities, that is, by the king and the parliament. This explains both the moderation and the incoherence of the system which was gradually established. At every turn the inexorable logic of religious theorists was set aside in deference to the practical considerations which swayed prudent politicians. The theologians pressed for a maximum of change; the lawyers conceded a minimum. There was give and take in the process, and the completed result was a curious amalgam of new principles and old precedents, revised doctrines and traditional disciplines, new offices and old names. Zealots —Puritan and Papist alike—found the national Church very repulsive, but it suited the genius of the English people, expressed their good sense and dislike of extremes, and it remains still the most tolerant ecclesiastical system in the world.

Henry VIII. had fashioned the tremendous weapon of the royal supremacy. Under Edward VI. that weapon was used with a cynical violence which jeopardised the Reformation; but the solid work of liturgical and doctrinal revision was carried through. The reaction under Mary was the saving of the Reformation, for the persecution made the Reformers morally respectable, and at the same time protected their work by creating in the popular mind that deep horror of all things Roman, which is still a powerful though latent force in England. With the accession of Elizabeth the triumph of the Reformation, and the character of the Church of England, were secured. At first it seemed doubtful whether the new sovereign would

maintain, or reverse, the religious policy of her predecessor, but the daughter of Anne Boleyn could have no choice. Elizabeth, however, was as little of a Protestant as her father, and as resolutely national in feeling. In deference to objections, which were felt by Puritans as well as by Papists, she repudiated the title of 'Supreme Head,' accepting instead the less offensive 'Supreme Governor,' but taking care to define it as co-extensive with the authority wielded by her father and her brother. It is important to observe that the two crucial Acts of the Elizabethan Settlement were passed in the teeth of the protest of Convocation, and in spite of the opposition of the bishops:

'The Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity and the Injunctions form the transition from the old law to the new; and they were all the work of the laity. Convocation was not even coerced into formal acquiescence as in Henry's time, but simply ignored. The Supremacy Act (the only Act ever passed without the concurrence of the Lords Spiritual) was not laid before it, the new Prayer Book was not referred to it, and the royal visitation was for the time being an almost complete abolition of episcopal government. No doubt the changes were accepted by Convocation in 1563; but there had been an entire change in the character of Convocation since 1559. Even Henry scarcely asserted more strongly than Elizabeth the principle of English law, that the competence of parliament covers faith and discipline without regard to Convocation. The reform was not carried out with the assent of the Church, but the State took the Church in hand and reformed it against its will' (Gwatkin, p. 224).

This is a brusque but just statement of the salient fact. The method of the English Reformation disallows the exalted theory of episcopacy now fashionable in some quarters as completely as it disallows the papal claim. For the bishop, hardly less than the monk and the Pope, belonged properly to the old international ordering of the Christian Church, and presupposed a Catholic system. The English bishop ruling his diocese under the royal supremacy, with no appeal beyond the nation, was as truly an innovation in Christendom as the Scottish presbyter commissioned and controlled by presbyters and a General Assembly. Internationalism, alike in England and in Scotland, though in different ways, had been found inconsistent with the free expression of full-grown nationhood, and had been definitely cast away. Only those elements of

the medieval Church which could be nationalised were suffered to survive. The lawyers, indeed, were careful to preserve the succession, for there were cogent practical reasons for retaining the 'Lords Spiritual' in parliament as an important political force at the monarch's disposal. Twenty-six archbishops and bishops formed one-third of the total peerage in Elizabeth's reign, and gave her control of the Upper House. Moreover, by keeping bishoprics vacant, and herself absorbing the revenues, the Queen assisted her treasury. While presbyterian theory held its ground in the minds of the new bishops, and the sees were steadily plundered at every vacancy, the episcopate in England seemed destined to shrivel into something akin to the 'tulchan' bishops in Scotland, that is, sponges to absorb the episcopal revenues for squeezing into the royal exchequer.

It was not until towards the end of Elizabeth's reign that the vital importance of the apostolic succession was proclaimed by Bancroft in a famous sermon (February 9, 1589), and then his views provoked many protests. Bishops were retained in the Elizabethan Church because they had become frankly national officers.* Every clergyman, from the archbishop to the deacon, had to take the oath of supremacy, which no honest interpretation can possibly reconcile with the older conception of the Church as a single polity. The substance of the oath was repeated in the Injunctions and in the 37th Article, though in somewhat mitigated terms. The effect of all this was to destroy the international or Catholic character of the English bishops.

It is sometimes asked by the more ardent advocates of Anglican autonomy, Why cannot the Church of England enjoy the same plenary liberty as is conceded to the established Church of Scotland? The answer lies in the difference between the theory of episcopacy and that of presbyterianism. While the first implies a super-national polity, whether of Pope or General Council, to which the bishops are in conscience bound to defer, the latter does not push its system beyond

---

* That is, of course, so far as their ecclesiastical character is concerned. As ministers of religion their character and commission are necessarily universal. The spiritual society acknowledges no local frontiers.

the 'General Assembly,' which is a merely national body. The modern papacy represents episcopal authority in the latest phase of a continuous development. An Anglican, discontented with the authority of the nation, and seeking to base his ecclesiastical allegiance on the apostolical authority of the bishops, will necessarily be carried out of the Church of England into the Church of Rome. An insular episcopate, which has no contact with the majority of bishops, must needs be a powerless anomaly. Dr. Gwatkin points out that the English doctrine of the indifference of forms of polity was contradicted from opposite directions :

'Geneva joined hands with Rome in claiming a divine right, the one for presbyters, the other for bishops, so they were in principle equally opposed to the English Reformers, who held that Church government is a matter which every particular or national Church may determine for itself' (Gwatkin, p. 253).

To admit the claim to Anglican autonomy on an episcopalian basis implies the bringing back of the internationalism which it was the first object of the Reformation to abolish. The unending controversies, with Rome without, and with Puritanism within, the Church, hardened and narrowed the Anglican spirit, so that when, after the Restoration, there emerged a great opportunity for broadening the basis of the national establishment, the clergy were in no mood to seize it. 'Episcopal ordination was for the first time made 'a necessary qualification to minister in the Church of 'England,' and 'subscription to *all* the Articles was now 'first required by law.' Had the new settlement been accompanied by a measure of toleration for the Nonconformists, who were now forced to become Dissenters, the consequences would not have been entirely evil, but the barbarous treatment of the evicted clergy created a schism in English life which, after more than 250 years, remains unhealed.

'The persecution which followed was probably the severest since the Marian, especially for the Quakers, and it has left its traces to this day. The feud it made between Church and Dissent, renewed as it was by Tractarianism, is still unhealed. In spite of many links between them and much profession of charity, they still confront each other as enemies. Again, the exclusion of dissenters from education lasted long enough to give their ministers a stamp of social inferiority which lasted into our own times. It

further explains why dissent in the eighteenth century was almost limited to the well-to-do middle class, and lost hold on the people till the rise of Methodism. But in two important points this persecution differed from those before it. First, it was the work of Parliament, which had never before been hostile but in 1593. However heartily the churchmen approved, the driving force was Parliament, not the High Commission. This meant that it was the work of laymen, and would die out whenever the Cavalier panic abated, for it was a panic of men who deemed that Puritans were rebels at heart; and if they held secret meetings they were no better than Jesuits. The other point is that it was no longer a contest on equal terms. Baxter could no more upset the Church than Venner the monarchy. Puritanism was reduced to beg for toleration, the refusal of it was mere revenge on beaten enemies, and of mere revenge decent men would sooner or later be ashamed' (Gwatkin, p. 355).

Toleration came through another panic, this time against the Papists. The restored Stuarts proved themselves traitors to the nation which had restored them, and when the magnitude of the peril which their treason brought to English liberties in Church and State was realised, there was a mighty outburst of Protestant feeling. It seemed to many of the Anglican leaders that the moment had come for recovering the ground which had been lost at the Restoration, and bringing back on reasonable terms those excellent Puritans who ought never to have been thrust out. But it soon appeared that 'Comprehension' was impossible. Neither Anglicans nor Dissenters were really anxious for it. The one disliked any further tampering with the Prayer Book; the other was bent on taking its own course under the newly gained toleration. So the last opportunity of restoring harmony to the religious life of England passed away, perhaps for ever.

'Since that day it has never been a practical question, though the ghost of "Unity" has never ceased to haunt the Church. But if the problem was hard in 1689, it became harder still when the old Puritans passed away. Baxter died in 1691, and Howe, the last of Cromwell's chaplains, in 1705. Their place was taken by ministers trained in dissenting academies instead of national universities, whose outlook was narrower, more sectarian, more bitter against the Church than that of the old ejected ministers. The social difference was harder to overcome than the doctrinal. So things remained till they were further complicated in the nineteenth century by the growth on one side of a belief that any connexion of Church and State is sinful, on the other of the

Tractarian doctrine that churches without bishops are no churches at all, and have no mercies promised them' (Gwatkin, p. 379).

The national Church no longer professes to be co-extensive with the nation, and there are many who would build on that fact an argument for making an end of its national character. But they forget that the difference is rather nominal than real. Probably a larger proportion of the English people approves the Church of England 'as by law established' to-day than at any previous period since the Reformation, except perhaps the century which intervened between the fall of the Puritans and the rise of the Methodists. The main difference is that whereas dissent was once illegal, it is now fully legalised. Conformity is now smaller in appearance but vastly superior in quality. There is nothing properly inconsistent with establishment in the recognition of dissent. Now, as always before, the true justification for the national claim of the Church of England is twofold—the national history and the national will. That history, stretching far back to the distant beginnings of the English State, attests an unbroken profession of Christianity by the English people as such. That will, expressed by the monarchy in former times, by the parliament in later, and now, perhaps, expressed mainly in that mingled and rather indefinite factor which we call public opinion, has affirmed continuously the witness of the national history.

If it be now the case, as indeed many circumstances suggest, that the English people is beginning to contemplate with something like complaisance the proposal to break with its own greatest tradition by secularising its polity, the explanation must be sought in the Church rather than in the State. For the idea of a national Church, which found expression in the legal establishment, appears no longer to commend itself to a large section of the clergy, and even moves contempt and opposition in many. Nevertheless that idea was lofty in itself, and it was embodied in a system, which has been accepted by good men, and defended by great thinkers. It has proved its spiritual quality in a history of more than 350 years, and the English character, as displayed in many fields of effort and on many scenes of heroism, is mainly its creation. The Church of England has been illustrated by a noble succession of statesmen, scholars, pastors, and poets. In Richard Hooker

and Joseph Butler it produced the two supremely great thinkers of English-speaking Christianity. Such a Church, so ancient, so deeply rooted, so illustrious, can only fall from within. If the national idea be repudiated by the English clergy, and they refuse to conform to the conditions of a national establishment, neither the glories of its past nor the services of its present can preserve the national Church. And precisely this is the danger at this moment, as the agitation for 'autonomy' sufficiently shows. The movement for 'Life 'and Liberty' is only an Anglican version of the 'Liberation 'Society.'

With the rejection of the national idea, it follows that the Church of England must be ordered on some different principle, either the abandoned principle of the medieval Church, which may be called international, or the familiar modern principle of sectarianism. There is no other principle disclosed by Christian history. The choice of Anglican reformers is finally restricted to this alternative, either reabsorption in the single polity of Rome (which is the only practicable expression of the Catholic idea) or reorganisation as a 'Protestant Episcopal 'Church,' that is, a Church which adds one more, though the largest, to the already excessive number of English sects. It is of course the case that few of those who are now clamouring against the establishment picture their goal in this way. They imagine themselves to be vindicating the 'catholicity' of the English Church against the cramping limits of a national system, and asserting its 'spiritual' liberty against the 'Erastian' aggressions of parliament. Very exalted language indeed is employed to describe the policy, but this is a familiar feature of sectarian enthusiasm. Sir Walter Scott has drawn the portrait of self-deluding zealots, blinded by their own magniloquence, in 'Old Mortality,' where, however, fanaticism could plead the excuses of genuine oppression. In the last century the Scottish disruptionists used to talk grandly about championing 'the Crown rights of King Jesus.' But rhetoric cannot alter facts, or avert their consequences. Howsoever described, the policy of sectarianising a national Church is not the same thing as vindicating its Catholicity.

It is not of course suggested that a national establishment contains no dangers to religion, but only that these are no greater than, if so great as, the dangers implicit in other

organisations of the Christian society. Infallibility has often been claimed, but never yet been exhibited, on earth. Even the Church of Rome, which holds the Pope to be infallible, finds it hard to indicate a single undisputed exercise of his priceless gift, and is mostly engaged in explaining to critics the fallibility of papal pronouncements. The fissiparousness of sectarian Christianity may be taken as proof enough of its imperfection. To make 'Life and Liberty' depend on specific ecclesiastical organisation is to build on the sand. 'Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.' In this vital respect a national Church is no worse placed than a Church Catholic, or a Protestant sect, and it has here in England some advantages of its own, which a considering Christian citizen will not be disposed to underrate.

With the national character also goes necessarily the title to the national property. Disendowment is inseparable from disestablishment. Only as officers of the Church of England 'by law established' do the clergy possess the tithes and glebes which from the most distant antiquity have been dedicated to religion; and fulfil their ministry in parishes, whose bounds were fixed a thousand years ago, and in parish churches, whose venerable aspect and glorious beauty have preached silently to the people from time immemorial. Who can estimate the gain to the nation from the steady, ceaseless influence of the unbroken tradition of ecclesiastical life? Who can measure the loss to the nation from a policy which would secularise the cathedrals and churches, and extinguish the regular ministrations of the clergy in countless English villages? Poverty, as we have seen in the case of the monks and friars, may be as hostile to piety as wealth. The last is never again likely to be a formidable danger to the English clergy, but the first is already oppressing them. No condition known to human experience is perhaps quite so unfavourable to spiritual witness as the desperate struggle for funds wherewith to carry on religious work, and this is the salient feature of competitive sectarian Christianity as it now exists. An observant and considering English citizen, persuaded of the truth of Christianity, and assured of its civic value, will be slow indeed to withdraw from religion in this country those resources which are indispensable to its efficiency.

The English are naturally a religious people. Their whole history disallows the notion that they would lightly break with their noblest traditions by casting aside the national profession of Christianity. Their goodwill to the Church of England has been proved by a thousand evidences, not least by the wonderful patience with which they have tolerated the contempt of law which has now brought ecclesiastical administration to a deadlock. They are the most tolerant people in the world, and the most reasonable, but they are not patient of ill-faith, and they honour sincerity. If the national Church is destined, after so long and on the whole so illustrious a history, to be cast aside, it will be because it has lost the public confidence, and no longer seems to justify its name and claim.

H. Hensley Henson.

TOWN LIFE—OLD AND NEW

1. **The Town Labourer, 1760–1832.** By J. L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond. Longmans. 1917.
2. **Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century.** By Professor William Smart. Macmillan. 1910 and 1917.
3. **Health and the State.** By William A. Brend, M.D. (State Medicine). Constable. 1917.
4. **Towards Industrial Freedom.** By Edward Carpenter. Allen & Unwin. 1917.

WE have entered on a phase of active social change in both town and country life. Large innovations have already been introduced, others are preparing, and in the background a dim outline of much larger ones can be discerned. The war has rather hastened than caused these changes, for we were moving towards them, though slowly, before it burst upon us ; but it has given them a great stimulus, and accomplished in years what might have taken as many generations. That applies with particular force to the restoration of agriculture to a high place in the national economy, and the regeneration of rural life. These questions had attracted growing attention for a good many years past, with very little result ; but they have now been pushed into the fore-front of all the war changes. A reviving regard for the country has been accompanied by a complementary depreciation of the town. There has been a sort of revolt against it, embodied in such phrases as ' Back to the land,' ' The simple life,' and ' The garden city.' The town, as it stands to-day, has come to be regarded as an evil thing. That is not, in itself, a new idea : there have always been individuals to whom the town was repellent and who have shunned it. But the present depreciation is not of that character : it does not arise from temperament, nor do the denouncers of the town act up to their belief and shun it. On the contrary, they frequent it as readily as anyone else. Their attitude is intellectual ; it is a cult. The town is posited as a ' blot on civilisation,' as contrary to man's instincts, and an unnatural product. Dr.

Brend expresses this view. 'In many little ways,' he says, 'we can see that an urban environment is opposed to all 'man's fundamental instincts, and he is continually rebelling 'against the surroundings in which he finds himself imprisoned.' The question at once arises—Why on earth did he ever imprison himself in them? Dr. Brend answers in anticipation—that 'each individual was caught up, and carried along willy-'nilly by a great flood of "progress," which, once started, 'rushed on uncontrollable.' Is that really so? And does mankind really regard the town in that light? Let us examine the evidence from history and from observation.

Civilised man in all ages has loved and gloried in the town. It is pre-eminently his handiwork, the concentrated expression of himself and of those attributes which distinguish him from other animals. His superior gregariousness, his higher faculties, his mastery over environment, his creativeness, are all most fully and completely displayed in the town: its dwellings, public buildings, streets, markets, monuments, warehouses, workshops, libraries, and works of art; its assemblies and halls of justice; its pleasures, amusements, and social intercourse; its comforts and conveniences; its pomp and display—all declare his greatness. Here the tide of human life is at the full. The size, populousness, splendour, wealth, business, beauty, strength, and fame of towns have always been a source of pride and a theme for poets, historians, travellers, and statesmen. Nations vie in maintaining the claims of their own on one ground or another; nor will they tolerate overmuch disparagement.

Towns pervade and dominate history. Whether that be a record of wars and dynasties—as some critics complain it too often is—or an exposition of social changes, ideas, and popular movements—as they maintain it should be—it is always a tale of towns: their activities and vicissitudes, their rise and fall. They are always in the centre of the stage, and the drama sways hither and thither round them. They are the seats of dynasties, which come and go; armies set forth from them and return to them, victorious or beaten; they are the prize of battle. So, too, knowledge and ideas radiate from them. Thought, which is individual, may spring anywhere; but it makes no way till it conquers the towns. Peoples that have no towns have no history. In the biblical

narrative, as soon as the human race became numerous and strong, after the Flood, they aspired to build a city and a tower reaching to heaven to 'make us a name'; but the project was defeated by divine interference, and they were scattered abroad over all the earth. The legend embodies the idea that the town is the expression of man's will and power and permanence, which may be carried to such a height as to defy God: it is man *in excelsis*, and the tale shows that the aspiration was held to be impious. When the same chronicle passes from legend or tradition to history, it at once begins to record the towns, and presently centres in Jerusalem, which is always identified with the glory of the Jewish nation. The Hebrew writers are never tired of extolling Jerusalem, 'builded 'as a city that is compact together,' or lamenting its fall. The Jews did, in fact, rise and fall, as a nation, with that city. It yielded to Babylon, another city representing another civilisation. Athens, again, stands for a third. When we think of ancient Greece we have in mind Athens, Sparta, and a few other towns; we hear of nothing else.

But the greatest example of all is Rome. For many centuries this one town dominated the Western and a great part of the Eastern world, civilised and uncivilised, and gave its name to the whole. History became the history of Rome. And the form of civilisation which it embodied and imposed was almost wholly urban—at least in the West, as Guizot has pointed out. 'If we follow the history of Rome,' he says, 'we shall find that she conquered or founded a host of cities. 'It was with cities she fought; it was with cities she treated; 'it was into cities she sent colonies. In short, the history 'of the conquest of the world by Rome is the history of the 'conquest and foundation of a vast number of cities.' The Roman roads ran straight from one town to another without by-ways, which were merely native tracks; and the monuments which remain to mark the Roman sway are found almost entirely in towns. The land was partly cultivated, but not peopled in our sense; there was no large standing rural population. Except for the 'villas' owned by wealthy Romans, who occasionally visited them, the proprietors and cultivators of the land lived in towns, not in isolated castles, farm-houses, and cottages, as they did in later ages. The Roman civil administration was based on the *municipium*

or urban local government—a system which obviously tended to exalt the importance of the town and to gather the population into it. With the collapse of the Empire the whole system of urban civilisation built up by the Romans was submerged by barbarism. But the Roman idea of the town lived through the chaos that followed, and eventually emerged once more in the free cities of the Middle Ages.

Before passing on to this and later developments, we must, in order to obtain a clear view of the meaning of the town in social evolution, go back to its origin and examine the conditions that created and fostered it. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond discuss this briefly in their book on ' The Town Labourer.'

> ' The capital idea associated with towns and town life in history is the idea of shelter. Shelter first from the primitive dangers to mankind, nature, wild beasts, hostile tribes, robber barons. The town walls enclose a refuge where men and women can break or check the power of circumstances over their lives ; a fortress where, relatively secure from want or violence, they can practise the arts of peace.'

This is far too narrow. No doubt man's first requirement, after food, is shelter from the elements ; but that does not demand a town, especially in those Asiatic regions where towns first arose. The nomad shepherds did without them for unknown ages and do without them still. The essence of the town is the concentration and permanent residence of many households in a limited space. Like other human institutions this mode of living was devised to suit man's convenience—to put it on the broadest ground. And that convenience takes many forms. Protection against physical danger is one, and in some epochs it has been the most prominent ; but it has never been the only one, and it is neither the earliest nor the most diffused. On the contrary it is both later and less general than the purely economic object of getting a living, which takes precedence of all others. Protection is, indeed, quite independent of towns. It has always been, and still is, applied to other conditions. Its commonest and probably original form is out-posts placed in a position of natural strength improved or secured by art. Out-posts have sometimes developed into towns, but that is a comparatively infrequent origin. Towns in general have either developed spontaneously or have been founded for other

purposes. They have provided themselves with defences and become places of refuge and shelter when and where they found it necessary; when they did not, they remained open. But even in the former case the military character is secondary and superimposed on the economic.

We know nothing about 'primitive man' and very little about his successors, who have left some traces but no written records. We do, however, know something about pastoral nomads and how they came to form permanent settlements which developed into towns. They moved about the open country with flocks and herds in search of pasture, and settled down when they came to a favourable spot, which was mainly determined by the presence of water. There they stayed, unless driven away by drought, and multiplied. In course of time they provided themselves with durable dwellings, and evolved a town. The primary object was not protection, but the permanent occupation of land which afforded them a living. Hence the 'cities of the plains.' If the object had been defence they would have selected hills. Defence came later when the settlements increased and the land became peopled. Neighbouring settlements came into contact and an intercourse arose—friendly or otherwise, according to circumstances. They traded together and intermarried, and got on well enough until their interests clashed; then they quarrelled and fought. As they increased in numbers and strength, feuds became permanent and fighting systematic; some settlements were turned into military strongholds, and the 'fenced cities' came into being.

It was in this way that towns were formed in unoccupied or sparsely populated regions, and it was the original way: at least, it was the earliest of which we know anything. The whole process is clearly seen in the story of Abraham. He was a successful and wealthy rancher, 'very rich,' we are told, not only in cattle but also 'in silver and in gold,' which he must have got by trading in Egypt. He went trekking with Lot, his nephew, who also had flocks and herds, up country where there were already other settlements, but still plenty of room. For when they outgrew the pasturage where they stayed and the land could not carry them, so that the herdsmen came to blows, Abraham suggested that they should separate instead of quarrelling, and that he should go one

way and Lot another, for the 'whole land was before them.' Later, Abraham founded Beer-sheba, which was always an open town and never became a fenced city. He dug a well and settled there, and his retinue must have been sufficient to form a town in itself. Many years before, he had been able to arm 318 of his own men for the expedition to rescue Lot who had been taken prisoner by Chedorlaomer. This seems to have been the only occasion on which Abraham had recourse to arms; otherwise he always maintained friendly relations with his neighbours and the other magnates with whom he came in contact.

The founding of Beer-sheba seems remote from modern life, but it has been brought near to us again by the military events in Palestine, in which this and other familiar names crop up daily with a new and strange significance. But the story of Abraham and of the ancient settlements in Palestine is really near to us in another sense; for it is being repeated in all essential features in the British Dominions. The New World has mainly been peopled with white races in the same way, by pioneer settlers and the establishment of trading stations, which have gradually developed into towns on the more frequented lines of communication. Here and there military posts have been established, but the chief element has been economic. So it was, too, with the colonies founded by the ancient Greeks and Romans and Phœnicians. They were trading places and generally sea-ports. Some developed a military character later, but others never did; they remained wholly commercial. And this element is by far the more stable and permanent of the two. Military requirements change and pass with political vicissitudes, but the need for trading remains, whoever the inhabitants may be; and places selected for settlement on account of their trading facilities never lose that advantage, but wax steadily with the exploitation of the natural resources of the surrounding region and with the growth of population, unless the stream is diverted to other centres possessing superior facilities. The great towns of to-day, which were founded in ancient times, were originally seats of trade carried on by natives or by colonists —such, for instance, were Marseilles, Lyons, Paris, and London. Tacitus, describing London before it had been fortified by the Romans, speaks of it as 'famous for the vast concourse of

'traders and for its abundant commerce and wealth,' although the dignity of a *municipium* had not been granted it. Through all subsequent vicissitudes the natural advantages which gave it that character remained and enabled it to recover its position; while other towns, more important under Roman rule, decayed and disappeared.

In addition to commerce and defence, some other less general causes have led to the foundation or contributed to the importance of individual towns. Wherever the Romans found medicinal, and particularly warm, springs they resorted to them and formed a settlement. Bath is the chief instance in this country, but there are many on the Continent.

A much more important influence, continually asserting itself throughout history, has been religion. It was as the centre of national worship, the 'House of the Lord,' that Jerusalem rose to the height of its power and fame; for 'thither the 'tribes go up to give thanks unto the name of the Lord.' In subsequent ages its sacred character in the eyes of the Christian world made it the objective of the greatest adventure of the Middle Ages and the most remarkable international movement ever undertaken. The same character has drawn innumerable pilgrims and travellers in modern times and inspired a great project in which all the nations are interested. To-day the eyes of the world are fixed on the final crusade, and such is the glamour attaching to the name of Jerusalem that its capture stands out as the most resounding incident that has occurred so far in the greatest of all wars. It renders possible a real restoration of the Jews centred in a new Jerusalem; and that phrase reminds us that the Christian Paradise, too, the heavenly vision is 'a great city, the holy Jerusalem.'

Jerusalem does not stand alone in ancient or modern history. Every organised religion has its sacred city or cities, whither the tribes go up. It is enough to mention Lhassa, Benares, Juggernaut, and Mecca in the East; Rome in the West. Mecca has, indeed, secured a wider recognition than Jerusalem itself in that the name has passed into common use as a general term signifying a goal of desire. But Rome, as a sacred city, has exercised a greater influence on history than any other. When the ancient empire fell, the magic of her name still clung to Rome, and she gradually replaced the former secular rule by a spiritual authority, which reigned supreme over Western

civilisation for centuries and still wields an influence acknowledged by the nations, as we have recently seen, though but a shadow of what it has been. The Church of Rome was the great civilising organisation in the dark ages, and when some sort of order was evolved out of chaos Rome lent her name and support to the secular authority established in Central Europe. Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the Romans by the Pope at St. Peter's, and in the next century the spiritual element and the authority of Rome were formally acknowledged by the adoption of the title 'Holy Roman 'Empire.' The city on the Tiber had re-established her supremacy in another sphere.

The influence of religion on towns and town life is not confined to sacred cities, or pilgrimages of the devout, or homage paid to shrines and seats of spiritual authority: it is much more diffused. The Christian Church was one of the chief agencies in restoring town life after the general break-up which followed the collapse of the old Roman dominion. Conditions varied widely in different parts of Europe, and generalisations about such a chaos can only be rough; but there is no doubt that the invading barbarians were antipathetic to town life and the Roman urban system. Tacitus makes a particular point of the absence of towns among the Germans. Towns are, in fact, a product of civilisation, and the relapse into barbarism devastated them, destroyed their *status*, and threw them back into insignificance. Their recovery was largely due to the Church, which established bishoprics and threw a protecting arm over the seats of ecclesiastical authority. The official authority wielded by the bishops in the conduct of municipal affairs is repeatedly recognised in the code of Justinian, as Guizot points out. The Church, in fact, filled the gap between the Roman system and the free towns of the Middle Ages, and prepared the way for the latter. It saved the towns and civilisation during the period of barbarism and of feudalism which followed. The feudal period was as unfavourable to the towns as the barbarian, though in a different way. There was order and authority of a sort, but its local seat was the stronghold of the territorial lord, who regarded the town and its citizens as his lawful prey. Until they were strong enough to defend themselves their only protectors were the Church and the King or

Emperor; and the oppressor was on the spot, while the protectors were generally far off. But gradually the towns rose again under the shadow of the Church, which offered a sanctuary to fugitives; they increased in number, population, wealth, and strength, and they began to secure recognition and privileges by charter. By the time the Church itself was absorbed by feudalism, and ecclesiastical lords became oppressors like the rest, the towns could not only stand on their own feet and defend themselves, but were gaining a certain measure of ascendancy.

It was the towns which more than anything else broke down feudalism. There were other influences, but they were the vital determining force. They represented the people—the beginnings of democracy, the principle of freedom—which would take no denial. They were already 'a third estate' in social fact though not in political organisation. There was for a long time no combination or concerted action—rather the contrary; but a common spirit of self-assertion pervaded them, and was heightened by emulation. They played off the sovereign against the nobles or the nobles against the sovereign, as circumstances dictated. The revolt of the towns, which began, or rather became, a definite movement in the eleventh century, took a long time to mature, and was full of ups and downs; but always they were broadly advancing in material, intellectual, and political consequence. The basis of this advance was wealth gained by trade, which implies a greater or less degree of industry. The towns were the seats of both trade and industry: not because they afforded protection, but because they occupied favourable situations. To put protection first is to set the cart before the horse. They had to protect themselves because they carried on trade and acquired wealth; they were liable to be plundered by force because there was something to plunder. Towns which were fortified merely as strongholds made little or no advance. Those which made most were those which enjoyed the greatest facilities for commerce, being either sea-ports or situated on rivers or placed in a central position on inland lines of communication where annual fairs were held. The towns of Italy, where feudalism was weakest and the Roman tradition strongest, were the earliest to acquire strength and independence. During the eleventh century the more important

ones became republics in effect and were strong enough to turn the tables on the territorial lords, besieging their castles and reducing them to submission. Flushed by success they sought further aggrandisement at each other's expense, and carried on furious internecine conflicts until the heavy hand of Frederic Barbarossa fell upon them. But their spirit was in nowise subdued by adversity. It only caused them to combine against a common oppressor instead of fighting each other, and they formed the Lombard League, which eventually secured them the formal recognition of full independence and self-government.

That was before the close of the twelfth century, and it marked an epoch in the rise of the towns as the hearths of liberty and the seats of commerce and industry. Italy was a centre from which the waves of economic activity spread in all directions. It connected the East with Western and Northern Europe through the Mediterranean, and was a school of craftsmanship for the other nations. The towns of France, Germany, and England were less advanced, but their course at this period was less stormy, and, if they never attained the same independence, they did better in the long run by more peaceful methods.

It is not the purpose of this essay to trace the development of the towns through the Middle Ages and the centuries immediately succeeding. It is enough to indicate the part they played in laying the foundations of modern civilisation. They continued as a whole to advance along the same lines, gradually increasing, through all changes and chances, in number, size, distribution, wealth, and influence. They absorbed an ever-growing proportion of the population and bore the banners of industry, liberty, and enlightenment. It has been necessary to dwell on the beginnings because they best demonstrate the ineradicable tendency of mankind towards the corporate life of the town and the effect of that movement in promoting the fulfilment of his aspirations and desires. Both are demonstrated in ancient times and still more plainly in the rebirth of civilisation, when the tendency persistently reasserted itself against the most adverse influences. The force so brought to bear on human evolution is the force of combination, by which men increase their strength indefinitely and are enabled to overcome obstacles

and enemies. By the division of labour, which results from combination, they acquire knowledge and skill, and so advance progressively in the mastery of their environment. At the same time the social intercourse entailed by concentration stimulates individual effort by promoting emulation. Minds in contact strike sparks from one another.

These truisms are not denied of the ancient or the medieval towns. The depreciation of town life, referred to above, is not applied to them. On the contrary, they are set up as objects of admiration in contrast to the towns of to-day, to which it is applied. So Mr. and Mrs. Hammond:

'To the people of ancient Athens, or of Florence or Siena in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, or of Norwich or York in the fifteenth century, their town was not a mere roof from the wind and the rain: it was a living personality, expressing and cherishing the instincts, tastes, beliefs, and corporate pride of the citizens, widely and richly pictured. This city life had produced the art and literature of Greece and Italy, and in England a spirit of enterprise in representative government and public administration that influenced profoundly the form and development of our national institutions. The history of these towns, their brisk and eager life, their triumphs and their crimes, the active share that their citizens had taken in building, adorning, defending, and serving them, were reflected in their streets and halls and churches. . . . They were the home of a race, with all the traditions and pieties and heirlooms of a home.'

This description of the old town life is prefatory to an examination of the contrasted new, which is the text of the book. The manufacturing towns created by the 'industrial 'revolution' were—

'not so much towns as barracks; not the refuge of a civilisation, but the barracks of an industry. The medieval town had reflected the minds of centuries and the subtle associations of a living society with a history; these towns reflected the violent enterprise of an hour, the single passion that had thrown street on street in a frantic monotony of disorder. . . . Nobody could find a spell of beauty or romance to supply the pieties of the old city or to kindle a civic spirit in the great tide of human life that poured in from the villages that had lost their commons or the distant towns that had lost their trade. Their towns were as ugly as their industries, with an ugliness that was a symptom of work and life in which men and women could find no happiness or self-expression; the brand of a race disinherited of its share in the arts and the beauty of the world.'

The theme is familiar; it has been played on the barrel-organs of Socialism for many years and in many keys. The favourite setting is that of economic theory, which sings of 'capitalism,' 'wage-slavery,' 'exploitation,' 'the proletariate,' and so on. Another version makes workmanship the keynote, and laments the ugliness, dullness, and monotony of work to-day contrasted with the beauty and joy of old craftsmanship. Mr. Carpenter strikes this note. He refers to the medieval guilds which realised the qualities of artistic creativeness and self-expression in work and made it a pleasure in contrast to the hideous drudgery of modern industry. A third version has health for a subject, and makes play with 'appalling' statistics—they are always 'appalling'—of sickness and mortality in modern life. This is Dr. Brend's theme, though his book does not belong quite to the same category. He does not ascribe the evils with which he deals to capitalism, nor does he seek the remedy in its overthrow; but he presents them as peculiar to our industrial towns, and refers to the ancient cities as something quite different. His indictment runs on parallel lines and can be easily switched on to the familiar argument, as it no doubt will be. The industrial town is the heart of the matter; it is a symphony in which all the themes appear as movements gathered into one grand composition.

It always opens with the 'industrial revolution.' This expression originated with Edward Baines, who more than once uses the word 'revolution' of the cotton industry in his 'History of the Cotton Manufacture,' published in 1835. He meant it in a laudatory sense to indicate the prodigious expansion of this industry effected by the machinery he describes. The expression was not used by the early English Socialists, who witnessed the process, but was picked up much later by Marx and Engels, who gave it a general application and made it the basis of their theories on the industrial side. It was the industrial revolution which deprived the workman of the ownership of his tools and turned him into a 'property-'less proletarian.' This interpretation gave the expression a twist which it has never lost. It conveys, and is used to convey, the impression of a complete, general, and abrupt break with the past in industrial and social life. And people who are acutely conscious of the evils around them readily

accept that impression, because it chimes with their inclination to bring out the present evils into sharper relief by contrasting them with a past that was free from them as well as with a future that will be so. The idea of a Golden Age is indestructible. Man will have his Golden Age when all the world was young and fair. He finds it by a comparison which sets the credit account of the past over against the debit account of the present. It is a false balance-sheet. The true account stands otherwise; it includes debit items against the past and credit items in favour of the present, and when the net balance is struck the result is very different. And so it is with this question of town life and town labour: a distorted and one-sided account has been put forward in order to make out a case.

It is impossible to traverse the whole ground in a single article, but some of the more salient points can be noted. The first of them is just life itself—the amount of it. By far the greatest difference between the old and the new is in the quantity of human life existing. The modern town stands for a vast increase of population. No proof is needed; the census of every industrial nation supplies it. Nor is it denied. In fact the indictment rests precisely on this increase of population, this mass of human life. Is, then, life a bad thing? No one can assert it. On the contrary, mankind has always held life to be the greatest good, and none more emphatically than the idealists. If it is not, what is? But, it will be objected, that depends on the quality; it must be good life. True; but in order to have good life you must have life to begin with, and in order to have much good life you must have much life. The proposition is unanswerable. Paley put it with his usual logical force in discussing the subject of population. The final view of all rational politics, he said, is to produce the greatest quantity of happiness in a given tract of country. But since individuals alone think and feel, the happiness of a people is made up of the happiness of single persons; and the quantity of happiness can be augmented only by increasing the number of the percipients or the pleasure of their perceptions. He admits that extreme cases may be found in which increase of numbers would be only an amplification of misery, but contends that broadly the quantitative relation holds good and that the aggregate

amount of happiness may be measured by the number of persons.

This will, no doubt, be denied of present as compared with past town life. The argument is, indeed, precisely the opposite, namely that increased population has meant increased misery. We will come to that presently, but meanwhile it is to be noted that mankind in general has always implicitly taken Paley's view and assumed that increased population was in itself a good. Communities have always been proud of their populousness, and asserted it as proof of superiority to less populous ones. They have regarded increasing numbers as a sign of vigour ; declining ones as a sign of weakness. That is particularly noticeable of the very towns which are the object of depreciation. The first thing in their history to be recounted with pride is the growth of numbers. The rise from small beginnings to the present vastness is always related with an assured satisfaction, needing no justification, and the more rapid the rise the greater the claim to admiration. Why ? Because it means more life, and more life must be good. The opposite phenomenon causes no satisfaction ; it arouses none but melancholy thoughts. A dwindling population speaks of decay and dissolution. Nothing is more dismal than empty streets and deserted factories. People say ' this was once ' a busy place,' and shake their heads. They do not ask if the inhabitants left there are happier than when the place was full. It is enough that there is less life. The place is dying, and the chill of death is over it. Surely, life is good in itself ! The more life, the more potentiality of happiness ; without it there is none. At least our teeming towns have increased the potential happiness. Their very detractors fall into line without intending it ; they are deeply concerned to add to the sum of life by reducing infant mortality even in these very deplorable places.

It seems, then, that there is something in mere quantity of life, after all, and that the general sentiment of mankind about it arises from a sound instinct. As a matter of fact a large increase of population does not occur among a people in a state of physical misery. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond say ' It is well known that population increases with a decline in ' the standard of life,' and they suggest that the great increase which took place at the beginning of the nineteenth century

was due to distress. They are mistaken ; nothing of the sort is well known. What is well known is that over-nutrition induces sterility in plants and domesticated animals, or some of them ; and there is reason to think, though it is not proved, that human beings are affected in the same way. In such cases fertility is increased by lowering the standard of nutrition, but only up to a certain point. Too little nutrition produces sterility as well as too much. And, further, fertility and increase are not the same thing. Increase depends on the balance of births over deaths ; and even if fertility rose consistently in inverse ratio to a falling standard of living—which it does not—that would not produce increase, because mortality rises too in inverse ratio to the standard of living, and particularly the mortality of children. A starved plant may put out a great many buds, but if it is not fed they come to nothing. If the proposition quoted above were true famines would produce an increased population—which is absurd. The great excess of births over deaths in the period under discussion is a certain proof of improved economic conditions. The development of agriculture, by producing more food, and of mechanical industry, by providing more employment, made possible the maintenance of more families. For, as Paley points out, it is only by the marriage-union that population is much increased. The offspring of promiscuous intercourse are too few and too neglected: the rate of mortality among them is far higher, and those who survive have inferior chances of founding families.

In any case the net result was a largely increased quantity of life, with the potentiality of happiness. This brings us to the question of quality. What sort of life was it ? Essentially town life and of a novel character, marked by the aggregation of masses of workers employed in factories in the same or allied classes of industry. The novelty lay in the scale and the character of the industry, not in the conditions of service. Hired labour is as old as anything we know of. The Mosaic law forbade delay in paying the hired man his wages, and we have the picture of men standing idle all day in the market-place—as it might be outside the dock-gates—because no one had hired them. Many industries were capitalistic in the Middle Ages—building, ship-building, shipping, mining, quarrying, smelting, glass, paper, pottery,

tiles, soap, brewing, tanning, dyeing, fulling, spinning, and weaving. Mills employing a number of workmen are mentioned at the beginning of the fourteenth century; journeymen formed a standing class and used to go on strike. But the scale of employment inaugurated in the eighteenth century amounted to a difference in kind, and the development of mechanical power made a still greater innovation.

Both changes were attended by great evils, due to three main causes: (1) the rapidity of the development; (2) general ignorance and failure to understand the conditions; (3) the abuse of power by employers. The rapid development of industry on a large scale caused a corresponding hurried accumulation of persons in particular places in a haphazard way. Previously, towns had grown by gradual accretions; now they grew by whole streets and quarters. Villages sprang into towns and small towns into large ones at a bound; in some cases new ones sprouted up like mushrooms. 'Not 'so much towns as barracks,' is true enough of many. The rate of development seems to be the reason why the term 'industrial revolution' is confined to this country, for many others have since undergone the same transformation. The rush was too great to permit of any care or forethought. But even if it had been otherwise none would have been taken. A slower pace would have resulted in a more organic growth, but the prevailing ignorance and indifference would have produced similar conditions in the end or rather worse ones. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond go so far as to admit that 'the old 'English towns were often over-crowded, insanitary, etc.' That does not meet the case at all. The old towns everywhere were not 'often,' but always, insanitary to a degree which it is difficult to realise now. They never were anything else, because there was no sanitation, as we understand it. Sanitation was, in fact, the child of the new order: not because the evils were new, as is commonly supposed, but because they were recognised. The increase of population and growth of the towns presented them on a scale which compelled investigation in conformity with the advance of knowledge and the rising standard of living. It is important to understand this.

One of the inherent evils of towns is the pollution of soil,

water, and air; and another is the spread of contagious disorders. Unless measures are taken to counteract these evils they increase in proportion to the aggregation of persons. We have come very slowly by the knowledge of cause and effect and of the preventive means; and the knowledge is still very imperfect, as Dr. Brend well shows, while its application lags yet more behind. At the beginning of the industrial era there was no real knowledge of these things. Ignorance and indifference were general, and the standard of conditions bearing on public health—water-supply, drainage, paving, and housing—was very low, according to our present ideas. The new towns were built as they were, because it was low; they were not worse than the old ones, but better; for the farther you go back the lower the standard. The period succeeding the Black Death has been called the golden age of labour, because wages underwent a great rise. But what of the living conditions that made a Black Death possible? Here is the description of Paris—then the queen of cities—at that very time, taken from an ordinance of Charles VI.:

'And whereas the paved streets of Paris are much injured and fallen into decay, so that in many places no horse or carriage can go without very great danger and inconvenience, and whereas this town has long been and still is full of dirt, rubbish, and ordure, which each person has left at his own door, so that it is a great horror and a great displeasure to all persons of respectability and honour, and a great scandal and shame to this city, and a great grief and prejudice to the human beings dwelling in and frequenting the said city, who by the infection of the stinking mass of filth, have fallen in times past into great illness and infirmities of body and great mortality.'

The numerous records relating to nuisances from filth in London show that it was no better: all refuse ran down the sides of unpaved streets into the water-courses. As to housing, we have Erasmus's description of the ordinary abode of the poorer classes in Henry the Eighth's time. It was a cabin of wood and clay, consisting of a single room, shared by all the inmates for all purposes and also by animals; no chimney; the floor of beaten earth, strewn with rushes, which were renewed every two or three years, and meantime received all the refuse and filth both human and animal. This type of dwelling is not yet extinct, but may still be seen in remote

parts of Scotland * and Ireland, and occasionally, though no longer inhabited, in colliery villages and small towns. In the Middle Ages, which are held up to our admiration, it was the only type for the working classes. The wealthier classes began to indulge in the luxury of a sleeping apartment built over the other in the fourteenth century, and to use stone in building; but wood was still the general material in the seventeenth century. From time to time complaints were made of over-building in London, and houses were pulled down; and attempts were made to clear the streams and ditches, which were blocked with filth, dead animals, offal, and every kind of refuse. Chancery Lane was not paved until 1541—and London was in advance of other towns.

We get a glimpse into medieval habits from the minute inventory of Sir John Fastolf's furniture at Caister Castle, one of the most sumptuous mansions in the kingdom. Out of twenty-six bedrooms only one—my lady's chamber—had any washing utensils, to wit—'1 basyn, 1 ewer, 2 pottys.' All the world lived in a state of indescribable filth down to a much later period. False generalisations are drawn from the beautiful buildings which have come down to us from old times. They have survived because they were exceptional; the common mass have perished. And further, such buildings deceive us by their architectural merit and we imagine the life they harboured to have been equally good in other respects; we conceive the picturesque old houses as provided with modern standards of living, modern cleanliness, comfort and convenience. But the men who built them had none of these things and no notion of them; and as a matter of fact the old houses are dark, dirty, inconvenient, uncomfortable and insanitary and they have to be 'modernised' to be rendered decently habitable according to our notions.

Any real study of towns at once reveals the fact that the worst conditions prevail in the old ones—especially the sea-ports, and in the oldest parts of them. The old sea-ports are still far worse than the industrial towns of the new era, although the worst parts of them have been swept away in recent

---

* It is described—as still used in the Island of Lewis—in the recently issued Report on Housing in Scotland.

years or greatly improved. People who do not remember conditions thirty or forty years ago do not know what a real slum is. Only fragments remain from which the past can be reconstructed, and these are to be found in the older towns, in mining villages in the North, and remote places. Edwin Chadwick, in his famous Report of 1842, which inaugurated systematic sanitation, specially selected for mention the wynds of Glasgow and Edinburgh, the courts in London and the older towns of England, as presenting conditions worse than the most loathsome prisons visited by Howard. Direct comparison can be made in some places, which have medieval centres, with later industrial extensions, and however poor the latter may be they are always superior in essential conditions. There are many examples on the Continent. Nancy is a good one because it presents the whole story in three zones, so to speak. You have the dignified feudal centre with later embellishments, full of charm; then the old town contiguous to it with narrow, crooked, dark and gloomy streets; and lastly the industrial area outside, superior in every respect. Essen is another example. It retained its medieval character down to the end of the eighteenth century, when we have this contemporary description of it by Justus Gruner, who made a journey of investigation into the social conditions of Westphalia—'Crooked, ill-paved narrow streets; old-'fashioned, dilapidated buildings; dirt, confinement, and 'darkness attest its antiquity.' The streets were unlighted, great posts, dung-heaps, and pig-styes stood in them. The old streets remain, and, though they are purified and renovated, one can tell what they were like and compare them with the handsome new town. The plain truth is that the old towns were nothing but slums—such as one cannot find now. Kings and nobles lived in a state of stench which would be thought unendurable to-day by any class, so greatly has the standard changed. It has been a gradual change, constantly progressing, but much more rapidly since the expansion of industry. Sir Walter Scott has a note in 'Redgauntlet,' which was written in 1832, on the change of standard in Edinburgh. Brown's Square, thought 'an extremely elegant improve-'ment' in 1763, when it was built, because the houses were self-contained, had become 'diminutive and obscure' in 1832.

Louis Simond, in his 'Tour of Great Britain in 1810-11,' remarks the same thing in Edinburgh, and contrasts the 'new town,' which had been 'created all at once within 'the memory of half its inhabitants,' with the old which had grown by degrees. He observes that houses in the latter, occupied not very long before by the greatest nobles, were only thought good enough for the lowest tradesmen or labourers, and gives instances, adding 'These are indications 'of a great revolution in the manner of life of all ranks of 'people.' He speaks of more space and cleanliness in the dwellings, evenings spent at plays and concerts rather than at taverns, and other changes for the better.

The Journal of this acute and unprejudiced observer puts the social condition of Great Britain in a very different light from that commonly presented. He was a Frenchman, who had lived twenty years in America, and had married an English lady. He spent two years travelling all about the country at the very height of the industrial revolution and in a time of distress. He visited Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Glasgow, and other manufacturing towns; was taken to see various works, and even went down a coal-mine. He displays close observation, a cultivated mind, and a critical but tolerant judgment. Little escaped his attention in town and country. He had no object but to see the country, and was able to devote ample time to it. The Journal was written in English, of which he was a thorough master, for the edification of his friends, and is one of the best books of travel in existence. It is particularly valuable because he had a standard of comparison; for conditions are always comparative. Professor Smart devotes a chapter to the Journal in his 'Annals 'of the Nineteenth Century,' but the whole book is well worth reading. The author repeatedly remarks on the prevailing prosperity and comfort and the absence of misery. He is moved to the conclusion that 'this country is, upon the 'whole, one of the happiest, if not the happiest, in the world.' At the same time he recognises that it is necessary to go below the surface, but insists that 'the poor do not look so 'poor here as in other countries; poverty does not intrude 'on your sight, and it is necessary to seek it. All human 'societies of course are full of it; but here it does not over-'flow.' His observations are broadly corroborated by the

evidence in Professor Smart's 'Annals,' which deal in detail with every year from 1800 to 1830 and show that the distress about this time, of which so much has been made, only became general or acute in particular years and was due, when it occurred, either to a bad harvest or bad trade or to the war and its effects. Otherwise, the increased population was supported with ease as a whole, though the economic changes inflicted great hardship on particular classes. When trade was good industrial distress vanished and gave way to prosperity. This accounts for the undeniable fact that the population *was* supported in spite of the war, whereas in the previous century, before the great changes, a much smaller population was outgrowing the means of subsistence.

The same consideration of the prevailing standard applies to working conditions as well as to housing and sanitation under the new order. No one at first understood what was happening, because everybody had the old standards in mind and tried to apply them to new conditions; and it was only when the resulting evils presented too great a mass to be ignored that enlightenment began to dawn. Most of the employers belonged to the same class as the workmen, and had risen from the ranks; they were 'little masters' who became big ones, and their ideas were those in which they had been brought up. They lived hard lives and were hard on others. To take the worst of the abuses—child labour: they had been compelled to work in childhood themselves and thought it the natural thing. Indeed, they thought they were conferring a benefit in providing employment even for the youngest. Children worked at home as soon as they were old enough to help, and they had long been employed in factories regardless of age. In the seventeenth century philanthropic workshops were set up to teach children to spin and knit, beginning at six or seven years old, in avowed imitation of the Dutch system. The children took home the money they earned. There was nothing new in employing them at a tender age, but there was something very new in the conditions; and it was not understood. Mill-owners thought that machinery and power lightened toil, and in a sense it did; but they failed to see that it involved strain of another kind. They did not understand—and do not fully understand yet—the remorseless pressure of the machine:

the unceasing application without pause or stay it inexorably exacts, hour after hour, with an infernal regularity. Young children, whose attention is always wandering, cannot possibly keep it up, however light the work; and the attempt to make them was ignorant folly and cruelty. But people knew no better. Even Robert Owen thought 10¾ hours not too much, and employed children ten years old. On the Continent similar ideas prevailed. So late as 1841 it was put forward in a statement intended to show the excellent conditions in Austrian cotton-mills, in which children of nine were employed, that the hours were from four or five in the morning to seven or eight at night, with three breaks for meals.

The alliance of ignorance or stupidity with commercial greed runs through the whole story, and it is clear that the former was the greater obstacle of the two to improvement. Intelligent employers were the first to see what was wrong and to readjust their ideas. They introduced new standards, which gradually gained approval until public opinion sanctioned or demanded their compulsory application. In this process a powerful agent was combination among workmen, which was at once demanded and rendered possible by the conditions of work and the massing of large numbers together in the industrial towns. The same process has continued ever since, and is still going on with a progressively rising standard of living and working conditions, realised in a thousand ways, the mere enumeration of which would occupy pages.

Looking back over the new town life and broadly viewing it as a whole, we can see that the modern towns, with their serried ranks of working men and women, are doing for the 'fourth estate' what the medieval towns did for the third. As those broke down feudalism and privilege, and conquered freedom, power, and prosperity for the middle class, so these are gradually breaking the power of plutocracy, achieving the emancipation of the classes lower in the economic scale, and winning for them a larger share and a higher standard of living. The methods are different because the old local and individual *status* of the medieval towns as social units has given way to a national framework of corporate life. But it must not be supposed that even the poorer citizens of the new town are less proud of it or less jealous of its dignity

and good name than those of the old. That is a great mistake. The stranger with different ideals in his mind may see nothing but what is repellent in the modern industrial town and wonder how anyone can live there. But the inhabitants do not think so; they are attached to it, warmly maintain its claims, and resent depreciation. They do not want anyone's pity, and they have reason; for the truth is that they enjoy life a great deal more than those who pity them. And they can call to witness for the abused industrial town a greater poet than Morris and a deeper lover of Nature than Ruskin—even William Wordsworth. He saw the transformation at the height of its activity, and with the profound insight of the true poet found it good. 'I exult' and 'I rejoice' are the expressions he uses in contemplating the great achievements of invention and industry, and the new towns—

> '. . . At social Industry's command,
> How quick, how vast an increase! From the germ
> Of some poor hamlet, rapidly produced
> Here a huge town, continuous and compact,
> Hiding the face of the earth for leagues—and there,
> Where not a habitation stood before,
> Abodes of men irregularly massed
> Like trees in forests—spread through spacious tracts. . .'

He saw in this transformation the flood-tide of human life rising with a mightier sweep than ever in the past. And the people who live in it feel its pulse beating around them. Nor is it true that they take no pride or interest in the products of their great workshops and factories, such as the medieval craftsman took in his handiwork. Here again a false balance is struck. The medieval craftsman who took pride in his work is the one we hear of, but what of the others? Were there no idle apprentices? Was there no bad work? There was so much that one of the chief functions of the guilds was to prevent and punish it and to maintain the standard, which was always being threatened by scamped and dishonest work. As for the theory that the men of old worked for use and beauty, not for profit, there never was a greater craftsman than Benvenuto Cellini, or one who took more pride in his work and its beauty. Nor is there a workman to-day who looks more keenly after his wages and pockets them with more satisfaction than Cellini did the price of his masterpieces. On the other hand there is

to-day a great deal of pride among workmen in the products of their factory, in its good name, and in the reputation of the whole town for the quality of its manufactures. Those who do not know this have never been among them. The feeling has come out strongly in the war. Men and women in munition works—not all, but many—have taken great pride in the finish and excellence of the work turned out and have been jealous for the reputation of the firm and of the whole town.

In conclusion these observations must not be taken to suggest acquiescence in existing evils or denial of the need of improvement. The standard is always rising and there is no finality. But truth is not served by false balance-sheets, selected evidence, and one-sided statements.

A. Shadwell.

ANIMISM, SORCERY, AND SPIRITUALISM

1. **Histoire de la Magie en France.** By JULES GARINET. 1818.
2. **Sadducismus Triumphatus.** By the Rev. JOSEPH GLANVILL, F.R.S. 3rd edition. 1688.
3. **The Everyday Book.** By WILLIAM HONE. 1826.
4. **The Discovery of Witchcraft.** By REGINALD SCOT. 1654.
5. **The Life of Jack Wilton.** By THOMAS NASH. Edited by EDMUND GOSSE. Chiswick Press. 1892.
6. **The Survival of Man.** By Sir OLIVER LODGE. Methuen. 1909.

'WHY is a cow's tail long? Why is a fox's tail bushy?' Thus Dr. Johnson mocked at Boswell's importunate demands for explanations; but Boswell was giving expression to a craving that is rooted in the very depths of human nature. 'Happy is he' said the greatest philosopher of antiquity, 'who can discern the causes of things.' The aphorism is true enough, but it would have been more apt if he had said 'Restless and dissatisfied is he who cannot discover the 'causes of things.' The craving for explanation shows itself in early childhood, and is never allayed to the end of life. When it is said that a child can ask more questions in five minutes than a wise man can answer in a lifetime, what is meant is that the child gives expression to the common craving for explanation by asking for reasons and causes. 'What 'makes the waves curl over and break?' 'Why does Mr. 'Smith wear his hat on one side?' Questions very different in range and scope, but perhaps not very different in the difficulty of finding a satisfactory answer. It would scarcely be too much to say that the chief endeavour of the lives of all of us is to arrive at the causes of things; and the grade of intelligence to which a person has attained may be very fairly judged by noticing the kind of thing for which he demands explanation.

It is one of the oddities of human nature that side by side with this innate and intense craving for explanation exists a willingness to accept with contentment seeming explanations that are no explanations, and that a moment's thought would expose and discredit. The classical example is of course the

pseudo-explanation of the production of sleep by opium. Opium produces sleep, we are told, by means of its soporific quality. Formulae equally absurd are still readily accepted as explanations by many cultivated and well-educated, if not very thoughtful, people, in communities advanced in civilisation. We need not wonder therefore if we find that primitive man is uncritical in his acceptance of explanations.

In order that we may reason correctly, and arrive at the explanations of things, certain precautions must be taken. In the first place, we must make sure that what we take to be facts really are facts, and are not merely the interpretation that we put upon facts; and in the second place we must be sure, in arguing from like to like, that the things we take to be alike really are alike for the purpose of the argument, that they are alike in respects material to the argument, and that their similarity, however close in other respects, does not conceal a difference in what really affects the argument. A large proportion of our reasonings are invalid from non-observance of these precautions—either from ignorance of their importance, or from neglect, or from the difficulty that often exists in determining what is and what is not material to the argument.

Primitive man knows of but one explanation, and he naturally applies it to everything that he experiences. Whether he be savage or child or uncultured boor, he knows, or thinks he knows, that whatever he himself effects is explained by the exertion of his own will. The clearest and most unmistakable effects that he witnesses are the effects that he himself produces by the exertion of his will. He constantly witnesses similar effects produced by his fellows; and, by a thoroughly valid and legitimate exercise of reasoning, he attributes these similar effects, brought about in similar conditions, to a similar cause. He credits each of his fellow human beings with a will like his own, and argues that their acts and the effects that follow from their acts are due to the exertion of this inherent indwelling will. So far, primitive man is justified of his reason, for he is arguing from like to like, and the likeness runs through and through, and holds good in all material respects. Moreover, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the correctness of a belief is tested by acting upon it. Acting on the belief that what he sees

other people do is prompted and caused by a spontaneous inherent volition like his own, he never comes up against an experience inconsistent with the belief. He finds that he can accelerate, assist, modify, and prevent their action by means similar to those that influence his own. His belief in the explanation of human action by the deliberate exertion of will is justified in every respect; and this encourages him to extend his hypothesis to the action of other beings.

He extends it to the acts of animals, and in this also he is to a great extent justified. He is justified, at any rate, with respect to the superior animals—to his horses and dogs, to beasts of prey and beasts of the chase; and he makes no nice distinctions between the superior and the inferior animals, between reason and instinct, between deliberate exertion of will and automatism or habit. Whatever is done by animals is, in his estimation, done by the deliberate exertion of their wills. More than this, he assumes that animals act from motives like those which he imagines he would himself experience if he were in the place of the animal. He anthropomorphises the animals around him. He reads into them his own mental constitution. He attributes to them desires, motives, and intentions like his own. Here he is on less solid ground, but the matter is of minor importance. The main thing is that in investing the lower animals with wills like his own, and in attributing the action of animals to the exertion of these wills, primitive man is reasoning after the only fashion of inductive reasoning, from what is known to what is like in many material respects to the known; that his reasoning is approximately valid; and that the test of experience does on the whole bear witness to the soundness of his conclusion.

Primitive man is further surrounded by a great multitude of objects that we have learnt to distinguish as inanimate, but that he has not learnt so to distinguish. The distinction of things into those that have wills and those that have not is beyond his mental acumen. He argues, as we also do, from what he knows, or thinks he knows, to what he does not know; he observes that the only effects of whose causes he has immediate knowledge are produced by the active exertion of will; he infers that many other effects of whose causes he has no immediate knowledge are similarly produced; he notes that this inference is borne out by experience, and therefore

assumes that all effects are produced in the same manner. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is action, wherever there is change—at any rate, sudden or rapid change—in short, wherever there is an effect, especially an effect upon his welfare, there he sees the exertion of an active will. Every object around him that he recognises as affecting his welfare has for him its inherent indwelling will by whose exertion its friendly or hostile action is determined. The universe, as he conceives it, is composed of objects, each of which is animated by a will, and whenever and however it acts, acts in obedience to the prompting and exertion of its inherent will.

If a tree or a stone fall and injure him or kill his fellow, primitive man does not, as we do, regard the fall of the tree or the stone as an accident. He has no notion of an accident, and therefore no name for it. Nor does he suppose that the tree or the stone fell owing to the action of natural inanimate causes. He has no notion of natural inanimate causes, and no name for them. His explanation of the matter, if he is in a very early stage of humanity, is that the tree or the stone wilfully threw itself down upon himself or his fellow, with the intention of inflicting death or injury. To him the tree is not only live, but animate; the stone, too, is both live and animate; and whatever movements they perform are as much the outcome of determination and volition as his own acts.

There is, however, an alternative explanation. Objects which we should call inanimate, and which the savage probably does not regard as alive, are used by him as tools or weapons: they are so used by his fellows. He is thus familiar with them as acting, not of their own free will, but as passive instruments in the hands of men, or as moved by animals—that is, by living beings other than men. These are the only ways in which, to his knowledge, bodies are moved, and he reasons from what he knows to what he does not know. If a tree or a stone fall, it must, as far as he can see, fall either of its own free will and determination, or fall because it is thrown down by some agent actuated by free will and determination. The explanation is natural. In the state of his knowledge it is inevitable. No other explanation occurs to him, and no other explanation is sought, for that which does occur to him is congruous with the rest of his knowledge, and is never

doubted. There is to him no reason why it should be doubted. It holds the field.

These are the two views of causation taken by all primitive minds. Together they constitute the cult of Animism, and it is in this faith that primitive man lives and moves and has his being.

The gradual process of enlightenment and increase of knowledge, as it slowly proceeds generation after generation and age after age, consists in the gradual substitution of causation by physical means for causation by the capricious wills of supposedly animate beings. The process is slow and very irregular. It sometimes stands still for ages; it sometimes advances by leaps and bounds. It never proceeds evenly in all departments of human knowledge. Here and there a redoubt resists for ages the assaults of rationalism; and rags and tatters of the animistic creed remain for long unnoticed and unsuspected here and there, especially among the uncultured, and very often among those who would rightly resent being called uncultured, but who are unaccustomed to think clearly and accurately.

Animism, like everything else, is subject to change, and like everything else its changes are in the directions of evolution and dissolution. It ramifies into many branches. It alters its appearance so much that its later and more elaborate developments seem to have no connexion with the crude Animism of primitive man; and were it not that we can trace the unbroken succession, we should no more regard them as products or descendants of Animism than our forefathers regarded themselves as the products or descendants of the fish-like amphioxus, and of beings still more primitive. It is worth while to trace some of these ramifications and note how naturally they grow.

In its early and crude form, Animism takes two views of the relations of spirits to material objects. The spirit may inhere in the material object as the conscious personality of man dwells in his body, may infuse its personality throughout that body and act as one being; or the spirit may be a thing outside and apart from the object, and may use the object as an instrument in much the same way as man uses a club or a stone to strike with or to throw, or otherwise to serve his own purposes. It would be a mistake to suppose that any such

distinction is clearly drawn in the early stage of Animism. In this stage even the conscious personality, or mind, or spirit of man, is not clearly distinguished from his material body. The belief that exists is vague and confused and fluctuating; but there gradually emerges a distinction between the living, actuating, causative spirit, and the more or less inert substance through and by means of which the spirit acts, either from within or from without the substance. The wind, the lightning, the thunder, may be itself personified and act in pursuit of its own purposes, or it may be merely an instrument in the hand of a spirit which uses it.

A disease may be itself a devil, which enters into a man's body to torture him, or it may be a mere instrument in the hands of a devil, who sends it into the man's body while the master-devil stands outside and watches the effect produced by his messenger; but there is no sharp distinction. The disease is regarded sometimes in one way and sometimes in the other, and more often perhaps as a confusion of the two. It would be a great mistake to read into the mind of primitive man clear-cut distinctions of which he is quite incapable. The thing to recognise is that to him all the objects and powers of nature—sunshine and storm, thunder and lightning, streams and rivers, trees and rocks, the earth itself and all its constituents—are all either themselves spirits or are the weapons or instruments of spirits, or are products of the actions of spirits that have wills of their own, and are actuated by motives, intentions, and caprices like those of men.

As some of the operations of nature—such as the growth of crops, the increase of flocks and herds, the ripening of the kindly fruits of the earth, the falling of rain in due season—are benignant and beneficial to man, while others—such as storm and tempest, plague, pestilence, and famine—are inimical and destructive to him, a natural division of spirits soon appears: they separate into the good and the bad, the benevolent and the malevolent. At the same time another natural distinction divides those of greater power from those of less. As the human intellect expands, and as man accumulates experience, this process of distinguishing the good and the bad, the greater and the less, results in the shrinking of the minor spirits into more and more insignificance; and the concentration of the good and evil powers more and more

in the hands of two presiding, prevalent, and antagonistic spirits—the Ormuzd and Ahriman of the Persian, the God and the Devil of medieval Christianity.

When this stage in the interpretation of nature is reached, the minor deities are not altogether abandoned and banished. They still remain as the agents and messengers of the presiding spirits, and naturally receive different titles as they owe allegiance to the good principle or to the bad. The former become angels—that is to say, messengers; the latter become imps. With these inferior spirits, now freed from attachment to any particular natural feature, and no longer resident in trees or streams, in wind or sea, remnants of the cruder Animism remain mingled. The spirits of the woods and fields become fairies and elves and pixies, not wholly incorporeal nor wholly corporeal; not quite immortal, but living on indefinitely; neither wholly malignant nor wholly beneficent; capable of mischief, but capable of benefaction also. To this secondary order of spirits belong the gnomes and cobolds also, that guard the treasures of the earth.

There is yet a third order of spirits of great importance in Animism, both in its crude and in its elaborate stage. These are the spirits of dead men and women, who still haunt the scenes they lived in when in the flesh, and still interest themselves in the affairs of their survivors.

To primitive man, the universe is a confused mixture of the spiritual and the material—a mixture in which the spiritual preponderates; to semi-civilised man, the spirits have sorted themselves out to some extent from the material world; but to both, the spiritual element in the universe is of the utmost importance. Such powerful auxiliaries are to be conciliated and employed; such powerful foes are to be propitiated and neutralised; and there soon appear men and women who claim to possess special influence and special powers in conciliating, propitiating, and at length even in commanding, the powers of the spiritual world.

In every tribe of primitive men there is one or more who claims and is allowed to have special powers in propitiating malignant spirits and enlisting the services of the milder; who can exorcise diseases, and bring down the needed rain, or cause the floods to abate; who knows what sacrifices will propitiate this spirit and what ceremonies will influence that

one ; who by means of these powers can foresee the future and even control it ; and whatever may be the truth of his claims to influence the spirits, there is no doubt whatever of the influence that his reputed powers give him over the minds of men. A man who can raise or allay storms and tempests, who can call down fire from heaven, who can save or ruin the crops, who can ensure success or failure in undertakings and control the course of events, is to be respected and propitiated. His advice and his commands can be disregarded only at great risk. He becomes a power in the State. Moreover, the services that he can render are valuable. They may be of inestimable value, but in any case they are valuable, and, as he who renders them is not slow to discover, they command a price. The witch-doctor, the sorcerer, the necromancer, the magician, the diviner, the witch—all follow a lucrative profession, all have a very strong motive in keeping alive the faith in their cult, and are often not very scrupulous in the means used for this purpose. This aspect of the matter should always be kept in mind, for it is the key to a great part of the practices in the pursuit of the occult.

Mankind always has wanted, still wants, and always will want to take advantage of the powers and forces of nature, to utilise them when they are favourable, to elude them when they are harmful, to control them, guide them, increase them, nullify them, so as to gain advantage from them. To this end there are two means, and only two. He who would gain advantage from natural processes must either adopt the assumption of primitive man that these processes are governed by spirits, and must seek to obtain control over these governing spirits ; or he must adopt the alternative hypothesis of civilised man that spirits have nothing to do with the matter, and he must seek to control the forces of nature by learning the conditions under which they operate. These are the two alternatives : there is no other ; and the degree to which men have advanced from savagery and attained to civilisation may be estimated by the degree to which they adopt one of these means rather than the other. Animism leads directly to the practice and cultivation of the occult : investigation is the foundation of science.

The cultivation of the occult as a means of understanding and controlling the forces of nature has been pursued for as

many centuries as the cultivation of science has been pursued for decades, and even for years. The cultivation of the occult has had, ever since man attained the status of humanity, a vast number of specialists engaged in its pursuit : the priesthood of science dates back only two hundred years, and has never included any considerable number of men. Yet the control that has been gained over the forces of nature by the pursuit of the occult is too small to be estimated ; the control that has been gained by the pursuit of science is already stupendous, and is increasing year by year and day by day.

The contrast is manifest and obvious, but it is worth while to insist upon it because the pursuit of the occult is, from its remote origin and its age-long continuance, deeply engrained in human nature. Often and often as its futility has been demonstrated both by reason and in practice, it is extremely difficult to extirpate. Up to the present time it has not been extirpated. Again and again it has been driven beneath the surface and has appeared to be extinct, but again and again its shoots have appeared above ground, and it has grown into a thick mat of weeds, threatening to starve and stifle the wholesome crops. At the present time some of the gardeners themselves, false to their trust, are manuring it, cultivating it, and propagating it.

The practitioners who profess to control and utilise spirits are very variously denominated, according to the department—that is, the mode of utilisation—to which they devote themselves, and according to the age in which they flourish. It would be tedious, even if it were possible, to enumerate them all here, but as samples we may distinguish the witch doctors, devotees of *voo-doo* and *ju-ju* of the barbarous African tribes, druids, magi, augurs, oracles, diviners, sorcerers, magicians, necromancers, wiglaers, soothsayers, medicine-men, wizards, witches, and in modern days mediums. Some of them are general practitioners, and profess skill in all the arts and crafts of the occult ; others are specialists, and restrict their operations to one or more departments ; but all belong to the same profession, few of them restrict themselves to a single branch of it, and those that do are seldom voluntary agents in the matter. If they restrict themselves to a small area of the field, it is usually rather because the remainder

is torn out of their hands than because they voluntarily relinquish it.

The operations of practitioners of the occult are primarily directed to obtaining control of a spirit or spirits, with a view to gaining information from the spirit, or for the purpose of in some way utilising the powers of the spirit or spirits. He who can utilise the spirits for his purposes, or who has the reputation of being able to do so, is deemed a valuable ally and a dangerous enemy. As an ally his services will be sought ; as an actual or possible enemy he is worth propitiation ; those who believe in his powers will be willing and eager to pay for the exercise of them. Thus the practice of the occult becomes a profitable calling, and history shows that in all ages it has in fact been practised for gain.

But believers in the occult, or at least many of them, retain a modicum of prudence, and will not disburse freely unless they have a reasonable assurance that the goods will be delivered. The occultist may be an honest man, and may genuinely possess the powers to which he lays claim ; or he may be an out-and-out impostor ; or his control over the spirits may not be plenary. Sometimes they will answer to his call and do his bidding, and sometimes they will capriciously refuse. The purchaser, if he is a prudent man, will not part with his money until he has some assurance that the powers that he wishes to utilise are possessed by the occultist. The purchaser, in short, demands a sign. He is come to purchase a miracle, and he wishes to be assured that the miracle will be forthcoming. It would seem that the short way out of the difficulty would be for the practitioner to perform the required miracle and then claim the price ; but this course is rarely followed. Perhaps the vendor does not trust the purchaser any more than the purchaser trusts the vendor ; but whatever the reason, it usually happens that the occultist is under the necessity of performing some minor miracle as a guarantee of good faith.

The central and most important power of the sorcerer consists in controlling the spirits, and especially in compelling them to appear ; for if the sorcerer can compel the spirits to appear and attend upon him, the inference is that he can command their services and compel them to do anything else that he may set them to do. The manifestation of this power

is, therefore, the aim of every sorcerer who aspires to any eminence in his profession. No doubt it is conceivably possible to command the services of spirits without actually producing them *in propria persona*, but it is much more convincing to the votary to have positive visible, audible, or tangible evidence of their presence, and this, therefore, is the most general manifestation of occult power.

The spirits produced and shown by the incantation of sorcerers are of three very different kinds. The first kind consists of the devil and his imps. These spirits were frequently summoned, and less frequently but still often enough, obeyed the summons in medieval times when the belief in the existence of a personal devil was universal and fervent.

The second class of spirits consists of the spirits of dead persons. It is these that respond most readily to the summonses of the sorcerer, and there appear to be very few sorcerers so imperfect in the mastery of their craft as to be unable to secure the obedience of the spirit of any dead person they may select. No doubt some sorcerers are more skilful or more powerful in this respect than others, and on the whole the power is certainly less extensive, or less freely exercised, than it used to be. At the present day no spirits are made to appear except those of persons who have died so recently as to have been known in the flesh by persons still living, and even these spirits have a difficulty in satisfying their living acquaintances that they really are the spirits they profess to be. They try to prove their identity by means of halting quotations from books, or what profess to be quotations from books; but the quotations are for the most part well-known passages from some such widely read author as Horace, who may of course be quoted by anyone, and is in fact quoted by a great many people. No such difficulty of identification existed in former times, when, we must suppose, sorcerers, or rather necromancers, were more powerful and better skilled. No modern necromancer can compare in this respect with Joseph Balsamo, the self-styled Count of Cagliostro. A hundred and fifty years ago there was hardly a fine lady in Paris who would not sup with the shade of Lucretius in the apartments of Cagliostro; hardly a military officer who would not discuss the art of war with Caesar, Hannibal, or Alexander;

or an advocate or counsellor who would not argue legal points with the ghost of Cicero. It does seem a thousand pities that Mrs. Piper or Mrs. Verrall, or some other necromancer now living, cannot summon up the ghost of Napoleon to show us how to repeat the campaigns of Austerlitz and Jena. But it is not only the necromancers who have lost so much of their powers ; not only can they not call up any spirits but those of the recently dead, but also these spirits, when they do appear, seem to have lost nearly all the intelligence they possessed when alive, and can converse of nothing but the most contemptible trivialities. They can tell us that they wear clothes, that they drink whisky and smoke cigars, but when they venture on subjects of which they had competent knowledge when alive, they make the most egregious blunders.

The third class of spirits over whom the sorcerer has control consists of the spirits of persons still living. In this department again the modern sorcerer is wretchedly inferior to his forerunners. This is the more surprising and disappointing since never were the spirits of living persons so loosely attached to their bodies as they are at the present time. Those who are familiar with that classical work ' Phantasms of the Living ' know that the spirits of living people can project themselves instantaneously to any distance, and can carry with them not only the spirits of their clothes, hats, and boots, but even the spirits of their inanimate surroundings also. This being so, it ought not to be difficult for a competent magician to compel the attendance where he pleases of such a wandering spirit—clothes, hat, boots, surroundings, and all ; but this seems quite beyond the powers of the modern magician, though it was accomplished readily enough by those of a former age. Cornelius Agrippa added to his power of raising the spirits of the dead this power of compelling the attendance of ' phantasms ' or spirits of the living. Not only did he, at the request of Charles V., call up the spirits of King David and King Solomon, and exhibit them to the Emperor, but also, to please Thomas Cromwell, the great disestablisher of monasteries, Agrippa procured the attendance of the spirits of Henry VIII., of his hunting companions, of his horses and his dogs, of the trees and the rest of the scenery of Windsor Great Park, and exhibited them all to Cromwell, the hounds in full cry, and the king and his huntsmen galloping after them. It was, in fact,

a kind of kinematograph show without the apparatus, and it certainly does seem a pity that modern magicians do not cultivate this particular power to the pitch attained by Agrippa, for it is manifest that it offers almost boundless commercial possibilities.

Apart from compelling the spirits to appear, the sorcerer can display his power by procuring from them knowledge otherwise unobtainable. This enables him to reveal secrets. He can predict the future: he can foresee the course of events: he can say what undertakings will be successful and what will not. In particular, he can foretell in more or less—usually less—plain terms the advent of death and of misfortune. He can reveal what has happened in the past. He can tell where lost or stolen goods have been deposited. He can tell what happened between two persons when no third person was present. Show him an object—a ring or other trinket—and he will name the possessor and reveal how it came into his possession. His supernatural knowledge also enables him to interpret the meaning of dreams with accuracy and certainty.

The magician or sorcerer further possesses a very miscellaneous assemblage of miraculous powers. He has the power of interfering with the course of nature, and of compelling things to happen as he chooses, and not as they would happen by the operation of natural laws. Of course, when sorcery was first instituted no such things as natural laws were known. There was then no known reason why things should happen in one way rather than in another, why for instance the sun should rise in the East rather than in the West; and it would not have been considered at all beyond the power of a competent magician to cause the sun to rise in the West, and to retrace his usual course and set in the East.

The most important, because the most useful manifestation of the magician's control over the forces of nature is his power to transport himself from place to place in defiance of the action of gravity. The older magicians appear seldom to have possessed this power, for the records of its exercise prior to the sixteenth century are but few. But in the seventeenth century, when magicians and sorcerers assumed the common titles of witches and wizards, the recorded instances of self-transportation and self-levitation become innumerable. Pure self-levitation—that is to say, self-levitation without the aid

of any instrument or steed—does not seem to have come into use until the nineteenth century, when it was introduced by Douglas Home, and has been frequently practised since. But there was no wizard or witch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who did not possess the power of transporting himself or herself in an incredibly short time to any place he or she pleased by the aid of a broomstick; or, if the transport was over the water, by using a sieve for a boat. The broomstick anticipated the aeroplane, and, speedy as the new method of transport is, it was far surpassed in this respect by the older. Seeing how small a mark for anti-aircraft guns a person riding on a broomstick presents in comparison with an aeroplane, it seems a thousand pities that this method of transport should have become obsolete. Among the many persons who are now engaged in practising other branches of the craft of the occult, surely there must be some who could rediscover the spell or charm necessary to convert a broomstick into an aircraft. It can scarcely be more difficult than raising the dead, a feat that is performed with ease and certainty every day.

Besides levitating themselves, magicians have the power of levitating other objects. This power, unlike the last, was but little practised until the last fifty years, but instances are recorded in previous times. Innumerable objects were levitated at Baldarroch in 1838—one sceptic who had gone to investigate the matter being quite converted by meeting the butter-churn walking in at the door. In 1772 similar phenomena were produced in the house of Mrs. Golding at Stockwell; and the events at Mr. Mompesson's in 1661 were so famous that a Royal Commission was issued to investigate them. In the older cases all kinds of things were levitated—chairs, boots and shoes, crockery, bed-staves, carrots and turnips, and even a piece of meat jumped down off its hook and placed itself before the fire, from which it refused to be removed until it was thoroughly roasted; but in modern days, for reasons that it is difficult to fathom, the levitating powers of magicians seem to be almost restricted to tables, and the levitation of a table is one of the easiest feats of sorcery, within the powers of the veriest novice. One can scarcely help being struck by the futility of this example. A table floating in the air is no better for any human purpose than a

table standing on the floor—in some respects not so good. If the magicians were to take post at the bottom of a stiff hill, and levitate the carts of brick, stone, and timber up to the top, instead of allowing them to be laboriously dragged up by horses, what a humane service they would render to the poor overstrained animals! But it is to be feared that some remnant of their old malignity clings to even the most modern wizards, or surely this would have occurred to them.

Another important power that magicians once possessed over themselves (and sometimes over other people also) was that of changing their bodily shape and appearance at will. A witch could transform herself into the likeness of a cat or a dog, or even—if she wished to escape through a key-hole—into a bee or a fly. This art seems to be quite lost; at least we never hear of its being exercised now.

A third power of manifest value was that of rendering themselves invulnerable to steel weapons and leaden bullets. Many historic characters, conspicuous among whom was Claverhouse, exercised this power, and thus obtained an unfair advantage both in battle and in single combat. The only known method of securing this advantage is by selling one's soul to the devil, the contract being set out in writing and signed with one's own blood. With the virtual disappearance of the devil, the method has become obsolete, and it seems that invulnerability cannot now be acquired.

The remaining powers of the sorcerer consisted in miscellaneous methods of benefiting himself or those who employed him, and of injuring his own enemies and those of his customers. The means employed were very various, according to requirements. He compounded love potions, the effect of which was to inspire a passion in her who consumed them towards him who administered them. He raised and allayed storms and tempests. He inflicted and cured diseases, both of man and beast. He secured the success or failure of crops. He caused or prevented accidents dangerous to life or limb; and in addition to these remunerative miracles he was always ready to perform others that served no other purpose than that of demonstrating his own power.

It will be seen from this long enumeration that the powers from time to time exercised by the magician, or at least ascribed to him, have been almost unlimited in number and of

stupendous importance. It will be interesting to inquire which of these remain to him and by what means he has been bereft of those that he has lost.

Certain modes of sorcery have always been forbidden by law. In the very earliest Jewish code it is enacted that a sorcerer shall not be suffered to live. In the Roman law of the Twelve Tables the use of sorcery for the purpose of theft was among the nine major crimes that alone were punishable by death. Subsequent Roman laws forbade the practice of sorcery for any purpose, and even made the possession of books of magic a crime. The Saxon laws forbade sorcery of every description; and over the whole of Christendom the ban of the civil law was backed by the ban of the Church. Sorcery was included in heresy, and offenders were triable in the ecclesiastical as well as in the civil courts, and were subject to ecclesiastical as well as to civil penalties. Even within the last few months ecclesiastical dignitaries—Cardinal Bourne and Father Vaughan—have denounced the practice. Charlemagne issued repeated edicts of increasing severity against necromancers, astrologers, witches, magicians, and enchanters, and many such laws have been placed on our Statute Book from the earliest times down to the year 1824, when the last and most effectual one was passed. By the law of England, pretending to use any kind of witchcraft, sorcery, enchantment or conjuration, telling fortunes or pretending to discover lost or stolen property by skill in occult or crafty science is punishable by a year's imprisonment. Thus some considerable branches of sorcery are lopped off by the operation of law.

Other branches have been dismembered by the encroachment of science, and the compassing by different means of the ends formerly sought by enchantment. The discovery of stolen property and the identification of the thief is now transferred to the police. The treatment of disease is entrusted more and more to the regular practitioner of medicine and taken out of the hands of the witch. The fertility of the soil and the increase of the crops is attributed more and more to good husbandry and appropriate manures than to magic, and failure of crops is combated by the fungologist and the mycologist rather than by the sorcerer. Disease among cattle is become the province of the veterinary practitioner

and the bacteriologist. Science has not yet placed in our hands the means of producing or allaying storm and tempest, but it has discredited the pretension of the witch to produce these effects. In all these respects the enchanter is shorn of his powers, and, what is even more important for him, is deprived of the confidence of his votaries. What, then, remains to him ?

He is restricted to only three items of his former immense range of powers. He can still summon up spirits : he can still exhibit supernatural knowledge : and he can still perform some of those minor and preliminary miracles that are necessary, or at least very advisable, for the purpose of proving that he does possess supernatural powers of other kinds. But even in these three matters he is compelled to submit to galling restrictions, his powers are but a shadow of what they once were, and are still rapidly diminishing.

What have been called his preliminary miracles, performed merely as a guarantee of good faith, and to prove that he does possess supernatural powers, consist mainly in commanding the spirits to produce raps and taps and scratchings and other noises, and in levitating material objects—in other words, throwing them about. Fifty, forty, thirty years ago, these were the recognised means of proving the possession of supernatural powers. The sorcerer turned down the lights, and then set his spirits to work to hammer at the walls and the furniture, and to throw things such as tambourines and banjos about the room. There are a few sorcerers who still retain these spirits in their service, but for the most part the power of compelling the services of this particular class of spirits is either lost or disused, for it is seldom exercised now.

Similarly, the exhibition of supernatural knowledge is but a poor remnant of what was once attainable. The provisions of the Vagrants Act, 1824, have deprived the sorcerer at one fell swoop of liberty to predict the future or to disclose the whereabouts of stolen property, and so have deprived him at once of two modes of displaying his miraculous powers, and of two considerable sources of income. Nothing remains to him in this province but to recognise persons who have not been introduced to him, to prophesy to whom trinkets and other small articles belong, and to relate how these articles came into possession of their owners. It is a melancholy

remnant of the powers sorcerers once possessed, of predicting death and misfortune, and foretelling the fate of kingdoms.

In practice, almost the sole province that still remains to the sorcerer of his once illimitable realm of power is that of summoning spirits and commanding their attendance, and even in this again his powers are far from what they once were. In medieval times it was easy and frequent to summon up the devil: but what sorcerer now possesses the power of calling up the devil? His appearance is quite unknown, and whether his horns and claws have grown in the last few centuries, or whether his tail terminates in a spear-head, as is sometimes represented, or in a claw like that of a lion, we do not know; and it seems that for any aid that latter-day enchanters can give us, we are likely to remain in ignorance. Of course it is possible that the spirits that serve modern magicians—Dr. Phinuit, Rector, Doctor, Feda, and the rest of them—are really impersonations of the devil, who loves, as we know, to assume various appellations; but as none of these spirits has ever been seen, this must remain a mere conjecture, a conjecture that is rendered very improbable by their low intellectual calibre. It is difficult to believe that the devil can be as foolish as these spirits show themselves to be.

The only powers of any importance that are retained by magicians nowadays are those of throwing themselves into trances and summoning the spirits of the dead. The art of producing visibly the spirits of the living, together with the spirits of their surroundings—as Cornelius Agrippa produced those of Henry VIII. and his court—seems to be quite lost. The only tattered remnant of their former powers is the production of the spirits of the dead; and even these do not become visible. They not only do not become visible, but they are almost entirely divested of their peculiar personalities. They do not talk in character. If they did not give their names, it would be impossible to guess from anything they say, or from the way they say it, who is speaking. It might be some silly person that died yesterday, or it might be some silly person that died a hundred years ago. It might be a foolish duke, or it might be a foolish tramp. There is nothing to identify them. When we compare these poor results of the modern sorcerers with the successes of Cagliostro, we cannot help being impressed by the deplorable

decadence of sorcery in the last hundred and fifty years. Where is the sorcerer now who could enable us to sup with Lucretius, to discuss points of war with Caesar, Hannibal, and Alexander, or to join in legal argument with the ghost of Cicero ?

We have a complacent habit of comparing our knowledge and our achievements with those of our forefathers, and asserting our own vast superiority. A survey of the practice of sorcery should teach us a lesson in modesty. It is clear that though we may perhaps excel them in engineering or in chemistry, we are very far behind them in the practice of every kind of magic. In a contest between a learned Professor of, say, electricity, Fellow of the Royal Society, Principal, perhaps, of a University, equipped with the very latest knowledge of all the wonders of wireless telegraphy, and an ignorant village crone of the seventeenth century, the odds would not all be in favour of the Professor. If the Professor could bring his batteries to bear in time, the old woman might be electrocuted, but the Professor would most unquestionably be owl-blasted.

CHARLES MERCIER.

THE USAGES OF WAR IN ANCIENT GREECE

WHAT the Greeks thought about war, and what was their practice in the conduct of war, has a very special interest at the present time and not a little actual value, when so much which by the end of the nineteenth century was taken for settled has again been called in question ; for the Greeks were the most keen-witted people of antiquity, perhaps of all time. Now war among the Greeks, like war in the ancient world universally, was ruthless ; so ruthless that we are apt to take that for the last word on the subject and to think of all softening of the extreme cruelty of war, the voluntary restrictions which make war civilised, as something wholly modern. But this is not all there is to be said. Some restriction of the unlimited violence of war there has been always and everywhere. Among the ancient Greeks there were definite usages of war carrying the authority of accepted custom, which attain almost the extent and consistency of a code. More than this, there are in Greek literature, and more especially in certain dialogues of Plato, speculations about the conduct of war which anticipate the steady movement for the alleviation of war through the nineteenth century.

The Greek moralisation of war by custom begins earlier than formal history. There was an heroic code, narrowly limited in range, yet within its range quite definite, which is familiar to students of the great epics. The heroic age of Greece had its own usages of chivalry. There is, to begin with, the single combat between champions, arranged with much of the formality of a medieval tournament. Of this there are two examples in the Iliad, the combat of Menelaus and Paris, and the combat of Hector and Ajax. The latter, in particular, seems comparable, socially and ethically, to the knightly joust, which is not necessarily to the death. For after engaging first with spears and then hurling huge stones at each other, the heroes draw their swords and are about to close for a final rally, when the heralds, Talthybius and Idaeus, intervene by extending their wands between the combatants, who thereupon separate after a knightly exchange of gifts. In other

respects the Homeric form of ordeal by battle is better illustrated by the fight between Menelaus and Paris in Book III. The preliminaries are more formally arranged ; oaths are taken and confirmed by the blood of victims. Lists are measured out and lots are cast to determine which champion shall throw his spear first, much as eighteenth-century duellists settled which should first receive the other's fire. And when the Trojan Pandarus shoots an arrow and wounds Menelaus, after he has proved himself decidedly the better man in the encounter, Agamemnon confidently appeals to Heaven for vindication of the violated sanctity of the compact.

Heralds appear in the Iliad on all ceremonial occasions, and their privileged position is well recognised. ' Greeting to ' you heralds,' says Achilles, when Talthybius and Eurybates come to his tent to fetch away Briseis ; ' you I count not ' guilty, but Agamemnon who hath sent you.'

But the chief article of the heroic code concerned the treatment of the dead. This may with advantage be somewhat more fully illustrated. There is the truce for the burning of the dead in Book VII., and the vivid scenes which follow : the felling of trees in the mountains, the search for the dead, the difficult recognition of friends, the washing of blood from the bodies ; the march of the Trojans, silent and unweeping by Priam's command (upon which Lessing makes curious comment) ; the great common tomb built on the shore by the Achaeans. Andromache relates how Achilles showed respect to her father, Eetion, ' and did not strip his body, for he ' reverenced him in his heart ; but he consumed the corpse by ' fire in its curiously-wrought armour and built a tomb over ' him.' The conditions of the duel between Hector and Ajax include a stipulation that the body of the vanquished champion shall be restored to his own people for burning.

When near the end of the Iliad Hector at length brings himself to face Achilles, he proposes the same honourable terms and promises on his own part, if victorious, to do no dishonour to his enemy's body ; but the offer is passionately rejected by Achilles. When fallen, and lying at Achilles' mercy, Hector again pleads for fair treatment and promises ample ransom from Priam, only to meet with a still more violent refusal from Achilles, who assures him that his head shall be flung to dogs and vultures, and even allows himself a regret that

it is not permissible for him to devour Hector's flesh himself. The subsequent maltreatment of Hector's body is described with every circumstance of atrocity. As the body lies there stripped of its armour, the Myrmidons come up to gaze upon it, and each who comes stabs at it : ' and none stood by without ' inflicting a wound.' Achilles pierces the sinews of the feet ' from heel to ankle ' and passes a thong through, and so fastens the body to the car of his chariot. Then he lashes his horses and drives towards Troy, while the body of Hector, its dark locks streaming out, trails behind in the dust of the plain. And again on the morning after the games at Patroclus' funeral, he harnesses the body to his chariot and drags it thrice round the tomb. But the poet indicates by the manner of his narration that this savagery offends his own feeling. ' So spake he and devised unseemly outrage upon noble Hector.'

This disapproval is no less plainly expressed later by representing the gods as moved with pity and insisting on intervention ; and when a proposal that Hermes should rescue the body by stealth is set aside, Zeus himself sends for Thetis and commands her to induce her son, Achilles, to restore the body to Priam for a suitable ransom. ' Depart swiftly to ' the host,' he bids her, ' and lay this precept on thy son. Tell ' him the gods are angry and that I of all the immortals am ' most wrath with him, for that in fierceness of fury he keeps ' Hector by the curved ships and hath not ransomed him.' And so in the sequel Thetis carries out her mission. Priam makes his daring night journey with a waggon-load of treasure to Achilles' quarters, the body is restored and finally burnt on the funeral pyre with all due honour by the Trojans.

Two touches are characteristic. Achilles, softened for the moment, himself arranges the washing, anointing, and clothing of the body in such a way that it shall not be seen by Priam in its disfigured state, and then with his own hands lifts and places it in the waggon. At Priam's prayer he grants a twelve days' truce for the full performance of funeral rites. ' Nine ' days,' pleads Priam, ' we would lament him in our halls ; on ' the tenth we would bury him ; on the eleventh we would build ' a tomb over him, and on the twelfth we will fight, if needs ' must be.' By the elaboration with which the rites are ultimately performed, Homer redresses the balance of the outrage on Hellenic sentiment which the previous savagery of Achilles'

behaviour produces on his hearers. 'So, I ween, did they 'perform with all care the funeral rites of Hector.' This is the note on which the Iliad concludes.

When we come to historical times, the proper treatment of the dead has gained the full force of a received convention. The precarious usage of the heroic age has stiffened into a rule of unquestioned authority. The feeling supporting this usage depends on a belief peculiar to the Greeks, that the spirit of the dead could find no rest in the underworld until the rite of burial had been performed, or at least a little dust had been thrown over the corpse. The spirit of dead Patroclus, when it appears to Achilles and reproaches him with delay in the celebration of the last rites, exactly expresses the Greek belief in this matter:

'Thou sleepest, Achilles, and rememberest not me; but I, whom thou forgettest, am not alive, but dead; bury me speedily, and let me pass within the gates of Death. The spirits will not let me be with them, the shadows of the dead, nor will they suffer me to cross the river; but I wander solitary in the wide house of Hades.' *

Sophocles' Antigone is a splendid monument of this belief. Antigone was condemned to death by her uncle Creon, because, in violation of his proclamation forbidding burial to her brother's body, she had dared to throw over it by stealth a handful of earth. The Greek usage of war regarding the dead was grounded in this feeling. Regularly after every engagement, whether by sea or land, recorded by Thucydides, the formula recurs, 'and they delivered over the bodies of the dead under 'truce,' or 'under a truce they recovered the bodies of the 'dead.' However furious the fighting, however sharp the embitterment of the combatants, the obligation was absolute. The strictness of the obligation is brought further into relief by the only recorded exceptions to its fulfilment. After the last fatal conflict in the harbour of Syracuse, when the Athenian fleet was defeated and all hope of retreat by sea taken away, it is related that the Athenians were so overwhelmed by the calamity that they never even thought of asking for the recovery of their dead; and a little later it is mentioned as an extreme

* Iliad, xxiii. ll. 69–74 (Purves' Translation, edited Evelyn Abbott).

circumstance of distress, when they abandoned their camp in order to attempt a retreat into the interior of Sicily, that the dead were left lying about unburied.

The other instance in Thucydides is even more significant. In the year 424 B.C. an Athenian army seized and fortified the temple of Apollo at Delium, on the coast of Boeotia, opposite Euboea, and near the frontier, with the design of using it as a post from which to foment revolution in Boeotia and settle the country in their own interest. The battle of Delium took place a few days after the seizure, as the Athenian force was withdrawing, and the Athenians were badly beaten. When, as usual, they sent a herald to ask for the bodies of their dead, they met with a brusque refusal, on the ground that they had committed sacrilege in occupying the temple and using the water in its precincts for secular purposes. The Athenians disputed the sacrilege, and made a vigorous appeal to the ancestral custom regarding the dead. For the time being there was a deadlock. Not many days later, however, the difficulty was got over through the recapture of Delium by the Boeotians. Then when an Athenian herald came a second time to demand the bodies, the permission asked for was granted without demur.*

A better-known episode is the trial and condemnation to death of six of the admirals who won the great victory for Athens at Arginusae, but failed to rescue the seamen from twenty-five Athenian ships sunk in the fight, or to recover the bodies of the dead. A wave of intense feeling carried the people away and for a time left no room for reason or justice.

The incident of Delium illustrates a second absolute prescription governing the warfare of Greeks against Greeks. Sacred buildings must be respected. The words of the Boeotian

---

* The 'Suppliants' of Euripides is a dramatisation of this theme in a mythological setting. The plot is concerned wholly with a fabled refusal by the Thebans of burial to the Argive dead after the defeat of the Seven against Thebes. Athens speaks through her hero Theseus:

> 'Think'st thou the wrong thou dost, when thou deniest
> Interment to the dead, confined to Argos?
> No, 'tis a common insult to all Greece . . .'

(πάσης Ἑλλάδος κοινὸν τόδε, Eur. Suppl. l. 538, and in l. 526 Theseus speaks of the usage as τὸν Πανελλήνων νόμον.)

herald are 'the Athenians do wrong in transgressing the 'customs of the Greeks, the ordinance recognised by all to 'respect sacred places when they march into each other's terri- 'tories.' That the feeling upholding this prescription should be strong follows from its origin in religion : its strength may be estimated by the intensity of the passion aroused by the destruction of Greek temples by the Persians, which led Alexander 150 years later to burn Persian temples at Persepolis. Instances of its violation by the Greeks are rare. The seizure of Delphi by the Phocians was the cause of the Second Sacred War. Polybius in a later age speaks in terms of the strongest reprobation of the outrage upon sacred places committed by Philip V. in his war with Attalus of Pergamum in 201. B.C.

'in which, as it appears to me, he did not wrong Attalus so much as himself. He threw down the temples and the altars, and even had their stones broken to pieces that none of the buildings he had destroyed might be rebuilt.'

A third point fixed and fundamental was the inviolable character of heralds. This is most strikingly illustrated by the story in Herodotus (vii. 134) of the atonement publicly made by Sparta for the murder of the envoys sent by Darius two years before the battle of Marathon to demand earth and water. At Athens the king's emissaries were thrown into a pit, at Sparta into a well. Herodotus says quaintly that he is unable to say whether any retribution came to the Athenians for this misdeed, but 'on the Lacedaemonians alighted the 'wrath of Talthybius, the herald of Agamemnon.' At Sparta there was a shrine of Talthybius, where a family, claiming descent from Talthybius himself, were hereditary priests and the official heralds of Sparta. After the outrage on the envoys of Xerxes the Spartans for a long time could obtain no favourable omens when they sacrificed, and there was great public dismay. At last proclamation was made that two Spartan lives must be offered in expiation of the murder, and Herodotus relates how two noble Spartans, Sperthias and Bulis, came forward and volunteered to devote themselves for their country. Accordingly they made the journey to Susa and surrendered themselves to Xerxes. But Xerxes magnanimously refused to do them any hurt. And then, long after, a coincidence happened which deeply impressed Herodotus with a con-

viction that the divine judgment, though delayed, must in the end reach its mark: the sons of these same two Spartans, Nicolaus, son of Bulis, and Aneristus, son of Sperthias, were in the third year of the Peloponnesian War, when on a mission to Asia Minor, betrayed into the hands of the Athenians, taken to Athens and there put to death.

Another prescription of Greek warfare was to spare the lives of women and children. In some respects the treatment of the conquered according to Hellenic usage, even when the conquered were another people of Hellenic race, was cruel in the extreme. On the reduction of a city by storm or siege, there was usually no difference of practice since the days of the fall of Troy: the grown-up men were put to death; the women and children sold as slaves. Here is a typical example from Thucydides:

'In this summer about the same time the Athenians completed the reduction of Scione: the men of full age they put to death, the women and children they sold as slaves, and they gave the land in possession to the Plataeans.'

Still it may be noted, as a mitigation of extreme savagery, that in such cases the women and children were at least saved alive. Similarly, on the surrender of the Plataean garrison in 427, while the men were all put to death, the women were spared.

There was not much mercy for the enemy worsted in fight. In the battles of the Greeks, as universally in the warfare of the ancient world, the number of those who fall, wounded or unwounded, into an enemy's hands are comparatively few. Nevertheless it is recorded with some frequency by Thucydides, when a battle is won, that some of the defeated side were taken alive (ἐζωγρήθησαν). The Plataeans, after their surrender to the Lacedaemonians in 427 B.C., definitely appeal to the granting of quarter as a recognised principle. Their words are: 'So ye would judge righteously if ye grant us our 'lives, duly observing that we surrendered to you voluntarily 'and hold out our hands for quarter, and it is law (νόμος) for the 'Hellenes not to kill those who do this.' Accordingly, whatever the common practice of the Greeks, the idea of the duty of granting quarter is not wholly wanting.

The motive of taking prisoners instead of killing was often that which has swayed combatants throughout the whole

progress of man from savage to civilised warfare, reciprocity of treatment and the exchange of prisoners. Two examples of exchange are found in Thucydides. In Book II., chapter ciii., he writes: 'Then the Athenians and Phormio sailed from 'Acharnania and reached Naupactus; and with the spring 'sailed home to Athens, taking with them the prisoners of free 'birth from the sea-fights; and these they held to ransom man 'for man.' There is mention of a similar exchange at the time of the Peace of Nicias, of captives taken to Athens after operations in Chalcidice. The extreme eagerness of the Athenians to effect the capture of the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria, and to capture them alive, was due to the perception of the advantage of having in their power a number of prisoners who were members of the exclusive circle of Spartan aristocracy.

There are several instances of formal capitulation in Thucydides, that is, of the surrender of their arms by bodies of fighting men after negotiation through their commanders. As a rule we find the terms of capitulation duly observed; but when the terms were surrender at discretion, 'to deal with as they 'will,' it was apt to go hard with the surrendered. Thus after the surrender of Mytilene, in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian War, over a thousand men of that city, deemed responsible for the revolt, were put to death at Athens. The Athenians were very angry, and the first passionate decree of the Ecclesia was to put *all* the men of Mytilene to death, without discrimination, and to sell the women and children into slavery. How the Athenians came next day to a better mind, and how narrowly the execution of the first decree was averted, is one of the most thrilling passages in Thucydides' history.

As an example of leniency we have the terms granted to the Potidaeans early in the war. The garrison and the civil inhabitants were all allowed to depart from Potidaea, the men with one garment and the women with two, and each with a small sum of money to carry them through the journey to a place of refuge.

The worst case is that of Mêlos. Situated about eighty miles east from the coast of Laconia, Mêlos is an island of no great size in the Aegean, one of the Cyclades. The inhabitants claimed a Laconian origin. Up to the year 416 they had been quite independent and had kept aloof from the war, neither taking part with Athens, nor against her. In the spring of

416 a force of hoplites and bowmen in thirty-eight Athenian ships of war appeared off Mêlos and demanded its submission. There was no just ground for the attack, and the Athenians did not even deign to invent a pretext. They bluntly claimed the submission of Mêlos as a natural consequence of their sea-power. Thucydides embroiders his narrative with a debate known as the 'Melian Controversy' between envoys sent by the Athenian commanders to urge the wisdom of submission, and the chiefs of the Melian state. It forms a curious disputation concerning interest and justice, to which we shall return later. After a brave, and for a time successful, resistance, the Melians were forced to surrender. It was a surrender at discretion for treatment 'as the Athenians should 'determine.' The epilogue is brief and tragic: 'And they 'killed the men of ripe age whom they took, and sold the 'women and children into slavery.' If within a few years Athens herself came to experience bitter calamity, and finally total overthrow, she had sinned in the days of her power.

The surrender of the Spartans at Sphacteria was a very special case. The prestige of Sparta made the lives of even a few Spartan prisoners of inestimable account. The wonder was that there should ever be Spartan prisoners at all, because in common belief Spartans 'never surrendered.' However, the Athenians had their 300 prisoners, 120 of them Spartiatae, or men of pure Dorian descent; and they took care that no accidents should happen to them. Consequently, though the 300 Lacedaemonians had surrendered at discretion they were well treated, and in 421 B.C. they were set free in the ordinary course, when the Peace of Nicias was concluded. In fact, the recovery of the prisoners was, on the Spartan side, the preponderating motive to the abortive Peace of Nicias.

It goes without saying that formal treaties are as much a part of Greek history—the Thirty Years' Peace, the Peace of Nicias, the Peace of Antalcidas—as they are of modern European history, and that similar controversies occur about their observance. Yet the rule that treaties were sacred, and were intended to be observed, was thoroughly admitted—at any rate in principle. On the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War each side charged the other with being the first to break the Thirty Years' Peace; and it is significant how much energy was expended in the conference of Peloponnesian States, at

which the decision for war against Athens was taken, in demonstrating that Athens, not the Peloponnesians, was guilty of breaking the treaty. Still more significant is a passage in the eighteenth chapter of Thucydides' seventh book, which shows how persistently Greek instinct associated divine displeasure with unjust political dealing. Thucydides is describing public feeling at Sparta concerning the newly opening phase of the war after the despatch of the Athenian expedition to Sicily, and he says :

' But there came to them in particular an accession of confidence, because they thought the Athenians with two wars on their hands, one against the Peloponnesians and the other against the Sicilians, would be more easy to overthrow, and because they believed the Athenians had been first to break the treaty. In the former war they thought that the transgression had been more on their side, because the Thebans had gone to Plataea in time of peace ; and whereas it was enacted in the earlier covenant that they should not make war, if the parties were willing to submit their disputes to arbitration, they had themselves refused when the Athenians invited them to a judicial decision. And for this reason they held that they had quite properly come to disaster, and made this account of their reverse over Pylus, and of any other that happened. But when the Athenians set out in twenty ships and ravaged Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and practised plundering from Pylus, and refused to heed when any difference occurred concerning points in dispute arising out of the treaty, though the Lacedaemonians invited them to a judicial settlement, then the Lacedaemonians, holding that the breach of law, which previously had been a trespass on their side, had now passed over to the Athenians, were eager for war.'

This is one of the strongest testimonies on record to the importance of the moral factor in statesmanship.

Account must also be taken of the severities which were a normal feature of Greek warfare. These were (*a*) the merciless character of the fighting : few prisoners were taken ; (*b*) it was not unusual to kill prisoners in cold blood ; (*c*) men, women, and children were frequently sold into slavery ; (*d*) the lands of the enemy were habitually laid waste. It may be worth while to illustrate each of these points briefly.

No mercy at all was shown to the foreign enemy—Persian, Thracian, Macedonian. We have it from Herodotus that on the storming of the camp of Mardonius after Plataea, the Persian host was slaughtered, though resistance had ceased.

His statement is that, apart from a division of 40,000 which marched away under Artabazus before the battle, not 3000 survived out of 300,000. Similarly, after the battle of Mycale next year, there was a great slaughter of 'barbarians.' Another massacre, less in scale, but dramatic in intensity, was the destruction to a man of the picked troops landed by Xerxes' command on the island of Psyttaleia, in front of Salamis.

In the course of the Peloponnesian War there are many instances of the slaying of prisoners in cold blood: by the Corcyreans after the sea-fight at Epidamnus in 435 B.C.; by the Corinthians after a sea-fight near Corcyra; by the Spartans of the gallant little garrison of Plataea in 427 (there were only 225, 25 being Athenians, the rest Plataeans); by the Athenians in the cases already noticed of Mytilene and Mêlos. Most flagrant in atrocity is the high-sea piracy practised by the Lacedaemonians in the opening years of the Peloponnesian War, as recorded by Thucydides, Book II., chapter lxvii.: 'All whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea were treated 'by them as enemies and indiscriminately slaughtered, whether 'they were allies of the Athenians or neutrals' (Jowett, i. p. 139). Naturally the Athenians thought themselves justified in making reprisals! And that is how Nicolaus, son of Bulis, and Aneristus, son of Sperthias (*supra*, p. 74), came by their end; for they were taken to Athens along with Aristeus the Corinthian, and there the Athenians put them all to death without trial, and afterwards threw their bodies down precipices.

The selling of captives as slaves (*ἀνδραποδισμός*) was very frequent. It was the common fate of the women and children, when the men were all put to death. This was what happened at Mêlos. Among other places where a like tragedy was enacted were the cities Torone and Scione in Chalcidice. The many thousand prisoners taken by the Syracusans after the ruin of Athens' Sicilian expedition were most of them sold in this way, after being confined for a time in the 'Stone 'Quarries.'

The devastation of land was habitual and unrestricted. Regularly year by year during the Peloponnesian War the Peloponnesians invaded Attica for the express purpose of ravaging and destroying: year by year the Athenians sent ships round the Peloponnesus with a commission to land and commit depredations as they had opportunity. Posts were

ultimately established for the systematic plunder and harassment of the enemy, by the Spartans at Decelea in Attica, by the Athenians at Pylus and elsewhere. Whenever an army enters enemy territory, whenever a siege is undertaken, the formula recurs montonously, 'they ravaged the land.'

Such was war among the Hellenes, alleviated in one or two particulars by authoritative custom, and occasionally ameliorated by the workings of humaner sentiment, but in the main wantonly cruel and destructive. There are indications in Greek literature that this licensed ferocity roused better minds to revolt and remonstrance. Thucydides himself is an historian, not a preacher; he does not openly and directly combat the prevailing atrocities of the warfare of his time; but he was also a great artist, and as from Shakespeare's plays, so from his history, the eternal truths of the moral law stand out. His own judgment condemns the excesses that war brought in its train to the Hellas of his day. This is discernible in his comments on the horrors at Corcyra, and in his account of the gradual deterioration that crept over Hellenic morals through the disorderly passions let loose by the Peloponnesian War; or, again, in his attitude towards the judicial murder of the Plataeans by the Lacedaemonians, or of the Mytileneans by Athens.

His implied thesis of the depraving influence of war is expressed most pointedly of all in the curious dialogue known as the 'Melian Controversy.' Here the argument of expediency and the law of the stronger are stated by the Athenian envoys with crude baldness. It is not to be supposed that Thucydides attaches a consenting sympathy to the arguments he puts forward through Athenian lips, though the Athenian envoys get the best of the argument. He is giving dramatic expression to the principles manifested in the acts and policy of the government of Athens in his day. He sees and understands, but condemns. The arguments he puts into the mouths of the official representatives of Athens are his commentary on the Melian case, a commentary more damnatory of Athens than any direct reprobation.

We have another comment on the Melian affair even more powerful and effective, because instinct with passion and imagination, in the 'Troades' of Euripides. Professor Gilbert Murray points out that the 'Troades' was produced in

the spring immediately following the surrender of Mêlos, and that it is Euripides' protest against the enormity of that crime. 'This tragedy,' writes Professor Murray in the Introduction to a translation which gives in English all the poetry and pathos of the original, 'is perhaps in European literature the first 'great expression of the spirit of pity for mankind exalted into 'a moving principle; a principle which has made the most 'precious, and possibly the most destructive, elements of 'innumerable rebellions, revolutions, and martyrdoms, and of 'at least two great religions.' This poignant study of the realities of war as exemplified in the fate of the women and children made captive by the fall of a besieged city is, indeed, a war pamphlet of a most moving kind, which gains fresh cogency when read now with insight quickened by events of the present day as terrible as any that happened in the Trojan War.

Plato raises plainly and directly the question of how war should be conducted between Hellenes, that is, between communities of kindred stock sharing one and the same civilisation. In the fifth book of the 'Republic,' when Socrates is describing the training of his young warriors, he propounds the question:

'Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help?'

His own answer is:

'Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise other Hellenes to observe.'

'Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?'

And he answers:

'Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more.'

The reasons he gives for these precepts are that 'the Hellenic 'race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship'; that is to say, there is, as in modern Europe, a common culture in which the States share, which all should combine to defend and advance. He glances also at the danger 'that the whole 'race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians.' War among Hellenic communities, he lays down, is 'intestine 'strife, not foreign war.'

The dialogue goes on :

'And will not the city which you are founding be an Hellenic city ? '

'It ought to be,' he replied.

'Then will not the citizens be good and civilised ? '

'Yes, very civilised.'

'And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples ? '

'Most certainly.'

'And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war ? '

'Certainly not.'

'Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled ? '

'Certainly.'

'They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents ; they will be correctors, not enemies ? '

'Just so.'

'And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands or rase their houses ; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction ? '

'I agree,' he said, 'that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies ; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.'

'Then let us enact this law also for our guardians :—that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.' *

Plato's birth is assigned to the year 428 B.C. He therefore had not seen that first invasion of Attica so vividly described by Thucydides, nor shared the agonised feelings of his countrymen, when compelled for the first time to wait behind the shelter of the city walls, while their farms and estates, their pleasant gardens and fruitful fields, were wantonly destroyed by the invaders ; he had not with his own eyes witnessed the smoke rising from the burning villages and country houses ; but he was in his fifteenth year when, by the traitorous advice of Alcibiades, the hostile post was established at Decelea, which

* Plato, 'Republic,' Book V. 470, 1 (Jowett's translation).

had the effect of making the open country permanently unsafe and subject to perpetual harassment. He knew enough, then, from personal experience, of the sufferings caused, and the feelings of resentment so deeply planted in the minds of the sufferers, to realise acutely the evils against which he makes his protest. There is also a story, which may possibly have some foundation in fact, that he was sold as a slave by the tyrant Dionysius, at whose invitation he had visited Syracuse, and so knew what the degradation was, to which he claimed no Hellene should be subjected. At all events there is no difficulty in understanding why these passages find place in the 'Republic,' and they are a valuable contribution to the movement of thought towards humaner views of war.

Further, Plato condemns both the robbing of the dead and the dedication in the temples of arms taken from conquered enemies. The traditional custom of stripping off the armour of the slain (*σκυλεύειν*) he permits, but the taking of anything besides arms is robbery, and despicable. 'And is there not illi-'berality and avarice,' he asks, 'in robbing a corpse, and also 'a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy 'of the dead body, when the real enemy has flown away and 'left only his fighting gear behind him?' The offering of the arms of Hellenes in the temples of the Hellenic gods he regards as impious.

In the opening of the 'Laws' there is a wider discussion pregnant with suggestion concerning the attitude of the State towards war. The interlocutors in that dialogue, regarded on good ground as the last of Plato's writings, are Cleinias an aged Cretan, Megillus a Lacedaemonian, and an Athenian friend who is not named, but who takes the leading part in the conversation and, like Socrates in the earlier dialogues, doubtless expresses Plato's own views. The discussion is about the constitution of States, and begins with a question of the reason underlying certain features common to Cretan and Lacedaemonian institutions—the common meals, gymnastic exercises, and carrying arms. The reason is, says Cleinias, that these institutions have in view the requirements of war.

'In reality, every State is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you look closely you will find this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged

by him with a view to war; in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.'

This position the Athenian turns by the familiar processes of the Socratic dialectic, and establishes in its place quite another:

'War, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another and good will are best; nor is the victory of the State over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity: a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or State, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare, nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.' *

There is one other noteworthy deliverance concerning war and education which Plato sets down in his 'Laws' out of the plenitude of the experience his times afforded:

'Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education: for many have grown insolent from victory, and their insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been, and will be, suicidal to the victors.' †

Polybius in the thirteenth book of his 'Histories,' chapter three, looks back regretfully to the nobler spirit in which he conceives wars to have been waged among the Greeks in earlier times. There is another reflection in his twenty-third book, which harmonises with Plato's plea in the 'Republic' for moderation in the license of destruction permitted in war. He writes:

'I never concur with those who indulge their anger against men of their own blood to the length of not only depriving them of the year's harvest when at war with them, but even of cutting down trees and destroying their buildings, and of leaving them no opportunity of repentance. Such proceedings seem to me rank folly. For while they imagine they are dismaying the enemy by the devastation of their territory, and the deprivation of their future as well

* Plato, 'Laws,' i. 628 (Jowett's translation).
† Ibid. i. 641.

as of their present means of getting the necessaries of life, they are all the while exasperating the men, and converting an isolated ebullition of anger into a lasting hatred.' *

In these passages from Greek literature, the noblest bequest of classical antiquity to the modern world, the wisdom of Hellas speaks to us, giving sentence by anticipation against the whole doctrine of 'frightfulness.' Greek speculation, we see, definitely considered and definitely rejected, the theory of war as the normal relation between States, and organisation for war as the end of the State's constitution; it exposed the unsoundness of the conceptions of war as 'violence which in its 'application knows no limit,' and justifies those who hold that though wars, as yet, may be 'inseparable accidents' of human society, war between civilised States may be, and should be, waged in accordance with civilised prescriptions.

H. R. James.

* Polybius, 'Histories,' xxiii. 15 (Shuckburgh's translation, vol. ii. pp. 332, 333).

THEATRICAL LANDMARKS

1. **Life of Sir Henry Irving.** By A. Brereton. 1908.
2. **Life of Edmund Kean.** By J. F. Molloy. 1888.
3. **My Time and What I've Done with It.** By F. C. Burnand. 1874.
4. **Periodical Writings.** By J. W. Comyns Carr.
5. **The English Stage.** By D. E. Oliver. 1912.
6. **Macready as I Knew Him.** By Lady Pollock. 1884.

DURING the twelve years that have passed since Henry Irving's death there have been recently removed within a short time of each other three latter-day theatrical landmarks in the persons of F. C. Burnand, Herbert Beerbohm Tree, and J. W. Comyns Carr. The zeal for their pursuit displayed by these three typical representatives of the upper-middle class testifies to the growing attraction of the stage. F. C. Burnand, as man of letters and conversationalist, formed a social link between his own period and that of Douglas Jerrold. Indeed, Burnand only came of age in the year of Jerrold's death. While yet a youth he had witnessed in more than one private circle the wit encounters and the light tossings to and fro of the verbal pleasantries and quips which Jerrold and Hook brought into fashion. 'Why, you never 'wear a great-coat, Jerrold,' said a friend, meeting 'the 'little man,' as Thackeray called him, on a cold day. 'No,' came the retort, 'I never was.' Even Thackeray yielded to the prevailing taste for puns, when he describes in 'Pen-'dennis' Bungay's dinner party inaugurating the fictitious 'Pall Mall Gazette.' 'Does your artist say he is a French-'man?' called out Wagg (Theodore Hook), 'because if he 'does he is a quizzin' yer' (cuisinier). This type of humour, which then unfailingly tickled the popular fancy, has now only an historical interest as marking the complete transformation in the public taste effected within a single generation.

At Eton the theatricals in which Burnand took a chief part both as author and actor were watched throughout and

encouraged by his master, W. G. Cookesley, who in an earlier generation had promoted and helped to contrive those with which Buckhurst, Henry Sydney, and the rest of the Young England set had been concerned. A piece composed for the occasion by Burnand involved his appearance with the robe and crown of royalty. From that day forth to the end of his life, the future editor of 'Punch' was always 'Your 'Majesty' to the famous old Eton master.

Burnand's spiritual development passed through some remarkable phases. During his early days the evangelical party had complete ascendancy in the Church of England. For a short time at Cambridge he came under the influence of the Simeonites, as the Low Church enthusiasts were called, and was even looked upon by their leaders as likely, if he took Orders, to be qualified for the Simeonite patronage. The next stage was in an opposite direction. Under the influence of Hugh James Rose, the Cambridge colleague of the Oxford Tractarians, Burnand became a fervent follower of Dr. Pusey, and entered the theological college founded by Bishop Wilberforce. A little later he completed his theological transformation by seceding to Rome. He even began to study for the priesthood at the house of the Oblate Fathers in Bayswater, not quite renouncing his literary and theatrical tastes, yet honestly resolved to restrict their indulgence.

But the ruling passion proved too strong. One of the priestly authorities, when leading the procession to the sacred building, looked back and caught sight of Burnand teaching a chorister the steps of a breakdown dance. A few days later Burnand received an authoritative but friendly hint that he might have mistaken his vocation. 'My son,' added the preceptor, 'at 'Cambridge you contributed to the gaiety of your genera-'tion by helping to found the A.D.C. Why not choose a 'profession which will enable you to continue that innocent 'service for the delight of a wider public as well as give you 'wholesome relaxation in your daily calling?' That of course pointed to the Inns of Court, and the ex-aspirant for the priesthood duly entered at the Temple and soon got his first brief. At the same time he resumed the play-writing begun at Eton, continued at Cambridge, and now pursued in London with an old Eton friend, Montagu Williams.

Those who knew Burnand chiefly during the latter half

of his life, or from meeting him in society, listening to his well-chosen, not less than his well-told stories, or the nautical piece of histrionic cantata, 'His Heart was true to Poll,' may not always have given him credit for the genuine brain power, which under the shrewd and sagacious editorship of Mark Lemon, enabled him at will to discipline his drollery for the production of what at any particular moment suited the popular taste in the playhouse or in print. For two years after Burnand joined 'Punch,' John Leech continued to show his picturesque and accurate knowledge of English life; Sir John Tenniel, as he had begun to do in 1851, still did the chief cartoon. Burnand's alert and assimilative mind necessarily profited from these personal opportunities. They helped to secure for him during nearly forty years a position of commanding influence among his contemporaries. Those who preceded him in the editorial chair had shown a sustained happiness of selection in making 'Punch,' from the year of its birth (1841), a pictorial and literary panorama, not only of the follies, foibles, and fashions of the time, but of its more serious events and tendencies as well. Queen Victoria's marriage with Prince Albert in 1840; the Great Exhibition ten years later; the free trade struggle; the successive vicissitudes of Benjamin Disraeli with Lord George Bentinck at his side; the Crimean War; the Indian Mutiny; the Volunteer Rifle Corps movement—all these had a pen and pencil record, establishing under Lemon the tradition continuously handed down through Burnand to the Owen Seaman of to-day. The special prominence given by Burnand to the theatre was more than the gratification of a personal taste; it illustrated the growing ascendancy of an institution. Journalist quite as much as humorist, Burnand bequeathed a spirit of intense topicality to all who came after him. And as the Burnand, known to the Club and drawing-room, was never the mere *farceur*, so under his inspiration the humour of 'Punch' always threw some light on the temper of the time.

J. W. Comyns Carr deserves for several reasons a place in any survey like the present. He formed a personal link connecting with his company or with his pen the most prominent figures of the nineteenth and twentieth century stage. A theatre-goer from childhood, he also resembled Burnand in

taking the law for his ostensible profession, and became to a limited extent a practising barrister in 1872. As an organiser of Browning Societies first and playgoers' discussion clubs afterwards, he had made himself an authority on dramatic affairs before treating the subject with his pen in evening and weekly journals. The 'Pall Mall Gazette,' then in its infancy, opened under Frederick Greenwood its columns to Carr's articles. During the early 'eighties Carr successfully dramatised Mr. Hardy's 'Far from the Madding Crowd' and also 'Called Back,' probably the earliest as well as the most sensational 'shocker.' At the same time he began to be a personage in the aesthetic world. His association with Sir Coutts Lindsay in establishing the Grosvenor Gallery, and with Mr. Hallé in popularising the New Gallery, prominently identified him with that socio-artistic movement at which his friend Burnand afterwards poked fun, not only in the 'Maudle and Postlethwaite' of 'Punch,' but in 'The 'Colonel' at the Prince of Wales's Theatre. But Carr had attained a position in which he could afford to smile at such good-humoured banter. As London representative of 'L'Art,' and as editor of the 'English Illustrated Magazine,' he had become an authority on everything connected with the elegancies and embellishments of nineteenth-century life.

The history of the stage has been one of strange vicissitudes and, as it has often seemed, periodically recurrent ruin, averted by the timely intervention of great men. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the stage, smiled upon by the Court, flourished exceedingly. But the habitual and deadly epidemics, nearly a quarter of a century before the Great Plague, added to Puritan influences, secured in the September of 1642 the suspension of stage plays, as not well agreeing with public calamities or with seasons of humiliation. For fourteen years till 1656 London had no theatrical performance, and then only in a private house, where Sir William Davenant's company produced an opera, 'The Siege of Rhodes,' and Mrs. Coleman was the first English actress to appear. She had to wait for a successor till after the Restoration, when Pepys saw the 'Beggars' Bush' and 'novelty undreamed of—'a woman enters an appearance on the boards!'

By this time the modern playhouse as a structure and an organisation had come into being. The temporary platform

unroofed, and for the most part in a tavern yard, developed itself into a permanent stage equipped with movable scenery. The late seventeenth and early eighteenth century stage, though commodiously housed, suffered from the traditions with which it had been endowed by the Restoration. The personable wenches with their orange baskets in the pit only disappeared by slow degrees, even after the historic heroine of their order was selected for the honour of maternity to a duke. Not less gradually did there fall into disuse the masks beneath which ladies who had not cast off all modesty concealed their blushes at the double entendres or downright obscenity of Wycherley and Congreve.

Generally it may be said that the history of our modern stage is the development of a pastime devised for a licentious Court and a corrupt society into an intellectual pursuit, delighting and even instructing respectable audiences, as well as attracting to itself whether as regards actors or authors the brains most representative of the time, and the steadily improving art of successive periods. The earliest impulse to reform came from the stage itself. Betterton and Kynaston, copious playwrights as well as accomplished actors, were both men of irreproachable character, whose withers were quite unwrung by Jeremy Collier's 'Short View' of the Immorality of the English Stage' in 1697. The beautiful and blameless Mrs. Bracegirdle set the example of drawing the pen through lines to which she objected in the part given her for study. The Court and the public soon heard of what had happened. Popular approval showed itself in an altogether unprecedented demand for seats. For two other reasons Mrs. Bracegirdle filled a unique place in her profession. The patent for Lincoln's Inn Fields Theatre, given her by William III. in 1695, made her the earliest actress-manager. The favour of Queen Mary secured her the distinction of being the first lady of 'the profession' to find a place in Court circles since the Revolution of 1688.

The finest stage artist, as well as the greatest actor-manager of the eighteenth century, David Garrick, continued all and completed many of the theatrical reforms initiated by his predecessors. Only more distinguished as an actor than as a man of letters, by his administration of Drury Lane he united the playhouse in its best aspects with the greatest

masters of the pen. In 1750 he gave a performance of 'Comus' for the benefit of Milton's granddaughter. About the same time he achieved another triumph with Johnson's 'Irene.' He brought over the footlights from France, and refused to allow members of the audience to go behind them upon any plea of business or pleasure. The secret of Garrick's success as an actor consisted in literal obedience to the precepts given by Hamlet to the players: 'Speak the speech trippingly 'on the tongue . . . in the very torrent, tempest, and 'whirlwind of your passion you must acquire and beget a 'temperance that may give it smoothness.'

During the London season of 1814 names famous in letters, art, and science were included among the parties made up by the leaders of fashion to witness the supreme genius of Kean in 'Richard III.' The social prestige won at this period by prominent actors showed itself in the effort to secure their presence at the great houses of the time. Garrick enjoyed society; Kean infinitely preferred a beefsteak at the 'Coal 'Hole' to the banquets at Holland House. On the Tory side the 'smartest' host and hostess of the time—Lord and Lady Jersey—loaded him with purses full of golden guineas and with precious stones. Kean persisted in his refusal to be their guest, and only after having long held out consented to visit Byron at Newstead. No actor before Kean is known to have drawn a prelate to the playhouse. Kean not only did this but so impressed their spiritual lordships that at the Alfred Club, then an episcopal haunt, they planned and signed an address of thanks to him for the lessons taught by his Othello, Shylock, and Macbeth.

'To see Kean act,' said Coleridge, 'is like reading 'Shakespeare by flashes of lightning.' John Forster, who spoke from experience, described to the present writer how well Kean's emphasis was always laid, often as the result of an entirely new perception of the author's meaning. 'This,' said Forster, 'distinguished Kean from Kemble, who frequently 'exaggerated the stress upon unimportant words.' Kean's masterpiece appears undoubtedly to have been 'Othello.' The involuntary outburst of the Moor's intense passion for Desdemona in the words 'and I lov'd her, that she did pity 'them,' as delivered by Kean, so moved the audience that the whole house felt that Othello's excess of jealousy seemed not

only natural but righteous. The scene in which Othello's suspicions are first conceived contains Iago's words: 'I see 'this hath a little dash'd your spirits.' 'Not a jot,' rejoins Othello. 'The stupendous effect,' continued Forster, 'of these 'three syllables uttered by the actor could never be removed 'from any of the audience.' Kean spoke with his eye as well as with his voice, especially where, after Desdemona's innocency is established, the final words and the one kiss of reconciled love brighten his despair with a momentary gleam. Kean, however, if he had always delighted 'the 'judicious,' had slowly to educate the general public, still apt to sigh for declamation and downright rant.

Macready, the greatest of Edmund Kean's contemporaries, began his stage career in 1810. At that time, notwithstanding all successive improvements and reforms, the theatre had not come into full favour with the severe sticklers for the proprieties; it combined, they said, the ways and morals of a 'free and easy' with the characters and customs of the promenade at Vauxhall. Macready did not wait till he became a manager to use his authority for the removal of that reproach. His theatre became the home of decorum as well as a school for elocution, although his delivery seems to have had a jerkiness which caused it to stop far from perfection.

Long before his retirement he found himself constantly approached by fond and anxious parents of the upper-middle class, and even of the aristocracy, with the request to receive stage-struck sons and daughters as pupils or apprentices. That was chiefly due to his connexion with Rugby, where he had been a boy much sought after by his school-fellows and standing well with his masters, twenty years before Arnold's time. The upper and lower middle class flocked to the first nights at the beginning of the Victorian era, not only because they were bent on showing their appreciation of his improvements in the social and moral atmosphere of the playhouse, but because they were on the tip-toe of expectation to see the new readings introduced into famous parts, especially Lear, Coriolanus, and some of the Ben Jonson revivals.

In 1842 a weekly newspaper, 'The Despatch,' had described as 'insincere and ineffectual,' Macready's regulations to exclude women of the town from the body of Covent Garden

and Drury Lane. Macready at once brought an action for libel and won a verdict. The evidence forthcoming in the trial established the complete success of his efforts, and made good his claim to have regenerated the entire area before the footlights. Macready's work did not end here. Retiring from the stage in 1851, he gave elocution lessons to a series of pupils, mostly clergymen. Among his clerical pupils was Canon J. B. Fleming (of Bath first and of York afterwards), whose natural gift of voice had been trained by the old actor to rare perfection, and who claimed for Macready a place among the ecclesiastical, not less than among the theatrical reformers of his time. That also is Lady Pollock's view in the excellent biography named among the books whose titles stand at the head of this article.

The third place in the nineteenth-century line of theatrical distinction belongs to Henry Irving, who died (October 1905) as suddenly and as close to the actual scene of his triumphs as Kean, but an older man by twenty-one years. Irving's iron constitution and prudence of life made it at one time seem likely that he might have emulated the octogenarianism of Macready himself. From his great forerunners there had descended to Irving all their contempt for the conventional and commonplace, whether in gesture, byplay, or elocution. Those most competent from their unique knowledge, like the late Lord Coleridge, to speak on the subject, discovered specific resemblance to Macready, not on the stage but in casual talk, and especially in Irving's unconscious adoption in the green-room or at rehearsal of what it seems was Macready's favourite phrase, if ever he thought there might be room for improvement: 'You annoy me very much.' The truth, of course, is that the Macreadian tradition, whether of intonation or 'business,' made itself universally imitated throughout the second half of the last century.

A natural dignity and a certain mysticism of manner, terse and entirely unpremeditated sententiousness of talk, and above all a most striking likeness as regards face and bearing to Lord Beaconsfield, then at the very height of his fashionable vogue, explain the remarkable impression made by Irving in the best-known drawing-rooms and country-houses of his time. As a host, whether after the evening's performance on the Lyceum stage or in the upper room once appropriated

to the historic Beef-steak Club, Irving gathered about him Cabinet ministers, ambassadors, diplomatists, and even in one or two cases ecclesiastics, sometimes with the ladies appertaining to them who had never before seen any part of the theatre behind the footlights. Meanwhile the whole town flocked to witness his interpretation of a famous part directly it was announced, as afterwards they did with Tree. If that actor will be remembered less as a great tragedian than as a genuine artist in 'character parts,' it is to be noted that he never enjoyed Irving's advantages and opportunities. Once fairly established in his profession, Tree had not sufficient leisure to give Shakespeare's masterpieces the time bestowed on them as on other parts by Irving. In private life, however, Tree with his genial, searching ways, and his quiet mastery of pithy and antithetic conversational effects, became a figure that will always be remembered only less vividly than Irving himself. In the case of both men it was the thoroughness of their work, the high and trained intelligence, and a general magnificence of conception characterising all they undertook that explain the success of each in the services which they rendered to their craft.

Henry Irving's London career opened at the Princess's in September, 1859. At the St. James's in 1866, then under Miss Herbert, he first fulfilled the following prophetic commendation of a famous provincial manager: 'A young 'fellow from Edinburgh, who will make his mark.' Irving indeed had won no hearty praise from the press till the October of 1861, when he played Dombey in the dramatised version of the story. The novelist himself was a born actor, and his readings, begun in 1858, formed a school of art for many dramatic aspirants. Irving, at any rate, so far as he was conscious of having been affected by any contemporary delineator of character, thought he had brought a good deal away from Dickens's impersonations of his own characters. During the 'sixties, however, when his star was steadily in the ascendant, Irving needed something more than the long-delayed newspaper recognition to confirm his place as a public favourite. The help he needed was forthcoming, after a fashion that pleasantly illustrates the genuine comradeship often uniting the players of that period. From the year 1856, in which he exchanged a City clerkship

for a place in a Sunderland company, he had found the most loyal of friends in the popular and amiable comedian, John L. Toole, and in 1869 Toole's good offices secured him the part of Reginald Chevenix in 'Uncle Dick's Darling.' This enabled him not only to deepen the effect already produced by him as a 'character' actor, but to show how faithfully he had caught the Dickensian spirit in a thoroughly Dickensian rôle.

The great achievement for which all this public work had been the preliminary came in 1871. 'Le Juif Polonais' had been running at a minor Paris theatre, and an English version, quite uncommissioned, was presented to Irving by a literary lawyer, Leopold Lewis. The success which he had just achieved in reciting 'Eugene Aram' made Irving think he might secure a similar hit as Mathias in the French play. Clement Scott and Joseph Knight were of the same opinion, and Colonel Bateman, who then controlled the Lyceum, decided on producing the drama. Irving, with characteristic intelligence, saw his way to improving on the conception of Mathias which had been formed by the French actors Tallien and Coquelin. They had both pictured Mathias as a simple, un-idea'd peasant; Irving perceived that a far higher effect would be produced, and that his own peculiar powers would find fuller scope, by the portrayal of a man conscience-stricken by the undying memory of a crime. Meanwhile, as it happened, F. C. Burnand on one of his many visits to Paris had seen 'Le Juif Polonais,' and brought home an English version. This by the title 'Paul Zegers' appeared at the Marylebone a few nights in advance of 'The Bells' at the Lyceum. It fell flat, while Irving's play took the town by storm.

For many years the popular mind identified Irving more closely with 'The Bells' than with any other drama. But his power of original interpretation was equally shown in the stage classics, whether of tragedy or comedy. His reading of Joseph Surface in 'The School for Scandal' had results not less creative than his study of Hamlet, of Shylock, and the Becket of Tennyson's play, whose dying words, 'Into 'Thy hands, O Lord,' were the last that fell faintly from Irving's lips on that October night of 1905 when he was helped off the stage at Bradford, never to reappear.

As has happened with all actors of anything like his calibre,

Irving, while stamping a new intellectual prestige on the theatre, enlarged and quickened a sense of responsibility among the players of more than one generation. First in order of time among them came Wilson Barrett. A first-rate man of business as well as a competent artist, he might with little trouble and small money expense have gone near to reproducing Irving's material success. Instead he had no sooner secured the public ear by melodrama than he devoted his energies and resources to studying with great thoroughness, and to presenting with due accuracy as well as becoming reverence, subjects that called back the mind to the religious mystery and miracle plays in which the English drama had originated, just as Athenian tragedy had its religious beginnings connecting it with the worship of Dionysus.

Then came the versatile actor and manager who only passed away last summer, Herbert Beerbohm Tree. Beginning with the creation of his part in 'The Private Secretary,' Tree showed during the last quarter of the nineteenth century all Irving's industry as well as something of his genius, not in merely playing his part, but for a time converting himself into the personages he portrayed. The happy results with which he did this in 'The School for Scandal,' to take a single instance, made his acting a faultless foil to that of Sir Charles Wyndham. Tree, like Irving, had been trained to business, but differed from his predecessor in having passed through some preliminary theatrical experiences before venturing on the public boards. Theatricals of different kinds were common in the German schools and families where he had been brought up, and the private audiences to which he played contained many spectators as critical and exacting as those described by Goethe at Weimar.

In the nineteenth as in the twentieth century, the first demand of the popular taste on the serious stage artist is a mastery of 'character parts.' It is true that there is also a desire for mere decoration, for picturesque or even gorgeous effects, such as those produced by Augustus Harris, Wilson Barrett, and the producers of the Gilbert and Sullivan pieces, as well as by Irving and Tree themselves. Other evidence of this contemporary appetite for warmth, colour, and sensuous appeals is to be found in the religious services of the Church. On the other hand, the effect produced by Tree in problem

plays, not only of foreign but of English origin, may be dimly prophetic of the wide acceptance yet to be found for dramas dealing with the great moral and social issues of the hour, as well as with the nice points of personal casuistry that have exercised the ingenuity of Messrs. Barker and Vedrenne or of Mr. G. B. Shaw, and which appear to receive fresh illustration in Lady Gregory's national Irish Theatre as well as in the municipal playhouses now springing up in the great centres of industry and trade north of the Humber. It was the forecast of some such possibility as this which made Matthew Arnold, when writing on the French play in 1889, exclaim: 'Organise the theatre; the theatre is irresistible.' At the present moment, indeed, the legitimate home of the drama may be thought to have fallen upon evil days. The dispensation of musical comedy, kinematograph plays, and of whatever may assimilate the playhouse to the variety entertainments of the music-hall, may yet be looked back upon at a future day as a transient fashion. The international struggle now convulsing the universe has not yet produced any dramatic genius approaching in calibre to the Greek or Elizabethan masters. Even they, however, though living under the inspiration of great world movements, did not essay the business of creative art till the storm had passed and there had come an interval of tranquil meditation for elaborating the themes flashed on the mind during the season of darkness.

T. H. S. Escott.

THE MEDICI ARCHIVES

Catalogue of the Medici Archives, to be offered for sale by Messrs. Christie, Manson & Woods, on Feb. 4, 1918.

THE present war has proved—if proof were needed—that the history of each nation is a living factor in the national development, the very spinal cord connecting the nation of to-day with its forebears. Thus a new form of patriotism is born, such as has ever arisen in moments of great stress: no mere abstract principle, but a life-giving energy, containing all that is finest in the national spirit. It is just this spirit of continuity for which each people is fighting, and on the preservation of this continuity depends the life of each nation. The Medici archives, which are about to be offered for sale, form a remarkable illustration of this continuity, and it is a fortunate if curious coincidence that they should be brought before the world in the midst of a world-wide war. Apart from their historical and antiquarian value, they have, under the present circumstances, a far deeper meaning for all those who view history in the wider sense as the mirror of the soul of a race.

Of all the great families of the Renaissance, the Medici are perhaps the most typically and truly Italian. Allowing for the inevitable differences due to time and conditions, the political ideals of a man like Lorenzo il Magnifico are very similar to those of a modern Italian statesman. The problems he had to face were on a smaller scale, but the method of their solution was practically the same. There is indeed a curious analogy between the Florentine republic in the days of Lorenzo and the position of Italy in the period immediately preceding the present war. In the former case there was a small republic emerging out of the turmoil of internal discord, and becoming under the leadership of a strong man one of the main Italian states, developing and successfully putting into practice the principle of the 'Balance of Power'; in the latter the kingdom of Italy, recently united, playing an analogous part in the European comity

of nations. The process is the same, and the two facts are interdependent. It is true that the period of peace and great intellectual and spiritual development due to Lorenzo, and so illuminatingly mirrored in the collection of correspondence contained in these archives, ceased almost immediately after his death. Nevertheless, the seed had been sown, and had taken root, and we are fully justified in saying that the work of Lorenzo the Magnificent helped to form the political conscience of Italy. Looking at the Medici archives from this point of view, we are able to perceive their full import and significance : not as a mere relic, or even as a monument of a glorious past, but as the keystone of the present, as the witness of the Italian genius and of the Italian spirit, and of the continuity of the Italian race.

How State papers of such importance should have come to be in the possession of a younger branch of the family has been explained by Mr. Royall Tyler in his preface to the catalogue issued by Christie's. According to this explanation, the most important part of the archives, represented by the letters addressed by Lorenzo de' Medici and the Otto di Pratica to Pietro Alamanni, and by the minutes of his answers to them, became Alamanni's property when he retired from his career, and were handed down by him to his descendants, in the same way as the archives of the Granville family at Besançon contain a large collection of letters written to members of the family who were ambassadors of Emperor Charles V. According to Mr. Tyler, in those days such retention of official correspondence by private individuals who had acted in a public capacity was a common practice. From Pietro Alamanni the documents passed nearly a century later to his descendant Costanza Alamanni, who married Raffaello di Francesco de' Medici, a descendant of Giovenco de' Medici, the younger brother of Lorenzo's father. Support is lent to this explanation by the fact that Raffaello himself kept all the letters—also included in these archives—addressed to him by Ferdinando, Grand Duke of Tuscany, whose ambassador he was at the Court of Ferrara, 1587–1590.

But whatever may be the titles of the present owners to these historic documents, it would clearly be most regrettable if they were to be dispersed. For they are essentially Italian—a part of the national history of the country, and more

especially of Florence, to which they belong no less than the Palazzo Vecchio or the Palazzo Riccardi. Taken out of their Italian setting they must inevitably lose a large part of that imponderable yet very real psychological value which is their very essence. On this account it is most desirable that steps should be taken to preserve for Italy this precious link in the chain of her historical continuity.

The collection is composed of two main sections—namely, the archives of the Castellina and Ottaiano branches of the Medici family, and those of the Alamanni Embassy. The former section, though of secondary importance, has considerable value, for these younger Medici played an appreciable part in the history of the Florentine Republic, and their archives are rich in correspondence and documents which give a very clear idea of the life of a typical Florentine family from the earliest days down to those of the Grand Dukes about 1770, thus forming a most interesting study in the social development of Florence. This is reflected more especially in the large collection of ledgers and account-books. The Medici, like most large families of the time, were primarily mercantile. Towards the end of the Trecento, Florence had already made herself known across the Mediterranean. She realised, as Italy to-day is realising, that the Italian peninsula has a special and quite individual rôle in the Near East. Wherever the banner of the Republic was hoisted, Florentine stuffs and tissues and jewellery found their way together with the golden florin of the Republic. These account-books, far from being dull and uninteresting, give an inside view of the activities not only of the Medici family, but of those of the whole city. One finds constantly recurring the names of the best and oldest families of Florence, many of whose palaces are still extant and are still occupied by descendants of the original owners.

Special mention may be made of the papers relating to the industrial and commercial life of the younger branch of the Medici family and their business connexions with other Florentine houses about the year 1340. Amongst these there is a note signed by Cosimo ' Pater Patriae ' himself, addressed to Bernardo de' Medici, from which it appears that the Medici had dealings not only with the larger *Arti* of the *Lana* and the *Seta*, but with other branches of business—such as soap

manufacture, cattle-dealing, etc. Their firm had correspondents not only in the main cities of Italy, but also at Lyons, Constantinople, and all through the Levant.

The documents respecting 'the measures to satisfy the 'creditors of the famous Count Guidoguerra'—to whom Mr. Tyler wrongly attributes the reputation of a reckless spendthrift—show that the Medici family held an important position in medieval Florence, for the name of one of the members of this family is included among those who were acting for the creditors of Guidoguerra. It is interesting to add that Guidoguerra was met by Dante in Hell among a group of distinguished literary men who suffered torment for sinning against nature. He is thus referred to ('Inferno,' canto xvi. lines 34-39):

'Questi, l'orme di cui pestar mi vedi,
Tutto che nudo e dipelato vada,
Fu di grado maggior che tu non credi:

Nipote fu della buona Gualdrada;
Guidoguerra ebbe nome, ed in sua vita
Fece col senno assai e con la spada.'

The greater part of these documents relating to the younger branch of the family are written in Latin and contain, amongst others, papal briefs of Pope Leo X. signed by Cardinal Bembo. One curious document is the ratification of a deed of sale of a property belonging to Piero Spinelli on the River Vingonia, signed by Thomas Wytton, notary public of London, and countersigned by Vincenzo Guicciardini, Florentine Consul in that city, dated 1561. There are also several letters of a private nature from children of the Magnificent asking advice and favours of various kinds. In one letter, addressed by Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, when nine years old, to Francesco di Giuliano de' Medici, Podestà of Carmignano, the writer asks if he may go and shoot wild boar during his holidays on his uncle's estate at Monte Acuto. Francesco di Giuliano was elected Gonfaloniere of Florence for a second time in 1516; it was his grandson who married Costanza Alamanni.

But the most valuable document in this portion of the archives is the letter written by Lorenzino de' Medici, the murderer of Duke Alessandro, to Francesco de' Medici. This

letter, which places his guilt beyond all question, is dated from Venice, where Lorenzino had fled, on February 5th, 1537. The murder had taken place in Florence on the 5th of the preceding month. Apart from its historical value the letter gives a curious insight into the writer's character. Weak, carried away by his hatred, Lorenzino looking back at his crime, saw it in its true proportions, and evidently felt the need of silencing his conscience and justifying his action. The isolation caused by his exile and the lack of sympathy aroused by what he professed to regard as an act of heroic self-sacrifice for the good of Florence appear to have affected him. In the first part of the letter he elaborately sets out to raise and to confute, for Francesco's benefit, all the objections which might be opposed to the advisability of committing the deed at that particular moment. He is anxious to make it quite clear that he was prompted only by unselfish motives. The moment had been chosen after careful consultation with every person of importance in Florence. He suggests that had it been done when Charles V. was in Italy, it might have provoked a very dangerous revolution. If, instead, it had been done while the Duke was out of Florence it would have greatly endangered the internal security of the city. In fact it was on this very account that, after having murdered Alessandro, he left hurriedly. Moreover he wished to preserve a life which might continue to be devoted to the welfare of the city. He is bitterly disappointed that his countrymen should have been so ungrateful and so short-sighted as not to appreciate the services rendered them. None of his so-called friends have understood his motive ; perhaps not even Francesco himself will truly understand it. But as the holding of such a view might prejudice his friend's position, he suggests that his letter should be burnt. The close of the letter has obviously the purpose of winning the Gonfaloniere's sympathy and of securing some way by which the writer may later be able to return to Florence. Happily for historians, the letter was not burnt, and remains to illustrate one of the most interesting chapters in the later history of the Florentine Republic.

Under the Dukes and Grand Dukes the Castellina branch of the Medici, so called because Lorenzo son of Raffaello Balì was created Marchese della Castellina, continued to hold important positions. There is an interesting letter from

Cosimo I. Duke of Florence to Raffaello de' Medici, son of the Francesco above mentioned, who married Costanza Alamanni, enclosing a petition from Caterina widow of Giovanni da Filettole, praying for relief against a certain Canon Gamberelli of Pisa, probably a descendant of Il Rossellino. It appears that this Canon in order to possess himself of the widow's youngest daughter, aged thirteen, had recourse to a series of unsuccessful stratagems, which are exhaustively described in the petition, and might have furnished matter for one of Bandello's Novelle. Somewhere about 1586 Raffaello de' Medici was appointed Florentine ambassador at Ferrara by Francesco I. Grand Duke of Tuscany, and was later entrusted by his successor Ferdinand I. with a special mission to Lorraine.

The later correspondence down to 1770, when the archives end, refers principally to the intrigues and counter-intrigues between Florence and Ferrara and other Italian States. It affords a very clear idea of the policy followed by the Northern Italian States between the end of the sixteenth and the early years of the seventeenth century. This very closely followed the political events and currents in France and England. The collection contains also a considerable number of semi-private letters which throw light on the life of the Tuscan Court of that day, which lasted with few changes till the dawn of the Risorgimento. One of the last of these is a charming letter written by the Marchese Giulio de' Medici in 1750 to his mother, the Marchesa Albizzi, in which he describes his journey to the Levant on a ship commanded by an English captain named Hutton.

The comparative enlightenment of these last rulers of Tuscany, and the economic conditions prevailing in that country, contributed to isolating it from the rest of Italy and to develop those characteristics of mingled conservatism and cynical free-thought which can still be traced in the mental habit of the 'toscani' of to-day.

Few of the great figures of the Renaissance have been so discussed or have given rise to such violent and opposite points of view as Lorenzo the Magnificent. The perusal of these original documents, though they do not contain any startlingly new facts, will convince the reader of the great work accomplished by Lorenzo. He was the greatest and most far-seeing statesman of his age. Some historians have repre-

sented him as the tyrant of Florence and the destroyer of democratic liberties; but he was the first to conceive a practical confederation of Italian States, united by their common interests—the only form of national unity which could at that time be evolved—and the first to foresee and try to guard against the dangers which foreign intervention was to bring upon Italy. As Balbo observes, in his 'Sommario della Storia 'd'Italia,' Lorenzo marks the transition from the period of the Comuni to that of the Signorie—a transition which was the inevitable result of elements not external to, but part of, the natural development of communal life in which the Medici played a passive rather than an active part.

The tendency to strengthen and to give a new life to the political institutions of communal days was already evident in the fourteenth century in Florence and elsewhere. The Comuni had awakened many latent energies and stimulated an artistic and intellectual consciousness which could no longer be satisfied with an existence full of strife and uncertainty. Desiring rest and peace, indispensable to the enjoyment of the riches accumulated by their ancestors, and to the development of their spiritual life,—the inhabitants of these civic states sought for a form of government which would afford the best chance of realising such desires. The phenomenon was not unlike that presented by Europe before the outbreak of the present war. The difference is principally one of degree; the intellectual and political attitude is the same. In Italy in the fifteenth century, as in Europe in the twentieth, men were seeking for means to preserve the 'balance 'of power' and to substitute arbitration for war. The best exponent of this ideal in the fifteenth century was 'The 'Magnificent.' It is on this less known and not sufficiently appreciated phase of the diplomatic history of Florence and Italy that the Alamanni embassy archives throw a new light.

They cover the last years of Lorenzo de' Medici's life, and in them one can clearly follow the steps by which he succeeded in putting into practice the policy which gave Italy, if only for some five years, a peace, the seeds of which were much later to produce so great a fruit. The documents contained in them are of three kinds: the minutes of Alamanni's reports to the Otto di Pratica and their instructions to him; minutes

of his confidential reports to Lorenzo and Lorenzo's letters to him ; various copies and original documents connected with his missions to Milan, Rome, and Naples between February 1488 and April 1493.

Alamanni was Florentine Ambassador at the Court of Lodovico il Moro, Regent of Milan, until October 1490. Two months later he went to Rome at the special request of Lorenzo, and remained there until about March 1492. After Lorenzo's death on April 9th, 1492, Alamanni was appointed ambassador in Naples. His activities during this period are set forth in the minutes of letters addressed by him to Piero de' Medici, son and successor of the Magnificent, between September 1492 and February 1493. These and subsequent letters and reports show the change that came over Italian politics as soon as Lorenzo's dominating and pacifying influence was removed, and the inability of Piero to solve the problems which arose after his father's death. They also show the chain of events which led up to the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. If any proof were needed of Lorenzo's well-justified fears as to the dangers of internal dissensions in Italy, it is given by the above documents, which in themselves constitute the best and highest tribute to his political and diplomatic insight. Especially was this insight displayed in his refusal of the help proffered by Louis XI. against Naples and the Pope: 'Io non posso anteporre il mio particolare 'vantaggio al pericolo di tutta Italia ; volesse Iddio che al 'Re di Francia non venisse mai in mente di sperimentare le 'proprie forze in questo paese, quando ciò accada l'Italia sara 'perduta ! '

Pietro Alamanni was one of the trustiest as well as ablest of Lorenzo's friends. He had been with him all through the stormy years of the Pazzi conspiracy and the war with Pope Sixtus IV. and Ferdinand, King of Naples, and had inside knowledge of all these events, their causes and effects. Nothing appears to have been kept secret from him, and Lorenzo trusted implicitly in his discretion and ability, as is witnessed by the fact that he was ambassador at Milan—a post which, like that of Rome, was of the utmost delicacy and difficulty. This period of Alamanni's embassy to Milan and Naples, though externally quiet, was full of strenuous diplomatic activity, rendered all the more necessary by the unscrupulous ambitions

of Lodovico il Moro, regent of Milan, and by the weakness of Pope Innocent VIII.

The first years of Alamanni's embassy in Milan are covered by the minutes of letters addressed by him to the Otto di Pratica, and to Lorenzo. From these it appears that the main points of interest for Florence at this moment were the intrigues of the Genoese with Venice, and the strained relations between the Pope and the King of Naples, each of whom wished to enlist for himself the support of Florence and Milan in the event of war. The task entrusted to Alamanni was that of sounding Il Moro as to his attitude ; he was then to shape his own conduct ostensibly in accordance with that attitude, but without offending the susceptibilities of the Pope or arousing the suspicion of the King of Naples. The agreement between the Lord of Camerino and Mattia Corvino King of Hungary, a kinsman of the King of Naples, introduced a new and disturbing element into the situation, as the Pope seemed to consider that this agreement was a menace to his safety. A very clear summary of the situation is given in a letter written at this time by Lorenzo to Alamanni, dated 11th May 1489. Lorenzo urges that the most important object to keep in view was the prevention of any recourse to violence ; both the King of Naples and the Pope ought to consider that the union of Milan and Florence and their assurances that neither Pope nor King would be allowed to attack the other, constituted a sufficient guarantee. The main difficulty to be overcome was the distrust and obstinacy of the Pope, carefully intensified by the Venetians and by the Lords of the Marches, to serve their own ends. In view of this an agreement between the Florentines and the Genoese became of first-rate importance. In the latter part of the letter, written partly in cipher, Lorenzo trenchantly sums up Lodovico and the policy to be followed in dealing with him, caustically observing that he must in the future be treated as he has been in the past, for 'da sè medesimo farà in modo che farà di sè assai buono 'merchato.'

The situation was rendered more dangerous by the apparent intention of the Pope to excommunicate Ferdinand, which momentarily caused Lodovico to change his attitude, and to throw himself almost completely on the side of the King. A month later, Lorenzo writes to Alamanni expressing the

fear that the intolerant attitude assumed by the Pope would lead the King to make impossible demands—all the more as he seeemed more anxious than the Pope for war. Lorenzo instructs Alamanni to speak quite openly to Lodovico deprecating his change of attitude, which would imperil the safety of Italy. In a later conversation Lodovico assured Alamanni that he had no intention of allowing the King or the Pope to attack one another ; and if Florence and Milan stood firmly together this would not take place. Lorenzo was somewhat reassured ; but in view of subsequent efforts of the King of Naples to sow discord between the Pope, Lodovico, and himself, Lorenzo expresses the hope that the King will be made to understand that the interests of Milan and Florence are interdependent, and he insists more than ever on the idea that the two States should co-operate to preserve the peace of Italy. In such manner was the all-important question of the relations between Rome and Naples discussed and studied by Lorenzo and Lodovico, both devoting their energies to preventing a conflict. But the central figure is undeniably Lorenzo de' Medici. Never for a moment does he lose control, or slacken his grip, on the other actors in this great diplomatic comedy. With consummate skill he turns from one to the other, playing on their weaknesses and on their petty ambitions.

It was, in fact, on the restraining influence that Lorenzo de' Medici exerted on the Pope, that the peace of Italy now principally hung. And the correspondence shows to great advantage all the ruses and methods to which Lorenzo had recourse—now wheedling, now frightening the Pope—so as to prevent the ever-present friction between him and King Ferdinand becoming acute. He gave instructions to his ambassador to find a compromise which would satisfy both parties and give the King no motive for taking active military measures. In the same letter Lorenzo insists on the necessity for keeping the friendship of the College of Cardinals, which, he assured Alamanni, exerted a very considerable influence. Anyhow, he who had succeeded in keeping two or three ladies at once, ought not to find the task too difficult, for 'basta essere 'secreto et non fare o dire cosa che dispiaccia a chi si fida di 'voi, ingegnandosi di guadagnare con ogni huomo et non 'perdere con nessuno.'

An instance of the Pope's weakness and obstinacy, and of

the difficulties which Alamanni had to smooth over, is afforded by the Ascoli rebellion which almost precipitated a war between Rome and Naples, and which gave rise to an endless series of intrigues and misunderstandings. The Florentine Republic acted as mediator, and Lorenzo's advice was, after much hesitation, followed by Innocent VIII. This preliminary understanding laid the foundations for a further and more important *rapprochement*, which had as its ultimate object the conclusion of a peace between these two States.

Lorenzo's attitude towards a general alliance of the Italian potentates is of special interest, because it is an instance of his far-sighted diplomacy and of his shrewdness in his dealings with other States. The idea—Lorenzo charged Alamanni to inform Il Moro,—though in itself good, might create dissension and dangerous mistrust, all the more as Venice—who had proposed it—had, heretofore, held aloof from any form of alliance. If Venice and Milan could induce the Pope to take part in it, well; if not, of what use could be a league which did not represent a common point of view of all the Italian States?

The Medici archives present Lorenzo the Magnificent as a statesman more completely and clearly than has ever been done before. Many of the letters addressed to Alamanni clearly show that all matters of great importance were dealt with by Lorenzo himself without the knowledge or the help of the Signoria or the Otto di Pratica. Lorenzo was far ahead, yet fully representative, of his age. The policy of alliance between the four great Italian States which he proved to be a practical possibility, if only for a short time, was very far in advance of the policy of the other princes who were his contemporaries. It led the way past the prejudices of the Florentine Guelphs, and all merely family interests, to a wider and more essentially modern conception of national life and international policy.

ARUNDEL DEL RE.

EARLY PHASES OF FOOD CONTROL

1. **First (Interim) Report with Statement showing the operations of the Royal Commission on the Sugar Supply from date of appointment to beginning of December, 1916.** Cd. 8728.
2. **Reports of the Select Committee on National Expenditure.** H. of C. papers 151 and 167 of 1917.
3. **The Food Supply of the United Kingdom.** A Report drawn up by a Committee of the Royal Society. Cd. 8421.
4. **Food Supply Manual.**

WHEN our descendants discuss the manner in which this generation met the gravest danger which has ever menaced Great Britain, they will probably decide that we did it in a thoroughly British way. Before the war it was a commonplace of popular discussion that Englishmen of the twentieth century were different from their forefathers. The view was widely held that the race had lost its virile qualities, that we were decadent, slothful, luxurious, shirking work and duty, and concerned only with golf, horse-racing, and picture palaces. That particular theory—which after all we only half-believed—found ready acceptance in Germany, and was, perhaps, by the irony of fate, the deciding factor which influenced the Kaiser's mind when he 'pressed the 'button' and launched the world into catastrophe. By the Germans, it is doubtless regarded as the crowning evidence of English hypocrisy, that we lured them to the belief that we were effete.

But our grandsons, in reviewing our great fight for national existence, will discover that we possessed just the traditional characteristics of the race. Incapable at the outset of visualising the task before us, plunging energetically into sporadic action, slowly realising the magnitude of the business, and then beginning to organise ourselves reluctantly and imperfectly, abusing one another violently, while subconsciously having complete faith in each other, settling down with grim determination to see the thing through at any cost, quite incapable of seeing more than one thing at a time, blind to a

brick wall until it positively stops further progress, and all the while fighting, whether at the Front or in the workshops, with a cheery confidence that nothing can shake, and a persistent 'grousing' which nothing can subdue—that is how the British make war. As we acquire an Empire in a fit of absence of mind, so we eventually attain a deadly efficiency in warfare in spite of ourselves.

When the crash came on August 4, 1914, neglected warnings of the danger of our dependence on oversea supplies of food were recalled—and exaggerated. As a result of these exaggerations the belief was common that any interference with our shipping meant almost immediate starvation. When therefore it was announced by the Government, as the result of special inquiries, that the supplies of wheat then in the country—including the home crop—were sufficient to meet the normal consumption for five months, and that the home supplies of potatoes were sufficient for nearly twelve months, and when further it was found that the mysterious menace of the submarine was—as it then appeared—almost negligible even in the narrow waters of the English Channel, there was a reaction from the first impulse of panic, the dread of starvation disappeared, and the tendency to rush up prices stopped.

Among other steps taken by the Government on the outbreak of war was the setting up of a Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies. Returns of stocks of all foodstuffs in the country were obtained, and arrangements made for the periodical collection of this information. As half our supplies of sugar came from enemy countries, the Government took steps to secure large quantities from other areas, and on the 20th of August established a Royal Commission to control the imports of sugar, and to buy the necessary supplies on Government account. At the same time, exports of food were prohibited except by licence, and after two or three months the prohibition was extended to feeding stuffs for animals. These may be recorded as the first steps towards Food Control.

The immediate position as regards wheat supplies in the autumn of 1914 was satisfactory. During the first three months of the war, the imports of wheat and flour were larger by 3,200,000 cwts. than in the corresponding period of 1913, and at the end of October the stocks in the country were

practically the same as at the beginning of August. But the outlook for the future was not reassuring, and became still more unpleasant when the Dardanelles were closed. Until the new crops in Argentina and India came into the market, there was practically no wheat to be bought, except in North America.

The United States fortunately had had a good, and Canada a fairly good crop, but in view of the uncertainty about the sufficiency of supplies, keen competition on the American and Canadian markets was inevitable. If the British Government had openly joined in the competition, and especially if it had endeavoured to buy more than the normal share of this country, the price of wheat would have been raised to any height.

On the other hand it could not be expected that corn importers, though they were known generally to be doing their best to maintain their regular trade, and to keep the nation supplied, would—acting on commercial lines—acquire unusual stocks, while it was also doubtful whether they would secure, against the keen competition of other countries, even the normal share for this country of the limited supplies. The Government accordingly in November, 1914, set up a secret Committee to make arrangements, under the general direction of the Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies, for the purchase, shipment, storage, and distribution of wheat and flour. During the next four or five months large quantities of wheat were shipped on Government account to the United Kingdom, the greater part of which was put into store and gradually distributed for consumption, through the ordinary trade channels, in the early summer.

At the end of 1914 the sufficiency of wheat supplies up to the harvest of the next English crop depended on the crops in Argentina, India, and, in a less degree, on Australia. Fortunately, Argentina had a good crop—some 50 per cent. larger than in the previous year—while the good news came that India had increased her wheat acreage by 4,000,000 acres, and in the end reaped the largest crop on record. In Australia, on the other hand, the crop failed, and so far from having supplies to spare, she became an importer of wheat before her next crop became available.

India as a rule does not begin to export her wheat crop

freely until May, and it was evident that the United Kingdom would need as much as possible during the early summer. The Indian Government found it necessary in the interests of India to control prices, and the regulation of exports was a natural consequence of that policy. In March, 1915, a Committee was set up to make arrangements in co-operation with the Government of India, and, under the general direction of the Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies, for the purchase, shipment, and disposal of Indian wheat. Large quantities of wheat were shipped from India to the United Kingdom during the period April to August, 1915, and the effect was to exert a moderating influence on the wheat market generally.

No addition to the world's wheat acreage which could affect supplies during the cereal year 1914–15 was possible, except in India, after the outbreak of war; but a great impetus was given to the sowing of wheat for the 1915 crop in the United States and Canada, where nearly 10,000,000 acres in all were added in the autumn of 1914 and the spring of 1915 to the area under wheat. British farmers also contributed in their degree, for although the additional area in the United Kingdom amounted to no more than 430,000 acres, this was an increase of 23 per cent., while the addition in the United States was 13 per cent., and in Canada 26 per cent. In August, 1914, the Board of Agriculture appointed a strong Consultative Committee, and a good deal was done to stimulate and advise farmers with results which, within the lines adopted, were substantial.

From the first the Government had necessarily bought large quantities of food of all kinds for the Army and Navy, and incidentally to the meat contracts made for the troops, certain quantities of imported meat were after a time placed by the Board of Trade on the open market, through the ordinary trade channels, but the supplies thus made available were relatively small. Otherwise, sugar and wheat were the only foodstuffs in which the Government dealt for civilian requirements.

The outlook for wheat supplies during the cereal year 1915–16 was favourable, and in marked contrast to the previous year. The increased area in the United States and Canada was attended by bumper crops, and North America harvested some 40,000,000 quarters more in 1915 than in 1914. The

United Kingdom had 1,500,000 quarters more, the crop being the largest since 1898. India still appeared to have a very large quantity unshipped from the crop of 1915, while towards the end of that year it became evident that Australia would have the largest crop ever gathered in the Commonwealth. There appeared therefore to be little cause for anxiety about supplies, provided always that the ocean highways were kept open. The losses of grain ships were comparatively few, and it appeared that the worst to be feared was a temporary and partial interruption of oversea supplies rather than a complete or prolonged failure of imports. To provide against this, it was decided again to purchase a reserve against the period when, by the exhaustion of home supplies, the trade stocks are normally at their lowest.

A further development of Government dealings in wheat had meanwhile taken place. During the winter of 1914–15 both France and Italy had bought largely, and their competition in the markets had obviously been prejudicial to the interests of each other, and also of this country. The British Government therefore approached the Allies, and suggested that in their mutual interests a system of co-operation, rather than competition, was desirable. An agreement was arrived at that all purchases of wheat, maize, and flour on account of the British and Italian Governments, and of the French Ministry of War, should be made jointly through one agent. A Committee was formed, comprising representatives of each of the Allies, which started operations in January, 1916, and for the following nine months met daily and conducted the business. The wheat bought on account of the British Government through the Committee was stored until the summer, a portion of it being placed in the mills under agreements with the millers, which provided that they should hold it until a specified date, and then pass it into consumption in regular instalments extending over a period of six weeks.

By this time the close relation of the control of shipping to the supplies of food was becoming more and more apparent, and the fact was strongly emphasised by the rapid rise in freights. The purchase of wheat involved the chartering of ships, and as it was deemed inadvisable to requisition vessels for this purpose, the tonnage had to be secured in the

open freight market. The loss of shipping by the action of the enemy was still comparatively small, but the loss was cumulative, and as not only allied but also neutral shipping became involved, the reduction of available tonnage began to be felt. The ever-growing demands of the Allies for shipping for the transport of troops, military stores, and munitions involved a still larger drain upon the mercantile marine. Towards the end of 1915 a system of requisitioning vessels for the carriage of foodstuffs was adopted, although the form which the requisition took was that of ordering vessels to make a particular voyage and take a particular cargo, the charges for freight being still left to agreement between the Government and the shipowner. At the same time a regulation was made that all British vessels should work under licence. The Ship Requisitioning (Carriage of Foodstuffs) Committee and the Ship Licensing Committee were the bodies respectively entrusted with these duties.

In the latter part of 1916 it became evident that a more complete control of tonnage and some limitation of freights were essential, if the food supply of the Allies was to be assured. But the control of tonnage for wheat practically involved the control of the shipments of wheat. So far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the imports of wheat on Government account had not amounted to more than one-seventh of our total oversea supplies. The remainder still continued to be imported by the corn trade, whose capital, organisation, knowledge, and experience were thus utilised in the service of the State. For the service thus rendered they were receiving substantial remuneration in the form of profits, of which the State took toll in the form of taxes, but the risks of the business were considerable, and many of them were becoming alarmed. It was not certain that the State could continue to rely upon private enterprise for the supply to the people of their daily bread, and it was decided that the time had come to adopt, in the case of wheat, the policy which two years earlier had been adopted in the case of sugar.

On October 11, 1916, the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies was appointed, with full powers to purchase, sell, and deal in grain, and took over the functions of the existing Grain Supplies Committee. The principle of buying by direct agents in the exporting countries was continued, but new

arrangements were necessary for receiving and distributing the grain in the United Kingdom. All corn merchants who had been in the habit of importing and distributing grain were given the opportunity of becoming agents for the Commission on fixed terms of commission. All speculation in wheat was thus automatically stopped. The Liverpool Option Market had been closed immediately after the outbreak of war.

The appointment of the Wheat Commission may be said to have marked a definite stage in the development of State Food Control. The war had lasted twenty-six months, a period which had almost coincided with two cereal years. During that period oversea supplies of the principal foodstuffs had been, on the whole, well maintained. The quantities imported in each of the two years are shown in millions of cwts. in the following table:

	1914–15.	1915–16.
	Million cwts.	Million cwts.
Wheat and Flour	111·5	111·8
Rice	10·1	8·3
Sugar	35·8	32·0
Beef	8·0	7·3
Mutton	4·6	3·5
Bacon	6·4	6·9
Hams	1·3	1·4
Butter	3·7	2·8
Margarine	1·7	2·6
Cheese	2·8	2·5

As regards home supplies a comprehensive view of the farming position can only be obtained from the returns collected in June of each year, but a comparison of the chief figures for 1915 and 1916 with those of 1914, shown in the table on p. 115, gives some measure of the agricultural effort during the first two years of the war.

The increase in the acreage under corn crops during the first year of the war was maintained in the second, in spite of the wholesale withdrawal of men from the land, while the stock of cattle and sheep was steadily increased. It is true that self-interest pointed the way, but it is equally true that

the majority of farmers honestly strove to increase the production of food from patriotic as much as from commercial motives.

The late Government were criticised for their alleged indifference to food supplies, but the record shows that they did in fact maintain supplies both from overseas and from home production. Some of the steps which they took with this object have been indicated, but their action was not advertised, no elaborate administrative machinery was constructed, and very little public money was spent. It may be argued that they might have done more if they had taken other measures, but it may equally be argued that if they had interfered more, they would, under the circumstances then existing, have

	1914.	1915.	1916.
	Million acres.	Million acres.	Million acres.
Wheat . . .	1·9	2·3	2·1
Barley . . .	1·9	1·5	1·7
Oats . . .	3·9	4·2	4·2
Potatoes . . .	1·2	1·2	1·2
	Millions.	Millions.	Millions.
Cattle . . .	12·2	12·3	12·5
Sheep . . .	28·0	28·3	28·8
Pigs . . .	4·0	3·8	3·6

achieved less. The organisation by which a nation is fed is not only vast and complicated, but extremely delicate in its adjustment. A derangement of the normal process, which appears only to affect shopkeepers at home, may react at the other end of the world. Exceptional wisdom and far-sightedness are required to avoid magnifying the evil which it is intended to cure, and above all courage is essential to resist popular clamour for specious and spectacular action.

In the end it was the popular discontent, excited by the rise in price of the main articles of food, which forced the hand of the Government. There were no signs of distress. The returns of pauperism had never been lower, and except among the professional classes, and those whose incomes were fixed,

there was every indication of financial prosperity. Evidence that the wage-earning classes on the whole were not pinched for the necessaries of existence was to be found in their unusual expenditure on the amenities and adornments of life. The root of the discontent was not in suffering or hardship, but in a sense of injustice and a feeling of resentment. The belief was widespread that the people were being exploited by the greed of individuals. There is a natural instinct of revulsion against the making of money out of human suffering, and it appeared that while our sons and brothers were enduring torture and death, in order that we might live in comfort and peace, there were some among us who were battening on the misery of mankind, and amassing unholy gains. The publication of balance sheets showing large profits made by supplying food to the people, and the complacency with which the results of such remunerative trading were announced, greatly aggravated the feeling of exasperation. One or two cases were seized upon by the press, and 'written 'up' with the remorseless effectiveness of modern journalism. Embellished versions of the facts found their way into every workshop and factory, and into every village in the country, where they still continue to furnish the watchwords of discontent.

To the ordinary business man all this appeared unreasonable and unfair. Any trader of ordinary judgment having capital and enterprise could hardly fail to make money on a rising market, in dealing in an article of prime necessity. The supplies of the nation can only be secured by 'buying forward,' i.e. buying to-day for delivery at some future period. The managers of any large business know their weekly or monthly requirements, and their object must be to ensure that the supplies for their customers will be at their disposal with absolute regularity. To do this they must take the risk of buying the commodities which they require at prices which, when the time comes to receive and sell them, may or may not—according to the course of the world's markets—show a profit.

It is easy now to look back and say that there was no appreciable risk in buying forward—that prices were bound to rise. At that time, apart from the fact that there were fluctuations in prices, and a certain number of traders were

more than once heavy losers by a break in the markets, no certainty was felt that prices might not fall. For a long period in the early part of the war, the possibility of the opening of the Dardanelles was a menace to the corn markets. The news of the first attack on the Dardanelles caused a break in the market, and undoubtedly if the supplies then held up in Russia and Roumania had been released, any trader who had large stocks would have incurred a heavy loss. From the business man's point of view, traders who took this risk were entitled to the profits, if their enterprise was successful, just as they would have had to bear the loss if it failed. The risk—whatever it was—had to be taken, if the nation's food supply was to be ensured, and after two years of leaving it to private enterprise—supplemented by the acquisition of a Government reserve—it was decided that the whole risk, with the attendant losses or profits, should be taken by the State.

The consequences of this step were probably not fully foreseen, but they were, in fact, fairly obvious. State control of wheat involved control of flour, and control of flour meant control of flour mills. State control of bread-corn involved the control of other cereals, and eventually the control of breadstuffs involved the control of other food imports. This extension of control was inevitable, not because it was logical, although in fact it was, but because it was certain that the Government, whether they contemplated it or not, would be steadily pushed farther along the path when they had once entered it.

As 'the music of the moon Sleeps in the plain eggs of the 'nightingale,' so it may be said that the full doctrine of State control of food supplies was hidden in the warrant of the Wheat Commission.

Within a month of the establishment of the Wheat Commission, the Government announced in the House of Commons their intention to appoint a Food Controller. In pursuance of this policy the Board of Trade proceeded, under the Defence of the Realm Act, to make Food Control Orders, the first being one compelling millers to extract a higher percentage of flour from wheat. They made further Orders prohibiting the use of wheat in brewing, fixing a maximum price for milk, and restricting the number of courses to be served at meals in public eating places. A bill providing for the appointment

of a Food Controller was introduced and passed into law on December 22, 1916.

It is worth while recalling what the expressed intention of Parliament was in taking this step. Section 4 of the Act (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 68) defines the duty of the Food Controller thus: 'to regulate the supply and consumption of food in 'such manner as he thinks best for maintaining a proper 'supply of food and to take such steps as he thinks best for 'encouraging the production of food.'

On December 26 Lord Devonport was appointed Food Controller, and held office until June last, when he was succeeded by Lord Rhondda. The general policy of both Ministers has been the same, and Lord Rhondda has more than once stated that he has in some matters carried out plans prepared by his predecessor. In fact it may be said that throughout the year's administration of the Ministry of Food 'one increasing purpose runs.' Maintenance of supplies has no doubt been kept in view, but the growing tendency has been to place foremost the reduction of prices, the regulation of distribution, and the restriction of consumption. The old Parliamentary principle of 'grievances before supplies' has, perhaps unconsciously, become the dominant policy.

The first Food Controller was embarrassed by the circumstances under which he took office. The clear path of wisdom was to sit down and study the problem, and to act cautiously and tentatively after mature consideration. But the nation was excited and clamorous for immediate action. The German policy of 'unrestricted' piracy by submarine had been announced and had established for a time a state of alarm, which neither Ministers nor the press did anything to allay. Demands for immediate and drastic action to save the country from starvation filled the air. The Food Controller was expected to make the country self-supporting by a stroke of the pen. It is a common observation that the public can only think of one thing at a time, and in this they are faithfully represented in the popular press. But the business of a Government is to think of many things at once, and to correlate them all in a considered policy. The immediate risk of a shortage of food had to be considered in connection with risks of a shortage of money, of munitions, of ships, of guns, of aircraft, of men, and of scores of other essentials. The conduct of war consists in taking risks, and in judging the

precise amount of risk which can reasonably be taken, on a review of all the circumstances, in each case.

The Food Controller started with a gallant effort to induce the nation to restrict its consumption of three main articles of food—bread, meat, and sugar. There is no doubt that the effort achieved substantial results. The exceptionally severe winter, the shortage of potatoes, and above all the fact that large numbers of the working classes were receiving wages far higher than they had ever previously received, and were, very humanly, satisfying their appetites to an extent which they had never before had the chance of doing—all these and other influences, such as resentment against the continuance of brewing, made the advocacy of food economy seem almost hopeless. But undoubtedly in hundreds of thousands of households less food was consumed, and, more especially, waste of food was greatly reduced.

More direct methods of ensuring economy were also taken. The amount of wheat used in bread, and of sugar in brewing and confectionery, was compulsorily reduced, the consumption of food in hotels, restaurants, and clubs was restricted, and the use of cereals for other purposes than human food was limited. The continued rise in the price of commodities was dealt with, and in a few of the more clamant cases maximum prices were imposed. At the same time steps were taken in the direction of diminishing speculation, and reducing middlemen's profits, particularly in regard to bacon, cheese, and butter. Flour mills were taken under control, and a scheme for establishing local machinery for the distribution of sugar or other articles of food was carefully elaborated for service if required. With regard to supplies, arrangements were made for substantially increasing the stock of wheat in the country, which in due course resulted in the establishment of a larger reserve than had ever previously been held. Under the circumstances few would condemn this action, but its consequences were far-reaching. The price of wheat in exporting countries was necessarily forced up by the additional demand upon a limited supply, with the result that in the end the Government decided that the people's bread must be artificially cheapened, and a charge estimated at £40,000,000 per annum was added to the heavy burdens of the taxpayer.

Before the results of his action had matured Lord Devon-

port resigned, and his successor proceeded, in the first place, to increase very largely the staff and organisation of the Ministry of Food. He claimed, very reasonably, to be allowed time to consider the problems confronting him, and to examine carefully the projects left to him by his predecessor. He took immediately, however, a step which seemed to be fraught with very hopeful possibilities—the establishment of a 'cost-'ing' department on an extensive scale, which enlisted the services of a number of eminent accountants. After due consideration he proceeded to take very active measures, mainly in the direction of Orders fixing maximum prices to the consumer, and restricting the profits of producers and dealers. There are now very few articles of food which are not subject to control in this sense. In pursuance of the policy previously settled, he made arrangements as rapidly as possible for securing control of all imports of foodstuffs, in co-operation with the American and Canadian Food Controllers. It is, however, much easier to fix prices here than to ensure the continuity of supplies across the seas. The natural and inevitable effect of fixing maximum prices is to check, if not entirely to stop, private enterprise, and unless the State is instantly ready to maintain the supply, there is likely to be a break in the regular flow, which no subsequent effort can completely make good. This is at once evident in the case of imported supplies.

The familiar instance of American bacon—which has been repeatedly brought under public notice by persons interested in the trade—is a good example. The export trade to this country is a comparatively small branch of the business of the American 'packers,' as the great dealers in 'hog-products' are termed. The hogs are selected, cut up and packed in a particular way for this market, and so long as the export trade runs its regular course, this department of the establishment goes on regularly. It takes, however, from two to three months before the hog bought in America is sold as bacon in England, and consequently the packer has to reckon what the price of bacon is likely to be when it comes on the English market. This in ordinary times is the market risk, and he bases his judgment on his knowledge of probable supplies of bacon, from all sources, coming forward, and the effect on market prices of plenty or scarcity. If, however, an arbitrary

authority steps in and fixes prices at a level which does not seem to him to give a reasonable chance of a profit, he at once shuts down the branch of his business which is engaged in supplying that market, and sends his bacon to the home or some other market, which has not been interfered with. Directly a Food Controller was appointed here, the American 'packers' became nervous, but for a considerable time after prices here began to be fixed, a nice adjustment was made, so as to keep the level at a point which would just avoid frightening them into stopping supplies. At last, however, this point was overstepped, and they immediately stopped their export business for this country.

This is how price-fixing may operate in the case of an imported foodstuff. The effect is quick and evident, and prompt action by the Government may rapidly retrieve the situation. In the case of home produce, the effect is slower and less obvious. Take cheese for example. The prices fixed for cheese were alleged to be below the level corresponding to that at which milk can be sold. The farmer thereupon decides that this season he will not make cheese as he has been accustomed to do, but will 'scrap' his cheese-making plant and sell his milk. But the effect of his decision, which may be arrived at in May, is not apparent until perhaps October, when, if a sufficient number of farmers have adopted this course, there will be a marked shortage of supplies in the cheese fairs.

In the case of meat supplies, the effect of price-fixing is still more difficult to follow. The effect of a particular Order on the numbers of cattle, sheep or pigs slaughtered can be readily seen. The rate of slaughter at any period is comparatively immaterial, except as regards the supplies of meat at the moment. What really matters is the rate of breeding to replace the numbers slaughtered. If farmers for any reason reduce the number of calves bred, it is a long time before the fact becomes apparent. There are very good reasons at present for increasing the rate of slaughter, but in the interests of future supplies, it is extremely important also to stimulate breeding. The problem is a difficult one, and it cannot be said that the manner in which it has been handled has been far-sighted.

From the first it appeared almost as if some imp of mischief

directed the policy of the Government in regard to home meat supplies. The early attempt of the Food Controller to limit wasteful consumption by imposing a meatless day in public eating-houses was abandoned as the result of short-sighted clamour. The timely warning to farmers of an imminent shortage of feeding stuffs was wise, but the injunctions to them in the midst of the grass season not to fatten their cattle were unnecessary. It was obvious that if farmers could not obtain artificial food during the winter, they would slaughter more of their stock, and at the present price of feeding cake—even if it could be obtained—there was no temptation to any grazier to make his beasts needlessly fat. Probably they paid no attention to the injunctions, but continued to feed their stock just as much as their supplies of food rendered possible; but it would surely have been wiser to urge them to put as much meat as their resources allowed on each animal before sending it to the butcher. The slaughter of lean or half-fat beasts may be unavoidable, but from the meat supply point of view it is obviously wasteful and greatly increases the drain upon the herds of the country. The fixing of maximum prices for meat may have been inevitable, but it was unfortunate that the scale was not announced earlier, and that when it was announced it had almost at once to be modified.

Potatoes, also, appear to have been the sport of an unkind fate. The first Food Controller found himself with practically no potatoes to control, and probably his wisest course would have been to leave them alone. Immediately he took office, however, he committed himself to a maximum growers' price, from which all later troubles developed. No manipulation of maximum prices could provide more potatoes, and any scheme of distribution by the Government of a wholly insufficient supply was no more likely to be successful than reliance on the ordinary trade channels. What was done was to keep the price low for those who could get them, and to attempt by prohibiting potatoes at restaurants and clubs, and by appealing to the well-to-do classes to avoid them, to secure that as large a proportion as possible of the limited supplies should be available for the poorer classes. A promising scheme for supplementing supplies by imports from Spain was frustrated by circumstances for which the Government were not responsible.

With the object of insuring against a similar potato famine in the following season, the Government offered a guarantee to growers of a price which, if their object was achieved, was higher than would be obtainable in the market. Again, owing to the change in the office of Food Controller, there was delay in announcing the scheme by which effect would be given to this guarantee, and when it was announced, it was found to be based on the principle of making the guaranteed price the minimum. This was so obviously impossible that it had immediately to be withdrawn, and a scheme substituted whereby the cost of the State guarantee for potatoes—as for wheat and oats under the Corn Production Act—falls upon the Exchequer.

For mistakes in dealing with meat and potatoes, there are many extenuating circumstances, but it must be confessed that they are less apparent in the case of sugar. The control of sugar supplies, as has already been said, was the first administrative adventure of the State into the uncharted sea of Food Control. At least a year ago the system of distribution was known to be defective, and methods of improved distribution were under consideration. After many months of deliberation, a scheme was launched, which bid fair to effect a very substantial improvement in distribution, even if it did not purport to be absolutely complete and watertight. It has been altered with a view of making it comprehensive, but it is open to question whether it would not have been wiser to put the original scheme into operation, and to defer amending it until experience had been gained of its working.

Nothing is more simple than complete Food Control—on paper. Any intelligent person with a slight knowledge of economic theory can sit down and draw up a perfectly logical and scientific scheme for bringing food supplies regularly from the farm to the household in adequate and properly proportioned quantities and at reasonable prices. Unfortunately, many people, intelligent and unintelligent, believe that a scheme on paper is equivalent to a scheme in practice. The amateur administrator assumes that any regulation or order formulated by the Government is automatically operative. The person who has been engaged for any length of time in the business of attempting to transform aspirations into action, knows by sad experience that no law

or regulation affecting the daily life of the people, or the conduct of commercial transactions, ever works precisely as intended.

We talk of the peculiar psychology of the German nation, but the psychology of the British people is equally peculiar. The mentality, habits, and traditions of the two nations are entirely different, yet both are easily governed, provided they are governed in the manner suitable to their characteristics. The German trusts and obeys bureaucracy, the Englishman distrusts and disobeys it. The German provides ideal human material for economic experiments, and a perfect field for statistical investigations; he contentedly and confidingly fills up forms, and regards the making of returns as an essential part of the duty of a good citizen. In all this he differs fundamentally from the Englishman, who will readily accept and obey any regulation which commends itself to him as reasonable and necessary and which does not give him much personal trouble; but he will resist and evade, with ingenious success, any order which he considers unreasonable or unnecessary. He takes nothing on trust from the Government; he needs to be convinced before he can be coerced. It is again very easy, sitting in Whitehall, to issue orders that all who contravene a legal enactment are to be prosecuted; but this merely penalises a few hundreds or thousands of the least clever or cautious of those who are disobeying. It will shock the intelligent person above-mentioned, but it is a profoundly true paradox that a symmetrical and theoretically perfect scheme of food control will never work satisfactorily in this country. The less logical symmetry there is in it, the more likely it is to be effective.

The most completely symmetrical system conceivable is the socialist scheme of State control of the means of production, and the machinery of distribution. The application of that system to the immediate purpose of maintaining supplies and regulating prices would involve State management of all farms and all retail shops, together with all agencies for converting, manufacturing, and distributing the produce, namely, mills, bakeries, bacon-curing establishments, slaughter-houses, butter factories, jam-making houses, and a hundred other intermediate industries. Assuming, for the sake of argument, the practicability of such an enterprise, is it possible

to imagine that so great an economic revolution could be effected in a few months or even years? At the best there would be intolerable friction and dislocation, at innumerable points, in the immense machine of food distribution, which would take much time and patience to adjust.

Food differs in one vital respect from all other commodities —its distribution must be as regular and uninterrupted as the sunrise. The supply of boots or hats, of gramophones or books, may be stopped for a few days or weeks, and nothing very tragic will happen. But the distribution of bread or meat cannot be suspended while the officials are adjusting some temporary breakdown in the arrangements.

The essential objects of Food Control are three: (1) to stimulate home production and maintain imports, (2) to prevent the exploitation of war conditions by private greed, and (3) to secure for each member of the community equal opportunities of obtaining the available supplies. To the attainment of these objects, all the steps taken, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, have been directed. The efforts to reduce consumption, whether compulsorily as in the Meals Order and some of the Sugar Orders, or by persuasion, as in the two Food Economy campaigns, indirectly help all the objects in view.

Direct efforts to stimulate home production have from the first been left to the Agricultural Departments, and cannot fairly be said to have been assisted by the Food Controller, although both Lord Devonport and Lord Rhondda have, in fact, endeavoured not to thwart them and have, consistently with what they regarded as their primary duty to the consumer, tried to be mindful of the producer. It would be foolish, however, to contest the fact that, whatever may have been the result of other acts of the Government, the policy of Food Control has tended to discourage production. As regards direct efforts for the maintenance of food imports, the Ministry of Food, from its start, has taken vigorous action, and has done all that has been possible under the very difficult conditions. If, now and again, administrative action at home has not been perfectly co-ordinated with action abroad, the inevitable 'hitches' which occur in working a new and temporary organisation may explain and excuse the accidents.

To achieve the second object in view, two lines of action have been taken. In the case of certain commodities, the

whole business of importing and of wholesale distribution was taken over by the State, and the firms engaged in the business were made agents of the Government at fixed rates of remuneration. This was done in the case of sugar, and partially in the case of wheat and meat, before the establishment of the Wheat Commission, which finally put a stop to all speculation and undue profits in the grain trade. The principle was gradually extended to importers and wholesale distributors of many other articles of food. Where the plan of making traders direct agents of the State was inapplicable, the method chiefly adopted to prevent undue profits has been that of price-fixing.

Most competent observers of the social barometer agree that the discontent which undoubtedly exists throughout the country with regard to food is mainly due to the popular indignation against what is conveniently, but vaguely, termed 'profiteering.' Like so many journalistic catchwords, the term is frequently used, but never defined. A simple definition would be, that profiteering is taking advantage of war conditions to obtain as high a price for something which you have to sell as you can induce a purchaser to give. As, however, this definition would include a very large proportion of the working classes, not to mention the proprietors of some of the most popular newspapers, it is clear that this is not what the term is intended to connote.

War is atavistic. The people tend to revert to primitive ideas and instincts, and it is curious to note that the hatred of 'profiteering' was universal in the earliest stages of the economic development of the community. In medieval England 'profiteers' were termed 'forestallers,' 'regrators,' or 'engrossers.' Forestallers were 'persons buying goods 'or victuals on the way to a market or port, or contracting 'to buy the same before actually brought for sale, or endeavour-'ing by these and other means to enhance prices and prevent 'supplies.' Regrators were 'persons buying corn or other 'victuals and re-selling the same in the same market place, 'or in any other fair or market within 4 miles.' Engrossers were 'persons buying corn growing, or other corn, grain, butter, 'cheese, fish or other dead victual, with intent to re-sell the 'same again.' There were local variations of the offences in the earlier days, when anyone who sold food which he had not

himself produced would seem to have run a serious risk; but they appear to have been defined generally in an Act of 1551. The usual penalties were for the first offence fine and forfeiture of the goods, for the second offence the pillory, and for the third offence, fine and imprisonment. There were however picturesque variants, such as drawing the maker of bad bread round the town on a hurdle, with some of his loaves strung round his neck.

These enactments now appear absurd, but they are not more absurd than some of the accusations brought against farmers and traders recently. Much nonsense was talked about holding up supplies, and one or two cases in which individuals had been discovered who were keeping their stocks an unreasonable time were commented on in terms which suggested that anyone who did not dispose of any commodity on the day he became possessed of it was a criminal. It is the business of the trader to regulate supplies, and his commercial aim is to hold sufficient stock to ensure the maintenance of his daily business. In the case of an annual crop, such as wheat or potatoes or apples, it is evident that as it cannot be all eaten at once, someone must hold it, and it is in the general interest that the greater part of it should be stored, and placed on the market as it is required. To glut the market at one time, and starve it at another, is bad distribution.

The arbitrary fixing of prices no doubt removes the temptation to hold stocks, but in doing so it necessarily promotes unequal distribution. Holding a stock of any article involves the use of capital, and the risk of depreciation and loss. If he buys only in quantities which he can sell immediately, the trader avoids this, but he will be caught from time to time without supplies. Fixed prices also must inevitably discourage production, however carefully they are adjusted.

To secure the third object of Food Control, viz. an equal chance for everyone to obtain supplies, the device for which there appears to be a growing demand, is the adoption of 'rationing' by an individual ticket system. To those who put their trust in schemes on paper, this is very attractive. The soup ticket and the coal ticket are more or less familiar, and it is assumed that it is only necessary to provide everyone with a proper supply of tickets to ensure that he will get his

due allowance of food easily and automatically. It is known that such a system has been adopted in Germany, and also in other countries, and it is assumed that what has been done elsewhere can be done here.

In Germany the rationing system has been longest in force, and there it should by this time have fully demonstrated its virtues. A well-qualified observer of the social and economic conditions in enemy countries states that the German people no longer place faith in official promises, and realise that the enforcement of a really equitable distribution is a task beyond the powers of even the most perfect administration. The Government still endeavour to reconcile the conflicting interests of country and town, of producer and consumer, of rich and poor, but hitherto have only succeeded in disappointing all alike. Some of their critics indeed maintain that there is no real shortage of food, and that only the organisation is at fault, while others argue that maximum prices have resulted in driving goods from the markets without checking the increase in the cost of living. Whatever may be the truth, it is at least certain that the rise in prices of food in Germany has been far greater than in this country, in spite of the most elaborate machinery of Food Control which has ever been constructed.

It may justly be said that no sensible person would wish to impose these restrictions and regulations on the public, if there were any alternative. The real question is whether there are other methods of securing the necessary results, which are equally likely to be effective.

The word ' rationing ' is an unfortunate one. It is borrowed from the Army, and is quite inapplicable to a nation. It is a simple matter, however large the scale, to apportion and distribute definite quantities of food from a central store to an organised and disciplined body of men, all more or less of the same age and condition, and none of whom can provide for themselves. It is also possible, though less simple, to put the population of a beleaguered fortress or city on rations, where it is again merely a question of apportioning a definitely known quantity among individuals, all of whom are also definitely known, and can if necessary be dealt with individually. But to put a nation on rations is, in any true sense of the term, impossible. Inequalities of distribution will remain,

and the hardships caused by loss, transfer, and forgery of tickets will be aggravated by the fact that the neighbourly helpfulness in emergencies, which is general among the poorer classes, will be replaced by selfishness. The occupier of a farm or allotment or garden cannot by the most drastic system of inspection be put in the same position as the town-dweller, who has nothing whatever to eat except what he can buy.

The distribution of food is normally effected so smoothly and automatically that the vastness and intricacy of the distributive machinery attracts no attention. The governor of the machine is the daily demand. The distributor orders his supplies of the kinds and quantities which his customers require. As supplies vary in kind and quantity from time to time, the demand is checked or stimulated by the price. There is no regulator of distribution so simple, and, on the whole, so equitable, as that of price, which measures the urgency of the individual requirement.

But it is said that there must be some control of prices, and that unless the State interferes, there is no check upon them. This is inaccurate. There is a very effective check. In addition to the normal competition between private traders, who might possibly combine to exploit the public, there is the competition of co-operative societies. Most large bodies of consumers are within reach of a co-operative store, and can therefore obtain the chief articles of food at prices fixed without suspicion of profiteering. In practice, too, multiple shops throughout the country compete keenly amongst themselves in 'cutting' prices as fine as possible. They also have to compete with the co-operative stores to keep their business, and cannot therefore maintain prices at a very different level. The answer therefore to the working classes who complain of 'profiteering' by the retail shopkeeper is that they should deal at the cheapest place.

There is no need, however, to leave the private trader wholly unrestricted in the amount of profit he may make out of the exceptional circumstances of war. It would not be difficult so to extend the Excess Profits Tax as to intercept for the benefit of the Exchequer any excessive profits made by any dealer in food, whether wholesale or retail. The necessary inspection of accounts would not be more difficult

or inquisitorial than the inquiries for income tax, and might be carried out by an expansion of the same official machinery. The process would be considerably less costly to the State than the proceedings of the Food Controller. It could then be said that no dealer in food was pocketing more than an authorised rate of profit, so that the charge of 'profiteering' would become meaningless.

Such a system would not equalise prices all over the country, but that would be one of its merits. Prices never are equal. No one expects to buy meat or cheese or butter in Mayfair at the same price as in Brixton, or expects a tradesman in a remote country district to sell at 'stores'' prices. Any attempt to equalise such prices is unfair and undesirable.

The plan above suggested also meets the difficulty of quality. A flat price discourages quality, and in any case makes the consumer, who is willing to pay for the best, pay no more than the consumer who gets the inferior. The theory that prices will vary below the maximum, according to quality, does not work in practice. In this connection, the suggestion which has been made, that a 'luxury loaf' of pre-war flour should be permitted to be made and sold at a high price—say 50 per cent. above the subsidised loaf—might be considered. If a pre-war loaf is deemed inadvisable, there might at least be two grades of bread, so that those who desired a superior loaf sufficiently to pay a substantially higher price might obtain it.

If it is indeed true that price-fixing and rationing—with all their defects and difficulties—are the only methods by which the State can exercise control, we must submit; but it is to be hoped that Ministers will have the courage to tell the people quite plainly the truth. To continue to allow the legend to flourish uncontradicted that there is still widespread exploitation of the people's food, and to encourage the fallacy that there is any device by which all difficulties in the supply and distribution of food can be removed, will tend only to increase the present discontent and pave the way for further trouble.

H. S.

DOMINANT FACTS IN RUSSIA

AFTER an intimate acquaintance with Russia and the Russians going back nearly half a century, I feel entitled to say that the present situation in that country may be ascribed to two causes: Misrule and Ignorance. They provide the bases of the process that has brought Russia into the abyss of Revolution and Anarchy. National character has, of course, contributed its share; and other ingredients—of an alien kind—have added ferment to the mixture. Analysis of the Russian situation will give us the exact nature and proportions of each element.

The population of what we must style the Russian Empire—until its designation has been *legally* altered—numbers at least 170,000,000 souls, of whom roughly speaking 130,000,000 are Russians inhabiting the European and Asiatic provinces. Of the remainder about 25,000,000 are Asiatic tribesmen—either Mussulmans or Buddhists. Poles, Armenians, Jews, and the Finnish races make up the total. The Jews, who number something like 6,000,000—the largest Jewish population of any country—provide an important element altogether disproportionate to their numbers. Our first concern is with the Russians themselves, and more particularly with the peasants, because they alone form 80 per cent. of the Russian population in Europe, and probably 90 per cent. in Siberia. Let us then take the Russian peasants and for the present treat them as a whole, without separating them into Great, Little, and White Russians. For originally they belonged to one great Slav migration, and although tribal characteristics have been accentuated by climatic and other causes—mainly by admixture of Great and White Russians with the Finnish tribes, with whom they came in contact in pre-historic times—their language and general character have undergone remarkably little change.

All these people long ago resolved themselves into two categories, according to their particular habitat—dwellers in the great river valleys of the Dvina, Dnieper, Volga, etc., and dwellers in the great plains. The latter depended entirely

upon agriculture. They were and remain the least enterprising element. The former engaged in commerce and took up farming as a secondary, not a sole, means of livelihood. So to the present day we have in Russia two well-defined categories among the peasants: one, an enterprising and comparatively well-educated man, the other lacking in initiative, benighted and refractory to progress. From the first sprang the Novgorodians of the early Republic, the Pomors of Archangel and the Murman, and the Cossacks of the Dnieper, Don, and Volga. From the second were obtained the serfs, who only fifty years ago received emancipation.

While it remains true that 80 per cent. of the Russian population lives by agriculture—or more than 100,000,000 men, women, and children—it is not all the truth; a considerable proportion are not simply farmers: they are also engaged in trade and handicrafts. For instance, the natives of Smolensk (Dnieper) are born navvies. Wherever a canal has to be dug or a railway built the peasants of Smolensk are always in request. The men of Riazan (on the Oka) have a speciality as bath-attendants. Wherever you go to a Russian bath in Petrograd, Moscow, Irkutsk or Baku you may be sure that the man who rubs you down is a native of some village in Riazan, and that he goes home regularly once a year. The inhabitants of Rostov, in the province of Yaroslav (Volga), are all market-gardeners. Around Nizhni-Novgorod (Volga) they are tanners, locksmiths, cutlers. On the other hand, the men of Orel and the adjacent black-soil region are unmitigated yokels, still under the influence of serfdom; for in this fertile belt the great landed estates of the gentry were mostly situated.

When the Emancipation was decided upon by Alexander II. his advisers hesitated whether the serfs should receive allotments free or purchase them by payment extending over fifty years. A compromise was made. The peasants were allowed to choose. They could take a small allotment from the landlord free, or a larger allotment by payment to the State, which settled with the owner by issuing special Land Purchase bonds with the help of two specially constituted state banks, the Peasants' and the Nobles' Land Banks. It was in the landowners' interest to give away a small lot rather than sell a large one, and some of the peasants were tempted by the prospect of getting something for nothing.

The result may be easily understood. These 'orphan' lots, as they were called, did not suffice to keep the family alive. Moreover, all the peasants who lived by agriculture alone had not enough land to divide among their children. Hence in the purely agrarian region of Central and Southern Russia we soon had a very serious problem, and it has been growing more serious ever since. For this region was also the most densely populated of all, and landowners were naturally unwilling to part with lands of extraordinary fertility, the 'black soil' being practically inexhaustible and capable of raising harvest after harvest of wheat without the use of any fertiliser.

Thousands upon thousands of these lack-land peasants annually migrated to seek employment, many going into Germany for the harvest and then returning home. The development of industries which began some thirty years ago helped somewhat to relieve the strain. Another resource was emigration to Siberia, which was not encouraged, however, for many years after the opening of the railway, and began to assume noticeable proportions only ten years ago. But in the highest year the emigrants did not exceed 1,500,000, whereas the yearly growth of population in Russia was more than 2,500,000.

It was among this teeming population of farmers without land that the agrarian disturbances of 1905 assumed extensive proportions, and it is there also that the present Revolution has called forth the greatest amount of violence and destruction of property.

The peasants of the north were great flax-growers, just as those of the centre and south were the wheat and beet-sugar producers. So we find the first textile industries in Russia concentrated around Moscow, the Upper Volga, and later around Petrograd. Fine linen was produced under the superintendence of managers and foremen from Belfast; cotton goods were manufactured under the auspices of Manchester men, and silk goods (in Moscow) by Frenchmen from Lyons. Coal and iron ore deposits around Tula stimulated an early hardware industry. Tula became the Russian Sheffield. Then the vast mineral resources of the Urals were tapped, and later—within the last twenty years—a huge steel and iron industry grew up in the Dometz region, where coal and ore are to be found in

abundance. The modern oil industries of the Caspian had been pre-ordained ages ago. At Baku natural gas flamed as far back as the days of early Zoroastrians.

Russian industries grew apace. The operatives multiplied and now form a substantial proportion of the population—something like 15 per cent. The process of industrialisation has been complicated by the tendency of the villagers to keep up their home ties. The redemption dues had to be paid and were provided to a considerable extent out of the earnings of mill hands. This fact explains the hurried departure of many workers from the industrial centres to the villages when the Revolution first held out promises of land for distribution.

The middle class, as we understand it, formed a very limited part of the population till quite recent times. Many of the peasants were small merchants, as explained above. But only after the development of industries and the consequent growth of the urban population could a middle class attain intrinsic importance. However, of late years its growth has been very considerable. The great cities alone, like Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev, contain a population of 5,000,000; but perhaps the total urban population of Russia does not much exceed 20,000,000 at the present day, or less than 12 per cent. We may take it that the middle class is well within 10,000,000, or about 6 per cent. of the total population.

As regards the upper class, numbers play a less considerable rôle. But even here we must make a distinction between the Russians and ourselves. In Russia there has never been an hereditary peerage. Even the Boyars were not an aristocracy. They were appointed by the Sovereign. There were many titled people, some owning huge estates, but they belonged to a 'privileged' not a 'political' caste, and the influence that they were able to exert on the affairs of the country depended not upon the accident of birth but of office.

Over this huge mass of semi or wholly inarticulate peasants and the relatively small admixture of burgesses ruled the autocrat, with the help of a bureaucracy recruited from the privileged class and a State Church whose priests were often little less ignorant than the peasants to whom they ministered. The parish clergy formed a separate caste, incumbencies going from father to son. Parish priests had no hope of rising to a bishopric because all the higher dignities of the Church were

reserved for monks, and therefore they had no incentive to learning. On the other hand, the monastic hierarchy had too little touch with the people.

It was an exceedingly primitive State organisation, suitable only for a nation of farmers, and perhaps if Russia had never progressed beyond that stage it would have continued to exist to this day, though there were serious uprisings even among the serfs more than a century ago. The Napoleonic wars, with their dread ordeal of invasion, gave the first shock to autocracy in the form of a revolt among the officers. Similar shocks followed after each successive war: the Crimean, the Turkish, and the Manchurian. Each of these struggles proved that the government of the country was inefficient and corrupt. Discontent was shown by the leading men of Russia, by great writers like Turgenev and Dostoievsky.

To cope with this phenomenon the autocrats relied upon repressive measures, and gradually placed themselves and the fortunes of the Empire in the hands of a vast police system known as the Okhrana, which in the end completely dominated Russian politics and stultified reform.

After the unfortunate experience of the Crimean War Alexander II. made up his mind gradually to prepare his people for constitutional government. In the sixties he introduced great reforms. He emancipated the serfs and created the Zemstvos (County Councils), in which the peasants had a large share. But practically nothing was done for the workmen or the middle class. They did not 'count' in those days. As a result they were disappointed and a revolutionary movement began in their midst.

Alexander II. was also disappointed. He had expected that everybody would be pleased and grateful. He saw, however, that the peasants took little interest in the Zemstvos, and his Okhrana reported growing unrest in the towns, and especially among the students of both sexes, who were then entranced with the specious doctrines of Nihilism. Yet it was all natural enough. The peasants were largely too ignorant to understand or care about local government—although they were grateful to and loved their 'Little Father'—while the hotheads who called themselves Nihilists really 'had nothing' to lose. But Alexander became soured and turned towards a policy of repression. At the beginning of 1881 he relented, and

even signed a constitution of sorts. His untimely death—he was assassinated March 13, 1881, by the revolutionaries—caused a great revulsion of feeling. The masses had venerated him and would have nothing to do with the revolutionaries for many a year.

Alexander III., under the influence of Pobedonostsev, pursued a policy of relentless reaction, which was continued by his son till the Japanese War forced from his unwilling hands a semi-constitution in 1905. But under the influence of the Okhrana and the discontent openly expressed by the earlier Dumas he also, like his grandfather, reverted to reaction.

Such in brief are the facts of the Russian situation as it appeared ten years ago. Then a great statesman arose in the person of Arcady Stolypin, who proceeded, with the help of the Okhrana, to root out Revolution and, with the aid of M. Krivoshein, an energetic minister of agriculture, to palliate the agrarian menace. For all this time the peasants had been multiplying, and although a good many private lands had been bought up by them with the help of the Peasants' Land Bank, there was still not enough land to satisfy their requirements. Everything was done—perhaps too much—to disrupt the primitive system of communal tenure that the peasants had been perforce allowed to retain after their emancipation. This communal system would have died a natural death with the termination of the land redemption payments and the spread of education. But its maintenance suited the village parasites—a large element which had arisen as a result of ignorance, hopelessness, and drink. It also suited the Socialists. The State encouraged the creation of small farms and organised emigration to Siberia. This was the more easy because all the land in Siberia belonged to the State. To this day there is no freehold property beyond the Urals. And the huge possessions of the Crown in the fertile Altai region were thrown open to settlers by the Tsar. However, the revolutionaries revenged themselves by assassinating Stolypin and the great war suspended his programme of land reform.

There is no outstanding historic quarrel between the Russian and the German peoples. The latter used to be known as *Niemtsy* (mute ones), which was the name given to all people who could not speak Russian; its specific application to the Germans shows how all-pervasive they were long before

Englishmen appeared on the scene in the days of Queen Bess and John the Terrible. Indeed, we know that the Republics of Novgorod and Pskov which were destroyed by John had been in constant communication with the Hansa cities. Russia's rulers had, moreover, cultivated and helped their German neighbours and become partners with them in the despoiling of Poland. But since the rise of the Hohenzollern Empire with its aggressive designs a change had come over the Russians—both the people and the Tsar. Alexander III. allied himself with the French Republic against the German Monarchy. That was a tremendous departure. It rejoiced all Russian hearts. All hoped—vainly as it turned out—that it would bring a change in internal politics also. But the Germans gradually 'took possession' of the country. Russia became a 'colony'—a market for cheap German goods and a storehouse of raw material and grain for German requirements. Everything was German: the Court, the bureaucracy, the Higher Commands. By the Baltic Provinces barons and the 3,000,000 of Germans inhabiting the Empire Russia was held as in a vice. To weaken Russia's growing importance in Europe the Germans even helped her in the war with Japan. Everybody remembers Wilhelm's theatrical presentment of the 'Yellow Peril.'

The screw had been put on once too often when Wilhelm, appearing for the second time behind the back of Austria, demanded that Russia should remain a silent spectator of little Serbia's dismemberment. War broke out and the whole Russian nation was with the Tsar, united and determined to shake off the German yoke and hoping also to secure their own enfranchisement.

It is not within the scope of this article to enter into the details of military operations. The point that interests us is this, that the war was conducted with utter disregard for the wishes of the people as expressed by the Duma. When it became only too evident that the Old Regime was incapable of dealing with grave problems arising out of the war, viz. food and transport, the Duma presented categorical demands for the appointment of ministers enjoying the confidence of the nation. But the Tsar, dominated by his wife, who in her turn was entirely under the influence of a charlatan peasant named Razputin, appointed men like Stürmer and

Protopopov, who were known to be partisans of a separate peace.

The patience of the long-suffering Russians was quite obviously becoming exhausted, but still the Tsar remained obdurate. Meanwhile Germany was not slumbering. Already in 1904 two Russian subjects, Lenin and Skoropis-Ioltuhowski, who were in Austria at the outbreak of war, had received missions to stir up a revolution in Russia. Ioltuhowski's special task was to create dissension in Little Russia by agitating for an automony with a view to combining the Little Russians with their kinsmen the Ruthenes of Galicia. Lenin had to direct the Social-Democrats in Russia, of whom he was a prominent leader.

In this evil work much aid was unhappily rendered by revolutionaries belonging to the Jewish race who were, however, outcasts from Jewry. The reason why Jews have figured so largely in recent revolutionary movements in Russia deserves to be told more fully. It accounts for one of the dominant facts in the present situation. A great number of Jews came under Russian rule by the partition of Poland. They had settled and prospered there after escaping from persecution in German lands, where they had been more or less germanised and to this day speak a jargon largely composed of German words. The Poles then were divided into nobles and peasants. The Jews became the middle-men and held all the business in their hands. They were the bankers and factors of the Polish magnates and kings ; they formed the bulk of the urban population, and no Gentile could carry on trade even in his own commodities.

Here is an instance drawn from recent times. Thirty years ago the writer was staying with friends who owned property in Poland near the town of Siedlce, the population of which then consisted of 13,000 inhabitants, of whom 11,000 were Jews. The dairy and the orchards on the estate were as usual ' farmed out ' to Jews. The land was not. The Jews did not care for agriculture. My friends decided to take over the live stock and manage their own dairy and orchards. When their produce was first sent to the market at Siedlce the Jews arranged a ' boycott.' They simply gave away their wares, so that nobody should buy from the Gentiles. When my friends slaughtered oxen for the requirements of the

neighbouring garrison the Jews bribed the 'vet' to condemn the meat. A few years later the Poles began to go into trade themselves, and the relations between Jew and Gentile underwent a complete change. Not long before the war a 'boycott' was proclaimed by the Poles against the Jews.

As a precaution against the exploitation of the Russian peasantry by the Jews, the latter had been restricted to the Pale, which included Poland and Little Russia. The conditions under which the Jews had to live amidst a hostile population—for the Little Russians, like the Poles, manifested their dislike for Jewish 'pushfulness'—were aggravated by a prolific natality among the Jews, and by the oppressive measures exercised by the police, who reaped a rich harvest from Jewish bribes. Every Jew naturally tried his hardest to get out of the Pale, and the easiest way was through the schools. Once he had obtained a University degree he could go anywhere and do what he pleased. It is easy to see why the Jews crowded the Universities, and also why they were disposed to take an active part in upsetting the government, and we must not be surprised by the fact that most of the extremists who have figured in the Revolution belonged to the persecuted race.

Another point must also be made clear. The Jews were in constant business relations with the Germans and there never was, nor well could be, any anti-German feeling among them. I speak, of course, of the Jews in Russia. The Jewish extremists naturally drew their inspiration from German revolutionaries, but having more cause of complaint against the Russian regime they were disposed to aggravate and intensify the doctrines of Karl Marx and other German socialists.*

During the war the Jews in Russia systematically evaded service at the Front, and often managed by means of bribery to secure exemption from all military service. They had some excuse because they were debarred from promotion. After the Revolution a good many young Jews of the better class applied for commissions. And generally speaking the tendency in Russia during the Revolution was a very conciliatory one towards the Jews. They at once obtained

---

* Hence arose the Bolshevist (or Majority) faction of the Russian Social Democrats.

equal rights with all Russians, and took full advantage of them.

We are so accustomed in our free democracy to appraise the power of the press that we naturally attach great importance to newspapers as organs of public opinion. In Russia the press was muzzled before and during the war by the censorship. It depended largely upon German firms for advertisements—the main source of newspaper revenue—and was almost entirely in Jewish hands—and so remains to this day. It is therefore somewhat difficult to regard the Russian press as an organ of public opinion. Some of the papers are Russian—a mere handful. But the Revolution, especially since the Soviet and Lenin have been in full control, has brought about considerable changes. The Jewish *bourgeoisie* has severed itself utterly and irrevocably from the Jew Extremists. That is a fact that will be very helpful to Russia and her friends in the future.

Education had been sadly neglected prior to the advent of the Duma. The Okhrana was afraid of it, as were all the supporters of the Old Regime. Then it was decided to make up for lost time, and a school programme was introduced which would have assured universal education within a few years—approximately by 1920. Many of the riverine peasants had taken matters into their own hands. In some of the Volga provinces every boy was attending school ten years ago. The youngsters who joined the colours at the beginning of the war had become educated. Their elders who had to join the colours later to fill up losses and provide reserves were largely illiterate. This helps to account for the rapid downfall of discipline after the Revolution.

Russian industry could not satisfy half the requirements of the home market. Germany stepped in. During the year preceding the war the volume of German imports had increased by a figure equal to the whole of the products of British industry supplied to Russia that year. This only shows what remarkable growth had been proceeding within the country. But the cessation of imports since the outbreak of war caused much hardship to the Russians. A very small quantity of American goods could get through by way of Vladivostok. The northern routes had been neglected; the Murman railway was completed only in 1917. But all these lines were monopolised for munitions and Russia's own

industries were mobilised for war purposes. In addition to a lack of food in the cities resulting from paralysis of the still undeveloped railway system and the scarcity of rolling stock, the Russians were thus almost completely deprived of woollen and cotton goods and of foot-gear.

Money was being scandalously wasted through inefficiency and corruption. The purchasing value of the rouble had declined by more than 60 per cent. Altogether life was barely tolerable. And there seemed no hope whatever of any improvement. The fighters were suffering from scurvy owing to defective nourishment. There were about 8,000,000 reservists stationed in the towns and cities, ill-fed and discontented, and not enough officers to look after them—ill-trained and wondering why they had been taken away from their villages, where the women and old men and boys remained—unable to till the land and sow the crops. City life had a deplorable effect upon the reserves. They saw daily before their eyes all the evidences of riotous gaiety and heard from revolutionary agitators tales—which were unfortunately true—of huge fortunes amassed in profiteering and speculation on foodstuffs. They were ripe for the Bolshevik.

All this was bad enough, but a remedy might have been found had the Tsar listened to repeated warnings from his kinsmen, from the Duma, from the Allied Ambassadors, and from his own generals. The main trouble was this, that nobody had any confidence in ministers who had been chosen on the advice of the Empress Alexandra and her 'saint,' and things did not change when Razputin was 'removed' by a group of young officers. Had the Tsar appointed Prince Lvov or any person whom the people could trust one week earlier there would probably not have been a Revolution.

The outbreak was undoubtedly planned by the Revolutionaries with the knowledge of M. Kerensky and his associates. What happened afterwards is familiar to us all. But I do not think that anybody outside the country has realised the fact that the whole course of the Russian Revolution from the first meeting of the Soviet or Council of Soldiers and Workmen's Delegates, which was held *before* the Provisional Government was constituted, was directed entirely by the Extremists. We were long deluded by the appearance of a government which really had no authority.

From the very outset the Revolutionaries proceeded to

carry out the plan that Lenin had been preparing since 1914. It is sufficient to recite the various stages: destruction of discipline in the army, incitement of the men against their officers, promulgation of the doctrine of 'no annexation and 'no indemnity,' 'rights' for soldiers, workmen, and peasants, no 'duties' except for the *bourgeois*. Therein lies the whole doctrine of Bolshevism, which may be summed up in a few words: military defeatism and social cataclysm. And—strange as it may seem—the worst periods of the Revolution were precisely those when no blood was being spilt. During the months of apparent calm the ruin of the State was being accomplished with appalling swiftness. The Minister of Finance declared at the Moscow Conference that the Revolution had then (in August) cost £700,000,000 in actual money taken out of the Treasury for the Soviets, committees, and other revolutionary organisations, and that the 'supplementary grants' demanded for soldiers' pay and rations over and above the huge sums already issued were in excess of *one thousand millions sterling* for the year 1917 alone.

Personally I consider—although it may seem paradoxical—that Lenin could not have done more had he been in office instead of Prince Lvov or M. Kerensky. And I ask, what could Russia be expected to do after this appalling overthrow of her resources and prevalence of anarchy?

Clearly she could not go on at that rate, for already in July the Exchequer was empty and the printing presses could not keep up with the demand for paper money. The wholesale murders of loyal officers and of landowners, and more particularly of peasant farmers, by the village parasites, the land-grabbing and destruction of property, the complete paralysis of industry by demands for impossible wages—all these 'horrors' were mere accompaniments to a deliberately organised breaking up of Russia's means of continuing the war. And this plan was being carried out at the instigation of Germany by a man of Russian and gentle birth to avenge his elder brother, who had been executed in 1887 for trying to murder the Emperor Alexander III. That man is Vladimir Ulianov alias Ilyin alias Lenin alias Cederblum. He was assisted in his fell work by a gang of the cleverest and most unscrupulous Jewish Extremists, who outwitted the other Socialists—all men of the middle class, lawyers mostly—

who had fallen a prey to visionary plans for enhancing the happiness of the multitude. The result of their labours is already apparent.' Millions of misguided reservists and workmen have been fleeing back to the villages to escape from the ' happiness ' that Lenin and his crew have provided.

All this was foreseen many months ago and induced a great and gallant Russian, General Kornilov, to try to sweep away the scoundrels who were ruining his country. But his attempt failed, like his short-lived victory over the Austro-Germans in Galicia in July, through the treachery of those who claimed that they were the real friends of ' Democracy.'

We have come back to the point from which we started—to the people. The Russian people drove out the Poles from Moscow three centuries ago in the ' Time of Confusion,' and probably will drive out the Germans now. But they must first evolve the anti-toxin that will kill the poison of Bolshevism. We must seek the remedy among the hardy and enterprising element which happily has not disappeared but survives with undiminished brilliancy in the Cossacks.

The Cossacks are a semi-military, semi-pastoral caste. They range from the Dnieper to the Pacific and control the richest lands and mines of the Empire. They are organising a host to dispose of the Leninites and enable the vast but apathetic majority of the Russian people to raise their heads once more and to resist the Bolshevist appeal to betray their allies.

The separatist movement in the Ukraine (Little Russia) insidiously fostered by German agents has proved to be a bane to its alien originators and a blessing in disguise to Russia. The Home-Rule government at Kiev has proclaimed itself against Lenin. The other ' Republics ' formed within the confines of the Empire—Cossackdom, Caucasia, and Siberia—are openly hostile to the anarchy of Bolshevism, and all constitute centres of resistance to subversive doctrines and to the wild schemes of spoliation and separate peace which the Bolsheviks have now shamelessly avowed after having so far weakened the country that they think further resistance will be impossible.

The Russians are a good-natured people and very responsive to counsels of moderation, but they are also extremely sus-

ceptible to injustice and apt to show their feelings in a very violent form. They had been deeply incensed by the mismanagement of the war and were apt under the stress of this emotion to exaggerate a sense of their wrongs. The diabolical ingenuity of the Socialist-Extremists in perverting this sense to revolutionary purposes lies at the bottom of most of the excesses that have been committed. But to use a homely American phrase, 'You cannot fool all the people all the time,' and the Russians being naturally a very intelligent people will understand in the end what the Lenin doctrine really means.

But let us no longer be deceived by specious words and phrases, as we were at the commencement of the Revolution. Our ignorance of Russia and Russian affairs then led us into some very grave and—I would say—almost comical blunders. Thus we imagined that it would help the Russians to send over some of our home-grown socialists to Petrograd so that the Soviet might understand, forsooth, how loyal and patriotic were the representatives of labour in Great Britain, in France, and in Belgium. But the men with whom they came into juxtaposition were infinitely superior to them in education and in revolutionary experience. The Russian or pseudo-Jewish Socialist leaders were all university graduates, versed in the lore of Socialism and, what is more, first-class specialists in agitation and terrorism. Many of them had, indeed, played a double rôle in the Okhrana and in revolutionary conclaves. To them, the Ferment of Revolution was a familiar weapon—its uses an exact science.

In conclusion I would add a few words about the Finns. For a hundred years they have lived within the Empire in the enjoyment of rights and privileges that the Russians did not possess. Doubtless they were worried by stupid Russian bureaucrats; and rough-ridden by the reactionary Court of Nicholas II.; but their conduct during the war is difficult to justify. They sided openly with Germany. Many thousands of Finnish students entered the German army to receive military training, and arms were smuggled into the grand-duchy to prepare an uprising. They have suffered from Bolshevik soldiers and sailors at Helsingfors and Vyborg. That is true. But Finnish socialists helped to promote military and naval insubordination while Finnish workmen in the

munition mills in Petrograd fostered German revolutionary propaganda. It was with the help of Bolshevik soldiers that the present Finnish government proclaimed the independence of Finland.

For the Russian Jews a new prospect of freedom and nationhood is opened by the British conquest of Palestine. For the Armenians there is also hope in the staunchness of the Cossacks and Caucasians. The Poles are more united than ever despite the horrors of the war, and sooner or later will come to their own.

Prophecy is freely indulged in by people who have a slight acquaintance with Russia regarding the future form of government. I state here only my personal impressions. As to the future revival of Russia I have not the shadow of doubt. No power in this world can permanently subdue or tread down a homogeneous population of 100,000,000 farmers. And I believe that in the end—but some time hence—we shall see the advent in Russia of a United Constitutional Monarchy.

ROBERT WILTON.

THE FINANCE OF THE WAR

1. **Reports of the Select Committee on National Expenditure.** H. of C. Papers 151 and 167 of 1917.
2. **Inland Revenue Report for 1915–16.** Cd. 8425.
3. **Customs and Excise Report for 1915–16.** Cd. 8428.
4. **English Taxation, 1640–1799.** By WILLIAM KENNEDY. Bell and Sons. 1913.
5. **British Incomes and Property.** By J. C. STAMP. P. S. King and Co. 1916.

THERE are two financial problems of the utmost importance before the people of Great Britain and Ireland to-day. The first is how to provide for the daily cost of the war; the second is how to deal with the debt which will stare us in the face when the war ends. These two problems are closely connected. For the methods we pursue in financing the daily cost of the war will affect not only the magnitude of the final debt, but also our economic and political capacity to deal with that debt after the war. It is sufficiently obvious that so far as we pay for the war out of borrowed money instead of out of current revenue we are adding to our total indebtedness; it is a good deal less obvious but not less true that if we finance the war neither by honest taxation nor by *bona-fide* borrowing, but by devices which have the effect of inflating currency, we shall intensify the economic difficulties which in any case await us when the war ends. The main body of our population has during the war grown accustomed to a regime of high wages with accompanying high prices, and it will be extremely difficult suddenly to adapt ourselves after the war to some lower scale of wages and prices which may be requisite for the retention of our foreign trade. The greater the present inflation the greater will be our post-war difficulties. A special difficulty is created by the consideration that the loans contracted in a period of high prices may have to be paid back in a period of low prices. This may mean a very large extra bonus, measured in goods and services, to the holders of Government stock, and a corresponding addition

to the real burden of debt resting on the shoulders of the taxpayer. This unpleasant post-war prospect is already giving rise to proposals which may be intended to be honest, but would in fact involve national dishonesty on a colossal scale.

The first war Budget was that which Mr. Lloyd George laid before the House of Commons on the 17th of November 1914. At that time no one, except perhaps Lord Kitchener, calculated that the war would last so long as it has done, still less did any one calculate that the daily expenditure would grow to its present enormous figure. But when every allowance has been made on this account it cannot be said that the proposals made in Mr. Lloyd George's first war Budget were adequate to the needs of the occasion. The estimated cost of the war up to the 31st of March 1915 was £325,000,000. In addition, the Chancellor had to meet an estimated falling off in the peace revenue of no less than £11,350,000 as compared with his final peace estimate made in June 1914. He had also to allow for interest and management of the war debt. The allowance consisted of £839,000 coming within the fixed charge for the national debt, and £3,443,000 coming outside that charge. The total of these three items is £15,632,000. That sum clearly constituted a first charge upon the Budget, and ought to have been wholly met out of new taxation. Yet the new taxes which Mr. Lloyd George proposed were only estimated to yield £15,500,000 in the then current financial year, leaving less than nothing to be contributed out of new taxation to the direct war expenditure. With the exception of the small sums that it was possible to take from the sinking fund of the old national debt, the whole of the direct war expenditure in 1914–15 was met by borrowing.

The Budget speech which ended with this result began with eloquent appeals to the example of Pitt in the Napoleonic Wars, and of Gladstone in the Crimean War. In addition, Mr. Lloyd George urged arguments of his own in favour of immediate sacrifices to meet the cost of the war. After pointing out that 'The less raised by taxation during the war, the 'heavier the taxes after the war,' he went on:

'Great Britain will be confronted with some of the gravest problems with which it has ever been faced. Why do I say that? Because I want to impress with all the earnestness at my command upon the committee that it is desirable that the nation should

raise as much money by taxation during this period of inflation as it can be induced to contribute.'

And again :

'It is easier to raise taxes in a period of war and to lower them in a time of peace than it would be to raise even lower taxes in a period of peace. . . . I am perfectly certain that when millions of our countrymen are volunteering to risk their lives no men who cannot volunteer are going to grudge a fair share of their possessions.'

This was the rhetorical prelude to proposals which yielded less than nothing in the way of new revenue towards meeting a direct war expenditure estimated at £325,000,000.

It may be urged that, in fairness to Mr. Lloyd George's first war Budget, account should be taken of the fact that the new taxation then imposed would not come into full bearing until the following financial year. This would be a material consideration if the prospective yield in that year had been in any way adequate as a contribution to the prospective increase in war expenditure. That was not the case. Mr. Lloyd George estimated in November 1914 that his new taxes would yield £65,000,000 in the year 1915–16. At the same time he calculated that the further decline in revenue which he then anticipated, together with the growing interest on war debt, would absorb no less than £50,000,000 out of this sum. So that on his own calculation he was only providing £15,000,000 out of revenue as a contribution to the war expenditure of 1915–16.

The additions to taxation by which these inadequate results were secured were three in number : (*a*) the doubling of income-tax and super-tax rates ; (*b*) an addition of a penny a pint to the duty on beer ; (*c*) the raising of the tea duty from 5*d*. to 8*d*.

When May 1915 arrived Mr. Lloyd George produced his second war Budget. By this time the magnitude of the task to which the nation was committed had become apparent to the whole country. The daily cost of the war was increasing very rapidly, and few people ventured to hope for an early peace. The one satisfactory feature was the increased yield of the revenue, owing partly to patriotic willingness to help the tax-gatherer in such a national crisis, and partly to increased industrial activity in consequence of the urgent

demand for war material. In such circumstances the clear duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was to revise his November proposals and ask the country to make a far greater immediate contribution out of revenue to the cost of the war.

Mr. Lloyd George opened his second war Budget speech by reminding the House that in the Napoleonic Wars our ancestors had 'faced the situation like men.' 'They began the war 'with a tax which was equivalent to one-seventh of the 'national income. They proceeded to one-sixth, and as the 'war went on to one-fifth, and they ended by taxing them-'selves to the extent of two-sevenths of their income.' His own proposals were of a different character. 'With the exception of a small adjustment of the wine duties and beer duties—shortly afterwards abandoned—he proposed no new taxation.

Yet he estimated the total expenditure for which he had to provide at £1,133,000,000. The detailed figures show that of this total about £235,000,000 was due to civil expenditure, plus peace estimates for the army and navy, plus the interest on war debt, leaving about £898,000,000 for direct war expenditure. He estimated the revenue at £270,000,000. After deducting from this the cost of the peace establishment and of the war debt, it will be seen that there only remained £35,000,000 as a contribution out of revenue to a direct war expenditure of £898,000,000.

These proposals contained no provision for that after-war finance on which Mr. Lloyd George had so strongly insisted in his previous November Budget, for this £35,000,000 would barely suffice to meet the growing charge for interest on debt in the succeeding financial year, and to provide a sinking fund. So that if the war had ended on the 31st of March 1916, there would have been nothing in hand for the heavy and inevitable charges for war pensions and war allowances, and the probable growth in other directions of peace expenditure. Peace would have been attended by the very event which Mr. Lloyd George had so passionately deprecated—an increase instead of a decrease in taxation. Seldom have words and deeds been in more glaring conflict.

This method of financing the war appears to have satisfied the House of Commons; it did not satisfy the City of London. Although the pecuniary interest of bankers naturally inclines

them to welcome large Government borrowings, the bankers of the City of London, realising the national danger involved in such reckless methods of finance, held in the course of the summer a meeting to urge upon the Government the necessity for a much higher scale of taxation both to bring in public revenue and to check private expenditure. The meeting also demanded strict economy in public expenditure. A deputation was subsequently sent to the Government, and was received by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, accompanied by Mr. McKenna, who had then succeeded Mr. Lloyd George at the Treasury. The Government as represented by these two ministers accepted in principle the views of the bankers, but three months were allowed to elapse before any attempt was made by new taxation either to get in additional revenue or to check the lavish scale of expenditure which artificial prosperity had begotten in nearly all classes of the community.

In the course of the summer the Government, stimulated by pressure from the House of Lords, had appointed a Public Retrenchment Committee to see what savings could be made in civil expenditure. It is doubtful, however, whether the Cabinet of the day had any real desire to secure effective economies. The Committee received an instruction from the Cabinet that it was not to deal with branches of public expenditure involving 'questions of policy.' This meant that wherever the country had been committed to heavy expenditure in order to give effect to some political programme the committee set up to secure public retrenchment was powerless. It could not, for example, make any recommendation upon such a matter as the action of members of the House of Commons in voting a quarter of a million a year to themselves without any authority from the nation. Nor could it deal with the net loss to the exchequer of over £1000 a day incurred for the sole purpose of maintaining the pretence that Mr. Lloyd George's land value duties, imposed by the Budget of 1909, were a source of revenue.* All that the Committee

* In his Budget speech in May 1915, Mr. Lloyd George stated that the Land Value Duties were estimated to yield in that year £350,000. Somebody laughed, perhaps remembering that these were the duties which were going to pay for Dreadnoughts and Old Age Pensions. Mr. Lloyd George promptly replied, in justification of this miserable little sum: 'Very useful! I think you

could do was to make recommendations for minor administrative economies and for an increase in postal rates. Most of these recommendations were in the event rendered futile by departmental and political opposition.

It is worth while in this review of our war finance to remind the country that while members of Parliament refused even to permit the discussion of their self-voted salaries, His Majesty the King voluntarily placed at the disposal of the Treasury a sum of £100,000 out of his personal resources. Public announcement of this patriotic example to the nation was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in April 1916.

Mr. McKenna introduced his first Budget on the 21st of September 1915. It did not go as far as the occasion demanded, nor as far as the public was certainly at that date prepared to go. But it showed a much clearer grasp of the gravity of the financial situation than had been shown in either of the two preceding war Budgets, and it contained a definite warning to the country that further taxation would be necessary. Six months later Mr. McKenna in his second Budget (4th of April 1916) proposed this further taxation, and it is therefore convenient to deal with the two Budgets together. Their combined effect was to raise the revenue from the figure of £270,332,000, as estimated by Mr. Lloyd George for 1915–16, to an estimated total of £502,000,000 for 1916–17, a figure which in the event was largely exceeded. The total expenditure for 1916–17 was estimated at £1,825,000,000. Of this enormous total about £305,000,000 was due to civil expenditure plus peace estimates for the army and navy, plus interest on debt. Therefore to obtain a true picture we must deduct £305,000,000 from both sides of the account. It will then be seen that Mr. McKenna provided £197,000,000 as a contribution out of revenue to a direct war expenditure of £1,520,000,000. That figure was a great improvement on the proposals of his predecessor. His own calculation on the assumption that the war ended on the 31st of March 1917 was as follows. After deducting the Excess Profits Tax, which presumably would terminate with the war, he would have in

---

could build three submarines out of that.' He forgot to mention the cost of collecting these duties. The figure for that year, after making all necessary allowances, was £513,000, leaving a minus quantity to pay for submarines.

hand for the year 1917–18 enough revenue to pay interest and sinking fund on the whole of the debt, except that portion incurred on behalf of the Allies and Dominions; he would also be able to pay £20,000,000 for war pensions and allowances, and would still have left £85,000,000 available for the reduction of taxation.

This sum was about twice as much as would have been required to pay interest upon all the advances at that time estimated to be made to our Allies and Dominions, so that on the very worst hypothesis Mr. McKenna had provided a substantial balance with which to reduce taxation on the assumption that war expenditure ended with the close of the financial year.

In considering the means by which this result was achieved, it will be convenient to deal first with the income-tax. Mr. Lloyd George had raised this tax to 2*s.* 6*d.* in the £ on the larger incomes; Mr. McKenna in his first Budget put the rate up to 3*s.* 6*d.*, and in his second to 5*s.*, with corresponding additions to the rate charged on smaller incomes. In passing it may be noted as a curious example of the apparent carelessness with which Budgets are prepared, that in his first Budget Mr. McKenna having decided on increasing the 2*s.* 6*d.* to 3*s.* 6*d.* —an increase of 40 per cent.—also decided with the concurrence of the whole House of Commons that all the subordinate rates should be increased by the exact proportion of 40 per cent. The result was the wholesale introduction of the awkward fraction of one-fifth of a penny. Thus, for example, the rate to be charged on incomes under £1000 a year was fixed in September 1915 at 1*s.* $9\frac{3}{5}$*d.* for the year 1915–16, and 2*s.* $1\frac{1}{5}$*d.* for 1916–17. After six months' reflection by the Treasury and the Inland Revenue Department this absurdity was abandoned and the rates were levelled up by Mr. McKenna's second Budget to round pennies. The effect of his two Budgets was to make the income-tax a very substantial impost upon the earnings and the fortunes of the middle and upper classes of the community. That the impost though substantial is not excessive, in view of the needs of the State in time of war, is proved by the readiness with which it is paid.

Credit is also due to Mr. McKenna for the tentative steps he took towards making the income-tax apply to the general body of wage-earners. He lowered the limit of total exemption

from £160 to £130, and he reduced the abatement from £160 to £120. The effect was that whereas formerly, no one with an income under £160 paid any income-tax at all, at present a person with £160 a year pays 2*s.* 3*d.* in the £ on £40, and with just over £130 a year pays 2*s.* 3*d.* in the £ on £10. These changes were avowedly intended to bring weekly wage-earners within the scope of the income-tax, and special provision for their supposed convenience was made by permitting them to pay the tax quarterly instead of annually. At the same time half-yearly payments were introduced for other income-tax payers. This latter is a very useful administrative reform, beneficial both to the taxpayer and to the Exchequer.

The scheme of quarterly payments for the weekly wage-earner has been a failure as ought to have been foreseen. Anyone familiar with the habits of the weekly wage-earner knows that he regulates his private budget on a weekly basis, and that it is extremely inconvenient to him to make lump payments at quarterly or even at monthly intervals. On the other hand, he is quite willing to tax himself week by week in order to get back a lump sum at some future date. This habit of mind among the mass of wage-earners finds expression in the establishment of such popular institutions as 'Goose Clubs' and 'Christmas Clubs,' where the members pay in a few pence week by week and share out the accumulated total at Christmas.

A still more cogent example of the financial habits and predilections of the wage-earning classes is furnished by the practice of the co-operative societies. These bodies, which constitute the most remarkable achievement of the English and Scottish working classes in the way of commercial organisation, make a practice of charging their members comparatively high prices for the commodities sold in order to be able to pay back a large quarterly or half-yearly dividend. The 'divi,' as it is popularly called, represents a return to the purchaser in a lump sum of the extra prices he has paid week by week for the goods that he, or his wife, has bought. It is valued just because it is a lump sum, which can be used for some substantial expenditure, such as a new carpet or a piece of furniture, or a holiday trip.

This practice, worked out by the wage-earning classes

themselves to suit their own tastes and convenience, provides the only satisfactory basis for an income-tax on weekly wages. A moderately high poundage tax would be deducted by the employer from every weekly wage, in much the same way as the flat insurance tax is already deducted. The employer would be responsible for paying the full amount so deducted to the Inland Revenue authorities, and would provide each wage-earner with a quarterly statement of the amount paid on his behalf and of the total amount he had earned. The tax-paying wage-earner would then be in a position to claim from the Inland Revenue authorities a refund of whatever sum might be due to him on account of the smallness of his income or the largeness of his family, and he would welcome that refund as he welcomes his co-operative 'divi.'

It will be observed that this system involves no prying by the employer into the family affairs of his employee, for the employer acquires no greater knowledge of his workpeople's affairs than he had before. Nor is there any serious objection to the scheme on the ground that it is more difficult for an employer to deduct a poundage rate from wages than a flat rate. On this point and on other points of administrative detail the present writer has taken pains to collect opinions from many large employers. They all assert that the plan is perfectly feasible and easy to work. The deduction would be made not by stamps but by an entry on the wages sheet.

Instead of adopting this obvious plan Mr. McKenna brought forward a much more elaborate and much less efficient scheme, which appears to have been prepared for him by his permanent officials. Employers were required to make a quarterly return of the earnings of all their employees; armed with this information the Inland Revenue officials were to assess each weekly wage-earner individually and collect what they could. If they could not collect the sum due these officials were then to go back to the wage-earner's employer—possibly a new employer—and demand that he should collect the debt out of the workman's future earnings. This proposal to convert employers into debt collectors and render them responsible for following up defaulters led to indignant protests and had to be dropped. The State has consequently to get what it can by prosecuting the defaulters in the police court. Every quarter scores of well-to-do munition workers are prosecuted

for refusing to pay the income-tax due from them. These prosecutions are unavoidable under the system which Mr. McKenna has established, but they certainly do not add to the popularity of an income-tax on wages.

It is worth while here to record that while Mr. McKenna's proposals for extending the income-tax to weekly wage-earners were still under discussion in the House of Commons a deputation of employers in the shipbuilding trade waited upon him and suggested that the income-tax on wages should be collected by a weekly deduction in the same way as the National Insurance tax. The officials then attendant upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that they preferred to follow their own plan of quarterly returns from employers. The reason for this attitude of the Inland Revenue authorities apparently was that they feared cost and labour involved in making the necessary refunds for children and other allowances. The objection is plausible, but misleading.

Of necessity the practice of collecting income-tax at the source, whether applied to rents or to dividends or to wages, must involve the setting up of machinery to make in the shape of refunds the abatements which the law allows. This is an inevitable feature of collection at the source; but what is the alternative? The only alternative is to collect from all the various sources concerned all the various items of information, and to collate these multitudinous details with precision, so as to enable a correct assessment of each individual's aggregate income to be made; then to present the bill to him and wait for the money. The cost of this procedure, if it is to be in the least degree accurate and effective, would immensely exceed any cost that could be incurred by the system of refunds. It is palpably less costly to the State to throw the onus of claiming a refund upon the taxpayer who believes himself to have been overtaxed; for the State then receives substantial sums in advance with very little cost for collection, and has only to deal with such claims for a refund as are presented. Undoubtedly hardship may arise in the case of poor persons in receipt of unearned incomes. To deduct 5*s.* in the £ from dividends due to a poor person and to pay no refund for nearly twelve months is clearly indefensible. But this objection can be met by making refunds half-yearly or quarterly. It should be added that in the case of persons

who have an earned as well as an unearned income, the cost of making a refund is avoided altogether by an adjustment of the charge made on the earned portion of the income. Collection at the source is, in fact, the mainstay of the revenue yielded by the income-tax in this country, and there is no reason why the principle should not be applied to wages as well as to dividends and rents.

By following the advice of his permanent officials instead of following the practice established by the wage-earning classes themselves in their co-operative societies, Mr. McKenna lost a magnificent opportunity of effecting a very great fiscal and constitutional reform. He also involved the country in needlessly heavy expenditure. In the current year it is estimated that the Inland Revenue Department will incur the expense of making separate assessments for 1,500,000 weekly wage-earners with incomes over £130 a year, and that only 630,000 of these will in the event pay anything at all. The total they are estimated to pay is £3,000,000.* It is obviously bad finance to levy a tax in such a manner and on such a scale that the majority of the persons nominally subject to it pay nothing.

Speaking in the House of Commons on the 19th of November 1914, Mr. Arthur Henderson said: 'He had come to the con-'clusion that the only fair way to treat the working classes 'was by a graduated tax on wages.' Clearly this idea cannot be attained as long as the large majority of wage-earners pay nothing. All wage-earners earning under £130 a year are entirely exempt; more than half of those earning over £130 are exempted as the result of various allowances; while as the result of further concessions recently made by Mr. Bonar Law large numbers of men earning over £200 a year will be entirely freed from direct taxation.

Before leaving the question of income-tax as affected by Mr. McKenna's war Budgets, it is necessary to add that credit is due to him for partially removing an injustice to which the general body of taxpayers had long been subjected for the unfair advantage of farmers. Acting on the assumption that farmers as a class are quite incapable of keeping accounts Parliament, in establishing the income-tax in the middle of

* *See* Times, November 23, 1917.

the nineteenth century, provided a special schedule (B) for their benefit. Until Mr. McKenna's reform they paid tax under this schedule on one-third of the rental value of the land they occupied. That meant, when the old exemption limit of £160 was in force, that a farmer occupying a farm of the rental value of £480 or under paid no income-tax at all. Mr. McKenna's reform consisted in requiring farmers, if they adhered to Schedule B, to pay on the full rental value instead of upon one-third of it. Even this still leaves an unfair advantage to the farmer, especially in war time. For the rent upon which he is taxed cannot be raised during the war, whereas his profits are notoriously rising. Nor did Mr. McKenna's reform get rid of the administrative difficulty which arises when a farmer acts also as a cattle dealer or milk dealer. As a dealer his profits must be assessed under Schedule D; as a farmer he may claim to pay on the fixed basis of Schedule B. The opportunities for confusion and fraud are obvious. In the interest of farmers themselves, and in the interest of the farming industry as a national asset, it would probably be a distinct gain if the option of Schedule B were altogether withdrawn, so that farmers would be compelled to keep accounts like other business men. They would be more than repaid by the knowledge they would acquire of the financial results of the various branches of their work.

By the changes in the income-tax above described Mr. McKenna secured a very handsome addition to the yield of this main instrument of our revenue. In May 1915 Mr. Lloyd George estimated that the income-tax and super-tax together would yield in 1915–16 £103,000,000. Mr. McKenna's estimate for 1916–17 was £195,000,000; the actual yield in that year was £205,033,000.

While making this enormous addition to the national revenue by expanding old machinery, Mr. McKenna also devised a new machine, which has yielded far more revenue than anyone in the first instance ventured to hope. The Excess Profits Duty, as originally proposed in September 1915, was 'a tax of 50 per cent. upon the excess of profits 'over pre-war standards in the case of trades, manufactures, 'and businesses, including agencies.' No tax was to be charged upon the first £100 of such profit, and it was announced that provision would be made 'for adjustment on appeal to

'meet the requirements of particular classes of case' (H. of C. paper, 344 of 1915, p. 6). The tax was a novelty, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer did wisely to proceed cautiously. In 1915–16 there was not time to bring the tax into effective operation. In April 1916 Mr. McKenna raised the rate to 60 per cent. At this rate he estimated that the new tax would yield in 1916–17 the huge sum of £86,000,000; it actually yielded in that year £139,920,000, while according to the estimate made in May 1917 it will yield in the present year £180,000,000 without the further addition to the rate which Mr. Bonar Law has made. For the institution of this tax, and for the substantial additions made to the income-tax, the country owes a real debt of gratitude to Mr. McKenna. They count for more in the national balance-sheet than any other changes in taxation which have been made since the war began.

It is a pity that they were not accompanied by equally drastic taxes upon expenditure. The economic difficulties which the country has had to face since the war began are very largely traceable to the failure of the individual citizen to reduce his or her personal expenditure in order to set free labour, tonnage, coal, and other materials required for the purposes of the war. If private expenditure had been reduced as war expenditure grew, there would have been less inflation of prices, less competition for labour, less difficulty with foreign exchanges, less pressure upon the limited tonnage available for bringing the necessaries of life to our shores. The very best way to enforce reduction of private expenditure is to tax it. Taxation on expenditure either prevents the particular form of expenditure which the State desires to check, or provides revenue for the State. From the point of view of war economy it matters little which of these events ensues; one or other is certain.

This common-sense view of the economics of taxation in time of war was partially adopted by Mr. McKenna in his Budget of September 1915, and further extended in April 1916. But on neither occasion did he go far enough. He seems to have started with the idea of a 50 per cent. all-round increase in the duties then levied upon several of the principal articles of consumption, namely, tea, cocoa, coffee, chicory, dried fruits, and tobacco. This is another illustration of the

casual way in which Budgets seem to be prepared in the Treasury, to be sanctioned in the Cabinet, and voted by the House of Commons. A 50 per cent. increase in the case of tea gave the substantial addition of 4*d.* per lb.; in the case of coffee the same percentage only meant 1*d.* per lb. increase; and in the case of cocoa only ½*d.* It was not until six months later that this blunder was discovered, and proposals made for a substantial addition to the cocoa and coffee duties. Even the 4*d.* added to the tea duty, bringing the total up to 1*s.* per lb., was insufficient, in view of the urgent need for checking the consumption of imported articles. In the Crimean War, merely as a fiscal measure, the tea duty was raised from 1*s.* 6*d.* to 1*s.* 9*d.* per lb.* Yet at that date, though the amount of tea drunk was much less than to-day, the habit of tea-drinking did extend—as the figures for total consumption clearly indicate—to practically all classes of the community, and all classes were much poorer then than they now are.

As regards sugar Mr. McKenna was even less courageous. The Government from the early days of the war had acquired all stocks of sugar, and on this account Mr. Lloyd George had stated—without explaining why—that he could not tax sugar. Mr. McKenna in September 1915 raised the tax from rather less than a ¼*d.* per lb. to 1*d.* per lb., but at the same time he announced that the Government would lower the price at which they were selling sugar, so that the real addition to the tax was only ½*d.* a lb., bringing the price of the day up from 3½*d.* to 4*d.* In view of the prosperity of the country, and of the notorious extravagance in the consumption of sugar in all classes, this was a totally inadequate increase. Six months later Mr. McKenna added another ½*d.*, but that was still insufficient to check consumption; for the price of sugar then was lower in London than in New York. If the politicians who in 1915 and 1916 were incessantly preaching the need for economy had had the courage to give effect to their speeches by imposing a heavy tax on sugar and a much heavier tax on confectionery, it would not have been necessary in 1917 to embark upon a costly system of sugar rationing.

---

* *See* Customs Tariff of the United Kingdom, 1800–1897 (C. 8706). The Crimean War tea tax was incorrectly given as 1*s.* 3*d.* in the EDINBURGH REVIEW for July 1915, p. 219.

Among the more satisfactory features of Mr. McKenna's two Budgets was the establishment of various new taxes on expenditure, including the very excellent taxes on entertainments and on matches. In addition he imposed import duties on motor-cars, cinema films, clocks, plate glass, etc., but the value of these new customs duties was in some cases subsequently destroyed by the adoption of a policy of absolute prohibition of imports. In the same way Mr. McKenna's attempt to get more money out of motor-cars by increasing the duty on petrol was largely frustrated by the subsequent introduction of the rationing system. He did indeed also propose to increase the licence duties on motor-cars and motor bicycles; but abandoned the proposal at the first breath of opposition.

Similar timidity characterised the action of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or of his colleagues, in dealing with the question of postal rates. The Public Retrenchment Committee, presided over by Mr. McKenna himself, had recommended unanimously the imposition of a war tax of ½*d.* on all postal matter. This would have raised the minimum letter rate to 1½*d.*, and the rate for circulars and postcards to 1*d.* A similar war tax on letters had already been adopted in Canada, and has since been adopted in France, Italy, and the United States. It would have yielded a considerable revenue, and would to some extent have saved both labour and paper; but the Government had not the courage to proceed with the proposal. All that was done was to lower the weight of letters carried for 1*d.* from 4 oz. to 1 oz.; and to place a limit of 6 oz. on the weight of newspapers that the Post Office carries for ½*d.* A small addition was also made to the parcel post rates, but there is reason to believe that these rates do not even now cover the cost involved. Thus at a time when the Post Office is hampered by a shortage of labour, when the railways are congested, and when the Exchequer is faced with a colossal deficit, the State is still engaged in carrying parcels for private individuals at less than cost. It also conveys telegrams at a loss, for the increased charge from 6*d.* to 9*d.* still leaves a heavy deficit on the service.

While it is necessary to point out these defects—many of them very serious—in the financial proposals of Mr. McKenna, yet we are bound to recognise that he did secure a magnificent addition to the national revenue, and that he did make very

substantial provision for the difficulties of post-war finance His successor did nothing. Mr. Bonar Law went to the Exchequer in December 1916. His first Budget, and so far his only Budget, was proposed to the House of Commons in May 1917. He was faced with a very heavy addition to the daily rate of expenditure upon the war and to the annual burden of the war debt; with an addition of £5,560,000 to the estimated cost of the civil departments; and with a falling off of £34,850,000 in the estimated yield of the excise revenue, owing to restrictions that had been placed upon the production and sale of alcoholic liquors. All he did was to propose an addition of 20 per cent. to the Excess Profits Tax, estimated to yield an extra £20,000,000, and additions to the Tobacco Duty and the Entertainments Tax, which he calculated would together yield £7,000,000. At the same time he proposed concessions upon the liquor licences, involving a loss of about £900,000 in revenue. His total estimated addition to the revenue out of new taxation was therefore only £26,100,000, or considerably less than the falling off in excise alone. Mr. Bonar Law's one and only Budget was not progressive but retrogressive.

He had in sight, in May 1917, an estimated total revenue of £639,000,000, and an estimated total expenditure of £2,290,000,000. Deducting from both sides the sum of £395,000,000 representing civil expenditure, plus peace estimates for the army and navy, plus interest on debt, there remained £244,000,000 of revenue to meet a direct war expenditure of £1,895,000,000. But from the £244,000,000 had to be deducted £200,000,000 for the estimated yield of the Excess Profits Duty, leaving only £44,000,000 as an available peace surplus. That sum would obviously be insufficient to meet the growing interest on war debt, and to provide a sinking fund, leaving less than nothing to meet the growing charge for war pensions and allowances. In other words, Mr. Bonar Law in May 1917, instead of providing means to reduce taxation should the war end with the financial year, budgeted for the certainty that additional taxation would have to be imposed the moment peace was declared. As a loyal supporter of Mr. Lloyd George, he followed the example and ignored the precepts of his chief.

During the ensuing summer and autumn months the daily

expenditure upon the war rose rapidly, and financial critics began to express alarm. With a view to allaying this alarm Mr. Bonar Law made a statement to the House of Commons on the 30th of October 1917. It was skilfully calculated to create an impression that everything was going well by insisting that some things were not quite so bad as they had seemed to be. With this familiar oratorical device it is unnecessary here to deal. The essential fact which the Chancellor of the Exchequer attempted to gloss over was the heavy increase in expenditure since his Budget estimate. That fact required a further provision of revenue. Instead of making such further provision Mr. Bonar Law treated the House of Commons to a calculation based upon a number of indefensible assumptions. He assumed that all the wholesale purchases of commodities made by the Government would be disposed of without loss, although at the time he spoke it was known that large stocks of Australian wheat, purchased by the British Government, were rotting in Australia for lack of transport. He assumed that countries like Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania would be in a position the moment the war ended to pay interest on their heavy borrowings from the British Exchequer, and that Russia would be both able and willing to repay what she has borrowed. He further assumed that the yield of taxation swollen by war wages and war profits would continue at the same level when war expenditure ceased. He also assumed that the cost of the army and navy would drop to the figures of 1913–14, although a higher standard of pay was on the point of being established for soldiers and sailors. Finally, he assumed that there was no necessity to contemplate any addition to the civil expenditure of the country to tide over the difficult period of resettlement after the war. On the basis of these assumptions he grandiloquently stated on the 30th of October 1917:

> 'If the war ended to-morrow the amount of taxation which we are now levying, the amount of revenue received, would be more than sufficient to enable us, without thought of additional taxation, and without counting the Excess Profits Duty, to bear all the normal expenditure of the government.'

Perhaps the politest comment that can in honesty be made upon this extraordinary statement is to quote the famous saying of the Swedish statesman to the son whom he had

introduced to the arcana of government : ' See, my son, with ' what little wisdom the world is governed.'

That is all that it is necessary to say for the moment about the failures of the successive war finance ministers of the United Kingdom—and especially of two of them—to provide out of revenue an adequate contribution to the cost of the war. Unfortunately there are other features of our war finance which have been equally injurious to the permanent interests of the nation.

The obvious alternative to taxation is borrowing, and to a limited extent borrowing is both economically sound and nationally legitimate to meet the cost of a great war. The economic function of taxation is to divert the power of spending from the private individual to the public authority. The pounds or the pence that are taken by taxation from the private citizen can no longer be used by him, or her, to call for goods and services for private gratification ; they pass into the exchequer, and the State acquires the whole power which they represent to call for goods and services for the public need. There is thus a real transference of national activity from private to public purposes. State borrowing, so long as it is supplied by the *bona fide* savings of the individual citizen, has the same effect. The money which the individual lends to the Government out of his own available cash can no longer be used by him for his private expenditure. The spending power passes to the State, and to this extent, and under these conditions, State borrowing performs the same economic purposes as taxation.

The difference is that when the State taxes it takes the money once for all ; when the State borrows it undertakes to repay the money at some future date, and in the interval to pay interest upon the sum borrowed. Thus borrowing involves a charge upon future years to meet the expenditure of the present year. If we all lived in a state of perfect communism ; all possessing the same restricted appetites, desires, ambitions ; all subservient in every detail of our daily lives to the authority of the perfect commune, it would be sheer foolishness to charge future years with present expenditure. But just because we are human beings we do not, and never shall, live in a condition of communal equality, and therefore the State in financing such exceptional expenditure as that

caused by a great war is bound to take account not only of inequalities of financial ability among its citizens, but also of their differing financial desires.

One man may be able to put his hand on £1000 without a moment's difficulty; another man who, judged by every test that taxing authorities could apply, is equally well off, could not raise £100 without seriously embarrassing himself. Therefore to compel both by taxation to hand over £1000 would involve real injustice. Again some men love to spend all the money they get; others prefer to save for the security of their old age or for the benefit of their heirs. In the interests of the nation—especially in war time—it is desirable that the latter class should be encouraged.

On both these grounds the State is justified in raising part of its war expenditure by means of loans provided by private citizens who have both the means and the will to lend. Those who have not the means to lend suffer no injustice if in future years they are taxed to pay interest on State loans; for the alternative would have been a present tax which they could only have paid by borrowing money themselves, probably at a much higher rate of interest. Still less can complaint come from those citizens who having the means have not the will to lend; for they have chosen to gratify their own selfishness in the time of their country's urgent need. Finally, it must be remembered that the people who lend will themselves be subject to taxation in one form or another to meet their share of the burden of the national debt. In every respect borrowing of this character—that is, borrowing out of the *bona fide* savings of individuals—is a perfectly legitimate method of meeting war expenditure, provided always that enough revenue is simultaneously raised by means of taxation to cover the whole of the liabilities incurred for interest and sinking fund, and to leave a large margin over for the reduction of taxation when the war ends.

Unfortunately our finance ministers have not been content with this *bona fide* borrowing from individuals; instead they have relied very largely on credits supplied by banking houses, with the result that the daily cost of the war has been artificially enhanced and the burden of debt upon posterity unfairly increased. In addition the Government have issued a very large volume of currency notes without any backing

of gold. The total at the end of 1917 was £213,000,000 against a gold backing of only £28,500,000. The volume of notes has generally grown during the past two and a half years at the rate of £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 a week, but in the second half of December 1917 an addition of over £13,000,000 was made in one fortnight.

The existence of this swollen currency enables people to bid up prices against one another to a greater extent than would have been possible if the currency had been kept on a commercial basis. This not only intensifies industrial difficulties to-day, but it aggravates the post-war burden of debt, when specie payments will have to be resumed. The only way to diminish the evil is to borrow less.

Thus we come back again to the necessity of raising by means of taxation a larger contribution to the current cost of the war Not only will this diminish the amount of debt which would otherwise have to be created, thus *pro tanto* lightening the post-war burden of debt ; but in addition it provides a margin of revenue which can be used on the cessation of war either to reduce debt or to remit taxation. At present there is no such margin. It may be said without hesitation that the most urgent financial need of the State at this moment is the establishment of a very large margin of revenue for these purposes. That the possibilities of taxation are not yet exhausted is sufficiently obvious. Indeed, they have grown progressively greater with each year of the war. By means of an expanded and carefully graduated income tax levied upon the whole nation from the poorest to the richest, and by means of taxes upon every form of unnecessary or extravagant expenditure, it is possible on the one hand to provide a very largely increased contribution out of revenue to the cost of the war, and on the other hand to compel economy in private expenditure so that the whole economic effort of the nation may be concentrated on the supreme task of winning the war.

EDITOR.

PROBLEMS OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

1. **Report of the Mesopotamia Commission.** Cd. 8610. 1917.
2. **Recollections.** By VISCOUNT MORLEY, O.M. Macmillan. 1917.
3. **India and the Future.** By WILLIAM ARCHER. Hutchinson. 1917.
4. **Nationalism.** By Sir RABINDRANATH TAGORE. Macmillan. 1917.
5. **The Indian Corps in France.** By Lt.-Colonel J. W. B. MEREWETHER, C.I.E., and Sir FREDERICK SMITH. Murray. 1917.
6. **The Indian Demands.** With an Introduction by G. A. NATESAN. Madras. 1917.
7. **What India Wants: Autonomy within the Empire.** By G. A. NATESAN. Madras. 1917.

THE Cabinet have definitely decided that questions of administrative and political reform in India are not necessarily to wait until the end of the war. They have sent Mr. Edwin Montagu, the new Secretary of State, to Delhi with two colleagues, Lord Donoughmore and Mr. Charles Roberts, and have instructed him to collect opinions with a view to framing a scheme which shall give the people of India a larger share in the internal administration of their affairs. It must be presumed that some alterations in the executive system are also in contemplation, and further, that there will be some reconstruction of the control exercised from London by the India Office. A third large problem which is under consideration is that of the organisation and administration of the army of India, which has been found to be gravely defective. The first two problems are closely inter-connected, and the third may be said to touch them both at many points.

There can be no doubt that the Cabinet were broadly right in resolving that the pressing problems of India could not be wholly neglected until after the war, the end of which may be still distant. When fighting began, it seemed to many that all questions not directly associated with the great conflict might be postponed until a more convenient season. The ideal of exclusive concentration upon the war was right, but it has proved to be unattainable, largely because the war has

not taken the course which at first was confidently expected. It has developed into far more than a simple military and naval conflict between the Allies and the Germanic Powers. Great and obscure world-forces have been gradually set in motion. We are in the presence of upheavals the end of which no man can foresee. We cannot yet be sure that the struggle may not last for years, or that it may not contain the seeds of a whole crop of wars. The warning of history is that whenever the Teutonic tribes in Northern Europe begin their warlike migrations, a long cycle of strife has invariably followed. Even if by some miracle the war ended to-morrow, we should still be only on the threshold of prolonged political and economic dissensions. The virtual disappearance of Russia as a great Power upsets the balance which has roughly existed in Europe ever since the Golden Horde was driven back into Asia. We are confronted with a solid block of German influence stretching from Antwerp to the upper waters of the Tigris, and the doors of the East are opening to our foes. Simultaneously in every country new ideas and new aspirations, some of which are wild and impracticable, are at work among the people. Apart from the clash of international hostilities, we are about to see fresh battles for power upon a class basis. Their advent will be accelerated by the exhaustion towards which the world is drifting, and by the deficiency of food, the paralysis of peaceful industries, and the devaluation of money. When such tendencies are manifest, every prudent Government must do its best to conserve and strengthen the fabric of the State. India has been called, perhaps with an excess of rhetoric, the keystone of the British Empire. The Cabinet cannot ignore Indian problems until 'peace comes dropping 'slow.' If war and fierce internal strife are to be normal factors in our lives, we must still continue the work of the world as best we can.

It cannot be said that the present political excitement in India is the outcome of the war. The symptoms now traceable have been developing for many years, and the war at first had a demulcent though afterwards an inflammatory effect. Ten years ago the Indian National Congress, then an almost exclusively Hindu organisation, broke up in disorder at Surat, and the rupture was followed by a deep schism between the Moderate and Extremist sections. The Moderates became on

the whole more constitutional than before, the Extremists grew wilder and more revolutionary. The Morley-Minto reforms in 1909, which admitted Indians to the highest executive offices, and enlarged the powers and the numerical strength of the Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils, had for a time a soothing influence upon the constitutional politicians.

The visit of the King-Emperor at the end of 1911 temporarily hushed all discords, and produced an outburst of enthusiasm which astonished all who witnessed it. His Majesty's tour would probably have brought about even more successful results had it not been associated with such controversial measures as the transfer of the capital to Delhi and the second reconstruction of Bengal. But though the Crown is still the strongest link between India and the rest of the Empire, the disquieting movements at work in India were too deep-seated to be permanently affected by the brief stay of the Monarch. The disruptive activities of the Anarchists were soon visible once more, and were only checked for a short time by the widespread indignation aroused by the mad attempt to assassinate the then Viceroy, Lord Hardinge. The younger Mahomedans in the big cities, already stirred because Eastern Bengal had been placed once more under the control of Calcutta, engaged in a largely factitious agitation in favour of Turkey when she went to war with the rest of the Balkan States. Many of the Moderates became disappointed with the limited scope of the Morley-Minto reforms, and showed a tendency to join hands with the Extremists. The National Congress and the Moslem League eventually sought to create a common platform, the basis of which was a mutual striving for some form of self-government. The news that the Empire was at war suddenly fell like a bomb-shell into the midst of all the wordy and excited discussions which were then prevalent.

The Western world is fond of talking of 'the inscrutable 'East,' and does not sufficiently realise that India is intensely emotional. A wave of emotional excitement swept through the peninsula when war was declared, and enthusiasm for the Allied cause ran high. The public spirit shown by all classes of the Indian communities was exceedingly creditable, and the attempts since made in some quarters to depreciate, or to measure and analyse too meticulously, the swift response

of India in the autumn of 1914, cannot be approved. The first months of the war showed that the heart of India was sound and uncorrupted. The fighting races gave their men, and all gave support. How well the Indian troops have fought is shown by the admirable and stirring record compiled by Colonel Merewether and Sir Frederick Smith. Their glowing tribute, based on personal observation and on authentic documents, removes many misapprehensions and redounds to the glory of the Indian regiments. But while the soldiers exemplified the fine spirit of the Indian communities, the misfortune was that the governing authorities, great and small, took no adequate steps to guide the generous eagerness of the people of India into the right channels. Their lassitude eventually chilled the popular fervour. Though the attempts of the secret revolutionaries to produce widespread rebellion in 1915 at the instigation of Germany were serious enough, they never touched the multitude; yet when it was found that the war would be a long one, political agitation revived, and the help India had given was made the foundation of demands far exceeding any previously presented. A 'Home 'Rule' party was formed, small in numbers but exceedingly vocal. The Government of India, who had declared their intention not to introduce controversial legislative measures during the war, preserved a massive silence, undoubtedly under instructions from home. Their reticence was misconstrued, and the excitement grew more intense during the latter half of 1916 and the first few months of 1917.

The publication of the report of the Mesopotamia Commission, in June 1917, made the situation worse, for the Commission practically arraigned the executive methods of the Indian administration. Its just criticisms chiefly related to the failure of the Indian authorities to exercise successful control over the campaign on the Tigris. It questioned the system under which the army of India was organised, but did not even remotely touch the aspirations which were being expressed by the Indian politicians. No one has ever suggested that Sir Charles Townshend would not have been ordered to march on Baghdad, or that the wounded would have been better cared for, if the Indian people had been managing their own affairs. But the particular form of polity assailed by the Congress and the League was nevertheless severely

condemned by the Commission in certain respects, and the spokesmen of India not unnaturally took up the cry and turned it to their own ends.

When Mr. Austen Chamberlain resigned his post as Secretary of State, as a consequence of the Mesopotamia report, the Home Government raised the excitement in India to a feverish pitch by somewhat rashly appointing Mr. Montagu as his successor. Mr. Montagu had considerable claims, and had acquired some knowledge of Indian affairs when Under-Secretary of State; but the true reason why he was chosen was that it was desired to break up the small band of younger Liberals who still clustered round Mr. Asquith. India thought otherwise. Mr. Montagu had made an indiscreet speech during the Mesopotamia debate, in which he had condemned the Indian administration, and even the India Office, root and branch. The Indian politicians hailed his appointment with delight, because they believed that it indicated an intention to put his extreme views into instant practice. The English community in India, which had watched the swift expansion of Indian claims with rising disapproval, simultaneously developed an alarm which was largely based on misunderstanding. For the first time for thirty years they began to organise and to hold meetings, and a fresh fissure was created between the Indian peoples and themselves. The Home Government made a belated attempt to allay the hubbub by drafting a formula regarding their policy, which was simultaneously announced in London and in Simla, but calm was not restored either among Indians or among the English in India. Mr. Montagu and his colleagues landed at Bombay in November to find an atmosphere which on one side was over-expectant and on the other over-apprehensive. In this matter Mr. Montagu is merely in the position of an advisory delegate. Whatever changes may be made will be the work of the Cabinet, of which he is not a member; and they must first be submitted to both Houses of Parliament, who represent the real arbiters of the destinies of India, the people of Great Britain.

In examining more closely the problems now ripening for settlement, it will first be convenient to deal briefly with the question of reforms in Indian army administration, which is entirely an outcome of the Mesopotamia report; next, with

prospective reforms in the executive civil administration of India; and finally, with the possible further development of self-governing institutions. The dispute between Lord Kitchener and the Government of India in 1905, which led to Lord Curzon's resignation of the viceroyalty, has never been rightly understood in this country. Lord Morley suggests in his 'Recollections' that the importance of the issue was 'enormously exaggerated' on both sides, but it is difficult to accept this verdict in view of what has happened since. The question was essentially a constitutional one, and in a somewhat different form it has actually reappeared in England during the present war. The principle involved is the subject of fierce contention to-day, and those who participated in the Curzon-Kitchener controversy see in the current demand that the whole military resources of the Empire should be placed at the unquestioned disposal of a single soldier simply a new variation of the old Indian battle of 1905.

There was never any opposition to the scheme of army reorganisation devised by Lord Kitchener, and he was given all the funds he asked for. Issue was joined because he sought to centralise all power in his own hands as Commander-in-Chief. When he reached India, he was executive head of the army, and was responsible for its organisation and training for war. The military department, at whose head was the military member of Council, was responsible for the branches of supply and transport, ordnance, remounts, clothing, medical stores, and for the preparation of the military budget. The military member was always a soldier of high rank, his duties were administrative and not executive, he served as a constitutional check upon expenditure, and he was also able on occasion to act as a second and independent military adviser to the Viceroy. Lord Kitchener sought to destroy the military department, and did in fact destroy it, for Lord Morley's ghost of a substitute only lasted three years. Lord Roberts said in the House of Lords at the time that 'the Viceroy should 'not be dependent on the advice of a single soldier, however 'eminent and distinguished he may be.' Lord Morley, before taking up office, declared that 'if there is one principle more 'than another that has been accepted in this country since 'the day when Charles I. lost his head, it is this—that the 'civil power shall be supreme over the military power'; and

he charged the Home Government with a 'great departure 'from those standard maxims of public administration which 'had been practically sacred in this island since the days of 'the Civil War.' That as Secretary of State he endorsed the 'great departure' a few months later did not alter the force of his original criticism. Lord Curzon said in his last speech in India: 'The principles have not vanished though they 'have momentarily disappeared. They will reappear, and 'that before very long.' These three utterances deserve remembrance. Twelve years later, in the midst of war, the Viceroy was unwisely guided by a single soldier upon whom he was dependent; the influence of the civil power had temporarily vanished, for the Government of India exercised no collective control over military policy; but in the end the old principles reappeared, exactly as Lord Curzon had predicted.

The result of the concentration of both administrative and executive power in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief was revealed by the shortcomings of the Mesopotamia expedition. Having 'to perform the work of six men,' Sir Beauchamp Duff was not able to discharge efficiently either branch of his dual duties. The supply and transport and the medical services proved inadequate, and the executive work of the Commander-in-Chief fell largely into abeyance. Precisely the same tendency towards over-centralisation was manifested by Lord Kitchener when he came to the War Office in London on the outbreak of war. He tried to combine the administrative duties of the Secretary of State with the executive functions of the Chief of Staff; and eventually Mr. Asquith's Government had to appoint Sir William Robertson as Chief of Staff, and to arm him with a special Order in Council to prevent encroachment upon his particular sphere. So far as India is concerned, the Mesopotamia Commission indited a crushing condemnation of the Kitchener system, which it declared to be 'over-centralised at its head, and 'cumbrous in its duality below.' It declared that the combination of duties of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member 'cannot adequately be performed by any one man in time of 'war.' It held that the Indian system of military administration was 'astounding' and inept, and it urged that changes must be made.

On Sir Beauchamp Duff's recall, Sir Charles Monro was

sent out as his successor, and the Home Government gave him a free hand to recommend whatever changes might be required. His conclusions have not yet been disclosed, and it is by no means clear that the necessary reforms are in contemplation. Strong efforts are even being made to place the army of India directly under the control of the War Office, a change which would be bound to react disastrously upon the native army and upon the whole military system of India. It cannot be too strongly urged that normally the army of India, British and Indian, must be administered and controlled in India, as in the past. The military and civil administrations are too closely related to permit the War Office to exercise arbitrary powers of interference with the Indian system in time of peace. The Commander-in-Chief should be the executive head of the army, and not an administrative minister; and the Viceroy should never again be left dependent on the advice of a single soldier in time of war. He should have access to a second opinion, as in former years. The Government of India should take its share of responsibility in decisions on military policy. It is impossible to believe that the desire of the Home Government to advance to Baghdad in the autumn of 1915 would have gained any acquiescence in India if a military member of the stamp of Chesney or Brackenbury had been in office, or even if the members of the Government of India had subjected the final advice of Sir Beauchamp Duff to common-sense scrutiny.

This short reference to a very complex problem is not a digression. The eighth Duke of Argyll said in 1870 that 'it should never be forgotten, and there should never be any 'hesitation in laying down the principle, that it is one of our 'first duties to the people of India to guard the safety of our 'own dominion.' The principle applies with special force to military defence, and no effort should be spared to place the military system of India upon a sound basis. A thorough overhaul of the methods of military organisation and control has become imperative for external reasons. We have never held India by the sword, as is thoughtlessly said so often; but we have guaranteed the people of India against aggression from without. The old isolation of India is breaking down. By land the peninsula must soon be linked up with the outer world. The collapse of the Russian Empire may conceivably

produce a great re-grouping of States in the Middle East and Central Asia. For these reasons, and not from internal causes, it is necessary that the security of India should be strengthened by prompt attention to the military defects disclosed by the Mesopotamia report.

When we turn to the second aspect of the subject, and consider what reforms may be necessary in the executive civil administration of India, we gain further enlightenment from the revelations of the Mesopotamia Commission. The picture unveiled is extraordinary. In Whitehall we find a Secretary of State transacting business of the gravest importance without any formal reference to his expert advisers, the members of the Council of India, more commonly known as 'The Secretary ' of State's Council.' When the Secretary of State wished to communicate with the Viceroy, he frequently used private telegrams, which were often not placed upon the public records. In India the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council were 'never consulted as to, nor were they privy to, the ' campaign in Mesopotamia.' Appointed members of a government, and therefore incurring the equivalent of joint ministerial responsibility, they were content to lapse into mere heads of departments, and some of them seem to have even gloried in their aloofness from the great issues over which they were bound by their oath to exercise joint control. At a time when India was clamouring for more representative government, the executive machine, both at Simla and in Whitehall, presented the curious spectacle of the development of purely autocratic methods, which were an almost complete negation of the constitutional safeguards devised long ago for the administration of India. No special blame attaches either to Mr. Austen Chamberlain or to Lord Hardinge for these perversions of the intentions of parliament. Both were merely the inheritors of a bad system, which they accepted without question.

The cases of the Council of India and of the Viceroy's Executive Council are by no means parallel. Lord Morley's compendious definition of the functions of the Council of India is that 'it is essentially advisory, but its influence upon ' the Secretary of State has weight and value, and on finance ' its authority is decisive.' It has no authority concerning ' the levying of war or the making of peace,' except in so far

as these matters may involve 'an expenditure of money.' Mr. Chamberlain defended himself in the House of Commons on the 12th of July 1917 against the accusation that he had not consulted his Council, but without admitting the validity of his technical plea, it may be said that the issue goes very far beyond the case of Mr. Chamberlain. For a long time past the tendency of the India Office has been to curtail and undermine the authority of the Council of India. The worst offender was undoubtedly Lord Morley, who, whatever his virtues may have been, was certainly the most autocratic and the least constitutional Secretary of State ever seen in Whitehall. He reduced the emoluments of the members of Council, a change which reacts with peculiar unfairness upon the Indian members; and while he was the first minister to summon Indians to his Council, he paradoxically ignored the place which the Council was intended to hold in the administrative system. Mr. Montagu roundly attacked the Council in his speech in the Mesopotamia debate, and declared that it produced 'an apotheosis of circumlocution and red-'tape beyond the dreams of the ordinary citizen.' This declaration is much more applicable to India Office methods as a whole than to the particular case of the Council.

The plain fact is that in recent years a tendency has arisen to advocate the abolition of the Council altogether. Secretaries of State, and the permanent staff of the India Office—hardly any of whom have Indian experience—are impatient of its presence and its powers. They thirst for the pure milk of bureaucracy, and dislike the intervention of a body of experts, none of whom can be removed from office without a special resolution of parliament. In our view, the considerations which originally led to the creation of the Council of India remain as imperative as ever, and all attempts to abolish it, or to belittle its authority, should be strenuously resisted. The true remedy is to strengthen and to modernise the Council. It should no longer be regarded as a comfortable retreat for retired civil servants who have spent their best energies in the service of India. We would prefer to widen its scope, and would provide two or three seats on a three years' tenure for younger men with Indian experience, but not members of the India Civil Service. The Act would require modification, but this is a minor difficulty. The principle of the

Council of India is excellent, and should be preserved, but it needs an infusion of current experience.

The question of private telegrams between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, about which the Commission has much to say, requires little comment here, because the requisite reforms are understood to have been already effected. The question is an old one, and traces of it are found in the chronicles of the late Lord Salisbury and Lord Northbrook. It recurs repeatedly in the political records of India. Private telegrams mean that the messages may not be seen by the Councils, and the Commission were quite right in urging that such telegrams and letters should not ' become a recognised channel ' of authoritative and mandatory communication.'

When we turn from Whitehall to the Viceroy's Executive Council, the disparity between the intentions of the legislature and modern practice, as revealed by the Mesopotamia Commission, becomes even more marked. India is governed by ' the Governor-General-in-Council,' and if successive Viceroys have in any respect acted unconstitutionally, the fault lies chiefly with the executive members of Council, who have neither asserted their rights nor performed their duties. Here, again, the evil is not new, though it required disaster in war to bring it fully to light. The practice in India, which is quite wholesome and necessary, is that departmental secretaries to Government have independent access to the Viceroy, and submit the departmental papers every week. The member of Council is the head of the department, but the secretary may state his own independent views, and in some cases does so very frequently. More than one Viceroy has gradually got into the habit of transacting business through the secretaries, and of not summoning the Executive Council regularly ; which is very much as though the Prime Minister were to conduct the business of the State through the chief permanent officials, to see his fellow-ministers rarely, and to neglect to summon Cabinet Councils. There can be absolutely no doubt that during the last thirty years, at intermittent periods which need not be specified, the Government of India (which is the Viceroy's Executive Council) has not been entirely conducted on constitutional lines.

It is because of these regrettable lapses from precedent that the question of the private telegrams between the Viceroy

and the Secretary of State assumed so much importance. In some instances members of Council not only did not know what was done, but did not want to know. They forgot that they literally and by statute were *the Government.* They preferred to immerse themselves in the work of their own departments, and in effect they ceased to be ministers. It is to be feared that for a long time past there has been—with occasional shining exceptions—a steady deterioration in the quality and vigour of the men who have attained the highest official rank in India. By their close preoccupation with departmental routine, they lost touch with the broader and deeper issues which were arising for settlement. They administered sectionally, but they did not govern. Some modern members of Council seemed to have no conception of the magnitude of their high office or of the character of their responsibility. They either suffered themselves to be effaced, or faded into obscurity with something akin to alacrity. That they were guilty of the very gravest dereliction of duty, that they must act themselves instead of thrusting the responsibility on others, were thoughts outside their ken. The progressive weakness of the Government of India in recent years is largely due to the failure of members of Council to discharge faithfully their duties as defined by parliament.

It is not too much to say that to-day the Government of India has almost ceased to exist in its collective form. It is a lifeless shell, manned by automata. It has neither nerve nor grip. We do not in the least agree with Mr. Montagu's declaration that 'the Government of India is an indefensible 'system of government.' What is indefensible is that the members of the Government of India have drifted into a totally wrong conception of their task, have become unduly subordinate, and while engrossing themselves with sectional interests have ceased to act collectively. A very similar tendency was visible in the ministry of this country during the early months of the war. Each minister prided himself upon his concentration on the business of his own office, and the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility became an empty theory. No great harm was done thereby, because Mr. Asquith's Cabinet was in any case too unwieldy for the conduct of a war; but the development of such methods in India means that the larger issues of administration are

disregarded. Questions submitted by departments receive attention, while the bigger problems, constantly arising now owing to the rapid changes of Indian political thought, are neglected. Should the Viceroy be inexperienced or perfunctory in his application to business, or inclined to shut his eyes to awkward and troublesome matters, these tendencies are greatly accentuated. Whatever changes are made in India, it is more necessary than ever that the members of the Government of India should govern, and not remain absorbed in their departments.

Regular and very frequent meetings of the Executive Council should be compulsory and automatic, and should not be dependent on the initiative of the Viceroy or on the suggestion of one or other of the members. The Viceroy should see all the members of the Government of India constantly, and it should not be considered that his weekly meetings with the secretaries are a substitute for continuous contact with his immediate colleagues, who in many respects share his powers and responsibilities. These particular observations are in no sense intended to apply specially to the present administration, but relate rather to the general constitutional laxity observable at Simla, which is not at all of recent growth. There have been periods in the past when Viceroys have not seen their fellow-members of Council for weeks together; when no Council has been summoned for an incredible time; and when the head of the Government has sincerely thought that he was fulfilling his task by receiving the secretaries. The right enjoyed by the secretaries of stating to the Viceroy any points of difference which may have arisen between themselves and their ministers is a most important and salutary feature of the Indian system, which should not be curtailed; but the Government of India will continue to be weak until the principles underlying Executive Council government are completely revived and fulfilled.

It is sometimes lightly said that the modern weakness of the Government of India is due to the introduction of Indian members of Council, whose presence impairs the system because, consciously or unconsciously, it induces more restraint. The contention cannot be admitted, because the tendencies here noted were visible long before Indians were appointed. They were noticeable, for example, in the time of Lord Elgin. In

any case, Indian members are now a permanent feature of the Council, and must be accepted without reserve. One undoubted source of weakness is that the Civil Service members are practically dependent upon the Viceroy for promotion to the post of Lieutenant-Governor when their term of office expires. Human nature being what it is, a member who is hoping to be promoted to the charge of a large province is not likely to differ too obtrusively from the Viceroy while in Council. This aspect of the system is unfortunate. Membership of the Government of India should be the highest office to which a civil servant can aspire. A man should be a Lieutenant-Governor, if at all, before he enters Council, and from the time he becomes one of the eight men forming the Government of India he should have nothing further to hope or to fear.

We have directed special attention to the question of the Governor-General-in-Council, because in current discussions concerning India it is too often ignored. Just as a sound scheme of military administration is more than ever of vital importance to India, so it is imperative that the executive organism known as the Government of India should be rightly constituted and should exercise authority in accordance with the conceptions of its creators. No reforms can be allowed to impair the efficient working of the Indian defence system or the federal control entrusted to the supreme executive. It is sometimes suggested that if India were transformed into a series of self-governing provinces and States, the Government of India might retire to its mountain eyrie and play the part of benevolent onlooker. We are asked to conceive it as a body relegated to the duties of collecting customs, adjusting railway rates, gently admonishing intractable princes, and writing agreeable letters to the Amir of Afghanistan. We cannot endorse this view. In the stormy times which lie ahead for all nations, the two first essentials for the preservation of the Indian Empire are an army strong enough to resist aggression from without, and a central executive able to exercise unquestioned authority as it is exercised on occasion by the central authorities of the United States. Complete security, and the unifying influence emanating from the central executive, are the bases upon which all schemes of Indian reform must be built at this juncture.

These premisses are not incompatible with a considerable delegation of power to the provincial governments. Lord Islington has recently suggested that all the principal provinces should have executive councils, consisting of two Europeans and two Indians. The time is ripe for such an advance, but it is not easy to understand why so much stress should be laid in many quarters upon the appointment of Governors from England. In addition to the Viceroy, there are now three Governors in India who are furnished from England, and are usually, though not necessarily, peers. The further multiplication of such appointments seems inadvisable. The best men in the Indian Civil Service should not be debarred from the charge of provinces, and probably all that is necessary is to let the field of choice include both classes of Govern rs.

No examination of the methods of the higher executive in India can avoid some reference to the migrations of the governments. The question of administration from hill-stations has been a perennial subject of controversy in India for fifty years. The report of the Mesopotamia Commission, which asked what would have happened if Thurso or Wick had been 'the headquarters of the British Army departments during 'this war,' ought to have proved its death-blow; but Simla apparently remains unabashed and unrepentant. There can be no doubt that hill-top government is unpractical and unreal. Every administration in India must eventually come down to the plains and stay there. A beginning should be made with the three Presidency Governments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, which should be permanently established in the coast capitals. The case of the administrations of Upper India is not so urgent, and the Government of India might also be given a respite; but the whole of the army administration should be uprooted from Simla without delay, and transplanted in an atmosphere more conducive to soldier-like efficiency. First and last, Simla has been the ruin of the army of India.

Changes in the executive machinery of India imply that there must be changes in the character of the control exercised by the India Office, which for many years has entrenched itself against reform behind defences as formidable as the Hindenburg Line. The India Office is an interesting archaic survival, a relic of the days of Charles Lamb embedded in the

midst of the Departments of State. It is built like a fortress, and conducted in the spirit of its architecture. Its spell falls upon all who enter it, and even Lord Morley was transformed into a passable imitation of the Great Mogul as soon as he was within its portals. While the whole world talks of Indian reform, the India Office remains as impervious to reform as a rhinoceros. Whenever a spasmodic disposition to inquire into Indian affairs penetrates the bosoms of the ordained authorities, the preamble to their directions is invariably found to be that the India Office must not be disturbed. It desires to remain a haunt of ancient peace. Even the Royal Commission on the Indian Public Services was sternly adjured not to touch the India Office. Mr. Montagu is no better than the rest. When he made his famous onslaught in parliament, it was discovered that the only thing he wanted to do in Whitehall was to destroy the Council of India, the one check upon the throng of permanent officials who climb steadfastly up the ladder that leads to knighthood by supervising the affairs of a country they have never seen.

Yet nothing is more certain than that reforms in India must be accompanied by a sweeping curtailment of the minute control exercised over the Indian administration by the India Office. More power over details must be given to the Government of India and the provincial governments, and the underlings in Whitehall must exercise their ingenuity in other directions. The Secretary of State must as time passes confine himself more and more to the big issues, and leave the little ones to be handled in India. He must be less of an administrator, and more of a distant guardian, retaining his supreme authority as the custodian of the responsibilities of the United Kingdom, able always to intervene with unquestioned power, but no longer called upon to sanction all the minor daily trivialities of administrative work. It must be obvious, too, that every fresh series of reforms in India must tend to lessen the direct control of parliament, whose powers should not be abated but should be less freely exercised. India can no longer be effectively governed in detail from Whitehall, and the India Office must be content to hold a watching brief in many matters where it now claims a deciding voice.

The third aspect of the subject concerns the development

of self-governing institutions in India, and has been thrust into the foreground of late to an extent which ignores perspective and the chaotic condition into which the Old World is passing. Progress in the East is a plant of slow growth, and cannot be artificially accelerated. We have deliberately refrained from devoting the bulk of this discussion to the claims of the Indian political parties, because we hold that they simply form part of a much greater issue, which is that of the preservation of the Indian peoples as a united and secure community within the British Empire. The clamorous demands of the more advanced Indian politicians are being debated as though they constituted the whole of the Indian problem. In reality they are not at present its most important feature. The event which now dominates Indian internal politics, as well as the international situation all over the world, is the appalling collapse of Russia, to which may be added the general confusion now revealed throughout the whole of Asia, with the exceptions of Afghanistan, India, Indo-China, and Japan. Large portions of Arabia have thrown off the yoke of the Turks, and are engaged in war. There is war on three fronts in Asiatic Turkey, and within the territories they still hold the Turks are engaged in incessant massacres of their subject races. The Persian Government is weak and unstable, and much of Persia is in the hands of roving banditti, who are only kept in check by small and mobile British forces. China, although she has joined the Allies, is torn by the dissensions between the northern and southern provinces, and shows no sign of recovering stability. The downfall of the Tsardom has plunged Siberia and Central Asia into chaos, out of which new States appear to be emerging in a rudimentary form. The prospective revival of independent Mussulman communities in Central Asia may mean the gradual evolution of a solid block of Islamic States stretching from the Bosphorus to the Chinese province of Kansu, which would very largely transform the political balance in the interior of Asia, and might bring about results which at present we can only dimly forecast.

In view of these possibilities, and of the extreme uncertainty of the outlook, our first duty is to maintain the security of India and to guard against any weakening of the British control, which alone shields India's millions from external

attack and internal ruin. The people of Great Britain are ready to give generous heed to Indian aspirations, but they have not the smallest intention of permitting the solid fabric of British rule to be undermined. Were they lax enough to neglect their plain duty, other great nations would instantly intervene. Mr. William Archer, whose thoughtful and sympathetic examination of Indian problems may be commended as the most balanced and careful study of the subject which has appeared for years, rightly observes that even if India 'deliberately made up her mind to relapse into 'eighteenth-century anarchy, she would certainly not be 'permitted to do so. The world would not stand by and see 'the chaos of Mexico repeated on a vaster scale.'

Since Mr. Archer wrote his book, the example of Russia has furnished a much more vivid and terrible object-lesson than Mexico. To admit any comparison between the re actionary and repressive rule of the Tsars and our mild and beneficent control of India would be to insult our own work; but in one respect a parallel can be drawn, because the Tsardom held Russia together, just as British rule unites India. When the Tsar was overthrown, Russia quickly fell to pieces, and there cannot be the smallest doubt that the relaxation of firm British rule would bring about precisely similar results in India. We cannot run such a risk, and it would be well to tell India so in the plainest words. The swift increase in the demands of educated Indians for place and power is largely traceable to the moral effect of the Russian Revolution. There is a very close resemblance between the windy and unpractical orations of the Lenins, the Trotskys, and even the Kerenskys, and the flood of vague rhetoric now being poured out on Indian platforms. The Indian politicians do not use the language of Karl Marx, because they have not the smallest sympathy with the Indian 'proletariat'; their object is the transfer of authority to the comparatively small class which they represent; but though the formulas differ, the aims of the more extreme 'spokesmen of India' are as nebulous and unreal as those of the Bolshevists.

The Hon. Mr. Malcolm Hogg, speaking recently in Bombay, observed that 'what is asked for is not what we generally 'understand by self-government, but administration by an 'Indian bureaucracy responsible to and controlled by an

'Indian oligarchy, who shall be sustained in power by British 'maintenance of law and order.' His definition does not relate to the more moderate opinion of India, but it certainly summarises the aspirations of the extremer sections, whose voices now drown the rest. If the demands of these people have derived stimulus from the Russian Revolution, they have their answer in the present deplorable condition of European Russia. They may be counselled in all frankness to remember that a minatory demeanour will not assist their purpose. Despite what has happened in Russia, the recent developments of scientific warfare have placed in the hands of stable governments infinitely more potent means for the suppression of rebellion than have ever before existed. The extremists and the revolutionaries of India must approach this question in a pacific manner, and must no longer seek to reinforce their arguments by veiled threats. Great Britain is far stronger to-day than she has ever been, and the secret apostles of violence in India will be well advised to bear that fact carefully in mind.

It must also be said that the experiment of transplanting Western representative institutions in an Eastern soil has not hitherto been an unmixed success. The Turkish Chamber, the Persian Mejliss, the Chinese Parliament, have all been failures from various reasons, and have certainly not demonstrated the fitness of their respective electorates to control their own affairs. The Japanese representative system is Prussian in its origin and in its working. We must admit that the one Asiatic country where embryonic representative institutions have justified their creation is India; but even in India the people must walk before they can run. There is no warranty for the excessive demand for a full-fledged parliament, or a series of provincial parliaments, in India, such as is advanced by the small 'Home Rule' party. If acceded to, this proposal would speedily bring about the breakdown of British rule, which appears to be the ulterior object of its advocates.

We have further to remember that in India, as elsewhere in the world, appetite often grows with feeding. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, which are now denounced as feeble and inadequate, were hailed at the time as generous concessions. On the morrow of their promulgation, Mr. G. K.

Gokhale and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, the two ablest Indian politicians of their day, both acknowledged that their own expectations had been exceeded. Yet there is some justification for the present feeling of disappointment, and eight years' experience of the working of the reforms leads to the conclusion that a further extension of the principle of self-government is now required. The Morley-Minto reforms have not fulfilled the hopes which attended their birth, because their electoral basis is far too narrow, and still more because their general tendency has been to develop criticism divorced from responsibility. The problem we now have to solve is that of the creation of a system of self-government which within certain limits shall be real, and this can only be done by placing direct responsibilities upon the Indian elected representatives in the different legislative bodies. We shall not satisfy Indian desires, and we must not expect to do so, for India is once more 'crying for the moon.' We must hope for the reappearance of calmness after the present political excitement has spent itself.

The extraordinary and continuous inflation of the aspirations of the men now in the forefront of the agitation appears to be due to two chief causes. One is their lack of wise leadership, for the older leaders who exercised a moderating influence upon Indian political movements have passed away; the other is the grotesque appearance of Mrs. Annie Besant upon the political stage. Even to men and women of mature age in this country, Mrs. Besant has long been little more than a dim memory. Many years have passed since she vanished from among us, murmuring 'In Vishnu-land what avatar?' She engrossed herself in educational work and in eccentric semi-religious movements in India, until dissensions with some of her associates deflected her, in the evening of her life, into politics, where she succeeded in attaining once more the atmosphere of notoriety in which she delights. Mrs. Besant set about her peculiar task with considerable shrewdness. She exalted Indian spiritual ideals at the expense of Western materialism, which is not a difficult process; and by gulling the unthinking and the credulous with stories of a Golden Age of India which never existed, she managed to attract a fairly large following. Upon these flimsy foundations she formed the Indian Home Rule League, a body at first small in numbers,

and looked at askance by the older political organisations. The Home Rule League has no definite constructive programme, and aims vaguely at independence of British control in all but name. It thrives upon the abuse of British institutions, and its worst feature is its deliberate hostility to the British population in India, who are attacked under its auspices by calculated methods to which the spokesmen of the Congress have not in the past resorted.

Mrs. Besant's reckless forms of propaganda at length brought her into conflict with the authorities, and after being excluded from one province after another she was interned in the Madras Presidency, in the hill-station of Ootacamund. The handling of her case is another proof of the inherent weakness of the Government of India. If her conduct warranted interference, she should have been deported; if not, she should have been let alone. What happened was that the provincial authorities were left to deal with her, while the Government of India lurked in the background. She was given the gratification of cheap martyrdom, and in the midst of the excitement which ensued the Home Rule League gained a great accession of strength. If it is true that her eventual release was due to the intervention of Mr. Montagu, we are not disposed to blame him, for the original method of procedure was unwise; but in the end Mrs. Besant became the central figure of the Indian agitation. The Congress and the Moslem League abandoned their earlier tendency to discountenance her political activities. In this change they were to some extent logical, for the programme of the two older bodies is now almost indistinguishable from the wilder manifestoes of the Indian Home Rule League. Each organisation has been trying to shout louder than the other. The Congress, as distinct from the Moslem League, began to see that if it did not swallow the Home Rule League it might in the end be left where the Irish Parliamentary party has been left by the Sinn Feiners. Little surprise was therefore felt when Mrs. Besant was nominated as President of the Congress last autumn. The Moderates tried to make a last stand against the Extremists at the final election in Calcutta, but they were instantly overwhelmed by the creation of a large number of sham voters in the Reception Committee, which had the power of choosing the President. The Moderates weakly yielded after a series

of ineffectual protests, and their acquiescence marked the disappearance of sanity and restraint from Indian political movements.

The whole intricate and confused story of the election of Mrs. Besant sheds more light on the character of current Indian politics and aims than a hundred books and a thousand speeches. The episode is a portent and a warning, for it shows as in a flash the manner of persons to whom we are asked to hand over the solid fabric of the British administration of India. A larger lesson must also be drawn from the choice of Mrs. Besant as President of the Congress. India is now at the crisis of her political destinies. Her 'representatives' claim almost unlimited powers, and profess their entire fitness for the complex task of governing all the peoples of India. The British Cabinet respond by expressing readiness to listen to their pleas. At such a juncture, the elevation of an Englishwoman to the supreme leadership of a professedly Indian movement is a stultification of the whole position. If three hundred millions of people can find no leader among themselves and have to fall back upon an elderly English lady, it is clear that the time for Great Britain to relinquish control of India is still distant. The personality of Mrs. Besant gives us the standard and the measure of the Indian movement, and suggests that the agitation contains a large element of unreality.

Yet though the recent trend of internal Indian politics has been disappointing by reason of its excesses and its futilities, Great Britain must continue on her appointed path, and must not shrink from such further extensions of the principle of self-government as the conditions of the time and the capacity of the people permit. Our purpose has been to discuss a few practical considerations, and in examining them we have endeavoured to avoid the windy generalities which seem inseparable from Indian politics. When we learn something more definite about the intentions of the Cabinet it will be time enough to consider in detail the political programmes of the Congress and the League, the far more limited proposals contained in Mr. Gokhale's political testament and in Lord Islington's admirable speech at Oxford last August, and the movement for a compromise between the views of Indian and British Moderates.

LOVAT FRASER.

THE ROMANCE OF THE BATTLE-LINE IN FRANCE *

Part I

IN France the scenes of the present war lie within the departments of the Nord, Pas de Calais, Somme, Oise, Aisne, Seine-et-Marne, Marne, Ardennes, Meuse, Vosges, Meurthe-et-Moselle (formed in 1871 of fragments, saved from annexation, of two departments of Lorraine), and the Territory of Belfort (which is similarly a fragment of Alsace spared to France, too small to form a department). Of the eighty-six departments only one, the Ardennes, is completely occupied by the enemy, and ten have been partially invaded. The rest have seen the German only as a prisoner of war, though there is not a commune of France near to or remote from the war-zone which has not been sorely affected. From this it is seen that only a small proportion of the surface of France has been within the fluctuating battle-line. Small as this area is, it is one of surpassing variety in scenery, product, and characteristic. It contains the chief coalfield of France and consequently the richest industrial district, so that its occupation by the enemy is an overwhelming disaster to the nation, financial and economical. Away from its smoky towns and villages—which indeed are less unlovely than our own mining and manufacturing centres of population—the invaded territory contains vast tracts of the finest agricultural land in France, forests covering wide plains and lofty mountains, and a province of vineyards which gives its name to the most famous of all the wines of the world. There are many regions in France richer in romantic traditions, such as Touraine, Burgundy, and Provence. Yet this relatively

* The author of this article, in an Introduction to the *National History of France* (Heinemann) wrote a few pages on the historic interest which attaches to the places in France where British soldiers have fought during the present war. The present article is an outcome of this Introduction, describing the places in greater detail and adding to their enumeration.

small corner of north-eastern France has more historical associations on its soil than the whole of Great Britain.

The comparative poverty of our British soil in this respect is chiefly due to our insular position, which for nearly nine centuries saved us from invasion. For most of the historical traditions of north-eastern France are the outcome of war, and of invasion in which the French were as often the invaders as their enemies. Even those traditions which are derived from movements and events within the French nation are connected with international affairs. Thus the great Revolution did not long remain a domestic commotion. Its influence travelled all over Europe, not by peaceful means, and its chief missionary, whose name and figure are associated with every battle-ground of to-day, except those of Arabia and further Africa, was Napoleon. The abundant memories of our own country which are associated with landmarks of history, had all been established when France began to lay in a fresh store, and the new series was founded on thrilling or romantic episodes, and on decisive events changing the destinies of the world, as important as any which dated from the distant past.

Our revolutions, which had no repercussion beyond our boundaries, came to an end in 1649 ' in the open street before ' Whitehall,' and in the mild epilogue of forty years later, when James II. migrated to Saint Germain to be the pensioner of his cousin Louis XIV. Soon two centuries will have passed since the final sequel of our revolutions caused the last battles to be fought on British ground, in 1745. The historical and romantic associations within our island shores, which oversea visitors cherish perhaps more than we do, are attached to places chiefly notable for the long tradition of peaceful life, which has continued unbroken for centuries.

France has no counterpart to associations such as these, which our restoring architects, our reforming politicians and the inroads of the mechanical age have failed to destroy outright ; it contains no great ancestral homes, of which a few survive in England, where life has gone on from generation to generation since the walls were built. The noblest monument of unbroken tradition in England was Oxford, and there is nothing to compare with it or with Cambridge in any other land. But the succession of our two old Universities has

now been sundered. Not only have they sent their sons by thousands to the war, but a greater number of adolescents who would have sustained the immemorial link between public-school and University have passed a sterner matriculation than that which Alma Mater imposed. The flower of young England has been sacrificed for the blind incapacity of their elders, who here, as in all other lands, have played the fool with the new civilisation of the mechanical age, not comprehending it.

In all countries, if there were justice on earth, the mature men and the aged would have gone forth to take one another's mischievous or futile lives, leaving the young to create a new world. It was not usual for undergraduates to die. An old Oxford man who visits the tombs at Holywell, finds the resting-place of many a once familiar high-tabled don, but rarely an inscription lamenting the untimely end of joyous student-life. Now undergraduates have learned to die, in the deserts of Mesopotamia and of Palestine as well as on the stricken plains of France. Perhaps one day our laudable Pietas Oxoniensis will issue from the University Press a biographic record noting the places where our young heroes sleep, including many a graduate not much senior in years, whose graves line every battle-field where British soldiers have fought.

Such tragic reflections must not give the impression that only the annals of war are associated with the places on the battle-line. On the contrary, as we shall see, almost every spot is full of memories of infinite variety. At the same time an account of all the past battles waged on the scenes where English and French have met the Germans, and of their causes, would embrace the whole history of civilisation, the culmination of which has turned into soldiers the manhood of all the human race which boasts itself civilised. If universal war is its crowning result, the present war-zone may be considered the training-ground of western civilisation. For ever since Caesar campaigned two thousand years ago in the parts 'quas incolunt Belgae' no half-century has passed without war within or on the confines of that region—not local conflicts, but war which has involved the destinies of western Europe. Before the Revolution the French names of the areas which covered the ground of the departments already enumerated were Flandre, Artois, Picardie, Île de France, Champagne,

Trois Évêchés, Barrois, Lorraine, and Alsace. Those names do not take us back to antiquity; but since the Middle Ages each of them, except Île de France, has denoted territory the ownership of which has swung backwards and forwards, from French to Spaniard, from German to Burgundian, with all the historic wars of Europe as accompaniments to each transfer.

From a glance at one short epoch of French history we may see how the destinies of France and of Europe have been fashioned by the force of arms in the region of which Arthur Young wrote at Cambrai in 1787, when noting the now antiquated fortifications of the towns of Flanders, 'every step in this 'country has been rendered famous or infamous by the bloodiest 'wars that have disgraced or exhausted Christendom.' There is a rare and noble folio printed in Paris at the Imprimerie Royale in 1722, entitled *Médailles sur les principaux événements du règne entier de Louis le Grand avec des explications historiques* [1643-1715]. The crimson of its binding is emblazoned with the cypher of the Grand Monarque among crowns and fleurs-de-lys. It cannot be called a handbook, as its majestic size needs, for its commodious study, a spacious lectern, such as one may see in the choirs of ancient monasteries; yet it forms an excellent and concise manual of the reign of Louis XIV.—from a one-sided point of view. Each vast page contains a clear-cut engraving of the obverse and reverse of a medal with explanatory text. There are more than three hundred of them, from the earliest effigies of the baby king and the pleasing likeness of the gracious young autocrat who won the heart of La Vallière, to the pompous profile of the time-worn bigot who was ruled by Mme. de Maintenon. Of all this collection about one hundred medals, a third of them, celebrate events which took place in the zone of the present war. The other two hundred signalise peaceful as well as warlike occasions —royal marriages, the building of Versailles, the extirpation of heresy, the foundation of the Academy of Inscriptions, for the purpose of providing devices of terse Latinity to illuminate these medals. But everyone of the hundred relating to this region commemorates a battle, a siege, or a treaty the outcome of war. Thus there are two inscribed *Ypris-Captis*, reminding us that even the devastators of the Palatinate could take and retake a city without the barbarous ruin of noble monuments which even then were the ancient pride of Flanders.

One of them is of 1648, with the portrait which in another of this period is labelled *Puer Triumphator*; the other, in 1678, marks a more serious capture, as Ypres remained French until 1713, when almost the last medal of the book celebrated the Treaty of Utrecht with the motto *Spes felicitatis orbis*—a warning to optimists who hope for world-wide felicity to result from treaty-made peace. For rarely has a compact been the spring of such prolonged dissension as was this Treaty of Utrecht, which was to settle all international conflicts from Alsace to Newfoundland, and which even between France and England was a subject of difference until 1904.

With such wealth of association evoked by the names of a hundred towns and villages in France, victims or witnesses of the present war, only a few can be chosen in illustration. We might begin at the beginning with the retreat from Mons, which at the close of August 1914 sent those first tragic lists to darken British homes, without a warning that they would be multiplied till a whole generation of our heroic youth was blotted out. Right and left of that fine march lie places famous in history. The first French hamlet passed was Malplaquet, where Malbrook and Prince Eugène met a gallant foe with such fortune that the battle of September 11, 1709, was not inscribed in the medal-book of Louis XIV. Not so Rocroy to the south-east, which in 1643 won the motto of proud anticipation *Victoria primigenia*. Valenciennes too is full of romantic association in another sense. For here was born Froissart, who found many a legendary subject of his chronicles, (such as that of the Burghers of Calais, perpetuated in art by the most modern of French sculptors,) in the adjacent regions, when he was 'clerc' to our Queen Philippa, who also came from Hainault; and Watteau, not one example of whose joyous and sunlit fancy suggests that the painter spent one half of a brief life of suffering in this gloomy northern town. Perhaps it will be more convenient to follow that longer route known as the Western Front, which runs from the Belgian frontier on the Straits of Dover to Lorraine. That long line has often fluctuated these last three years, generally in favour of the Allies. So it will not be possible always to go from place to place in geographical order, and sometimes we shall have to retrace our steps.

Near the extreme left of that line there rises from the plain

of Flanders a solitary hill, crowned by the little town of Cassel, *castellum Morinorum* of the Romans. Arthur Young, when he rode up the Mount in 1787, said it was 'the only hill in 'Flanders,' a statement which our tired soldiers, who know many a blood-stained ridge in those parts, are disposed to doubt; and there are on the road to Poperinghe the Mont des Cats, with its Trappist convent, and one or two other monticules. But the striking feature of Cassel is what the geographer Onésime Reclus said of it: 'Le mensonge et la 'magie de l'isolement dans la plaine,' which makes it dominate the flat country around. The road from Dunkirk winds beneath an avenue of trees, up the hill, and enters the town through an ancient archway bearing the trace of the portcullis. Except for one or two modern hotels Cassel has a mysterious old-world look which soldiers, freed for a short rest from the dread 'Salient,' say impresses them by its gravity and makes the most boisterous of them relapse into silent contemplation of these ancient buildings, which, after suffering siege and capture and pillage in twenty centuries, have just escaped the tide of ravage in the present war.

Tourists have neglected this picturesque site, French Flanders being off their accustomed track; though sometimes a traveller has strayed this way, as did Disraeli one parliamentary holiday when in lucky search of a quiet place near home for undisturbed literary work. For those who love extended views where every landmark indicates a spot where history has been made, Cassel is unrivalled—even in France, a land of wide prospects, where from a height it is not uncommon to see the Alps a hundred and fifty miles away, as from the cathedral battlements at Langres. The peculiarity of Mount Cassel is that though it is of modest height, not much superior to that of Strasbourg spire, it rises from a vast plain, so the view from it is on all sides coterminous with the horizon. To enjoy its full extent it is necessary to have a day of transparent atmosphere, rare in Flanders which endures an English climate. Then from the summit one hundred and thirty towns and villages are said to be visible, and nearly as many belfries and church-towers, from the belfry at Bruges in Belgium to the steeples of Artois and Picardy. On such a rare day, when the white cliffs of England for once are not wreathed in fog, one can make out beyond the sea the South Foreland, where

Caesar landed in Britain two thousand years ago. It needs imagination, even with a telescope, to descry further west Dungeness, overlooking the spot where the Normans landed eleven hundred years later when the history of invasions of British soil was supposed to have ended. But there is another point, plainly visible from here, on the cliffs at Dover which marked the change of that tradition when a bold young French airman, stealing a march on his English rivals, flew across the Channel four years before the war, and by his landing on Shakespeare Cliff proclaimed that England is no longer an island.

The inland view embraces an expanse of country which has heard the echo of nearly every war recorded in the history of western Europe. When the Hundred Years' war swept backwards and forwards over it, there was no spot in it which had not already a long record of battles and sieges. The field of Creçy, down Abbeville way, is not visible from Cassel, but the rising ground above Agincourt can be discerned. There are also several places within sight where French and English men-at-arms have met without leaving memories of hostility. Thus we can 'look towards Ardres' Golden Field 'across this wide aerial plain' where the two comeliest young kings of the Renaissance met in friendly joust on the Champ du Drap d'Or; and nearer we can see, by Dunkirk, the site of the battle of the Dunes, which has the peculiar renown of a battle-field in France where English soldiers fought on both sides. It was in 1658, when Mazarin was acting with Cromwell, who in the last year of his life was the ally of young Louis XIV. The Protector sent 6000 troops to join the French under Turenne against the Spanish army, in which the Great Condé was fighting; for, as Saint-Simon said, the battle of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, during the Fronde, had thrown M. le Prince into the arms of the Spaniards. On their side too was an English force, including a hundred men of the King's Regiment of Guards, under his brother the Duke of York, the corps which ultimately became the Grenadier Guards. This little band vainly fought to prevent Dunkirk from falling to the English—a conquest basely cancelled four years later by the elder of the Stuart brothers, *moyennant argent*. In Louis XIV.'s Medal Book the presence of the English on either side and also the part taken by Condé are ignored in the text describing the battle of the Dunes, and the Medal celebrating the fight is simply inscribed *Hispanis caesis*, which shows that

the censorship of official accounts of battles is as old as the Grand Siècle.

At Cassel in 1677 the Duc d'Orléans beat the Prince of Orange in a battle followed by the capitulation of Saint Omer, which with neighbouring cities became French by the Treaty of Nimeguen in 1678. Its towers and spires are conspicuous from Cassel, only ten miles away. We now associate Saint Omer with the British Headquarters in 1914, where our old Field Marshal died three months after the declaration of the war which he, unheeded, had predicted. But for many generations the 'Fanum Sancti Audomari' had in its domestic annals a romantic association with England. It was in Spanish dominion when Philip II., not from love for our nation, aided the English Jesuits to build their famous college here. A few years later there were stealthy comings and goings between Saint Omer and Ashby St. Ledgers, till a letter to Lord Monteagle shortened the lives of several of its promising pupils. Saint Omer was never a school of love for England:—'Hate at 'St. Omer's into caution drilled' was said of its renowned son O'Connell. Yet many of its students, from ancient English manors with their priest-holes and clandestine oratories, were of that good stock of our hereditary Catholics who, in spite of penal laws, were loyal to the British Crown to the extent of being reproached in later days for Gallicanism or Cisalpinism, by fiery converts who had not so suffered for their religion. John Carroll, born in 1735, who was consecrated first Catholic Bishop in the United States at one of those English homes of the ancient faith, Lulworth Castle, was educated at Saint Omer, and at Watten, the novitiate of the English province, which stands on a hillock in Artois, also visible from Cassel. He knew an aged English father there, Levinus Brown, whose loyalty to England was encouraged by his friendship with Alexander Pope. The old Jesuit, being nearly a hundred when in 1764 the Society was expelled from France (nine years before its dissolution by Clement XIV.'s Brief *Dominus ac Redemptor Noster*), was allowed to end his days at Saint Omer after witnessing a remarkable series of religious conflicts and vicissitudes in France—the development of the Gallican movement, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the controversy on Quietism, the destruction of Port Royal, and the condemnation of the Jansenists, down to the suppression of his own Order. Reflection on these pious subjects, as well as on the hopes and

fears of Holy Church in England during the chequered pastorate of the Vicar of Bray, was more than once rudely disturbed in this secluded cloister by the noise of siege and battle.

Noise of siege and battle, with their resulting ruin, now sums up the landscape viewed from Cassel in another direction. The flat prospect was never picturesque, but the ugly cloud which hung over chimney-stacks and furnaces was a sign of the richness and industry of France; while now the smoke rising from the plain marks a trail of destruction more dire than ever this war-worn region has suffered. Some of these dark industrial towns have features which date from another age: a bit of Vauban's fortifications, or a Flemish town-hall, and always a belfry—a relic of the days when proud and prosperous city fathers disputed the Church's right to chiming and bell-ringing. The belfry of Bailleul stands, with the hôtel-de-ville, in a fine cobbled square, of architecture such as in England is seen only on the stage in opera, which has made young British soldiers, halting there on the inexorable road to battle, feel that they were taking part in a big performance. To the south-east lies Armentières, and beyond it the big cluster of German-occupied towns, of which Lille is the chief, stretching to the Belgian frontier. The tragedy of that great centre of industry is such as cannot be realised in England. Those ancient cities, such as Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, which form one vast urban area with ten times the population contained in it a century ago, have been the pride of their enterprising citizens, who from father to son have created and developed their prosperity. The French *industriel* (to use the term of which we have no equivalent) is of a fine and unique type, the mainstay of the nation, though for the most part excluded from its government and administration. Unlike the similar class in England, he rarely lays out his acquired wealth in the purchase of a country seat, and never in the purchase of things corresponding to our peerages and baronetcies—titles costing nothing in France and the *haute bourgeoisie* having no use for them. The French wealthy man of business retains his old home, amid the smoke which has made his riches, where year after year he has watched the progress of his buildings and machinery. To such patriotic citizens, to have their factories, their mines, and their forges seized by the enemy and the products diverted to the ruin of their own country is an experience even more heart-rending than that of thousands of

Frenchmen of every degree who have had the poignant grief to see only their dwellings devastated by the invader.

To-day if an Englishman climbs the Mount of Cassel or one of the lofty towers which overlook the Flemish plain with a guide who can designate the landmarks upon it, their names will signify to him places where English boys have died. Before the war the recital of the names might have recalled the adventures of the Three Musketeers ; for the expanse stretching down to Béthune and its tall belfry is the Dumas country. To-day, by a pathetic reversal of ideas, the pages of Dumas père, describing this region, call to mind scenes which were the last beheld by young heroes who came from all parts of the British Empire to die in Flanders.

Take this passage from *Vingt Ans après*, when the son of Athos was riding to join the Staff of Condé, before the battle of Lens :

> ' The little troop trotted along the road to Cambrin where they expected to meet the Prince, but he had retired the previous day to La Bassée, having been misinformed that the enemy would cross the Lys at Estaires. Misled by this information the Prince had withdrawn his forces from Béthune and had concentrated between Vieille Chapelle and Laventie ' :

an historical note, the general accuracy of which may be verified by the contemporary account of these days reproduced by the Duc d'Aumale in his ' Histoire des Princes de Condé.' Or take a passage of pure fiction, an earlier adventure when the Musketeers were riding down Miladi to her doom. From Béthune, where they had found the headsman, they rode through the village of Festubert, past the woods of Richebourg to Herlies. Just beyond Fromelles a storm burst, and a little further, by a lightning flash, they caught sight of the village of Erquinghem, and a few hours later the moon, rising behind Armentières, lit up the scene of the execution on the bank of the Lys. How these passages call to memory the dark days of the first period of the war, when English people were less accustomed to tragedy than now, and when every week one heard from mourners how the hope of their house had fallen at one of these places, which till then had seemed to be mere names belonging to the domain of romance.

Although Dumas' reinless fancy drove him into the most dazzling inaccuracies that ever beguiled a reader in the fascinating pursuit of history in his pages, he is a trustworthy

geographical guide in his own north-east (we shall pass Villers-Cotterets, his birthplace, farther on our way) and the itineraries quoted will stand the test of verification with one of our large-scale military maps. But like many other masters of romance, in writing one chapter he sometimes forgot what he had set down in another. This gave rise to a little misunderstanding in the second year of the war. A young British officer who had known his Dumas from his early childhood in France, scrupulous not to name in his letters the places where he was campaigning, invented with a correspondent, who also knew his Dumas, a topographical code founded on the epic of the Musketeers. One day a letter came which seemed to announce secret news of such glorious importance that it has never been repeated, for it said 'We have passed through *la ville du bour-'reau*.' Now when Miladi was confronted with her executioner by the Lys she recognised him with the cry: 'Le bourreau 'de Lille.' Our newspapers, for some futile reason ,were not then allowed to mention the localities of either our successes or reverses,so for a fewhours the recipient of the letter believed that we had retaken Lille. It was the fault of 'Papa Dumas.' Having in the first book of his trilogy sent his heroes to Béthune to find the 'bourreau de Lille,' when writing *Vingt Ans après*, he called that ill-fated official 'bourreau de Béthune,' and it was this the young officer had in mind; for it was only through Béthune that our troops had passed on their way to the Somme. Perhaps Dumas might have explained that the red-mantled executioner performed the function of what the French clergy call *binage* when a curé has to officiate in two different parishes.

'From Béthune to Arras an admirable gravel road,' wrote Arthur Young in 1788, the year before the Revolution, and the old capital of Artois witnessed as many of its grimmest scenes as any provincial city in France. After centuries of warfare Arras enjoyed a period of relative quiet. In 1749, the unification of its area, governed by rival civic and ecclesiastical authorities, benefited the city and brought prosperity to the local bar, a leader of which had a son born in 1759, Maximilien Robespierre, who was sent to the Collège Louis le Grand at Paris. There Cardinal de Rohan, who was Abbot of Saint Vaast at Arras, noticed the clever youth and extended his favour to a young brother (Augustin Bon-Joseph were his very christian names)—who finally died with his elder on the

same scaffold in 1794. Maximilien did so well at the local bar that the Bishop of Arras gave him a judgeship, but his sensitive objection to the penalty of death, which the court had power to inflict, made him resign it. In the Constituent Assembly he was deputy for Arras, but in the Convention he and his brother were members for Paris. So this *par nobile fratrum* had less to do with the Revolution in their native place than an active fellow-townsman, Joseph Lebon. The Robespierres were only protégés of the Church: Lebon, born at Arras in 1765, was a priest—an Oratorian father, and his declension was rapid, as he was not ordained until after the Revolution, at Christmas 1789. He soon got into trouble with his Order, but the Civil Constitution of the clergy having been voted by the Assembly he took the required oaths and became a vicaire at the great abbey-church of Saint Vaast. After the fall of the monarchy he was elected in September 1792 by his fellow-citizens deputy to the Convention and mayor of Arras. Two months later he married Elisabeth Regnies—his cousin Mimie—and it was the first marriage of a priest and the first civil marriage celebrated in the new department of Pas de Calais. A child was born in Paris just when the Queen was passing along the next street to the scaffold on October 16, 1793. Then he was sent by the Convention on a mission to his native district and installed himself at Arras in an old house in the rue Saint Maurice, which with its sixteenth-century tower was standing before the war. There he surrounded himself with a committee of incorruptible republicans, of whom six were old Oratorians, and day by day men, women, and children of Arras were sent by the score to the guillotine. It was set up near the Petite Place, close to Robespierre's house and opposite the theatre, the balcony of which was reserved for the pro-consul, in gorgeous uniform accompanied by Mimie and their courtiers, and it was so near the scaffold that Lebon, who knew all his victims, used to insult them by name as they went to their deaths. Then Mimie and her court retired to supper and feasted joyously while Arras was as a plague-stricken city. In May 1794 Lebon and his band transported the Terror to Cambrai, where, amid similar scenes of license and butchery, news from Paris put an end to the festivity while at its height. On 11 Thermidor it was reported that Robespierre, the chief citizen of Arras, was dead. The Terror was over; France woke up from its nightmare imposed by a

mad minority and Lebon was guillotined at Amiens amid the unanimous joy of Picardy and Artois.

Before the war nothing was less suggestive of revolutionary fury than the aspect of the immense Grande Place and the Petite Place at Arras—unique examples of Flemish Renaissance architecture, arcaded below and gabled above, monuments of civic and commercial prosperity, in spite of a siege or two which had failed to deface them. Officers who have recently been at Arras say that the damage done to these squares is not irreparable. It may be feared that they are comparing the irremediable ruin of Ypres, and that here much of the delicate carving and sculpture has gone for ever. The noble Hôtel de Ville had been much restored fifty years ago, so it perhaps may rise again not changed beyond recognition; but the fate of the ancient bells in the belfry is a matter of anxiety, as is that of the municipal archives of high historical value. The cathedral seems to be hopelessly smashed. But it was a modern building, begun in the reign of Louis XV. and completed in the last century. It was the church of the Abbey of Saint Vaast, and the old cathedral, which was magnificent, was sold during the Revolution and then wantonly demolished under the Empire and the Restoration when it might easily have been re-established in its former splendour. The modern cathedral contained among its relics the head of St. James the Great, which puzzled pilgrims who had visited Santiago de Compostella, and the more authentic blood-stained rochet of Thomas-à-Becket, which it may be hoped has not fallen into German hands.

Twenty-five miles south of Arras is Albert, a little town on the Ancre, a small tributary of the Somme which here quickens its sluggish course in a series of cascades. It is a red-bricked town which strikes the soldier's eye as one of the few places in that devastated area where a number of buildings have managed to remain erect. A statue of the Blessed Virgin on the church was displaced by the German bombardment and hangs by its feet, and the inhabitants say that it will not fall till the war is won. It may thus become a rival to the miraculous statue within the church of Notre Dame de Brébières, patroness of shepherds, which has been an object of pilgrimage since the thirteenth century, when the town, like the river, was called Ancre. It owes its name of Albert to a most romantic history. In the childhood of Louis XIII., his

mother Marie de Médicis fell under the influence of her foster-sister, Léonora Galigai, an Italian of humble origin, who became her waiting-woman and married one of the Florentines about the court, Concino Concini, who well calculated the advantage of being the partner of the Queen's favourite. When Henri IV. died in 1610 the influence of the couple had no bounds over the Queen-mother, who gave Concini the marquisate of Ancre and made him a Marshal of France. Though he had never seen a battle he became known as the Maréchal d'Ancre, and in 1617 Louis XIII., only sixteen years old, resented the tyranny of these adventurers, who were presuming to rule France. In his own suite was a poor gentleman of Provence, twenty years older than he, Charles d'Albert, sieur de Luynes, who was King's falconer, and to him Louis confided his desire to be rid of the interloper. D'Albert was too cautious to undertake the task of removing him and handed it over to the Marquis de Vitry, a noted duellist, who one day, when Concini was entering the Louvre, ordered the guards to shoot him. It was a turning-point in the history of France. Paris acclaimed the hitherto unknown boy-King, the Queen-mother was exiled to Blois, and most of the rewards of Vitry's *coup d'état* fell to Charles d'Albert, including the fortune of Léonora, who was executed, and the Marquisate of Ancre, to which he gave his name of Albert. This is why the town, where British soldiers gaze with curiosity on the dislocated Virgin, is called Albert. The prodigious fortune of its sponsor did not end there. The King created him Constable of France and Duc de Luynes, one of the few ducal titles of the old monarchy which still authentically survives. Unluckily for him he married one of the most amazing women who ever had a share in French history, Marie de Rohan, and this probably hastened his end. He died in 1621 after brief enjoyment of his dazzling success, leaving his widow, who became Duchesse de Chevreuse, to fill with her name and intrigues the subsequent half century.

Although Albert is on the confines of the terrible battle-field of the Somme we will not for the moment enter it, or we shall go too far east before visiting certain historical places further south, where our soldiers were in the early stages of the war. On our way we may glance at Corbie, also on the Ancre, which, though von Kluck passed through in 1914, was left unharmed by the Germans, and is a place of pleasant reminiscence for thousands of our brave heroes who have billeted

there just outside the region of bloodshed and desolation. Corbie has a fine old abbey-church, which has the sad renown of having been worse mutilated by government architects than any historical monument in France—and that may have been a reason why the German barbarians left it alone.

Here we will take a stride into the Oise, the next department, where around Compiègne we shall find a country full of romantic interest. There is no woodland scene in France more beautiful than the forest of Compiègne, which early in the war was associated in English hearts with a rare episode in the grim, underground war of trenches, as it was here that British cavalry had the chance, not often repeated, of charging the enemy in the open. As one drove or rode over grass-rides past Pierrefonds, rising like a fairy-palace among the trees, to Villers-Cotterets, or northward towards Noyon, one never thought that such pleasant landscapes, which had lost all trace of ancient battles, would one day be dotted with little crosses, marking the resting-places of brave young Englishmen who were the light and joy of their distant homes—lying side by side with gallant French soldiers, united in fraternal sleep never anticipated by the warriors of old who passed this way, from Joan of Arc to Napoleon.

Noyon has become proverbial during the war owing to M. Clemenceau's warning cry constantly repeated to optimists while it was occupied by the enemy sixty miles from Paris—'Et les Allemands sont toujours à Noyon.' In the spring-time, embowered in fruit blossom, it did not suggest the austere tradition of Calvin, who was born there, the son of an ecclesiastical lawyer, descended from a race of bargemen who got their living on the Oise. The noble church, which was a cathedral till 1791, is, if it remains intact, one of the most precious architectural specimens in northern France: but there is also a very human interest attaching to it in the memory of a bishop under Louis XIV., François de Clermont-Tonnerre, who Saint-Simon says was the vainest man that ever lived. It was he who referred to the Pope as 'Monsieur de Rome'—bishops in those days not being 'monsignorised,' to adapt Voltaire's term, Bossuet being M. de Meaux, Fénelon M. de Cambrai. His putting the Supreme Pontiff on the level of other diocesans was said to be due less to his Gallicanism than to his pride. It was so impenetrable that for his reception at the French Academy some

courtiers arranged with Caumartin, afterwards Bishop of Blois, who received him, to deliver a discourse of burlesque flattery, and M. de Noyon swallowed it. The censorious diarist makes short work of his pride of birth, declaring that he was of 'aucune naissance.'

The vanity of Alexandre Dumas was of a more genial order. His birthplace, Villers-Cotterets, is between Compiègne and Soissons—that much suffering city, with its exquisitely proportioned cathedral, which experts put in the first rank of French churches, and of which, it is to be feared, the Germans have not left much standing. Whenever there has been fighting in France Soissons has had its share, and even the domestic Revolution of July brought it into grave peril. At least so said Dumas one winter evening in 1856, when he was discoursing in the salon of Princesse Mathilde: 'In 1830 I myself unaided 'took the town of Soissons. just by threatening to blow out the 'brains of the Commandant.' The père Dumas, with his warm African blood, had more of the aggrandising temperament of his Gascon heroes than that of a native of the borderland of Picardy. Yet he loved that country. In the touching letter which Dumas fils wrote as a preface to Maurice Leloir's fine illustrated edition of the 'Musketeers,' the brilliant inheritor of some of his genius describes how his father died at Dieppe in the dark winter of 1870, saddened because the Germans, then as now, were soiling with their presence parts of his beloved native region, and how when they had gone he performed the pious duty bequeathed to him of laying the body to rest beneath the great trees in the cemetery of Villers-Cotterets, between the graves of his parents. It is, or used to be, a bright characteristic French country town, and the tomb of the great romancer, who claimed our own Walter Scott as his ancestor who 'showed 'him the way,' is a pleasanter place of pilgrimage than the remains of the Château of Villers-Cotterets, raised by the most sumptuous of royal builders, François I., which is now degraded to the base uses of a depot of mendicity.

A dozen historical places round the forest, witnesses of the war, might be mentioned, such as Senlis, full of charm from the time when the courtiers of Louis XIV. disputed its governorship, which in 1914 saw its buildings mutilated and its chief citizens murdered by the Germans. But the romantic associations of Compiègne itself are too many to enumerate them all. We will not linger by Joan of Arc's tower and discuss the

everlasting question whether Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais (in which diocese Compiègne still stands), or the Burgundians or the English are most to blame for her fate. We will go back no further than the period when French was spoken and written in all its perfection.

In 1698 Louis XIV. decreed a superb camp at Compiègne. It was the year after the Peace of Ryswick and the marriage of the King's grandson and heir, the Duc de Bourgogne, who had been Fénelon's pupil, and was to be the father of Louis XV. So peace on earth having been proclaimed, which lasted for nearly five years, Louis le Grand commanded this military pageant to give the son of the Dauphin a little insight into the art of war. *Militaris institutio Ducis Burgundiae* was the inscription on the medal commemorating the Camp. That was the official reason for the martial display. But Saint-Simon declares that the King's notion was to offer a 'superb spectacle' to Mme. de Maintenon; and in so doing he presented a spectacle of another sort to the army, the court, the ambassadors, and to the vast throng which came from all parts to crowd the countryside. It so impressed the diarist that he wrote: 'If 'I had to depict the scene forty years hence, it would be as 'fresh in my memory as to-day.' For there was the favourite, aged sixty-three, in her sedan-chair in the highest place of honour, the Duchesse de Bourgogne seated on the shaft and the King standing bareheaded behind, with the ladies of the Court making circle around. It was the apotheosis of Françoise d'Aubigné, Veuve Scarrron, and was held to be the recognition of her secret marriage to the King soon after the Queen's death fifteen years before.

Twelve years after the Camp at Compiègne, in 1710, the Duc de Bourgogne had a son, whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather dying in the next five years, he came to the throne as Louis XV., at the age of five. It was in 1810, just a hundred years after his birth, that near Compiègne was set up another camp, by a monarch more powerful for a brief moment than Louis le Grand himself. Napoleon, who was born a subject of Louis XV., was at the height of his glory. Sixteen years before, at the date of the events we have noted at Arras, he was a needy young Corsican officer, glad of the patronage of the Robespierre brothers. Now he was master of the European continent, and his camp near Compiègne was in honour of 'the daughter of the Caesars,' whom he had never seen and who

was coming to him as a bride. The daughter of the Emperor of Austria was already Napoleon's lawful wife, he having married her by proxy at Vienna, the ring being placed on her finger by her kinsman the Archduke Charles, whom her husband had defeated the previous summer at Wagram, near the gates of the Austrian capital. Marshal Berthier was sent to escort her to France and his title of Prince de Wagram seemed to emphasise the fact that the daughter of Francis II. was delivered to Napoleon as a trophy of war. On the road from Compiègne to Soissons the camp was pitched for the first interview of their Majesties. There was one tent for Napoleon and his suite, another for the young Empress (she was just eighteen), and a third for the ceremonial meeting of the bridal pair, before their solemn procession to the palace, where the bride was to be left while the Emperor was to retire to the Chancellerie until the religious ceremony the next day. All this was according to the strict etiquette of Courts, which in theory Napoleon affected. But it was all forgotten in a moment when on March 28 an express arrived with the news that Marie Louise had passed through Vitry in the Marne on her way to Soissons. In defiance of the protocol, Napoleon ordered a carriage and four and galloped to meet his bride far beyond Soissons. At Courcelles he met her, leaped into her carriage, and embracing her gave the order to drive full speed to Compiègne, where there was no solemn entry to the Château, which Napoleon did not leave again that night.

Less than four years later, in March 1814, Napoleon and Marie Louise had parted for ever, and he was at Courcelles again. It was the campaign of France in which Napoleon's genius rose to its height, winning battle after battle against the armies of three nations, those of his father-in-law, of Russia, and of Prussia, until overwhelmed by numbers and driven to his abdication at Fontainebleau. He was at Fismes, where Marie Louise had changed horses just before he surprised her at Courcelles when he heard of the capitulation of Soissons, which Thiers described as 'the most fatal event in our history except 'Waterloo.' The name of the young Empress is not associated with the glories of Napoleon. Yet in this last struggle there was an army of young conscripts which gave it a warlike tradition, as these poor children torn from their homes to fight without training were known as the 'Marie Louises.' Perhaps we may return to this area, most fateful for France and for Napoleon, as

it is traversed by the blood-stained way called the 'Chemin 'des Dames,' about which has taken place some of the most desperate fighting in the present war.

Forty years after the marriage fêtes at Compiègne another Napoleon was ruling France. On the 2nd of December 1852 the Prince-President became Emperor of the French, and three weeks later Viel Castel (whose journal can be cited only when he is not calumnious) wrote: 'The Court is at Compiègne hunting, 'dancing and amusing itself, and the Emperor is in love with 'Mlle. de Montijo, the beautiful and gracious Spaniard whose 'sister married the Duc d'Albe.' So not much time was lost in adorning the Second Empire with a Court, and when a month later Napoleon III. made the beautiful Spaniard his Empress, the somewhat chilly palace warmed with a gaiety it never knew before or since. Within these walls, reconstructed at a bad period under Louis XV., the politics of Europe were often settled and unsettled during the Second Empire, as ambassadors and less official envoys from foreign Courts paid long visits here, with better opportunity for familiar conference with the enigmatic Napoleon III. than at the Tuileries or Saint Cloud. But the domestic fame of Compiègne during his reign arose from the festivities of a pleasure-loving court. The private theatricals were the talk of the capitals of Europe. The ladies of the Court, whom Winterhalter portrayed, were led in their revels by Mme. de Metternich, the Austrian Ambassadress, who was as witty as they were beautiful. In 1865, before Sadowa and Queretaro had cast their shadows on the dynasty, the annual travesty, written by M. de Massa, the Court playwright, was called 'Les Commentaires de César,' after the book which the sovereign had recently published. In honour of a minor entente with England then in vogue, the parts of Britannia and of La Belle France were played by two lovely women, who retained traces of their beauty well into the twentieth century. Another of that joyous troop who long survived was that amazing soldier, Galliffet, between two campaigns in Mexico, just five years before his heroic adventure by the calvary on the field of Sedan; and Viollet-le-Duc was the prompter in the intervals of superintending the restoration of Pierrefonds, which was a present from the Emperor to his beautiful consort, who in England has survived for half a century the gaieties of Compiègne.

The palace remained closed as a residence for thirty years.

Republican simplicity is held to be inconsistent with brilliant fêtes, and the Presidents who have used the ancient appanages of the Crown, chiefly for shooting parties, have preferred Fontainebleau and Rambouillet. In 1901 a second visit to France of the Tsar and Tsarina was announced as a new friendly incident in the ill-starred Franco-Russian alliance, which in the end precipitated the opening day of the universal war. After much nervous hesitation the Russian sovereigns decided to go to Compiègne, leaving it uncertain whether they would visit Paris. So at enormous expense and trouble the State apartments were prepared, the cold walls of the Château being brightened with the priceless Savonnerie tapestries which Louis XIV. ordered for Versailles, while a monumental bed of Napoleon I. was set up for the Tsar. Among the rare survivors who saw the Imperial Court at Compiègne is M. Xavier Paoli, the last of the Corsicans whose racial loyalty to the Bonapartes caused Napoleon III. to choose them for the chief posts at the Prefecture of Police. Under the Republic every sovereign who visited France was put in charge of M. Paoli, and Queen Victoria was so mindful of his faithful services that, when she was buried, the Corsican commissary was the only foreigner not of royal or diplomatic rank invited to St. George's Chapel. But all his royal missions put together gave him less anxiety than the Russians' three days at Compiègne. On the surface there was cordial welcome and rejoicing. The Comédie française performed in the theatre built for the Imperial amateurs and the graceful doyenne, Mme. Bartet, recited Edmond Rostand's audacious 'Oh! oh! c'est une Impératrice'—while the cellars below were full of armed men, and behind every shrub in the private grounds were soldiers with loaded rifles. A special train was ready night and day in the Compiègne station, with the steam up, to take the sovereigns to the capital; but finally they decided that they would not show themselves to the good people of Paris. The reason was that they were forbidden to go there by a charlatan called 'Philippe,' who actually followed them to Compiègne, where he was taken for an anarchist, arrested and detained till his importance was revealed. He for the moment was the reigning adventurer at the Russian Court and a predecessor of Rasputin, from the consequences of whose influence Russia and Europe will never recover.

People often wonder whether the prestige of a Court casts

upon incidents a romantic or interesting glamour which would not be perceptible amid more commonplace surroundings. At Louis XIV.'s camp at Compiègne there was an incident which both Saint-Simon and Dangeau thought worth while to relate in their picturesque language. It was known as the 'Histoire de Chapeaux,' and there was an Histoire de Chapeaux at Compiègne in the presidential circle during the Tsar's visit, which may be compared with it. The story of 1698 was of a practical joke played by the Duc de Lauzun on the Comte de Tessé, a colonel of dragoons. He assured M. de Tessé that at the great parade the King would expect him to wear a *chapeau gris*, which he thereupon sent for to Paris and appeared before the astonished Louis XIV. and the amused courtiers in a large grey hat adorned with a long black feather and a huge cockade—and many pages of the two great diarists are filled with the mirth and the witticisms which ensued beginning with his Majesty's 'Where the devil did you get that hat?' The modern 'Histoire de Chapeaux' at Compiègne concerns the other sex. Before the arrival of the Russian sovereigns the wives of the ministers were invited to déjeuner early in the day with Madame la Présidente. In French circles which have no pretension to fashion, it is the practice of ladies when they go out to lunch to remove their hats before sitting down. In circles which consider themselves fashionable the contrary English custom prevails. Among the guests at this semi-official meal was a French ambassadress of the highest fashion who alone retained her elegant hat. Her excellency's action, to the *femmes de ministres* who had uncovered, seemed to suggest a presumption of superiority. On the eve of welcoming an empress they were in no mood to accept a lesson in fashionable propriety, and they took counsel together how they might avenge themselves. They decided to demand the head of the Ambassador, and sure enough, he was removed from his post all on account of this Republican 'Histoire de 'Chapeaux' at the Château of Compiègne.

J. E. C. Bodley.

(To be continued.)

No. 464 will be published in April 1918

Printed by Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co. Ltd., Colchester, London and Eton, England.

The Edinburgh Review

APRIL, 1918 No. 464

THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY

1. **The Limits of Pure Democracy.** By W. H. MALLOCK. Chapman & Hall. 1918.
2. **Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.** By ROBERT MICHELS, Professor of Political Economy and Statistics, University of Basle, and Honorary Professor of Political Economy, University of Turin. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Jarrold & Sons. 1916.
3. **State Government in the United States.** By ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, Assistant Professor of Government in Harvard University. The Macmillan Company. 1916.

WHEN we speak of the war as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, our language may not be very exact, but its general implication is correct enough. The war is a phase, perhaps the decisive phase, in the great contest of political principles which has continued ever since the French Revolution, or rather since the American Declaration of Independence. When, on the other hand, we speak of it as a struggle between right and might we are on more doubtful ground, since both sides claim to be fighting for the right. To the religious mind the validity of this claim on the one side or the other is of vast importance, and the war is an ordeal in which the ultimate decision rests with God. From the scientific point of view, however, the war is really a trial of strength between two different types of civilization, and its

All rights reserved.

outcome is merely a question of the survival of the fittest. If democracy fail in this contest, it will simply have proved itself the less able to hold its own in the struggle for existence, and the world will succumb to the domination of the German idea, if not to that of the German nation.

The immediate problem of democracy is to win the war. By doing so it will not only have cleared the ground for the possible realization of its ideals: it will have proved its superiority even in the appeal to the *ultima ratio regum*, and all the more thoroughly because of its conspicuous inferiority at the outset. Even from the German, purely 'biological,' point of view it will have won the right to determine the future of the race. It is well realized, however, that this victory will not solve the whole problem of what we call democracy. The sum of the forces generally described as 'democratic' will have received a great impetus, but it is by no means clear that the social and political order that will emerge will be, in any exact sense of the word, democracy. The essential problem will still remain to be solved.

Before considering this problem it will be well to define what we mean by 'democratic' and 'democracy.' In practice these terms, like all political catchwords, are very loosely used. In popular parlance democracy and liberty are practically interchangeable terms; yet so great a master of lucid language as Tocqueville spoke of 'democratic societies which 'are not free,' in reference to the French imperial system in which 'equality and despotism' were combined; and recently an English writer has denounced Pitt for inciting the British public to the destruction of the 'democratic Empire of 'Napoleon.'* For Tocqueville 'democracy' meant primarily the principle of equality, as opposed to 'aristocracy'; for him, as for Immanuel Kant, democracy was inimical to liberty. Again, we are accustomed to speak generally of any broadly representative government as 'democratic,' whereas Kant, in his ideal republic, rejects democracy in favour of representative government. In doing so he had in mind democracy as exhibited in the Greek City State, and he used the word in its strict sense of direct self-government

* Sir Walter Runciman, 'No Peace with Napoleon and its Consequences.' 'Contemporary Review.' No. 624. December, 1917.

by the whole body of the citizens. No such simple and clear meaning now attaches to the word. Apart from its political meaning, whatever that may be, it is now used—as Mr. Mallock points out—with equal frequency in other senses, which are indicated by the epithets 'industrial' and 'social.' But in whatever sense it may be used, it is at least clear that the modern idea of democracy, based as it is on the revolutionary doctrine of the equal rights of all men, differs fundamentally from the Greek conception, which was established on the belief in natural inequality. Opinions may still differ even in democratic communities as to the expediency of admitting this or that category of citizens into the effective body politic, and in practice the distinction drawn by the French Constitution of 1791 between 'active' and 'passive' citizens is still widely maintained; but the *demos* in the modern State is no longer conceived, as it was in ancient Athens or in the Poland of the Renaissance, as a privileged group of citizens, however large, but as the whole body of people owing allegiance to the State. It is in this whole body of people that, according to the principles of modern democracy, the sovereignty or supremacy resides. The ideal exercise of this sovereignty is expressed in President Lincoln's famous formula, 'government *of* the people *by* the people *for* 'the people,' a formula which, however justly open to criticism, may be accepted provisionally as the best, as it is undoubtedly the most popular, definition of democracy as now understood. What new thing does the sovereignty of the people thus defined connote?

'All government (wrote Sir William Temple) is a restraint on liberty; and under all the dominion is equally absolute, where it is in the last resort. So that when men seem to contend for liberty, it is indeed but for the change of those that rule. . . . Nor can it be in the other case, that when vast numbers of men submit their lives and fortunes absolutely to the will of one, it should be want of heart, but must be force of custom, or opinion, the true ground and foundation of all government, and that which subjects power to authority. For power arising from strength is always with those that are governed, who are many; but authority arising from opinion is in those that govern, who are few.'

'The ground on which all government stands,' he concludes, 'is the consent of the people, or of the greatest and strongest

'part of them.'* The argument by which Temple supported his thesis is not based on democratic principles, though it may be taken as supporting them. He compares his ideal State to a pyramid, which is 'of all figures the firmest.' 'A 'commonwealth,' he says, 'the more it takes in the humour 'and bent of the people, and the more it spires up to a head 'by the authority of some one person founded upon the love 'and esteem of the people, the firmer it stands.' Clearly this may be true of any monarchical government, and it is in this sense that the Germans claim that their system is grounded on the consent of the people, as it certainly takes in their humour and bent. To say, then, that the ground on which all government stands is the consent of the people is not a statement of principle but of fact, and as such it was repeated by David Hume in his 'Essay on Government.' 'It is,' he said, 'on opinion only that government is founded; 'and the maxim extends to the most despotic and most 'military governments, as well as to the most free and most 'popular.'

The modern democratic principle is something more than this. It was first formulated, not indeed as a theory, but as a maxim of practical politics, in the statement of the American Declaration of Independence that 'government derives its 'just powers from the consent of the governed.' The difference between this formula and that of Sir William Temple lies in the introduction of the single word 'just,' in which is implied the whole of that revolution of which the world-war is the most stupendous phase. Before the French Revolution all forms of well-established government were accepted as equally legitimate. Even the fathers of the American Constitution were content to define the democratic principle as a pious opinion, without any attempt to carry it to its logical conclusion either in their own government—which tolerated slavery and established a high property qualification for the franchise—or in their relations with other governments, with which they disclaimed any intention of interfering. It was reserved for revolutionary France to define the democratic principle as a dogma to be accepted *de fide* by all the world. Henceforward,

---

* 'An Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government.' In 'Miscellanea.' Part I. London, 1679, p. 53.

from the revolutionary point of view, though all governments may be grounded *de facto* on the people's will, only those governments are *de jure* which have demonstrably grown out of this will and remain its acknowledged interpreters and executors. The ultimate sovereignty of the people is not to be merely implied; it is to be explicit.

But the definition of democracy as the sovereignty of the people does not carry us far; there remains the task of defining what is meant by the 'people.' Government of the people by the people for the people may, as Mr. Mallock points out, mean no more than 'government which is exercised over 'the French people, and not (for example) over the German; 'that it is exercised by the people of France, not by the people 'of Germany; and that it is exercised by the people of France 'with a view to their own advantage.' Stated thus, the famous formula resolves itself into 'a sequence of superlatively 'barren platitudes,' and if it has been used by millions as an effective war-cry, this must be due, says Mr. Mallock, to some vital meaning, altogether unstated, attached to one of the words, namely the word 'people.' This vital meaning he discovers in the definition of democracy by a distinguished American publicist, as a special system of government which ensures that 'every man, in virtue of his manhood alone, shall 'have an equal voice in the affairs of the common country.' Pure democracy thus resolves itself into government by the average man; it predicates a political system in which there is no place for special capacities and 'government is determined 'by faculties which, however unequal actually, have for this 'special purpose been reduced artificially to their lowest com-'mon denominator.' This, says Mr. Mallock truly, would be the result, in strict or abstract logic, if democracy meant government by all as units of equal influence. But, whatever may be the maximalist theory, in practice such a government is impossible, and to put it forward as an ideal is but 'to render 'the people restive by popularizing impossible expectations.' Nor do the responsible spokesmen of democracy deny this impossibility. They admit that authority must be in those that govern, who are few; the only really new principle that they insist upon is that this authority shall be consciously derived from the opinion of the many, and—to quote President Wilson's formula—that this opinion shall be 'properly

'expressed and registered.' Democracy implies, that is to say, not only passive consent, but an intelligent participation of the governed in the work of government.

The vast problems involved in the attempt to realize such an ideal in a world peopled by human groups in every stage of development, from primitive savagery upward, it needs but little knowledge to imagine. The most obvious problem is that presented by those races which have fallen under the dominion of peoples of higher culture, or at least of more developed political capacity. For the idealists of the French Revolution, of course, the problem did not exist. They were, as Mirabeau said, 'metaphysicians' travelling on a map of the world, and so quite untroubled by such obstructions as mountains and rivers. The National Assembly, having decreed that all men are by nature free and equal, raised the negro slaves at a stroke to the full rights of citizenship, with the result that France lost a flourishing colony, and the world gained—the black republics of Hayti and San Domingo. France, through the experience of her colonial empire, has learned her lesson in this respect; but the democratic world at large, armed once more to assert an ideal, is troubled by conditions which seem to give the lie to the professions of its leaders; the word Imperialism, confounded in the 'metaphysical' mind with Militarism, has an evil sound, and a democratic empire is denounced as a contradiction in terms.

This opinion has, not unnaturally, been most vocal in the United States, which in 1898 suddenly found herself forced, as a result of the war with Spain, to assume Imperial powers and responsibilities owing to the acquisition of countries, notably the Philippines, which could neither be absorbed into her own system, nor honourably returned to their former masters, nor safely left to themselves. To many Americans this new Imperialism seemed a gross violation both of the spirit and the letter of the Declaration of Independence, and a strong agitation arose in favour of handing over the Philippines to the sovereignty of their inhabitants, which would have meant in effect handing them over to the tender mercies of Aguinaldo, a chief who had risen to power by a series of assassinations, and Pio del Pinar, the most notorious bandit in the islands. The fortunate failure of this agitation was largely due to the powerful influence of Senator Elihu Root,

whose definition of the principles by which in such cases a great democracy should be guided deserves to be quoted at some length :

'We are told (he said) that, irrespective of agreements, irrespective of anything said or done by the Filippino leaders, or by ourselves, we ought to transfer to them sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, because government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and our maintenance of sovereignty is a violation of that great principle of the Declaration of Independence.

Nothing can be more misleading than a principle misapplied . . . The doctrine that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed was applicable to the conditions for which Jefferson wrote it, and to the people to whom he applied it. It is true wherever a people exists capable and willing to maintain just government, and to make free, intelligent, and efficacious decision as to who shall govern. But Jefferson did not apply it to Louisiana. He wrote to Gallatin that the people of Louisiana were as incapable of self-government as children, and he governed them without their consent. Lincoln did not apply it to the South, and the great struggle of the Civil War was a solemn assertion by the American people that there are other principles of law and liberty which limit the application of the doctrine of consent. Government does not depend upon consent. The immutable laws of justice and humanity require that people shall have government, that the weak shall be protected, that cruelty and lust shall be restrained, whether there be consent or not.

When I consider the myriads of human beings who have lived in subjection to the rule of force, ignorant of any other lot, knowing life only as the beast of the field knows it, without the seeds of progress, without initiative or capacity to rise, submissive to injustice and cruelty and perpetual ignorance and brutishness, I cannot believe that, for the external forces of civilization to replace brutal and oppressive government, with which such a people in ignorance are content, by ordered liberty and individual freedom and a rule that shall start and lead them along the path of political and social progress, is a violation of the principle of Jefferson, or false to the highest dictates of liberty and humanity.'*

This is something more than the statement that Mirabeau had the courage to make in the French Constituent Assembly, that 'dans la pratique des gouvernements on est souvent 'forcé de s'écarter, même pour l'intérêt public, de la rigoureuse

* Address at Canton, Ohio, October 24, 1900. 'The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States.' 'Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root,' pp. 42, 43.

'pureté d'une abstraction philosophique.' It is not the conscious violation of a principle for a 'reason of State'; it is the accommodation of a principle to the stubborn facts of a world in which the need for and therefore the right to government is often more insistent than any abstract right to self-government, a world in which 'there are other principles 'of law and liberty which limit the application of the doctrine 'of consent.'

Senator Root's argument is, of course, open from the democratic point of view to obvious objections. That it is inconsistent with the principle of pure democracy is patent enough, but it is not so inconsistent as at first sight may appear with this principle as actually translated into practice in popular governments. For in all these a somewhat arbitrary line has been drawn—whether of income, or residence, or sex, or age—between what, to borrow the French terminology, we may describe as active and passive citizens. The passive citizens are, as it were, *in* but not *of* the body politic; they share in all its rights and privileges of citizenship, excepting only an active voice in the government; they are for the most part active citizens *in posse*; and wherever they are numerous the government cannot continue without their consent. Mr. Root says roundly that government does not depend upon consent, and in a certain sense this is doubtless true. But Sir William Temple came nearer to the full truth when he said that in the long run the fundamental condition of all government is that it should take in the 'humour and 'bent of the people,' and thus win their consent. The justification of an Imperial democracy will depend on the extent to which it fulfils this condition in the case of the politically less developed races subject to it.

The problems involved in the practical application of the principles of democracy under modern conditions are, however, by no means confined to the relations of the democratic State to the primitive or backward races which have from various historical causes become subject to it. They are less conspicuously, though no less really, present in the government of the democratic State itself. The history of the internal development of the progressive nations from the French Revolution to the Great War has been, speaking generally, that of the attempt to assert the effective sovereignty of the

people, sometimes by violent overturns, sometimes by the methods of constitutional expansion. The general result is summed up by Professor Michels in a single sentence. 'There 'have been revolutions,' he writes, 'but the world has never 'witnessed the establishment of logical democracy.' It may well be doubted if it ever will. To say this is not to say that pure political democracy, *i.e.*, government in which every citizen plays a really equal part, is in itself, and under all circumstances, impossible. But, as Mr. Mallock makes clear, it is possible only in 'communities which are minute, primi-'tively simple in their conditions, and isolated.' As communities increase in size, and industrial and other conditions become more and more enormously complex, the simple man can no longer form a true judgment of the conditions under which he lives and works, and he is effective only when grouped with others under the guidance of an intelligence which can form such a judgment. In other words, whatever part may be played by democracy in the complex society of the present and future, the element of oligarchy is essential; for 'unless 'some exceptional influence were systematically exercised by 'the few, there would be on the part of the many no effective 'action or reaction at all.' This, indeed, is a truth which is admitted by some even of the extremest exponents of pure democracy. 'In politics, as in everything else,' says the Italian revolutionist Labriola, an apostle of Syndicalism, 'the last thing that true democracy means is the influence 'of all men acting as units of equal influence, as though right 'were always the sum of the largest assortment of like 'individual wills. True democracy, on the contrary, is the 'concentrating of power in an *élite*, who can best judge of the 'interaction of social cause and effect.'* Thus we return by a track which leads over the highest democratic altitudes, and through the most rarefied atmosphere of theory, to the common ground of experience on which Temple stood when he said that 'when men strive for liberty, it is indeed but for the 'change of those that rule.' Some of the hardest problems of modern democracy are, as we shall see, connected with the mechanisms for effecting such a change.

It is abundantly clear that, whatever may be the theoretical

---

* Quoted in Mallock, p. 59.

power of the 'people' in democratic countries, actual power is in the hands of certain organized groups, whether political parties, of which the object is at least ostensibly the general good, or trades unions and similar associations, of which the object is the furtherance of particular interests. These groups, whose organization and discipline give them a weight out of all proportion to their numbers compared with the unorganized mass of the people, are in effect oligarchies. In the case of political parties this fact is less obvious in countries with a long tradition of constitutional government than in those where this system is an exotic and has never become thoroughly acclimatized. But the difference is in degree rather than in kind. Even in the Anglo-Saxon communities, to which representative government is native, the average man has become uncomfortably conscious that his share in sovereignty consists in no more than the right to vote, at rare intervals, for one of two or three 'official' candidates, who are too often selected, not for their capacity adequately to represent their constituents, but on account of their subservience to the interests of the party and the party 'bosses.' In the Iberian peninsula and in Latin America the sovereign people has almost lost even the modest amount of power involved in the right to substitute one party for another; for, quite apart from military *pronunciamientos*, under the ingenious system known as 'rotativism' the ruling oligarchies called parties as often as not avoid the risks of an appeal to force by an amicable agreement to enjoy the spoils of office alternately. It is to be noted that these abuses are most flourishing precisely in those countries whose Constitutions are established on the most advanced democratic principles.

Discontent with this state of things has expressed itself in various movements, differing greatly in character, but all aiming at making the sovereignty of the people a reality. To some of these reference will be made later. Meanwhile, we will turn our attention to those smaller democratic groups within the nation, whether political or industrial, known as Leagues, Associations, Federations, or Unions, in order to see whether—as Mr. Mallock puts it—'democracy without any 'oligarchic concomitant is more practicable in the microcosm 'of the League than it is in the macrocosm of the great and

'highly civilized nation.' For the purpose of this study the work of Professor Michels provides rich material.

This work, as the author tells us in his preface, aims at a critical discussion of the problem of democracy. Democracy, he says, both as an intellectual theory and as a practical movement, has entered upon a critical phase from which it will be difficult to find an exit; it has encountered obstacles, not merely imposed from without, but spontaneously arising from within. 'Democracy,' in short, 'leads to oligarchy, 'and necessarily contains an oligarchic element.' The best field for the study of this phenomenon, he says, is offered by the intimate structure of the democratic parties, and more especially the Socialist and revolutionary Labour parties, because in respect of origin and programme these parties represent the negation of the oligarchical tendency, and have actually come into existence out of opposition to it. Their object, as Mr. Mallock puts it, is to replace existing systems of government by a system altogether new, in which pure democracy, unadulterated by any alien element, and representing solely the will of equal and equally influential units, shall be a realized fact at last. The appearance of oligarchic phenomena in the very bosom of these parties is, then, to quote Professor Michels, 'conclusive proof of the existence 'of immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human 'organization which strives for the attainment of definite 'ends.' It is the best available proof that the ideal of pure democracy is unrealizable save in the simplest and smallest communities.

Professor Michels shows how the very fact of organization implies a tendency to oligarchy, since it involves the creation of a body of leaders and officials with special qualities and aptitudes. In the early days of the British trade unions an attempt was indeed made to translate into practice the theory of democratic equality, and the officials were chosen by lot. But this had, of course, soon to be abandoned; selection of the fittest by vote was substituted; and as, with the growing complexity of the organizations and of the business connected with them, the standard of fitness was raised, the original democratic organization assumed more and more the characteristics of an oligarchy. For *la désignation des capacités suppose elle-même la capacité de désignation,* and it

is precisely this competence requisite for the recognition of competence that is almost universally lacking in the masses. To quote Professor Michels' own words:

'Numerous are the parliamentary orators and the trade union leaders who are in opposition to the rank and file at once theoretically and practically, and who, none the less, continue to think and act tranquilly on behalf of the rank and file. These latter, disconcerted and uneasy, look on at the behaviour of the "great men," but seldom dare to throw off their authority and give them their final dismissal.'

The truth of this has been abundantly illustrated in our own country during the war. But it does not follow that, because the masses differ in opinion from their leaders, the authority of the latter is any less founded on opinion, if this be no more than gratitude for past services, or a sense of the indispensability of men who 'know the ropes' and whom the masses feel themselves incompetent to replace at short notice.

Thus the leaders and officials tend, for one reason or another, to become permanent and even hereditary, so that as a result of organization every party or professional union comes to be divided into 'a minority of directors and a majority of 'directed.' Presently a regular bureaucracy is established inside the party or union, and this is apt to exhibit all the jealousy of bureaucracies in general of democratic control. The leaders may accept the referendum in principle, but in practice they object to it, since they believe themselves, perhaps rightly, to be more competent than the masses to judge the issues involved. They have, in general, everywhere tended more and more to concentrate power in their own hands, filling up vacancies in the executive bodies by co-optation, themselves exercising all patronage in the appointment of officials and employees, and reserving to themselves the right to represent their organizations at general conferences, which are thus often not really representative of the bodies of work-people which they are supposed to represent. Even in the party congresses, says Professor Michels, which represent the party life seven times sifted, we find that it becomes more and more general to refer all important questions to committees which debate *in camera*.*

* Compare the answer of Mr. Havelock Wilson, of the Sailors'

This tendency of the leaders ' to isolate themselves, to form ' a sort of cartel, and to surround themselves, as it were, with ' a wall, within which they will admit only those who are of ' their own way of thinking,' has everywhere led to a certain estrangement between them and the masses they are supposed to represent. The ties between the leaders and the led have not indeed been broken, but there are signs that they are being loosened. Professor Michels brings plentiful evidence to show that in all industrial Europe before the war, and increasingly so since the beginning of the war, there has been a movement among the rank and file of the working men to recover ' democratic control ' of the labour movement. Syndicalism, indeed, is something more than a revolt against the aristocracy of labour, but the name has been made to cover many of the manifestations of what is no more than a distrust of the mass of work-people for the organized leadership with which it feels itself out of touch. This motive was revealed in the course of the controversy about the shop steward system, which broke out in more or less acute form in various important centres of munition work after the trouble on the Clyde in the early months of the war, and came to a head in the great Coventry strike of November and December, 1917. In some quarters this strike was represented as the outcome of a Syndicalist conspiracy to transfer the charge of the workshops from the employers to the workmen. In other quarters it was described, with greater truth, as

' merely an effort by the workmen to establish among themselves a stronger local authority, capable of more prompt and energetic action than is provided under the existing constitutions of the big national trade unions, whose seat of government is often remote from large industrial districts and whose leaders at head-quarters are often believed to be out of touch with the feelings and aspirations of the rank and file ' (The *Times*, Dec. 6th, 1917).

---

and Firemen's Union, to Mr. Arthur Henderson, in the *Times* of February 14th: ' You say the party has considered its war aims through its special conferences. I deny that. If you mean by the party a number of trade union officials or delegates being called together at short notice and passing resolutions in the name of labour, then you are speaking correctly, but I may remind you that the memorandum is headed " Labour's War Aims," not the war aims of the officials of the trade unions. You will note the difference.

From the point of view of the ideal of democratic control, however, experience proves that even Syndicalism, which is its extreme expression, comes in fact little nearer to its realization than any other system. It seeks to escape from the oligarchical tendencies of Socialism by rejecting the principle of representation, as leading to 'bourgeoisization,' and substituting for it 'direct action.' This is the principle proclaimed by the French Confédération Générale du Travail, of which the General Committee is not directive, in the strict sense of the term, and does not pretend to give orders, but only advice. But in practice, Professor Michels shows, the 'masses' never take the initiative, but wait for instructions from the committee. Syndicalism, then, so far as it is organized, displays just the same tendency to oligarchy as all other organizations. Democracy, in short, here, as elsewhere, has no existence in its rigorous purity. The ultimate power may be in those who are governed, who are many; but authority arising from opinion is in those that govern, who are few.

In the case of States the truth of this is most strikingly illustrated in times of revolution. The violent overthrow of a political system is only possible when, as in the case of the *ancien régime* in France, or that of the Russian autocracy, its foundations have been sapped by a change in the opinions of the greater or stronger part of the people. Such a revolution, then, so far as its destructive side is concerned, is in the strictest sense democratic, since it represents the will of the great mass of the governed. But it does not follow that the result will be democracy. The disorganization of opinion will suffice to break up an established social and political order, as in the case of France in 1789 and of Russia to-day. For the construction of a new order, organization of opinion is necessary; and the moment this process begins democracy develops into oligarchy, or, as often as not, into tyranny. The classic instance is, of course, the Great Revolution itself. Starting with the proclamation of the sovereignty of the people, it rapidly developed into a struggle of organized groups for supreme power. The men of the Terror, in theory the upholders of the purest standards of democracy, set up in practice a tyranny based on the opinion of a small minority —that of the armed mob of Paris organized in the clubs

and sections, and because thus organized stronger than the moderate opinion in France, though numerically this was far more powerful.* In the final phase the sovereignty of the people was embodied in a single man, Napoleon, whose authority was derived from the opinion of the strongest of all the groups—the army—and based on at least the passive consent of a people utterly weary of democratic experiments. It is possible that the revolution in Russia, which in its earlier developments has taken a course in many ways strikingly similar to that of the French Revolution, may ultimately reach the same conclusion. It has certainly illustrated, to the point of hideous caricature, the contrast between the theory of pure democracy and its application in practice.

But though the excesses of the Bolshevik régime may, as Mr. Mallock suggests, have their uses in convincing by bitter experience those democratic idealists who are not amenable to reason, the wholly unfavourable conditions in Russia, arising out of the character of the former Empire and of its peoples, make it an unsatisfactory field for the scientific study of the practical working out of the great experiment of modern democracy. In the United States of America, on the other hand, democracy as a working hypothesis has been for more than a century put to the test of experiment under the most favourable conditions possible—in a country of immense spaces and vast natural wealth, unhampered by the pressure of external enemies, and with a population schooled by tradition, and by the very circumstances of its rapid expansion, in the discipline of self-government. And just as it was the framers of the American Federal and State Constitutions who first asserted the sovereignty of the people as the basic principle of their systems, so it is in the history of these Constitutions that the problem presented by the logical application of this principle may best be studied.

There was at the outset no attempt made to apply the principle logically; the Fathers, as President Lincoln put

* 'Pourquoi, me direz-vous, une douzaine de Jacobins ont-ils fait peur à deux ou trois cent aristocrates? C'est que les premiers ont un point de ralliement et que les autres n'en ont point.' Letter of the secret agent Dutard to Garat, Minister of the Interior, April, 30th, 1793. In Schmidt, 'Tableaux de la Révolution Française,' i. p. 161.

t, ' meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement ' of it might follow as fast as circumstances would permit.' In the case of the United States there was, to begin with, no such clean sweep of traditional institutions as in France was to clear the ground for a theoretically perfect system. The sovereignty of the people was proclaimed, but the exercise of this sovereignty was not to be arbitrary, but in accordance with law; and law was represented by the legislatures and the judiciary which survived from the days of colonial dependence. The sovereignty of the people was thus limited at the start by traditional ideas and institutions. The men and classes of men whom the revolution had placed in power conceived themselves as the trustees of this sovereignty. The people had an inalienable right to liberty and to law, but the exercise of sovereignty, *i.e.*, the right to vote, was reserved for those duly qualified, and it was for those already in the enjoyment of political power to decide in what this qualification should consist. The narrow franchises characteristic of most of the original State Constitutions were indeed early widened under the influence of what Mr. Holcombe calls ' the social democracy of the frontier,' which brought political democracy in its train, until manhood suffrage, though not universal, is the norm. Yet even from this point of view democracy in its rigorous purity has not, and cannot have, any existence in the United States. The theory was saved by the fifteenth Constitutional Amendment, which forbade the erection in any State of a bar of race or colour to full citizenship. In practice, however, the negroes are excluded from the full rights of citizenship wherever the vital interests or the prejudices of the dominant race demand such exclusion. Methods of violence and fraud proving unsatisfactory, the white people of the South, beginning with Mississippi in 1890, have adopted a policy of disfranchising the vast majority of the negroes by means of constitutional restrictions on the suffrage, nominally applying to all citizens alike, but actually discriminating against the negroes. In several other States, too, education tests have been instituted, with the object of excluding illiterate alien immigrants from the franchise. In view of the immense corruption of American political life which followed the flooding of the electorate with hordes of foreigners, utterly ignorant of the American

or of any other constitutional system, such methods of exclusion seem abundantly justified. But they are quite inconsistent with the modern doctrine of pure democracy. They are as little democratic as the objection of the privileged trade unions to the 'dilution' of skilled by unskilled labour. They are based, in fact, upon no theory, but on the eternal instinct of self-preservation.

The Fathers not only saw the limitations of the practical application of the principle of popular sovereignty, they recognized the difficulty of safeguarding its exercise even within these limitations. They were in particular well aware of the danger of the establishment in the legislatures, freed now from whatever effective control the Crown had exercised over them, of just such an 'elective despotism'—to use Jefferson's phrase—as that into which in Great Britain the House of Commons threatens to develop.* Their misgivings were abundantly justified. In most of the original State Constitutions no special provision was made against violations or arbitrary alterations of the Constitution, either by direct appeal to the people or otherwise. 'Apparently,' says Mr. Holcombe, 'the people put their 'trust in the power of public opinion and the good faith of 'their representatives.' From the first this trust was consistently abused. Even during the supreme crisis of the Revolution, Richard Henry Lee, the proposer of the Declaration of Independence, complained that the politicians were thinking more of the spoils of office than of their cause and country,† and at the close of a long life spent in affairs of State, he was to declare bitterly that 'politics is the science of fraud, and 'politicians the professors of this science.'‡ The record of the early American legislatures, as outlined by Mr. Holcombe, certainly endorses this sorry opinion. It may be summed

* Jefferson said that 'one hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.' We ourselves have witnessed during the last three years, in the case of our own ancient Constitution, the most stupendous revolution being carried through, in the name of democracy, without the slightest attempt to ascertain the will of the people, by a House of Commons which has long ceased to be representative, and a House of Lords which has been compelled to abdicate its function as the guardian of this will.

† Ballagh, 'Letters of Richard Henry Lee,' ii. p. 65.

‡ *ibid.*, ii. p. 544.

up in a single quotation—'the public interest was lost to 'view.'

The American people had thus very early good cause for distrusting the representative system, and the various efforts made during recent years in the several States to supersede it show that this distrust has not diminished with the progress of time. The truth is that, with the perfecting of the party organizations, the average man has been forced to realize, in America as elsewhere, that, however much his ears may be tickled with phrases about his birthright of sovereignty, he is in fact powerless, save as a cogwheel in a political machine devised by brains more subtle than his own, moved by forces over which he has no control, and serving interests which are by no means necessarily his. We in these islands complain of the tyranny of the party system, of the corrupting influence of the 'caucus' with its secret funds; but we have been saved from their most harmful consequences by the fact that our administrative and judicial systems are not based on democracy in its rigorous purity. The tyranny of organized minorities is far more oppressive in the United States, where the whole framework of government is raised on a democratic foundation, but where the 'machine' has closed its grip on nearly every organ of the administration.

The state of affairs revealed in the course of the libel action of *Barnes* v. *Roosevelt*,* as existing in New York State may be exceptional; but it is at least typical of the tendencies and forces against which all that is respectable and disinterested in American politics is waging unequal war.† Under the Constitution Mr. Roosevelt had, as governor, the right and duty of making certain public appointments; actually he had to consult not only the Republican 'boss,' Senator Platt, but also the notorious Boss Croker, the leader of Democratic

---

* Tried at Syracuse, New York, in April and May, 1915.

† In 1902 a respectable citizen of Denver, Colorado, complained to the present writer of the gross corruption of the city. Asked why he and his like did not get together and stop it, he replied that they were helpless in the matter; that when they went to the polling booths they found that their votes had already been recorded, and that it was useless to appeal to the Courts, as the judges were elected and were the nominees of the very party which had profited by the fraudulent votes.

Tammany, since they found it convenient to work together in apportioning the 'spoils.' That is to say, the real government of the State consisted, not of Governor and Legislature, but of the party machine and its bosses. 'The most undesir-'able bosses,' said Mr. Roosevelt, 'do not hold the offices which 'they control, yet they really form the all-powerful, invisible 'government which is responsible for the administration and 'corruption of the public offices of the State.' This state of things is inevitable wherever democratic principles are applied in the case of peoples which, like the heterogeneous population of New York, are quite incapable of intelligent 'self-'determination.' It is repeated in the 'democracies' of Latin America, where the 'boss' is represented by the occasionally more picturesque *caudillo*.

To the disquieting contrast between the theory and practice of democracy, as exemplified in their own institutions, the American people have during the last few years become increasingly awake. It is the results of this awakening, in a whole series of constitutional experiments, which form the subject of the most interesting part of Mr. Holcombe's study. The object of all these experiments is to prevent the abuse of power at the expense of the people, by making the sovereignty of the people effective. The revolt against the 'elective despotism' of the legislatures had, indeed, begun early. In the first instance it resulted in an elaborate system of checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and the omnipotence of the legislature was limited by the terms of written Constitutions drawn up, and only to be amended, by special conventions elected *ad hoc*. This combination, first established by the people of Massachusetts in 1779–1780, became 'the corner-stone of constitu-'tional government in the United States.'

All ordinary legislation having thus to be in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the final decision as to the validity of any law came to lie with the judges, with whom rests the task of interpreting the Constitution in the intervals between Constitutional Conventions. How far-reaching is this power of judicial review is shown by the fact that between 1903 and 1908 no less than four hundred Acts of Legislatures were declared unconstitutional by the State and Federal Courts.

The principle of the sovereignty of the people was further asserted by making the executive and judicial officers of the States directly elective by the people, thus rendering them comparatively independent of legislative control. There has, moreover, been an increasing tendency to turn the Constitutional Convention itself into a legislative body, so as to withdraw from the competence of the legislatures whole classes of legislation and to prevent the abuse of the judicial power in declaring popular measures unconstitutional. The original State Constitutions contained no ordinary legislation. The Constitution of Oklahoma, passed in 1907, embodies eleven pages of such legislation. Finally, in the attempt to combat the oligarchical tendency of democracy, the principle of direct legislation, or of a direct veto on legislation, by the electorate has been introduced in many States. The principle of the referendum was very early applied in exceptional cases, but the legislative—as distinct from the constitutional—referendum was first used in Oregon in 1906, and down to the close of 1914 had been used altogether seventy-eight times in twelve States. The popular initiative was employed for the first time in Oregon in 1904, and down to the close of 1914 had been used two hundred and nine times in fourteen States.

Mr. Holcombe's judgment on the effect of these democratic experiments is on the whole favourable; he notes especially the educative effect of the referendum and initiative. But, however well they may work in the primitive conditions of some of the less developed American States, it may be doubted whether in the long run they would succeed in securing effective democracy. In larger and more complex communities it is clear that the popular initiative in legislation would be unworkable, though the referendum would be useful in ascertaining the will of the people in the case of broad and simple issues. However this may be, it is certain that, in the absence of a widespread intelligent interest in the questions at issue, the decision would still rest with the political party best organized for bringing pressure to bear on the electorate.

This being so, it is highly significant that, in spite of all the legislative and other efforts made of late years in America to break the power of the party 'machine,' this power remains, and seems moreover to be great just in proportion to the

translation into practice in the framing of the Constitutions of the theory of popular control. The ordinary man may be able to exercise an independent judgment between two or three candidates for the Presidency or for Congress, but when nearly every office is elective, and he is asked at one and the same time to vote for candidates for fifty different posts, without any guide but the party 'label' stamped by the Government against the name of each, the limitation of his sovereign will is obvious. Usually, says Mr. Holcombe, he has no choice but to vote 'the straight ticket.' His opinion is valueless, since he has no material out of which to form one. The party, in short, is everything. In the light of Professor Michels' ruthless analysis of the working of party systems it is clear that, even in the United States, though democratic theory reigns supreme, in practice true democracy has no existence.

It does not follow that, because true democracy has no existence and can have no existence under the complex conditions of the modern State, what we call democracy stands condemned, or that the world should revert to systems which have for sufficient reasons perished. The world cannot go back, even if it would; and the record of the undemocratic systems of the past is not such as to encourage a desire for reaction. But if progress along the lines generally followed during the last century is to lead to conditions of greater political and social stability, it is, above all, necessary that the issues should no longer be obscured by cloud-spun fancies wholly unrelated to the world of fact. The ideal of pure democracy is such a fancy. The truth is that, whatever impulse may have been given to the forces making for change by the almost religious fervour inspired by this ideal, the 'democratic' order is not really the outcome of any theory at all, but of the struggle for self-assertion of group interests grown conscious of their power and determined to assert it. This is clearly evident in the stages of democratic progress since the last quarter of the eighteenth century. First the industrial revolution raised the middle classes to power on the ruins of the old order; then the economic struggles of the last century led to the organization of labour, and organized labour is now effectively asserting its right to rule; in Russia the hordes of the 'have-nots,' owing to the accident of their being

armed, have momentarily set up an anarchical régime profitable to themselves. All these movements have been camouflaged by the theory of democracy; none of them has been in the strict sense of the word democratic. Democracy presupposes a general will in the people and a machinery by which this will can be made effective. But, as Mr. Mallock justly points out, though there may be a general will on certain fundamental questions—such as equality before the law—there is no general will in the case of the thousand composite problems which make up the task of government. There is a clash of wills, which are able to assert themselves effectively in proportion to the strength of the sectional organizations by which they are backed. Just, then, as the relations between States, under whatever system may be set up, will depend for their stability on a balance of power between them, so the stability of the State itself will always depend on the equilibrium between the various group interests within it, and in any well-ordered community the art of government will consist in as far as possible keeping this balance. If at any time the balance be overset, there will be—as the experience of Russia has once more proved—either anarchy or tyranny.

The true progress of what we call democracy since the Great Revolution has been toward the establishment of such a balance, on the basis of the new self-conscious group interests which economic changes have brought into being. The result is not 'government by the people for the people,' even in countries which are most democratic; it is government by groups—political parties, trade unions, trusts, and the like—engaged in a perpetual struggle for ascendancy. The essential difference between the 'democratic' systems and the autocratic or aristocratic systems which they have replaced is that the ascendancy of the group in power is never stable. Its authority is, in the last resort, based on the opinion of the people in the same way as that of an aristocracy or an autocracy; the difference lies in the fact that by means of the constitutional mechanism this opinion can be brought more immediately to bear upon it. The chief gain of democracy, in short, has been the power to effect without violence the change of those that rule. The 'democratic' government may not accurately interpret the will of the people in all its

policy ; it may abuse its power to further particular interests contrary to the general good ; but in the long run it knows that it must give the people an account of its stewardship, and that this account must satisfy popular opinion if it is to remain in power. Thus—to paraphrase Mr. Mallock's general conclusion—while it must always be an oligarchy that governs, this does not exclude democracy, since it is the people who will determine the character of this government. The problem of democracy is not really, then, that presented by the difficulty of devising a scheme under which the people shall govern themselves, but rather that involved in their capacity or incapacity to select and obey those who can govern them well. It will be solved only when and where the masses shall have obtained, perhaps by long and bitter experience, ' the capacity to recognize capacity.'

Walter Alison Phillips

POPULATION AND FOOD SUPPLY

1. **Birth-Rate and Empire.** By JOHN MARCHANT. Williams & Norgate. 1917.
2. **The Declining Birth-Rate.** Report of the NATIONAL BIRTH-RATE COMMISSION. Chapman & Hall. 1916.
3. **Population and Birth Control.** An Address by C. K. MILLARD, M.D. Leicester: W. Thornley & Son. 1917.
4. **Fecundity *versus* Civilization.** By ADELINE MORE.
5. **Biological Fact and the Structure of Society.** By PROFESSOR BATESON. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1912.

IT must never happen again! Broadly speaking, this is the expressed opinion of many preachers, politicians, and publicists confronted with the spectacle of civilization ravaged by the destruction of barbarous warfare. This is 'the war that is to end war'; the future must be made safe for democracy, the world a pleasant and a peaceful place for our children's children. As to the means by which this consummation is to be attained, the majority of those who profess to guide public opinion on the subject, especially in the United States, appear to believe that when once Prussian militarism has been finally overthrown, and the evil spirit of its Kultur broken, the millennium will be in sight and the Brotherhood of Man assured. It is the eternal delusion of the New Era, the expression of humanity's pathetic and persistent hope of being able to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire and then remould it to the heart's desire.

The war, at any rate, has shattered this sorry scheme to bits; all our elaborate protective machinery, laboriously constructed during half a century of talk and toil, has once more been swept away in this frenzied orgy of man-killing. And because the finite intelligence of man has never been able to reconcile this ever-recurring slaughter with any Divine purpose of infinite wisdom and benevolence, we have continued, despite all human experience, to cherish hopes and ideals incompatible with the mysterious Law which decrees that every life subsists at the cost of other lives. Since the beginning of recorded

time, mankind has dreamed its dreams of the day when 'the 'calf and the young lion and the fatling shall lie down together, 'and a little child shall lead them.' Mr. Wells, who mistakes his reach-me-down for the prophetic mantle, proclaims 'A League 'of Nations to enforce Peace' in place of the little child of Isaiah, but the splendid dream remains ever the same. Once the Prussian Junker has been finally abolished, international arbitration will take the place of lethal weapons, armaments will cease and the new democracy go blithely forward down the primrose path of peace inviolate. The young lion and the fatling will lie down together and the lion will cast no glance of greed upon the fatling, for both will draw their ample rations from a self-supporting Utopian State.

Socialistic opinion, throughout the civilized world, and even in Germany, concurs in believing that, when peace is restored, society generally will be brought to a condition far superior to that which existed before the war—that, in fact, the war will prove a blessing in disguise because it will have achieved many things, including the redistribution of wealth, for which progressive legislation has vainly struggled these many years. There is also evidence, especially in England and the United States, of a very widespread belief in the power of international agreements and legislation hereafter, not only to prevent war, but to set the collective wisdom of the world in authority over its collective folly. Capital and labour will be reconciled once and for all, politics be purged of all the old impurities, and the civilized world united in bonds of progress and philanthropy. The consensus of sincere optimism is unmistakable; it is only when we come to close examination of the various panaceas and prescriptions by which the reconstruction of society is to be effected, that the path to Utopia becomes less clear to the eye of faith.

The various popular schemes for the reorganization of the social State upon better and surer foundations all have this in common, that they recognize the necessity for reducing poverty and for improving the standard of living amongst manual labourers. Most of them are apparently based on the belief that these desirable ends are to be attained by processes of legislation, and that any government elected to achieve them will labour continuously and effectively until they are firmly established. Many of these schemes have long

been in vogue amongst us, without sensibly affecting the condition of the masses, yet the faith of those who advocate them remains unshaken—as, for example, our schemes for parliamentary reform, technical education, woman suffrage, the artificial regulation of wages, free trade, religious instruction, emigration, intensive agriculture, temperance, the early closing movement, trade unionism, and socialism of various brands.

To anyone not blinded by enthusiasm in support of any one of these particular expedients for dealing with the problem of low wages and poverty, to anyone who has studied in various parts of the world the efforts of political economists to remove the causes of human misery, of social unrest and of war all the panaceas proclaimed by politicians appear alike delusive, in that they continue to ignore the fundamental cause of economic pressure, namely, over-population. There is something inexplicable, almost mysterious, in the inability or unwillingness of statesmen, moralists, and economists to recognize the truth and the inexorable working of the law of population. It almost seems, indeed, as if the refusal of the majority of mankind to recognize this law and its inevitable consequences must be a matter of imposed instinct, like race hatreds or language barriers, compelling men to pursue to the end their predestined paths of evolution by ceaseless and ruthless struggle. Nearly all the present schemes of philanthropists and statesmen for the improvement of the condition of the masses after the war continue to ignore the central fact, to which the history of modern civilization points most emphatically, namely, that the *positive* checks to over-population—war, pestilence, and famine—must inevitably continue to operate with ever-increasing severity on this congested planet, unless *preventive* checks are applied to limit the reproductive fertility of the human race.

Here and there, amidst the multitude of counsellors who proclaim new paths to Utopia, new ways of paying humanity's old debts, one may hear the note of warning voiced by Mill seventy years ago, but, generally speaking, the warning is still derided. The confusion of ideas which prevails on this subject amongst educated people all over the world is still due in great measure, as it was in Mill's day, to the spurious delicacy which prevents the free discussion of sexual questions, and to the religious prejudices which blind men to the hard

truth which Malthus first proclaimed. For centuries the world has been led to believe, and has believed despite the evidence of its senses, that ' the Lord will provide '—and yet the history of all life on this planet stands to confirm the truth that uncounted millions of human beings are brought into the world in obedience to one law of nature who, by another equally inexorable law, cannot possibly be supported thereon.

Confronted by this position, the believers in *laissez-faire*, and even the philosophers who (beyond the limits of their own domestic circle) believe in the survival of the fittest, are wont to declare that the resources of the globe in the matter of food supply are by no means exhausted, and that, on the contrary, they are capable of enormous expansion. There may have been some shadow of plausibility in this line of argument seventy years ago. At that time, as far as Great Britain was concerned, the inexorable necessity of positive or preventive checks on population was obscured by certain peculiar and transient conditions, by the existence of a great undeveloped area of food production in America, and by rapidly improving methods of transportation. These conditions, combined with the development of steam-power and manufacturing industrialism in Great Britain, had resulted in doubling the population of the United Kingdom in the first half of the nineteenth century, despite a steadily increasing tide of emigration. Superficial observers were therefore led to believe that the checks on population, thus relatively diminished, might be absolutely overcome as the result of industrial skill and organization. The progress of mechanical improvements tending to increase production and distribution served to counteract, over a certain privileged area, the law of diminishing returns. The idea that the operation of this law can be indefinitely postponed still appears to prevail in many quarters. For example, Sir Bernard Mallet, in his Presidential Address to the Royal Statistical Society on November 20, 1917, referring to the fact that ' many people are writing and speaking as if the declining birth-rates of our population in Europe ' were matter for congratulation in view of the shortage which ' they foresee in the world's food supplies,' said that even if it could be shown, which he much doubted, ' that the globe ' as a whole was within sight of the time when population was ' beginning to press seriously upon the means of subsistence,'

he would personally feel unable to look with indifference upon the phenomenon of our falling birth-rate. His attitude towards the general problem of population was, in fact, determined by the instinct of race preservation.

Even those political economists who decline to follow Malthus and Mill in their definition of the law of population and its effect upon our social state, will scarcely venture to deny that the risk of war, as the result of ever increasing economic pressure, would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, could means be found to limit the birth-rate by a common consensus of opinion operating throughout the civilized world. Few will deny that Germany's urgent need of territorial and commercial expansion, her insistent demand for 'a place in the sun,' has been a fundamental cause in the present conflict. Prince von Bülow, writing in 1913 ('Imperial Germany'), put the facts succinctly when he said:

'The population of the new German Empire in 1871 was 41,958,792. In 1900 the number had risen to 56,367,178, and to-day it has reached 68,000,000. The Empire could no longer support in the old way this immense mass of humanity within its boundaries. Owing to this enormous increase of population, German policy was confronted with a tremendous problem. This had to be solved if foreign countries were not to profit by the superfluity of German life which the mother country was unable to support.'

Germany prepared for war, in fact, for the same inexorable reason that the hordes of Genghis Khan swept forth in their day from Asia to the conquest of Eastern Europe, for the same reason that the Goths and Vandals bore down upon the corn-lands and vineyards of Italy. The Report of the Birth-rate Commissioners admits that the pressure of population in any country 'always remains a chief cause of international dispute and wars'; every nation that proclaims its manifest 'Imperial' destiny to inherit the earth and populate the globe proclaims, *ipso facto*, its determination to survive by force, and at the expense of other weaker nations.*

* It is interesting, in this connection, to record the opinion of a Committee of the Lambeth Conference of Bishops and Archbishops, which considered the question of birth control in 1908, and condemned it as a gigantic evil and gravely immoral. Amongst its dangers the Bishops perceived 'the world danger that the great English-speaking peoples, diminished in numbers and weakened in moral force, should commit the crowning infamy of race

Nevertheless, strange to say, amongst the schemes put forward for the reconstruction of society and the prevention of war in the future, many continue to insist upon the urgent need of increasing, at all costs, the birth-rate of the British Isles. Because, at the end of 1917, the United Kingdom had lost by the fall in births due to the war some 500,000 'potential lives' (roughly one-tenth of the loss incurred by the Central Empires), many 'race-suicide' enthusiasts have been led to raise the cry of 'Depopulation' and to proclaim it as the duty of every Englishwoman to make two babies grow where one grew before. Sir A. Conan Doyle, for example, declares 'that in thirty years time the balance of power in 'Europe will depend on the children now being produced.' Father Bernard Vaughan appeals earnestly for more babies —apparently regardless of quality. The Countess of Warwick, in a recent pamphlet on 'race suicide' urges her fellow women to be fruitful and multiply, come what may, justifying her plea by the statement that 'Providence has placed us in a marvel-'lous world, capable of raising far more than is needed to supply 'the reasonable wants of one and all.' On all sides, legislation is proposed for the purpose of making maternity easier and more attractive by transferring part of the parents' burdens to the community, whilst public and private benevolent societies concentrate their activities on increasing the population. Germany, similarly, impelled to replenish her stock of canon fodder (for the preservation, no doubt, of the world's peace), contemplates State recognition and support for the offspring of 'secondary marriages.' In all these activities the impelling force lies in the struggle for race-survival, and therefore takes no account either of eugenics or of the effect of over-population on the individual's chances of health and happiness, nor of the problem of the next generation's food supply.

---

suicide, and so fail to fulfil that high destiny to which, in the Providence of God, they have been manifestly called.' Similarly, in June, 1916, Mr. Walter Long declared that everything possible should be done to restore the birth-rate 'as it was never more essential that our great race should expand and cover the globe.' In the face of opinions such as these, the future of the League of Nations would appear to be doubtful and the prospect of 'peace in our time' remote.

The Countess of Warwick's conception of the food supply question, above quoted, is interesting chiefly because it undoubtedly reflects the popular, semi-religious, attitude on this subject. There are many worthy people at the present day whose opinion is much the same as that set forth by Carlyle in 'Sartor Resartus' eighty-four years ago:

'Too crowded indeed! Meanwhile, what portion of this inconsiderable terraqueous globe have ye actually tilled and delved, till it will grow no more? How thick stands your population in the Pampas and Savannahs of America, round ancient Carthage and in the interior of Africa, on both slopes of the Altaic Chain, in the Central platform of Asia, in Spain, Greece, Turkey, Crim Tartary, and the Curragh of Kildare? One man in one year, as I have understood it, if you lend him earth, will feed himself and nine others.'

The seer of Chelsea's vision of vast unpeopled spaces awaiting 'the toil-worn Craftsman that with earth-made implement 'laboriously conquers the earth,' to cover it thereafter with his struggling progeny, has persisted even until now. In practice, the industrial nations at the centres of civilization have steadily become more and more dependent on the food resources of the 'Pampas and Savannahs,' and at the same time the tide of human life has been steadily rising in those partially developed regions, rising slowly but surely towards the point where their food resources must of necessity be required for local consumption. Under our undiscerning eyes, within the last few years, this point has been rapidly reached in the United States of America. And all the time statesmen and churchmen and politicians have continued to impress upon these masses that it is their duty to increase and multiply, regardless of consequences, and that a high birth-rate is the outward and visible sign of a virile and progressive race.

Let us glance briefly at the record of the past century. In England and Wales the population at the opening of the nineteenth century was 8,900,000. In 1901 it was 32,500,000. It had been multiplied three and a half times in a hundred years. The increase was nearly 24,000,000. During the eighteenth century the increase was less than three millions. In the first decade of the twentieth century the population of England and Wales increased by 3,500,000; that is to say, the volume of increase per annum in the twentieth century was more than ten times the corresponding factor in the

eighteenth. The circumstances which have enabled the English race to increase at this rate were, and are, still peculiar; briefly stated, vast numbers, that could by no means have been supported by the food production of the country, have survived because the nation's accumulated wealth and industrial capacity enabled it to acquire food (at the cost, be it observed, of other human lives) from India, Russia, and other countries less fortunately situated. Yet it must be evident, even to the militarists who cry for babies to maintain the balance of power, or to capitalist enthusiasts for cheap labour and cut-throat competition, that these privileged conditions are of their nature transient. It must also be evident, even to the religious people who denounce Great Britain's lately declining birth-rate as a disgrace and a calamity, that it is not possible for England in the twentieth century to repeat her man-making record of the nineteenth. The rate of increase which obtained in England and Wales from 1801 to 1901 would, if maintained, produce a population of some 1,400,000,000 three hundred years hence. Or (to put the matter with equal force in another way) had our forefathers, since the days of William the Conqueror, been in a position to achieve a birth-rate and a death-rate similar to those of England and Wales in the nineteenth century, the present population of this tight little island—without allowing for any contribution from Scotland—would be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 150,000,000,000. Even a bishop must admit that the problem, thus simply stated, is of a nature to give pause to those who would go on blindly 'replenishing the earth' on the 'Lord will provide' principle. Even if we had the field to ourselves, and supposing that we could eliminate the rivalry of other nations in this birth-rate competition, it is clear that somehow, and very soon, checks to population would need to be applied. The vital question which confronts modern civilization is whether the checks shall continue, as in the past, to be the positive checks of war, pestilence, and famine, or the preventive check of a rational and intelligently directed birth-control.

If England's case and that of Germany were isolated instances of remarkable increase in population, the cheerful gospel of unlimited increase might be justified. For England, at all events, there are still the safety valves of her Colonies and Dominions overseas and the possibility of a State-organized

and scientifically directed system of migration from congested centres. There remains, for some time to come at least, the expedient of purchasing our food supplies from less wealthy nations as we have done in the past, even though this expedient involves a very high rate of infant mortality in those countries. But, as a matter of fact, the same causes (above mentioned) which led to the rapid increase of population in England during the nineteenth century have been operative, in greater or less degree, throughout the western world. As Dr. Inge stated before the Birth-Rate Commission :

> 'The productiveness of the human race would appear to have been evolved in such a way as to meet the losses due to war, famine, pestilence, and other causes.* In the Middle Ages, for instance, the birth rate was about forty-five, and the death-rate about the same. Within the last century, the death-rate has been reduced from the medieval level to fourteen, and if the birth-rate were maintained at anything like its natural level, about forty, all over the world, the population of the globe, which is now 1,700,000,000,† would in 120 years have reached 27,000,000,000 or about ten times as great a number as the earth could probably support. That, it seems to me, is the fundamental fact we have to recognize, and one that makes a drastic limitation of the birth-rate an absolute necessity' (p. 293).

Economic pressure, the *res augusta domi*, the desire for a higher standard of decency and comfort, began to bring this fundamental fact home to the educated classes in Western Europe, and most notably in France, before the close of the nineteenth century. Birth control, at first tentative and localized, is now instinctively practised by thoughtful men and women throughout Europe, North America, and Australia, in fact in almost every civilized country of the Western world except Russia and the Balkans. As showing the position of affairs in England, the following figures for 1911, supplied by

---

* Dr. Inge here inverts cause and effect. The position was more accurately stated by an exponent of the Malthusian doctrine in 1854, who observed that, given a birth-rate in excess of the maximum possible increase in means of subsistence, the more infant mortality is reduced by humanitarian expedients, the more longevity is increased by medical science, the greater becomes the inevitable necessity for war, pestilence, and famine as nature's positive checks on over-population.

† The usually accepted estimate is nearer 1,800,000,000.

Dr. Stevenson to the Birth-Rate Commission, speak for themselves :

Social Class.	Births per 1,000 married males aged under 55 years	Deaths under one year per 1,000 children born.
Upper and Middle Class ..	119	76.4
Skilled Workmen	153	112.7
Unskilled Workmen ..	213	152.5

Apart from this striking evidence, the fact is statistically established beyond all question that infant mortality increases regularly in proportion to the size of the family. In other words, the procreative recklessness of the lower social groups results merely in filling our graveyards with human waste. The systematic extension of birth-control amongst the better educated classes reflects individual and collective recognition of the truth that not by the number of births shall a family or a State be made prosperous and secure, but only by the number of healthy survivals. A curious commentary on the collective pronouncement of our bishops in favour of an unrestricted birth-rate is afforded by other figures furnished by Dr. Stevenson, in which he shows from the census of 1911 the relative fertility of certain selected occupations. From these it appears that whereas forty years ago the fertility of the clergy of the Church of England was above the average, it now comes very close to that of the medical profession and teachers, at the bottom of the list. It was little more than half that of the coal miners and agricultural labourers, who head the list. That is to say that the clergy, in their private lives, have realized that it is better for the community and for the future generation's chances of happiness that the quiver should not be too full. In the fullness of time Malthus, the misconstrued, has been justified and the social order brought to recognize the fundamental soundness of the distinction which he drew between a 'redundant population and one actually great.' Almost unaided, except by the sweet uses of adversity, and in spite of its spiritual guides, modern civilization is swiftly coming to the knowledge that :

'It is not the *maximum* number but the *optimum* number, having

regard to the means of distribution, that it should be the endeavour of social organization to secure. To spread a layer of human protoplasm of the greatest possible thickness over the earth—the implied ambition of many publicists—in the light of natural knowledge is seen to be reckless folly. We need not more of the fit, but fewer of the unfit. A high death-rate is often associated with a high birth-rate, but happily a low birth-rate and a low death-rate are quite compatible with each other.' *

As examples of countries in which the collective wisdom of the social organization has triumphed over the collective folly of the improvident and uneducated classes, we may cite New Zealand and the Netherlands. In New Zealand the birth-rate up to 1860 was high (over 40 per thousand); thereafter it fell rapidly, until in 1911 it was 26. Simultaneously with this decline, the death-rate diminished until it reached the lowest figure recorded, viz., 9.5 per thousand, with the result that New Zealand's rate of natural increase by excess of births over deaths is actually the highest in the world, sufficient to double the population in forty-four years. Yet the Bishop of London, looking only to the birth-rate, uttered a grave warning in 1913 concerning Australia's danger, confronted by the 'glorious fertility' of China and Japan.

In Holland the reduction of the birth-rate has been systematically encouraged as a matter of national policy, directed on eugenic and humanitarian principles; this, be it noted, in a country distinguished for the patriotism and civic virtues of its citizens. In 1881 a society was organized in Amsterdam for the specific purpose of educating the poorer class to a sense of the benefits which it would derive from birth control. In 1895 the value of its work had become so conspicuous that it was officially recognized as one of the Societies of 'Public 'Utility.' The results of its propaganda at the end of the first decade of the present century were remarkable. The birth-rate had steadily fallen to 28 per thousand, but at the same time the death-rate had been reduced to the lowest figure in Europe, 12.3 per thousand. Infant mortality had diminished more rapidly than in any other country. More important still, from the national point of view, the physical and social condition of the people had been vastly improved;

* Professor Bateson, Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1912.

the average stature of the Dutch people increased by four inches in fifty years. The Dutch themselves attribute the undeniable improvement in the country's prosperity to the fact that the poorest and physically unfit have been educated to birth control, and they contrast the results thus attained with those which persist in countries where the lower social groups, the thriftless and the thoughtless, are encouraged to produce unlimited families, which either become a burden upon the intelligent and efficient class, or swell the mass of human misery.

In countries where, owing either to the effect of religious misguidance or the hand-to-mouth ignorance of the masses, procreative recklessness has been allowed full scope, the results afford little matter for satisfaction either to the exponents of the 'race-suicide' theory or to the sincere philanthropist. In Russia, for example, the birth-rate until quite recently was the highest in Europe (nearly 50 per thousand), but of every four infants born one died in its first year, and the nation's physical and mental standard has long been lower than that of other European countries. In India, as the result of the government's irrigation schemes and public health measures, the population increased from 287,000,000 in 1891 to 315,000,000 in 1911, a result which the enthusiasts who rejoice in swelling numbers have welcomed as a triumph of civilization. But the net result of this triumph has been that the number of survivals in the tide of India's 'glorious fertility' has risen swiftly to the new level of the improved possibilities of agriculture. This does not mean, as under an enlightened social organization it might have meant, that the increased means of subsistence have brought relief to 'the great hordes' who provide in their lean bodies victims for the yearly 'sacrifice to cholera, famine, and plague.' * The average death-rate remains at about 35 per thousand—more than three times the rate in Australasia. The infant mortality of Bombay city was 322 per thousand in 1911, as against 91 per thousand in London. It is because religion and innate fatalism impel the Indian peoples to breed up to the limit of human fertility that famine is endemic in their land, and has been so for centuries. The average of human lives that are wasted

* Sir Frederick Treves in 'The Other Side of the Lantern.'

annually is about 7,000,000. They are brought recklessly into a land that cannot possibly feed them.*

China, isolated for long ages and self-sufficient in the established order of her ancient civilization, provides an even more striking illustration of the results of thoughtless and thriftless over-population, of blind obedience to the procreative instinct. The history of the country from the beginning of the Christian era to the present day is little more than the long record of nature's inexorable methods of dealing with overcrowded humanity. Century after century has seen the same dismal folly, bred in the bone of the people with ancestor worship, producing the same appalling consequences; the survivors of generations that have been decimated in their teeming numbers, devastated by cataclysms of civil strife, by pestilence and famine, have returned blindly to this task of replenishing the earth, giving in marriage their children fresh from school, practising polygamy up to the uncertain limit of their visible means of subsistence. Their frenzy of man-making has ever been conducted on the 'take no thought for the morrow' principle of Oriental fatalism; a tenth of the nation has always been at the mercy of next season's harvest, and the yearly human wastage of superfluous lives has been reckoned on a conservative estimate at an average of 11,000,000. It does not occur to the Chinese, essentially a passive, non-resisting race, to solve their problem of over-population as the Germans have planned to solve theirs, by overflowing their borders and possessing themselves of the territory and tribute of other nations; their philosophy denies the gospel of force and asserts the supremacy of right over might. It is also content to attribute to Providence the ever-recurring calamities inseparable from the cult of ancestor worship, whereby the humblest coolie is impelled to indulge his philoprogenitive instinct at all costs. The Chinese regard with composure the appalling rate of their infant mortality—which varies from 70 to 85 per cent. according as seasons and localities are good or bad—ascribing it to the same 'will of heaven' which permits plague, floods, and famine, and the chronic rebellions

* The ordinances of Manu prescribe the procreation of children as a sacred duty. 'By a son, a man obtains victory over all the world; by a grandson, he achieves immortality, and by the son of that grandson, he attains unto the Abode of Light.'

of the great unfed. The Confucian religion, which is chiefly responsible for this mental state, was well suited, like the exhortations of the Book of Genesis, to a fertile and thinly populated planet: but unless in these latter days it can be reconciled with some practical system of birth-control among the Chinese masses, nothing can possibly relieve them from their chronic condition of endemic starvation, disease, misery, and consequent political unrest.*

From the facts and figures above cited certain general conclusions may fairly be drawn. Firstly, that the doctrine of a high birth-rate, as desirable either on moral or economic grounds, is untenable. All human experience and scientific knowledge tend more and more conclusively to support the principle that it is not the number of births, but that of healthy and efficient survivals which shall make and keep a nation in the forefront of progressive civilization. In course of time, as education spreads, even our politicians must come to admit that votes may be reckoned by quality rather than quantity. Secondly, it is evident that in every civilized country, and most noticeably in those countries where the average of education and intelligence is highest, birth control is being more and more widely introduced and practised; and that wherever (as in Holland) this control is inculcated among the poorer and less fit class, the results are of immediate and undeniable advantage to the community. Thirdly, it is evident that a system of birth control limited to the intelligent initiative and self-denying prudence of the educated and efficient classes cannot of itself put an end to national poverty, disease, prostitution, and all the other ills inseparable from an overcrowded population; on the contrary, so long as the inefficient and poorer classes are encouraged to excessive reproduction (the

* As an example of the attitude of the moralists who believe in the greatest number as the greatest happiness, it is of interest to note that a certain American professor recently advocated the concentration of European missionary and medical activities upon the tragedy of China's appalling rate of infant mortality. He urged the reduction of this great waste of human life, by means of scientific hygiene. A simple calculation goes to show that if China's present birth-rate (estimated at over 50 per thousand) were maintained and her death-rate reduced to the level of that in England, her population would be over 4,000,000,000 a century hence. The problem of food supply did not concern the professor.

fit being taxed for the maintenance of their offspring, as in Great Britain to-day) there can be no hope of the individual State achieving security and prosperity, or of permanent peace among the nations.

Finally, the present war has made it plain to all thinking men that, as Mill and other economists foretold, the unprecedented increase of population in Europe during the last hundred years, resulting from the new means of subsistence provided by the energy latent in our coal fields and new methods of transportation, has placed upon the present generation and those to come a heavy burden of social and economic disabilities. Neither by legislation, nor shifting of the incidence of taxation, nor by humanitarian schemes, can this burden be lifted, for the problem which confronts the nations, individually and collectively, is that of a world whose food production is actually and prospectively insufficient for its needs. Western Europe, intoxicated by the transient prosperity of modern urban industrialism, has had its fling; it has ushered millions of human lives into the world for whose decent, comfortable maintenance the planet's diminishing fertility promises no provision; civilization has devoured a large part of its capital, heedless of the fact that the next generation of consumers will be more numerous than the last and that somebody, somewhere, must needs go empty away.

For some years before the outbreak of war thoughtful observers had noted the increasing pressure of the world's population upon its means of subsistence, and had perceived therein evidence of the working of the law which determines the productiveness of land, the law whereby the results of agricultural industry tend to diminish, in the sense that they do not increase in proportion to the labour employed. A direct and unmistakable result of the nineteenth century's birth-rate and emigration to America was made manifest, even to the man in the street, in 1912, when the United States, from being the largest supplier of meat to the United Kingdom, reached the point of having none to export and became an importer of Australian and South American beef. In London, according to the Board of Trade returns, the price of meat rose 15 per cent. between 1900 and 1912. The upward movement in the cost of the necessities of life began to assert itself noticeably in 1905. The Board of Trade figures for 1912, having

reference to twenty-three staple food articles, gave the following results, based on the index figure of 100 for the year 1900:

WHOLESALE PRICES.

1905	97.6	1909	104.8
1906	100.5	1910	108.7
1907	105.8	1911	109.3
1908	102.8	1912	115.0

The most important increases were those which affected the food supplies of the masses, that is to say, bread, meat, sugar, flour, butter, and rice. Statistics issued by the Co-operative Wholesale Society in 1912 showed an increase of 12 per cent. in the cost of essential foods between 1898 and 1911. In the same year an address presented by the Socialist members of the German Reichstag to the Chancellor called upon the Government to convene the Chamber for the purpose of devising measures to counteract the increasing price of foodstuffs. As compared with the averages of 1901-1905, the prices of staple foods in Berlin in 1911 had risen in a manner which created widespread uneasiness and political agitation; the increase in the price of meat was over 2½*d.* a lb. Amongst a small school of economists the reduced purchasing power of money was attributed to the increased production of gold, but gradually it became apparent that the real cause lay in the fact that the demand for food had outstripped all visible supplies; that the world-wide rise in prices was due to density of population and a higher standard of living, acting in conjunction with a relative diminution in the output of agricultural industry.*

In Germany, more especially, political economists were confronted by the stern fact that the country's agricultural

* A French scientist, M. Hardy, has calculated that if the world's total food production were equally distributed, the ration of proteids available for each individual would be short by one-third of the standard recognized as sufficient to produce efficiency. Even if we eliminate the underfed masses of population in India and China, this is evidently true. It is obvious that an agricultural labourer in England or Germany cannot possibly provide the necessities of life on an adequate scale for a large family out of the highest possible scale of wages which his labour can earn on a purely economic basis of remuneration.

production was no longer sufficient to meet the demands made upon it and that, to obtain the necessary supplies, the nation must develop new markets abroad for her industrial products —in other words, that it must assert its claim to a larger place in the sun. For those who had eyes to see the writing was plain upon the wall, a presage of conflict to come.

If these things are so, if the war has brought us to realization of the hard fact that the world of the future can never be as the world of the past, and that the nation which depends on other countries for its vital necessities must stand in imminent peril, is it not strange that politicians and prelates should seek the salvation of the Empire in the production of more consumers ?

Pace the ideal of international federation which finds expression in the pacifists' scheme for a League of Nations to enforce peace, and *pace* the declarations of Mr. Bernard Shaw, Mr. H. G. Wells, and other literary Bolshevists in our midst, that this war is to end war, practical men will still be guided by the teaching of history and biological science to believe that the instinct of race-preservation will continue to be a dominant factor in human evolution. To this instinct must be ascribed the prevalent agitation in favour of an increased birth-rate and the conviction expressed by public men and prelates that Great Britain's ' high destiny ' is to ' expand and cover the ' globe.' Similarly, in Germany, the cry of the militarist and religious authorities is for more children. The leading speaker in a full debate on the falling birth-rate question in the Prussian Diet in February, 1916, declared that Germany must speedily make good her loss of man power. ' We need an increase in ' human beings to guard against attacks of envious neighbours ' as well as to fulfil our cultural mission. Our whole economic ' development depends upon the increase of our people.' Herr Naumann, the famous author of ' Mittel Europa,' regards an increased birth-rate as ' an indispensable condition both for ' military and industrial success.' Regarded in the light of these utterances, the prospects of peace for future generations appear to be anything but reassuring. Pending the better education of the toiling masses of Europe in the elementary principles of political economy, pending a more widespread recognition of the truth that in the excessive multiplication of human beings lies the root-cause of war, as of poverty and all

its concomitant evils, each government will probably continue to denounce birth restriction as incompatible with its policies of national defence and commercial expansion.

But the situation is by no means lacking in hopeful symptoms. Amongst the most significant of these must be reckoned the fact that the fall in the German birth-rate, which began in 1876, has been greatly accelerated since the beginning of the century, attaining, indeed, a rapidity of decline unequalled in any other country. In other words, the educated and artisan classes in Germany have shown that they are not prepared to go on producing children indefinitely to gratify the ambitions of Prussian militarists. The same classes in France and England are already following the same practice. On this road Hope beckons to humanity and the League of Nations emerges, from the far distance, into the realm of practical politics. Thus is fulfilled the wisdom of Mill, who said that in proportion as man rises in civilization, population is checked rather by the dread of want than by want itself; and that the foresight which forms the distinguishing characteristic of civilized man will prevent him from bringing into this world human beings for whom no satisfactory provision can be made.

The only plausible justification for the agitation in favour of an increased birth-rate in Great Britain and her Colonies lies in frank and final acceptance of the assumption that militarism is destined not only to continue, but to increase, and the struggle for race-survival to be intensified amongst civilized nations. (It is of interest to note that few, if any, of the leaders of the ' more babies ' campaign accept this assumption; they profess, on the contrary, to believe that increased intensity of economic pressure will hereafter be relieved by the sweet reasonableness of international arbitration or other miraculous expedients.) Clearly, if we accept this assumption, if we admit that militarism and the necessity for strong national defences are not likely to be eliminated in the immediate future, the problem which England's legislators, economists, and philanthropists have alike to face is, How shall we reconcile the necessities and obligations of race-preservation with the maintenance of such a standard of decency and comfort for the working classes as shall satisfy the public conscience? Is it possible to achieve the prosperity and security of the

Empire and at the same time to diminish the terrible burden of economic pressure under which our industrial communities are now labouring? The example and experience of Holland, above referred to, justify the belief that the problem is capable of solution.

Holland, like France, but even more systematically and consciously, has proceeded to the alleviation of economic pressure—in other words, of poverty, disease, and vice—by accepting and acting upon the truth of the great saying of Malthus, viz., that:

'*It is not in the nature of things that any permanent and general improvement in the condition of the poor can be effected without an increase in the preventive check to population;* that unless this occurs everything that is done for the poor must be temporary and partial; a diminution of mortality at present will be balanced by an increased mortality in future; and improvements of these conditions in one place will proportionately depress it in another.'

The collective wisdom of the Dutch people has risen superior to its collective ignorance and improvidence; it has infused into the poorer classes of Holland the same quality of intelligent and essentially moral foresight which now operates amongst the upper classes of England, the United States, Germany, and other civilized countries, and by so doing it has delivered the nation, in no small measure, from the danger of the process of reversed selection which obtains wherever the inefficient and poorer class are encouraged by professedly humanitarian legislation to reckless propagation. At the same time, and as the direct result of this educative process, the nation's physique and general standard of intelligence have been materially raised, individual longevity increased, and the natural increase of population fully maintained. To quote Malthus again:

'It does not seem visionary to suppose, that if the true and permanent cause of poverty were clearly explained and forcibly brought home to each man, it would have some, and perhaps no slight, influence on his conduct; at least the experiment has never yet been fairly tried. Almost everything that has hitherto been done for the poor has tended, as if with solicitous care, to throw a veil of obscurity over this subject and to hide from them the true cause of their poverty. When the wages of labour are hardly enough to maintain two children, a man marries and has five or six. He, of course, finds himself miserably distressed. He accuses the low rate of wages; he accuses the parish for their tardy and scanty assistance; he accuses the avarice of the rich; the partial and

unjust institutions of society; and perhaps he accuses the dispensations of Providence. But he never adverts to the real quarter whence his distress arises. The last person he would think of accusing is himself, on whom, in fact, the principal blame rests, except in so far as he has been deceived by the higher classes of society, who are, however, generally as ignorant of the matter as himself. He may perhaps wish that he had not married, but it never enters into his head that he has done anything wrong. He has always been told that to raise up subjects for his King and Country is a highly meritorious act and is indignant at the cruelty and injustice of others for allowing him so to suffer.'

To teach the elements of truth in political economy to the masses, to counteract the transmitted tendencies of centuries of error, and to overcome the prejudices and class bias of those who advocate a high birth-rate at all costs, will require time and a systematic process of popular education. A curious example of the working and powerful effect of class bias lies in the fact that whereas, as has been shown, medical men recognize the necessity for birth control and practice it in their private lives, professionally and collectively they are frequently found to be advocates of a high birth-rate. In the same way, the class bias of undertakers must always be opposed to small families.

The attitude of the Churches, and of the Roman Catholic Church in particular, is one of moral assumptions based on the doctrine of infallibility, while that of the Jewish persuasion is based on the Old Testament tradition of a Divine and immutable command. With the ethics and inspiration of ecclesiastic disapproval of birth control on moral (and frequently on political) grounds, it is not necessary to deal in this article. *Eppur si muove.* In their private memorandum on the misuse of marriage, issued by the bishops of the Church of England for the guidance of the clergy subsequently to the Lambeth Conference, their lordships (with certain exceptions) practically admit the necessity and even the desirability of birth control in certain cases, confining their condemnation to what they describe as 'artificial methods.' In this condemnation, as in their approval of the particular method which they regard as legitimate and physically harmless, they rely admittedly not upon religious but upon medical authority, and by so doing abandon the purely moral offensive. But all the evidence produced by current discussion of the

subject tends to show that medical opinion is gradually coming to the conclusion that birth control, the preventive check on population, may properly be adopted without detriment to the physical and moral qualities of the race. The distinction between 'artificial' and 'natural' contraceptives need not here be discussed; it has been fully dealt with in the Report of the Birth-Rate Commission.

Looking to the future of Great Britain as the centre of the British Empire, is it reasonable to believe that the happiness of posterity can possibly be achieved simultaneously with any considerable increase in the redundant population of these islands? Of a certainty, as the result of this war, the nation's intelligence will henceforth realize the perils which confront even the present generation, in view of the steadily diminishing food-surplus available for purchase from overseas. The danger of continued dependence upon foreign food supplies must inevitably become greater, in the face of the intensified industrial competition of the future, the steadily accelerated exhaustion of our coal reserves, and the increasing efficiency of races hitherto industrially inferior. Regarded in this light, everything points to the advisability—nay, to the necessity—of diminishing rather than increasing the population of the British Isles, and at the same time of strengthening the Empire as a whole, for purposes of mutual economic support and military defence, by organized State-directed migration of our surplus population, men and women—especially women—to the less populated Colonies and Dominions. The agricultural production of Great Britain cannot suffice to maintain its present population; who shall say that fifty years hence we shall be able to draw supplies from India and Russia, as we do to-day, incidentally helping to impose an abnormally high infant mortality on those countries? And who shall say that the social organization on which the Empire rests will endure even for that period the present stress and strain of economic pressure? In the systematic inculcation of the preventive check lies the only hope of providing any permanent alleviation of all the mass of human suffering and political unrest or any diminution of the severity with which nature applies the positive checks to over-population. And of these the swiftest is war.

J. O. P. Bland.

THE RIDDLE OF AFTER-LIFE

1. **Immortality: An Essay in Discovery.** Edited by CANON BURNETT H. STREETER. Macmillan. 1917.
2. **The Question: If a Man Die Shall He Live Again?** By EDWARD CLODD. Grant Richards. 1917.
3. **On the Threshold of the Unseen.** By SIR WILLIAM F. BARRETT, F.R.S. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1917.

THE recent revival of interest in psychic questions, and more particularly in the possibility of communion with the dead, is undoubtedly a direct outcome of the war. The early years of the present century had, indeed, shown some signs of a reaction against the hard, intellectual agnosticism of the later Victorian period; the 'new Reformation' of the eighteen-nineties had not so much failed to carry conviction as simply ceased to exist some time after the death of Huxley, its chief exponent, in 1895. But although agnosticism drifted away into a rather stagnant backwater, it cannot be said that it was conquered by the dogmatic orthodoxy against which it fought so long a battle; it was not followed by any golden age of faith, and it is hardly likely that the most paradoxical historian will ever point to the Edwardian age as one of the great spiritual epochs of England. The agnostics were often, and not always unjustly, accused of materialism by their opponents; they seem in retrospect to have been far less materialistic in their attitude to life than their immediate successors. At least they were men who thought deeply on these grave subjects; the Edwardians simply turned to other things altogether. If agnosticism after Huxley produced no great literature and contented itself with cheap and sometimes nasty rationalist reprints, the Churches made little attempt to reoccupy their lost territory; the fires of hell were drawn, and the more active clergy became absorbed in 'social reform,' which, however excellent a thing, is necessarily and emphatically mundane.

In part, no doubt, this attitude was inevitable. The measure of our desire for heaven depends to some extent on our present

ease and security. Now, the Edwardian age was extraordinarily prosperous; it was the period of the motor-car, the country-house, the week-ender, and the ostentatiously palatial hotel. Large classes of the community were making fortunes; civilization seemed at last securely founded; human life was assured and lengthening year by year. When everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds, there was little need to focus much attention on the subsequent adventures of humanity. We still confessed ourselves miserable sinners in church, but we laid less emphasis on the misery than our ancestors, and for the most excellent reason. We had conquered this world, and we desired no other.

Into this prosperous and comfortable community there suddenly intruded the greatest war in history. Thousands of young men laid down their lives at the very outset of their careers. Families that were securely established found themselves sonless; wives with their children were reduced from affluence to want. The newspapers were filled with predictions of famine; placid security vanished with aerial war; the world had changed. When the material universe that had seemed so safe and sufficient was subject to such convulsions people turned naturally to the older spiritual conceptions for consolation, or at least for some explanation of these disasters. The churches filled again, but they had no new message, and they are often accused of failing in the presentment of the old. Men and women, and more particularly those women who had lost their men, looked elsewhere for sympathy. Many found it in spiritualism. Séances were organized, mediums brought messages from the dead, books were published with their revelations of the unseen world and had large sales, lectures were given to crowded audiences, popular newspapers opened their columns to the subject.

It was extraordinarily affecting, this spectacle of Rachel weeping for her children. The present writer recalls a dull autumn day two years ago, when the very air seemed heavy, as it were, with the oppression of the world's sorrows, as he saw a woman in early middle age coming out of the house of one who professed a knowledge of the psychic craft and the unseen. She was in mourning; her figure was bent with recent grief; she was the very type of *mater dolorosa;* but

in her eyes, as she passed preoccupied among the throng, was a strange light of exaltation, as of one who has received unexpected consolation and good tidings. Her lips moved with prayer, perhaps with thanksgiving, as she went through the crowd and was gone.

It was easy to read her secret. She had lost a son in the war and was eager for tidings of his welfare in another world. There are thousands of such mourners now, and their grief has created a sinister industry—it has raised up among us a host of seers who profess communication with the dead, who tell us of their doings, and proclaim their very thoughts as they move in unknown spheres or, it may be, insubstantially among us, who bring tidings of comfort and good cheer from the departed, and describe, through unseen mediums and mysterious disguises, the daily routine of immortal life. For a few guineas one may purchase a glimpse into a pretended heaven; for a somewhat higher fee the trader in bereavement will undertake to disturb the dead and bring us their authentic messages.

The question of communion with the dead, of which a thousand legends of the Catholic Church and the Bible itself assume the possibility, is evidently only a part of the larger problem of human immortality. If the human soul is not immortal there may still be an unseen world of sprites and gnomes and angels, but there can be no communion with the dead. This very matter, which seems so dubious and uncertain to-day, seemed equally dubious and uncertain nineteen centuries ago; and it was largely on this question that Christianity first took its stand. The doctrine of human immortality, so hesitatingly maintained or denied by the Jewish writers,* was triumphantly affirmed by the early Christians. It was taught by Christ during his lifetime; His own Resurrection and Ascension furnished the final proof of His promise. But it did not win immediate or ungrudging assent. The resurrection of Christ is related in all four Gospels;

* Maintained in the Book of Wisdom; denied or ignored in Ecclesiastes and Ecclesiasticus; dubiously alluded to in the Book of Jubilees, and more distinctly affirmed in Enoch. The doctrine of a limited immortality, a kind of psychic survival of the fittest, is suggested in 2 Esdras; and this view seems to be supported in Luke xx. 35: 'they that are accounted worthy to attain to that world, and the resurrection.'

so also is the admission that some, even among the disciples, doubted the fact. The Jews themselves, who hated Jesus, spread the report that the body was stolen while the guard slept, and this was very commonly believed.* The Greeks as well as the Jews doubted the doctrine when it was propounded by St. Paul; when the Athenians 'heard of the 'resurrection of the dead, some mocked, but others said, 'we will hear thee concerning this yet again.'† Only a few believed the apostle on that occasion; the Stoics and Epicureans dismissed him as a babbler, and his converts were probably among the unlearned.‡ He encountered the same difficulty in defending himself before Agrippa: 'Why 'is it judged incredible with you, if God doth raise the dead?' It is true that he almost convinced Agrippa, but to Festus his words were those of a madman.

Such was the prevalent doubt among a civilized people, accustomed to weigh evidence and dispute philosophy; but the doctrine, not perhaps so much of human immortality but of the resurrection of the body which was coupled with it, was in itself so novel and extraordinary that we ought perhaps to be surprised, not that so many doubted, but that any believed at all. One cannot fail, however, to be struck by one peculiar fact in these discussions—the fact that St. Paul and his colleagues, faced with a dead weight, as it seems, of adverse or at least sceptical opinion, should not have produced their strongest evidence. Christ Himself had ascended and could no longer appear in the flesh; but almost certainly there were others still alive who had risen from the dead. Three persons had been raised by Christ's own hand: the ruler's daughter, the widow's son, and Lazarus. St. Paul himself had raised Dorcas still more recently. Must we assume that each of these four had died again before their evidence, which should surely have proved convincing even to the sceptical, could be produced before these doubting crowds? They must have been notable witnesses of the truth of Christianity, and notable far beyond their own community; yet it is not anywhere recorded that any use was made of them. But even if these four had descended into the tomb and been forgotten by all but the true believers, there were others whose

* Matt. xxviii. 13-15. † Acts xvii. 32.
‡ Specifically admitted in 1 Cor. i. 26.

evidence, at least to the Jews, should have proved conclusive. At the crucifixion, the tombs of Jerusalem ' were opened, and ' many bodies of the saints that had fallen asleep were raised, ' and coming forth out of the tombs they entered into the ' holy city and appeared unto many.'* This event, so amazing in itself that it would seem as though it must have overshadowed even the popular excitement caused by the trial and crucifixion of Christ, cannot fail to have been eagerly discussed in Jerusalem, if only for the reason that it refuted for ever the arguments of the great sect of the Sadducees. The risen saints must have attracted attention ; indeed, the wording of the narrative implies that they sought rather than shunned the public gaze. The evidence of one of those risen saints would have proved the doctrine of immortality for St. Paul against the whole world of doubt ; are we, then, to assume, what is not even hinted in the text, that these also had all returned to their tombs ? Even if they had, the evidence of some who had seen them on that amazing day must have been available to confute the sceptic and confirm the doubtful. But it was not produced. Its very existence was not even alluded to.

But an examination of these stupendous miracles raises further questions. In both the Old and the New Testaments the dead are raised to life ; in every instance the fact is related with an astonishing economy of detail, with less detail indeed than some trivial occurrence of everyday existence is narrated by the same writer. Elijah restores life to the child of the woman with whom he lodges ; the mother thanks the prophet as a man of God, but nothing more.† The ruler's daughter raised by Christ before a jeering but finally convicted crowd is merely recorded to have walked and eaten. Of Lazarus no details whatever are given. Of the widow's son at Nain, we are told that he spoke after he was restored to life ; but the words he spoke, which would have been more precious than any human utterance as evidence of the state of the dead, are passed over in silence. Had they been recorded, we should at least have known whether the soul retains its consciousness after its separation from the body.

' If they believe not Moses and the prophets,' said Christ, ' neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the

* Matt. xxvii. 52-3.

† 1 Kings xvii. 21.

'dead.' Several rose from the dead, but it does not appear that their testimony was used to persuade, or even to inform, the living of the conditions that awaited them. But it must be admitted that this difficulty seems not to have been felt at the time, or for long afterwards—for the early Church contains numerous records of raising from the dead, but none of any communication made by them, as to the condition of the departed. The power to raise the dead was in fact so common that it was not confined to the orthodox, but was also triumphantly exercised by those whose subsequent defeat and discredit has since branded them as heretics or schismatics.*

It would seem that the prevalent theory among the early Christians was that death entailed a simple suspension of consciousness, a dreamless sleep from which all men should be awakened when 'the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven 'with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the 'trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first.' If that were so, the dead would have nothing to reveal.

But this theory of a suspension of consciousness† slowly faded and ultimately vanished. Reasonable as it seemed when the day of judgment was impatiently attended as an immediate probability, to be confidently awaited by some of those who were even then in the flesh, it must have become increasingly difficult to hold as one generation after another passed into the unknown and the return of Christ was delayed. The theory was insensibly modified to suit the necessity of the case: in place of the dreamless sleep in which Christian and pagan alike awaited the final audit of their deeds and the apportionment of eternal bliss or punishment, arose the theory of immediate judgment at the very hour of death, and the existence of a heaven and hell and purgatory as the present destiny of departed souls.

---

* The heretical miracles were sometimes admitted by the orthodox. A later age may perhaps exercise the dispensing power allowed by a Catholic bishop to no less a person than Cardinal Newman, who was advised that the *less authenticated* miracles, 'those which a writer introduces when 'he wishes to make a work as full as possible, should be pruned down.'—'Life of Cardinal Newman.'

† It derives some support from the popular fable of the seven sleepers, who were ignorant of the passage of time when they woke in their cave.

No serious difficulty seems to have marked the gradual transition. Heaven and hell could easily be justified from scripture; the existence of purgatory was more dubiously supported by the sacred text. But it may be suspected that purgatory was evolved as a practical necessity—the obvious unfitness of most men for an immediate entry into paradise, the not less evident injustice of condemning men to eternal torture for trivial offences, or of postulating a merciful or even a just God from these premises. The medieval philosophy which this view enshrined reached its final and indeed its flawless perfection in the *Divine Comedy*; but many centuries earlier the legends of saints appearing to men in dreams, and of their hearing and forwarding the petitions of their votaries on earth, show that popular theology had definitely abandoned the theory of a dreamless sleep of the dead.

The theory then was modified to suit the facts, but the Reformation again modified the theory. The existence of purgatory, which might well have seemed the most probable continent in the whole celestial geography, was denied;* and prayers for the dead were necessarily forbidden, since petitions for those in hell were unavailing, for those in heaven superfluous. But it was still held, at least in the Church of England, that judgment was immediate, and that instant reward or punishment awaited the soul of the departed. 'Almighty God, with Whom do live the spirits of them 'that depart hence in the Lord, and with whom the souls of 'the faithful after they are delivered from the burden of the 'flesh, are in joy and felicity,' is the precise language of the burial service; scarcely less definite are the words of the petition for a sick child or for the dying, in the office for the visitation of the sick.†

---

* 'A fond thing vainly invented.'—Article xxii. of the Church of England.

† The Collect in the Burial Service, however, rather implies suspension of judgment.

Popular hymnology, as might be expected, is more vague. The well-known hymn, 'Now the labourer's task is o'er,' echoes the primitive theory:

'Father, in Thy gracious keeping,
Leave we now Thy servant sleeping,'

but another runs:

'Ah, Lord Jesu, grant that we
There may live where it is living.

But apart from this brief intimation, the reformed churches generally preserve a decent reticence before the profound mysteries of death and judgment. When the sacred writers themselves leave the condition of the departed obscure, and the veil that separates the living from the dead is not withdrawn, the legends and traditions, and the whole body of beliefs that had grown up in a thousand years of the Catholic Church, were abandoned by the reformers. The grave reticence of Protestant divines, however, could not change human nature or deaden human curiosity. The people still shuddered over ghosts, unquiet spirits were said to walk the earth, the suicide had a stake driven through his body to pin him to the spot. These things could be dismissed by theologians as the fancies of the ignorant, but they survived.

But although the theory was modified from time to time, the essential doctrine of the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul, which appeared incredible to so many who heard the preaching of the apostles, triumphed; nor has there been any greater or completer triumph of an idea in the whole history of the world. Whether it would have triumphed so completely had St. Paul not put it in the very forefront of his teaching, had he not made it the basis of his whole position and stated his case with a nobility of phrase and a majesty of argument which none can ever read unmoved, is a question that can never be answered. But the triumph was complete and absolute. In all the long history of the Christian heresies, which have disputed every article of faith from the incomprehensible Trinitarian controversy to the inconclusive debates on predestination, there is but one doctrine that has never been denied or disputed by any body of Christians—the belief in personal immortality.* The first Epistle to the Corinthians fixed that doctrine in perpetuity† To this day it remains the central fact of Christian belief,‡

* Gibbon cites one obscure bishop, Synesius of Ptolemais, who denied the resurrection and therefore the keystone of the Pauline argument for immortality. He must have been *contra mundum*—at least in those days.

† There were still doubters when the epistle was written: cf. 1 Cor. xv. 12.

‡ Although all creeds were free in More's 'Utopia,' those who denied the immortality of the soul were excluded from public office, because their opinion was held to be degrading to mankind,

and it is equally accepted by Mohammedan theology.* So completely has the doctrine of human immortality triumphed, indeed, that it seems natural to us to desire it and assume its existence as certainly promised if not demonstrably proved. But large numbers of mankind have lived not unhappily and died bravely without that hope; even with that hope it seems conceivable that our attitude may partly depend on the normal length of human life. If all men died at twenty-five, when the faculties and physique are ripening, but real achievement has not yet begun, then the problem of immortality would become the most pressing in existence after the immediate provision of food and raiment was assured, since so long an apprenticeship for mere annihilation would be intolerable without the firm conviction of another life. If, on the other hand, our normal span were lengthened to the alleged age of the patriarchs,† it is at least possible that many would be glad when the day's long task was over,‡ while if the fantastic dream of Condorcet were ever

---

and therefore to incapacitate them from governing in a noble temper. It is curious that this point was not cited in the Bradlaugh controversy in parliament; probably none of his opponents had ever read 'Utopia.'

But the belief in immortality was rendered compulsory in England by a sturdier House of Commons. A statute of the Long Parliament enacted that anyone who denied the resurrection of the body should suffer the pain of death. It seems a particularly incongruous penalty in this connection.

* Islam postulates a paradise, a series of descending hells, a period of expiation for repentant sinners varying from 900 to 7,000 years, and the reunion of soul and body on the day of judgment; notwithstanding the vulgar belief, it affirms that women possess souls.

† It is not always realized exactly what this would mean. If men lived as long as Adam or Methuselah, the protracted and, we may hope, prosperous but necessarily varied reign of King Canute would have been drawing to an end about the time when the Parliament Act came up for his signature.

‡ Even the present limits have been sufficient for many, and those not always men whose lives had failed of purpose or success. Lecky declared in the 'Map of Life' that the normal span of years was long enough; while Gladstone, when some one assured him in his last year that he would live another ten, answered gravely, 'I trust that God in His mercy will spare me that.' Gladstone had a firm belief in immortality, but few men have ever lived the

realized, and mortals attained immortality on our own planet, we should, perhaps, revolt from the terrible achievement, and the healthy pray for death as earnestly as the sick now pray for life.

But unfortunately the obscurity in which orthodox Christianity has left the actual condition of the dead has had unhappy consequences. In the Middle Ages it produced a thousand superstitions, many of them beautiful, some not yet wholly exorcised—even Huxley, whose familiar attitude to life was the calm acquiescence of a Prospero, could confess a momentary 'terror of that which may appear when the fictitious 'veil of Isis, the thick web of fiction man has woven round 'nature is stripped off.' And in our own day, scarcely less credulous than the Dark Ages—for a generation which has believed in the Angels of Mons on the strength of an acknowledged fiction in an evening newspaper can hardly plume itself on its critical attitude towards evidence*—this obscurity has led directly to spiritualism and its allied follies or rogueries, and men of science as well as the clergy have dallied with the dangerous mistress.†

These extravagancies, no doubt, will pass with the occasion which gave rise to them. When life again becomes normal and secure, when the poignant sorrow of those bereaved by the war is healed by the slow passage of time or the kindly call of death, the emotions which have given spiritualism its current vogue will lessen and the vogue itself will die, leaving behind merely another curious chapter in the history of human mentality, like the beliefs in demonology and witchcraft and other similar persuasions. But the cardinal mystery will remain.

---

present life with keener zest; yet before ninety he wished it ended. It must be remembered that he suffered acute physical pain at the close, and prolonged agony would probably reconcile most men to death, even to annihilation.

* The widespread belief that Lord Kitchener is not dead might also be adduced to show that we are not far removed from the Middle Ages, which believed in the return of Arthur and Barbarossa. No such belief arose after the death of Cromwell or Napoleon; the Puritans and the Grand Army were less credulous.

† Sir William Barrett, for instance, in 'The Threshold of the Unseen,' is half inclined to believe in the existence of demons and malignant spirits who personate the dead, enter the bodies of the living, and even influence the regular order of nature and evolution.

Christianity in any case can do no more—its revelation is complete and final, and for most people, save at a time of extraordinary emotional stress like the present, it has proved an adequate comfort in affliction. We can look for no further message from that source, for the theory which Newman expounded, of a progressive evolution of Christian doctrine, will hardly commend itself to the thoughtful.* The psychic 'science' of the day, with its table-rappings, its mediums, its fragmentary and childish conversations which insult the living no less than the dead, merely repel and disgust. But it is possible that another way than this may open—a road that promises no speedy end to the urgent explorer, a road neither short nor easy, a path which is still thickly beset with the thorns and brambles of human prejudice and ignorance, but nevertheless a road which may yet lead us nearer to the goal, whatever the goal may be, than the limited revelation of religion or the will-o'-the wisp of modern psychic practice. If such a road there be, we are bound to follow it patiently.

It is a road which starts from the purely material conception of modern biology. But it does not necessarily end there. The naturalist, who looks with invincible distrust on the phenomena of spiritualism—a distrust which is not lessened by the frequent exposures of its agents—would state the case for or against human survival after death (for his attitude is that of 'not proven' rather than of blank denial) from a different angle altogether. It is not a popular case, for it runs counter to the opinion of the vast majority of mankind; and it is perhaps no great recommendation that it would be supported, in its opening if not necessarily in its argument, by a few philosophical schools now mostly extinct and forgotten. But such as it is the case must be stated.

The naturalist, then, is tempted at the start to doubt the current theory not only of the resurrection of the body, but of the spirit. He dismisses entirely the evidence of psychic

* Perhaps the best comment on Newman's theory of an evolution of Christian doctrine is his own unconscious refutation of it: 'An old saying, imputed to Monsignor Talbot, that what made the definition of the Immaculate Conception so desirable and important was that it opened the door to the Pope's Infallibility.' To which may be added his further remark in another connection: 'There are truths which are inexpedient.' He seems to have forgotten the motto of his own University at that moment.

research as inadequate, and so far very many will go with him. But he also regards the arguments of St. Paul as devoid of scientific substance or proof; and here Christendom will indignantly part company with him, and Islam will likewise cast him forth. It is no matter. To the argument that what every creed has always taught must be true the naturalist will answer that not every creed has always taught this belief, and retort Ecclesiastes upon his opponents; and to the argument, if it is an argument, that what the vast majority of mankind have always believed must be true, the naturalist will answer that the vast majority of mankind have always believed, and perhaps still believe, that the sun goes round the earth. The belief in human immortality to him rests, for the moment, on the same basis.

Other difficulties face him on the very threshold of the enquiry. The birth-rate of a country depends very largely on economic conditions, and the food of the people. A young country usually produces more children per marriage than an old, an agricultural community more children than an urban, an industrial community (particularly when there is a demand for child-labour) than a professional community. A high birth-rate is almost invariably coincident with a high death-rate; the laws of supply and demand come into being in this as in other matters, and where human life is abundant it is cheap. An extremely high birth-rate by no means implies a rapid increase of population.

These things are clear and demonstrable, the familiar counters of political economy, of statistics, and of social science. Man increases or diminishes like any other animal; he draws his sustenance from the same soil, and if the soil fails him he starves like a dog. If man is regarded merely as a superior animal, as a thing that has its day and perishes and is forgotten, these things are natural and explicable. But if we look at man as the possessor of an immortal soul, the question becomes more difficult. For it would commit us to the grotesque proposition that the number of immortal souls successively appearing in the world, and consequently the population of heaven and hell, depends ultimately not on the will of a beneficent deity, but on such trivial factors as the substitution of arable for pasture, of cotton-spinning for arable, or the success or failure of a main drainage scheme.

Normally, man breeds beyond the level of subsistence, but the amount of available subsistence depends very largely on his intelligence. The low level of intellect among the Australian aborigines kept those tribes down to very meagre numbers. Unable to cultivate a fertile soil, a few thousands lived sparsely in a country which would have supplied millions in plenty; but even those few found their numbers excessive, and an elaborate series of checks on increasing population were devised. Other methods were adopted elsewhere. In the easy life of the South Sea Islands, inhabited by a far more intelligent race than the aboriginal Australians, the population also increased beyond the level of subsistence, and continual attempts were made to redress the balance by emigration and war, the historic constructive and destructive remedies for overcrowding. But these obviously proved inadequate, since abortion and child-murder were practised wholesale. The first Christian missionaries who visited Polynesia were horrified at these customs, and did their utmost to discourage an economic remedy that had become a regular part of the social code. They preached with some success, and no doubt their exhortations helped to raise the people to a higher level of morality, and awoke in them a consciousness of the waste and cruelty of their method; but it must be admitted that the advent of the white trader and the consequent introduction of tuberculosis and syphilis among a healthy stock, effectively, if undesignedly, seconded the missionary propaganda by diminishing the population, and thus abolishing the need for these abhorrent devices. The net advantage of the change is scarcely manifest, since a whole stock was weakened in place of some of its units being destroyed.

The same problem has arisen in very many countries. Prevention or child-exposure has been widely allowed, or at least tolerated, as a preferable alternative to famine; it was advocated by Plato in ancient Greece, and the indifference shown until recently by public opinion in England at the appalling infantile death-rate is an indication that the same doctrine was tacitly accepted in another form by the industrial civilization of the nineteenth century.

This attitude is explicable, if we regard man like any other animal, subject to the same conditions of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. From the standpoint of

absolute materialism, it is as natural that the children of human beings should be destroyed when they are too numerous as that blind kittens should be drowned in a pail because the cat is too fertile of offspring which are consumers but not producers of food. But when we look at the problem from the psychic instead of the physical standpoint, it assumes a different aspect; for it is to be presumed that it is not only the survivors who possess immortal souls.

A parallel difficulty may be noted. To the biologist war is not always, or even often, a political issue in all its aspects; it is a struggle for survival by the elimination or defeat of an opponent, a contest between rival peoples for the mastery, such as is familiar throughout nature both in the animal and vegetable world. The present war may be politically a struggle between democracy and militarism. But the man of science is inclined to suggest that that is a mere accident of the issue, a convenient and popular phrase of current statecraft. For himself, he will seek its origin in another source—the fact that the rapidly-increasing population of Germany sought a redistribution of the world's soil at the expense of the stationary population of France, while it was itself frightened at the (apparently) still more rapid increase of the rival Slavonic populations. And it is at least curious in this connection that the one Power whose attitude was hesitating and dubious at the outset of the crisis was England, whose excess population migrated elsewhere than to the Continent, and therefore did not increase the struggle for existence in Europe.

But, again, when we transfer the problem from its physical or political to the psychic plane it seems an intolerable conclusion that millions of souls should be violently stripped of their garment of flesh before their time, and millions more should be prevented from being born at all because a shot is fired in an obscure village in the Balkans.

The glory and sacrifice of death in battle, the tragic triumph of humanity, have always and will always move our emotions. We are accustomed to death as an occasional intruder in our homes. We have coined the term of 'natural death' for the normal end of man, and our physicians have somewhat robbed the King of Terrors of his pains—they cannot indeed refuse him entrance when he comes, but a little syringe and the merciful poppy may ease the exit of his chosen companion.

But this death is different in quality from the violent and untimely end of the battle-field; it is as sleep to a dreadful nightmare.

One sees a mere boy go over the parapet, one moment full of life—a perfect animal endowed with generous soul—and the next moment perhaps he is still; a little piece of metal, propelled from a tube held in the hand of another perfect animal, has wrecked that complicated mechanism in an instant, torn its flesh, shattered its bone, spilt its blood upon the earth. But where is the soul which animated that mechanism? Our whole being revolts from the thought that the light we loved is extinguished with no more ceremony than a guttering candle in a breeze. The body remains, jagged and mutilated, for a space; it is surely asking too much to ask us to believe that the soul, what seemed the very essence of the man, has vanished utterly. It is the cutting off of young life that fortifies our belief in a hereafter; on this torn soil of sorrow and affliction the psychic seer sows his tares, and we hug the thistles he produces as rare and precious flowers. Perhaps the gods smile gently at our frailty.

But let us consider the alternative. If that stray bullet had not disturbed those balanced chemical proportions, if that youth had lived, he would in time have died. In fifty, sixty, seventy years at the most, slow·time would nearly have accomplished what a fragment of lead has achieved in one bare instant. But time would have done more, for the brain would have grown and worn with the body, and might in the end have perished before the body. Could we then so hopefully have postulated that this decayed, enfeebled thing which achieves its utmost triumphs and is so demonstrably exhausted in a mere fraction of time—a fraction which even to a tortoise or an oak must seem puny—could we have postulated that this outworn organism would live for ever? It seems a large assumption.

Such are some of the more obvious objections to the current doctrine of human immortality which beset the naturalist at the outset of his enquiry. They are difficult but not insuperable obstacles, and they lead directly to the fundamental divergence between cautious science and confident theology on this grave matter. Theology presents us with conclusions, science insists on the investigation of origins; and the

distinction between the new method and the old is profound and permanent.* Theology informs us whither the human soul is bound; science would prefer to investigate whence it came as a preliminary. It is at least possible that we attack this problem from the wrong end when we regard immortality as a mere pendant of death.

Four several opinions have been maintained as to the origin of the human soul: (1) That it is propagated directly from Adam, who contained within himself the mental as well as the physical germ of all humanity. (2) That it is eternal and divine. (3) That it is separately created before its union with the body. (4) That it is separately created, or coincidently formed, at the moment of conception. The first may be disregarded, the existence and consequently the paternity of Adam having been now regretfully discredited by his most respectable theological descendants. The second seems by sheer logic a more acceptable theory, since it is more probable that that which is to survive for all time should have existed for all time than that it should have a finite beginning, as is implied in the third and fourth opinions. That which existed before birth can be most easily supposed to survive death. But all three opinions have to be tested by the facts, after the traditional manner of science. If the hypothesis does not square with the facts, and the facts are unchallengeable, then the hypothesis, however beautiful and ennobling, must be modified or abandoned.

An illustration may therefore be given of the facts when confronted by the theory. A hundred odd years ago three children were born, or, rather, out of the hundreds of children who are born every hour we may distinguish three children from the rest. The first was the son of a respectable London banker in Old Broad Street, the second of a reputable country doctor in Shrewsbury, the third was of obscure parentage. The first and second became men of singularly acute reasoning

* Only on the hazardous bogs of predestination and free-will, where the theologian trembles, does the man of science walk more firmly. To him the argument about free-will is idle, since we have none of us free-will even to decide our sex; and the doctrine of predestination appears merely as an extension of the demonstrable truth (which nevertheless revolts the socialist theory of the day) that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children. It is a short moral summary of a problem of heredity.

powers; the third was, unfortunately, an idiot. The first and second showed in some respects marked likeness of mind, coupled with a weakness of body that did not, nevertheless, deny them both a life beyond the normal span. Both studied the principles of human development deeply; both possessed in superlative degree the faculty of observation, allied with a slowness that seemed almost a timidity in coming to a conclusion, and a firmness in holding it when formed against all criticism and clamour, which first astonished and then impressed their fellows. The name of the London banker's son was John Henry Newman; the name of the Shrewsbury doctor's son was Charles Darwin; the idiot's name does not matter, since he lived and died unknown. The two first were both investigating the problems of growth in the same years; both saw miracles—the one a liquefaction of the blood of a saint of the Church, the other a transmutation of a whole species; each produced a great work on development, the one of Christian doctrine, the other of the natural world. Had there been a slightly different direction of their faculties, had the doctor's son studied the fathers of the Church, or the banker's son gone round the world on the *Beagle*, it is conceivable that Newman might have written the 'Origin of Species' and Darwin the 'Development of Christian Doctrine.'

The three men lived and died, two of them famous and revered, the third a gibbering sot. Whence came these men, two of them the ornaments of their kind, the third our shame? The mercenary air of Old Broad Street produced a prince of the Church, the pleasant provincial town a prince of Science, the accident of birth, or the negligence of a physician, a wretched idiot who, but for an unhappy combination of parentage or some unknown chance, might have rivalled either or both his contemporaries. Why? We do not know enough even to guess.

Had Darwin an immortal soul, created before, at, or after conception? That profound and patient intellect, which revolutionized our theory of life, considered the matter deeply and answered with his natural humility that he did not know. And Newman? The faith he won through the struggle of years at least never wavered in that; and all who have read that great man's writings must admit that if ever human flesh incarnated an immortal spirit, then the flesh which was

John Henry Newman contained that eternal essence. And the idiot? Instinctively one shudders, and rejects the theory that a being which could not speak a consecutive sentence, or clothe itself with decency, or feed itself unaided, should hold within its loathsome prison the priceless guerdon of immortality.

Yet we know that an accident at birth, which the helpless infant could neither have foreseen or prevented, might have made an idiot of Newman, as an accident of physique slew John Keats at twenty-five and spared the preposterous Martin Tupper to a ripe old age. Is personal immortality then dependent on an accident at birth? Reason rejects so melancholy a conclusion, yet reason must admit that the accidental presence of a tubercular germ on a susceptible soil killed poetry, which in the lower human sense of the word would have been immortal in John Keats. If premature or accidental death may destroy on the one hand, may not premature or accidental birth destroy on the other?

Are unborn children then immortal? The question seems absurd, yet on the chance meeting of a man and woman and all that it entails must depend in the last resort the condition if not the existence of the spirit world. For if no men and women ever met, if men lived in one hemisphere and women in another, not merely our immortality above but the continuance of our mortal existence below would depend on an accident of navigation. Within a century the race would be extinct; in fifty years its power of reproduction gone.

The hypothesis is absurd, the conclusion ridiculous. Yet the doctrine of personal immortality as well as the current theories of the origin of the soul seem to depend upon it. What is it but a minor accident, of navigation if one will, that brings men and women together? On a series of further accidents may depend the number of their children. Our statisticians compute the number of lost births on a falling birth-rate, but our theologians are silent on the ulterior implications of those facts. Are we each of us the accident of an accident? One chance step a hundred generations back and our lives had been different, perhaps had not been at all. Are we sure that we are even such stuff as dreams are made of?

We cannot say until we know more of the making of this 'foolish-compounded-clay.' Of the heredity of the lower

animals and plants we know relatively much; of the heredity of the human family certainly very little. Yet without this knowledge we cannot expect to investigate the problem of human personality or of human origins with any success; nor, until we have that knowledge, can we demand or expect to add or substitute a strictly scientific proof to the religious doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

It is conceivable that that proof may eventually be given with the certitude and precision of a mathematical demonstration. If, as is probable, our still infant science remains for long baffled by its ignorance of what are as yet impenetrable mysteries—among which the question of human immortality, so considerable an issue to one small species on one small planet in one of the minor solar systems, is by no means necessarily the gravest or most difficult problem to be faced—we have still the robust conviction that this life, with all its evils, is for most people well worth living for itself, and perhaps not least worth living to those who occupy themselves with these enquiries. And if, as may be, the progress of science should in the end confirm the longing for survival after death, it would place the faith of many on a securer basis than now seems possible for man to hold; while it might in time—although of this prospect one cannot but be far more doubtful—even restore some measure of conviction to those recent theologians who find the New Testament at best an unsatisfactory collection of documents, and who, having now abolished hell as well as purgatory,* will probably proceed to investigate the promise of paradise with equally devastating results. If it should ever indeed be the fate of science to revitalize our fainting theologians with the first principles they have now tremblingly abandoned, the outraged shade of Galileo might perhaps smile ironically at the poetic justice of the revenge.

A. Wyatt Tilby.

---

* 'The New Testament is ambiguous and not always consistent. It does not always give us all we want. . . . It is probably safe to say that except in a few restricted circles a living belief in hell has practically vanished to-day in the Church of England.'—The Rev. C. W. Emmett, in the series of essays edited by Canon Streeter on 'Immortality.' One had not realized before that hell, like parliamentary government, depended on a democratic majority.

MR. HARDY'S LYRICAL POEMS

1. **Wessex Poems and Other Verses.** Harper & Brothers. 1898.
2. **Poems of the Past and the Present.** Harper & Brothers. 1902.
3. **The Dynasts. A Drama of the Napoleonic Wars.** In three Parts. Macmillan. 1904-1908.
4. **Time's Laughingstocks and Other Verses.** Macmillan. 1909.
5. **Satires of Circumstance. Lyrics and Reviews.** Macmillan. 1914.
6. **Moments of Vision and Miscellaneous Verses.** Macmillan. 1918.
7. **Selected Poems of Thomas Hardy** (Golden Treasury Series). Macmillan. 1916.

WHEN, about Christmas time in 1898, Mr. Hardy's admirers, who were expecting from him a new novel, received instead a thick volume of verse, there was mingled with their sympathy and respect a little disappointment and a great failure in apprehension. Those who were not rude enough to suggest that a cobbler should stick to his last, reminded one another that many novelists had sought relaxation by trifling with the Muses. Thackeray had published 'Ballads,' and George Eliot had expatiated in a 'Legend of Jubal.' No one thought the worse of 'Coningsby' because its author had produced a 'Revolutionary Epic.' It took some time for even intelligent criticism to see that the new 'Wessex Poems' did not fall into this accidental category, and still, after twenty years, there survives a tendency to take the verse of Mr. Hardy, abundant and solid as it has become, as a mere subsidiary and ornamental appendage to his novels. It is still necessary to insist on the complete independence of his career as a poet, and to point out that if he had never published a page of prose he would deserve to rank high among the writers of his country on the score of the eight volumes of his verse. It is as a lyrical poet, and solely as a lyrical poet, that we propose to speak of him to-day.

It has been thought extraordinary that Cowper was over fifty when he published his first secular verses, but Mr. Hardy

was approaching his sixtieth year when he sent 'Wessex 'Poems' to the press. Such self-restraint—'none hath by 'more studious ways endeavoured, and with more unwearied 'spirit none shall'—has always fascinated the genuine artist, but few have practised it with so much tenacity. When the work of Mr. Hardy is completed, nothing, it is probable, will more strike posterity than its unity, its consistency. He has given proof, as scarce any other modern writer has done, of tireless constancy of resolve. His novels formed an unbroken series from the 'Desperate Remedies' of 1871 to 'The Well-Beloved' of 1897. In the fullness of his success, and unseduced by all temptation, he closed that chapter of his career, and has kept it closed. Since 1898 he has been, persistently and periodically, a poet and nothing else. That he determined, for reasons best left to his own judgment, to defer the exhibition of his verse until he had completed his work in prose, ought not to prejudice criticism in its analysis of the lyrics and the colossal dramatic panorama. Mr. Hardy, exclusively as a poet, demands our undivided attention.

It is legitimate to speculate on other probable causes of Mr. Hardy's delay. From such information as lies scattered before us, we gather that it was from 1865 to 1867 that he originally took poetry to be his vocation. The dated pieces in the volume of 1898 help us to form an idea of the original character of his utterance. On the whole it was very much what it remains in the pieces composed after a lapse of half a century. Already, as a very young man, Mr. Hardy possessed his extraordinary insight into the movements of human character, and his eloquence in translating what he had observed of the tragedy and pain of rustic lives. No one, for sixty years, had taken so closely to heart the admonitions of Wordsworth in his famous Preface to the 1800 edition of 'Lyrical Ballads' to seek for inspiration in that condition where 'the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful 'forms of nature.' But it may well be doubted whether his poems would have been received in the mid-Victorian age with favour, or even have been comprehended. Fifty years ahead of his time, Mr. Hardy was asking in 1866 for novelty of ideas, and he must have been conscious that his questioning would seem inopportune. He needed a different atmosphere, and he left the task of revolt to another, and, at first sight, a

very unrelated force, that of the 'Poems and Ballads' of the same year. But Swinburne succeeded in his revolution, and although he approached the art from an opposite direction, he prepared the way for an ultimate appreciation of Mr. Hardy.

We should therefore regard the latter, in spite of his silence of forty years, as a poet who laboured, like Swinburne, at a revolution against the optimism and superficial sweetness of his age. Swinburne, it is true, tended to accentuate the poetic side of poetry, while Mr. Hardy drew verse, in some verbal respects, nearer to prose. This does not affect their common attitude, and the sympathy of these great artists for one another's work has already been revealed, and will be still more clearly exposed. But they were unknown to each other in 1866, when to both of them the cheap philosophy of the moment, the glittering femininity of the 'jewelled line,' the intense respect for Mrs. Grundy in her Sunday satin, appeared trumpery, hateful, and to be trampled upon. We find in Mr. Hardy's earliest verse no echo of the passionate belief in personal immortality which was professed by Ruskin and Browning. He opposed the Victorian theory of human 'progress'; the Tennysonian beatific Vision seemed to him ridiculous. He rejected the idea of the sympathy and goodness of Nature, and was in revolt against the self-centredness of the Romantics. We may conjecture that he combined a great reverence for 'The Book of Job' with a considerable contempt for 'In Memoriam.'

This was not a mere rebellious fancy which passed off; it was something inherent that remained, and gives to-day their peculiar character to Mr. Hardy's latest lyrics. But before we examine the features of this personal mode of interpreting poetry to the world, we may collect what little light we can on the historic development of it. In the pieces dated between 1865 and 1867 we find the germ of almost everything which has since characterized the poet. In 'Amabel' the ruinous passage of years, which has continued to be an obsession with Mr. Hardy, is already crudely dealt with. The habit of taking poetical negatives of small scenes —'your face, and the God-curst sun, and a tree, and a pond 'edged with grayish leaves' ('Neutral Times')—which had not

existed in English verse since the days of Crabbe, reappears. There is marked already a sense of terror and resentment against the blind motions of chance—in 'Hap' the author would positively welcome a certainty of divine hatred as a relief from the strain of depending upon 'crass casualty.' Here and there in these earliest pieces an extreme difficulty of utterance is remarkable in the face of the ease which the poet attained afterwards in the expression of his most strange images and fantastic revelations. We read in 'At a Bridal':

> 'Should I, too, wed as slave to Mode's decree,
> And each thus found apart, of false desire
> A stolid line, whom no high aims will fire
> As had fired ours could ever have mingled we!'

This, although perfectly reducible, takes time to think out, and at a hasty glance seems muffled up in obscurity beyond the darkness of Donne; moreover, it is scarcely worthy in form of the virtuoso which Mr. Hardy was presently to become. Perhaps of the poems certainly attributable to this earliest period, the little cycle of sonnets called 'She to Him' gives clearest promise of what was coming. The sentiment is that of Ronsard's famous 'Quand vous serez bien vieille, au soir, à la chandelle,' but turned round, as Mr. Hardy loves to do, from the man to the woman, and embroidered with ingenuities, such as where the latter says that as her temperament dies down the habit of loving will remain, and she be

> 'Numb as a vane that cankers on its point,
> True to the wind that kissed ere canker came,'

which attest a complexity of mind that Ronsard's society knew nothing of.

On the whole, we may perhaps be safe in conjecturing that, whatever the cause, the definite dedication to verse was now postponed. Meanwhile, the writing of novels had become the business of Mr. Hardy's life, and ten years go by before we trace a poet in that life again. But it is interesting to find that when the great success of 'Far from the Madding Crowd' had introduced him to a circle of the best readers, there followed an effect which again disturbed his ambition

for the moment. Mr. Hardy was once more tempted to change the form of his work. He wished 'to get back to verse,' but was dissuaded by Leslie Stephen, who induced him to start writing 'The Return of the Native' instead. On the 29th of March, 1875, Coventry Patmore, then a complete stranger, wrote to express his regret that 'such almost 'unequalled beauty and power as appeared in the novels 'should not have assured themselves the immortality which 'would have been conferred upon them by the form of verse.' This was just at the moment when we find Mr. Hardy's conversations with 'long Leslie Stephen in the velveteen coat' obstinately turning upon 'theologies decayed and defunct, 'the origin of things, the constitution of matter, and the 'unreality of time.' To this period belongs also the earliest conception of 'The Dynasts,' an old note-book containing, under the date June 20th, 1875, the suggestion that the author should attempt 'An Iliad of Europe from 1789 to 1815.'

To this time also seems to belong the execution of what has proved the most attractive section of Mr. Hardy's poetry, the narratives, or short Wessex ballads. The method in which these came into the world is very curious. Many of these stories were jotted down to the extent of a stanza or two when the subject first occurred to the author. For instance, 'The 'Fire at Tranter Sweatley's,' first published by Lionel Johnson in 1894, had been begun as early as 1867, and was finished ten years later. The long ballad of 'Leipzig' and the savage 'San Sebastian,' both highly characteristic, were also conceived and a few lines of each noted down long before their completion. 'Valenciennes,' however, belongs to 1878, and the 'Dance at 'the Phœnix,' of which the stanza beginning 'Twas Christmas' alone had been written years before, seems to have been finished about the same time. What evidence is before us goes to prove that in the 'seventies Mr. Hardy became a complete master of the art of verse, and that his poetic style was by this time fixed. He still kept poetry out of public sight, but he wrote during the next twenty years, as though in a backwater off the stream of his novels, the poems which form the greater part of the volume of 1898. If no other collection of his lyrical verse existed, we should miss a multitude of fine things, but our general conception of his genius would be little modified.

We should judge carelessly, however, if we treated the subsequent volumes as mere repetitions of the original 'Wessex 'Poems.' They present interesting differences, which we may rapidly note before we touch on the features which characterize the whole body of Mr. Hardy's verse. 'Poems of 'the Past and Present,' which came out in the first days of 1902, could not but be in a certain measure disappointing, in so far as it paralleled its three years' product with that of the thirty years of 'Wessex Poems.' Old pieces were published in it, and it was obvious that in 1898 Mr. Hardy might be expected to have chosen from what used to be called his 'portfolio' those specimens which he thought to be most attractive. But on further inspection this did not prove to be quite the case. After pondering for twelve years on the era of Napoleon, his preoccupation began in 1887 to drive him into song:

> 'Must I pipe a palinody,
> Or be silent thereupon?'

He decides that silence has become impossible:

> 'Nay; I'll sing "The Bridge of Lodi"—
> That long-loved, romantic thing,
> Though none show by smile or nod, he
> Guesses why and what I sing!'

Here is the germ of 'The Dynasts.' But in the meantime the crisis of the Boer War had cut across the poet's dream of Europe a hundred years ago, and a group of records of the Dorsetshire elements of the British army at the close of 1899 showed us in Mr. Hardy's poetry what had not been suspected there—a military talent of a most remarkable kind. Another set of pieces composed in Rome were not so interesting; Mr. Hardy always seems a little languid when he leaves the confines of his native Wessex. Another section of 'Poems of 'the Past and Present' is severely, almost didactically, metaphysical, and expands in varied language the daring thought, so constantly present in Mr. Hardy's reverie, that God Himself has forgotten the existence of earth, this 'tiny sphere,' this 'tainted ball,' 'so poor a thing,' and has left all human life to be the plaything of blind chance. This sad conviction

is hardly ruffled by 'The Darkling Thrush,' which goes as far towards optimism as Mr. Hardy can let himself be drawn, or by such reflections as those in 'On a Fine Morning':

> 'Whence comes Solace? Not from seeing
> What is doing, suffering, being;
> Not from noting Life's conditions,
> Not from heeding Time's monitions;
> But in cleaving to the Dream,
> And in gazing on the gleam
> Whereby gray things golden seem.'

Eight years more passed, years marked by the stupendous effort of 'The Dynasts,' before Mr. Hardy put forth another collection of lyrical poems. 'Time's Laughingstocks' confirmed, and more than confirmed, the high promise of 'Wessex Poems.' The author, in one of his modest prefaces, where he seems to whisper while we bend forward in our anxiety not to miss one thrifty sentence, expresses the hope that 'Time's Laughingstocks' will, as a whole, take the 'reader forward, even if not far, rather than backward.' The book, indeed, does not take us 'far' forward, simply because the writer's style and scope were definitely exposed to us already, and yet it does take us 'forward,' because the hand of the master is conspicuously firmer and his touch more daring. The 'Laughingstocks' themselves are fifteen in number, tragical stories of division and isolation, of failures in passion, of the treason of physical decay. No landscape of Mr. Hardy's had been more vivid than the night-pictures in 'The Revisitation,' where the old soldier in barracks creeps out on to the gaunt down, and meets (by one of Mr. Hardy's coincidences) his ancient mistress, and no picture more terrible than the revelation of each to the other in the blaze of sunrise. What a document for the future is 'Reminiscences of 'a Dancing Man'? If only Shakespeare could have left us such a song of the London of 1585! But the power of the poet culminates in the pathos of 'The Tramp Woman'—perhaps the greatest of all Mr. Hardy's lyrical poems—and in the horror of 'A Sunday Morning's Tragedy.'

It is noticeable that 'Time's Laughingstocks' is, in some respects, a more daring collection than its predecessors. We find the poet here entirely emancipated from convention,

and guided both in religion and morals exclusively by the inner light of his reflection. His energy now interacts on his clairvoyance with a completeness which he had never quite displayed before, and it is here that we find Mr. Hardy's utterance peculiarly a quintessence of himself. Especially in the narrative pieces—which are often Wessex novels distilled into a wine-glass, such as 'Rose-Ann' and 'The Vampirine Fair'—he allows no considerations of what the reader may think 'nice' or 'pleasant' to shackle his sincerity or his determination; and it is therefore to 'Time's Laughingstocks' that the reader who wishes to become intimately acquainted with Mr. Hardy as a moralist most frequently recurs. We notice here more than elsewhere in his poems Mr. Hardy's sympathy with the local music of Wessex, and especially with its expression by the village choir, which he uses as a spiritual symbol. Quite a large section of 'Time's Laughingstocks' takes us to the old-fashioned gallery of some church, where the minstrels are bowing 'New Sabbath' or 'Mount 'Ephraim,' or to a later scene where the ghosts, in whose melancholy apparition Mr. Hardy takes such pleasure, chant their goblin melodies and strum 'the viols of the dead' in the moonlit churchyard. The very essence of Mr. Hardy's reverie at this moment of his career is to be found, for instance, in 'The Dead Quire,' where the ancient phantom-minstrels revenge themselves on their gross grandsons outside the alehouse.

Almost immediately after the outbreak of the present war Mr. Hardy presented to a somewhat distraught and inattentive public another collection of his poems. It cannot be said that 'Satires of Circumstance' is the most satisfactory of those volumes; it is, perhaps, that which we could with the least discomposure persuade ourselves to overlook. Such a statement refers more to the high quality of other pages than to any positive decay of power or finish here. There is no less adroitness of touch and penetration of view in this book than elsewhere, and the poet awakens once more our admiration by his skill in giving poetic value to minute conditions of life which have escaped less careful observers. But in 'Satires 'of Circumstance' the ugliness of experience is more accentuated than it is elsewhere, and is flung in our face with less compunction. The pieces which give name to the volume are

only fifteen in number, but the spirit which inspires them is very frequently repeated in other parts of the collection. That spirit is one of mocking sarcasm, and it acts in every case by presenting a beautifully draped figure of illusion, from which the poet, like a sardonic showman, twitches away the robe that he may display a skeleton beneath it.

We can with little danger assume, as we read the 'Satires of 'Circumstance,' hard and cruel shafts of searchlight as they seem, that Mr. Hardy was passing through a mental crisis when he wrote them. This seems to be the 'Troilus and 'Cressida' of his life's work, the book in which he is revealed most distracted by conjecture and most overwhelmed by the miscarriage of everything. The wells of human hope have been poisoned for him by some condition of which we know nothing, and even the picturesque features of Dorsetshire landscape, that have always before dispersed his melancholy, fail to win his attention :

'Bright yellowhammers
Made mirthful clamours,
And billed long straws with a bustling air,
And bearing their load,
Flew up the road
That he followed alone, without interest there.'

The strongest of the poems of disillusion which are the outcome of this mood is 'The Newcomer's Wife,' with the terrible abruptness of its last stanza. It is not for criticism to find fault with the theme of a work of art, but only to comment upon its execution. Of the merit of these monotonously sinister 'Satires of Circumstance' there can be no question; whether the poet's indulgence in the mood which gave birth to them does not tend to lower our moral temperature and to lessen the rebound of our energy is another matter. At all events, every one must welcome a postscript in which a blast on the bugle of war seemed to have wakened the poet from his dark brooding to the sense of a new chapter in history.

In the fourth year of the war the veteran poet has published 'Moments of Vision.' These show a remarkable recovery of spirit, and an ingenuity never before excelled. With the passage of years Mr. Hardy, observing everything in the little world of Wessex, and forgetting nothing, has become almost

preternaturally wise, and, if it may be said so, 'knowing,' with a sort of magic, like that of a wizard. He has learned to track the windings of the human heart with the familiarity of a gamekeeper who finds plenty of vermin in the woods, and who nails what he finds, be it stoat or squirrel, to the barn-door of his poetry. But there is also in these last-fruits of Mr. Hardy's mossed tree much that is wholly detached from the bitterness of satire, much that simply records, with an infinite delicacy of pathos, little incidents of the personal life of long ago, bestowing the immortality of art on these fugitive fancies in the spirit of the Japanese sculptor when he chisels the melting of a cloud or the flight of an insect on his sword-hilt:

'I idly cut a parsley stalk
And blew therein towards the moon;
I had not thought what ghosts would walk
With shivering footsteps to my tune.

'I went and knelt, and scooped my hand
As if to drink, into the brook,
And a faint figure seemed to stand
Above me, with the bye-gone look.

'I lipped rough rhymes of chance not choice,
I thought not what my words might be;
There came into my ear a voice
That turned a tenderer verse for me.'

We have now in brief historic survey marshalled before us the various volumes in which Mr. Hardy's lyrical poetry was originally collected. Before we examine its general character more closely, it may be well to call attention to its technical quality, which was singularly misunderstood at first, and which has never, we believe, been boldly faced. In 1898, and later, when a melodious *falsetto* was much in fashion amongst us, the reviewers found great fault with Mr. Hardy's prosody; they judged him as a versifier to be rude and incorrect. As regards the single line, it may be confessed that Mr. Hardy, in his anxiety to present his thought in an undiluted form, is not infrequently clogged and hard. Such a line as

'Fused from its separateness by ecstacy'

hisses at us like a snake, and crawls like a wounded one. Mr. Hardy is apt to clog his lines with consonants, and he seems indifferent to the stiffness which is the consequence of this neglect. Ben Jonson said that 'Donne, for not keeping of 'accent, deserved hanging'; perhaps we may go so far as to say that Mr. Hardy, for his indifference to a mellifluous run lays himself open to a mild rebuke. He is negligent of that eternal ornament of English verse, audible intricacy, probably because of Swinburne's abuse of it. But most of what is called his harshness should rather be called bareness, and is the result of a revolt, conscious or unconscious, against Keats' prescription of 'loading the rifts with ore.'

In saying this we have said all that an enemy could in justice say in blame of his metrical peculiarities. Unquestionably he does occasionally, like Robert Browning, err in the direction of cacophony. But when we turn to the broader part of prosody we must perceive that Mr. Hardy is not only a very ingenious, but a very correct and admirable, metricist. His stanzaic invention is abundant; no other Victorian poet, not even Swinburne, has employed so many forms, mostly of his own invention, and employed them so appropriately, that is to say, in so close harmony with the subject or story enshrined in them. To take an example from his pure lyrics of reflection first, from 'The Bullfinches':

> 'Brother Bulleys, let us sing
> From the dawn till evening!
> For we know not that we go not
> When the day's pale visions fold
> Unto those who sang of old.'

In the exquisite fineness and sadness of the stanza we seem to hear the very voices of the birds warbling faintly in the sunset. Again, the hurried, timid irresolution of a lover always too late is marvellously rendered in the form of 'Lizbie Browne':

> 'And Lizbie Browne,
> Who else had hair
> Bay-red as yours,
> Or flesh so fair
> Bred out of doors,
> Sweet Lizbie Browne?'

On the other hand, the fierceness of 'I said to Love' is interpreted in a stanza that suits the mood of denunciation, while 'Tess's Lament' wails in a metre which seems to rock like an ageing woman seated alone before the fire, with an infinite haunting sadness.

It is, however, in the narrative pieces, the little 'Wessex 'Tales,' that Mr. Hardy's metrical imagination is most triumphant. No two of these are identical in form, and for each he selects, or more often invents, a wholly appropriate stanza. He makes many experiments, one of the strongest being the introduction of rhymeless lines at regular intervals. Of this, 'Cicely' is an example which repays attention:

'And still sadly onward I followed,
That Highway the Icen
Which trails its pale riband down Wessex
O'er lynchet and lea.

'Along through the Stour-bordered Forum,
Where legions had wayfared,
And where the slow river up-glasses
Its green canopy';

and one still more remarkable is the enchanting 'Friends 'Beyond,' to which we shall presently recur. The drawling voice of a weary old campaigner is wonderfully rendered in the stanza of 'Valenciennes':

'Well: Heaven wi' its jasper halls
Is now the on'y town I care to be in . . .
Good Lord, if Nick should bomb the walls
As we did Valencieën!'

whereas for long Napoleonic stories like 'Leipzig' and 'The 'Peasant's Confession,' a ballad-measure which contemporaries such as Southey or Campbell might have used, is artfully chosen. In striking contrast we have the elaborate verse-form of 'The Souls of the Slain,' in which the throbbing stanza seems to dilate and withdraw like the very cloud of moth-like phantoms which it describes. It is difficult to follow out this theme without more frequent quotation than we have space for here, but the reader who pursues it carefully will not repeat the rumour that Mr. Hardy is a careless or

'incorrect' metricist. He is, on the contrary, a metrical artist of great accomplishment.

The conception of life revealed in his verses by this careful artist is one which displays very exactly the bent of his temperament. During the whole of his long career Mr. Hardy has not budged an inch from his original line of direction. He holds that, abandoned by God, treated with scorn by Nature, man lies helpless at the mercy of 'those purblind 'Doomsters,' accident, chance, and time, from whom he had to endure injury and insult from the cradle to the grave. This is stating the Hardy doctrine in its extreme form, but it is not stating it too strongly. This has been called his 'pessimism,' a phrase to which some admirers, unwilling to give things their true name, have objected. But, of course, Mr. Hardy is a pessimist, just as Browning is an optimist, just as white is not black, and day is not night. Our juggling with words in paradox is too often apt to disguise a want of decision in thought. Let us admit that Mr. Hardy's conception of the fatal forces which beleaguer human life is a 'pessimistic' one, or else words have no meaning.

Yet it is needful to define in what this pessimism consists. It is not the egotism of Byron or the morbid melancholy of Chateaubriand. It is directed towards an observation of others, not towards an analysis of self, and this gives it more philosophical importance, because although romantic peevishness is very common among modern poets, and although ennui inspires a multitude of sonnets, a deliberate and imaginative study of useless suffering in the world around us is rare indeed among the poets. It is particularly to be noted that Mr. Hardy, although one of the most profoundly tragic of all modern writers, is neither effeminate nor sickly. His melancholy could never have dictated the third stanza of Shelley's 'Lines written in Dejection in the Bay of Naples.' His pessimism is involuntary, forced from him by his experience and his constitution, and no analysis could give a better definition of what divides him from the petulant despair of a poet like Leopardi than the lines 'To Life':

'O life, with the sad seared face,
I weary of seeing thee,
And thy draggled cloak, and thy hobbling pace,
And thy too-forced pleasantry!

'I know what thou would'st tell
Of Death, Time, Destiny—
I have known it long, and know, too, well
What it all means for me.

'But canst thou not array
Thyself in rare disguise,
And feign like truth, for one mad day,
That Earth is Paradise?

'I'll tune me to the mood,
And mumm with thee till eve,
And maybe what as interlude
I feign, I shall believe!'

But the mumming goes no deeper than it does in the exquisite poem of 'The Darkling Thrush,' where the carolings of an aged bird, on a frosty evening, are so ecstatic that they waken a vague hope in the listener's mind that the thrush may possibly know of 'some blessed hope' of which the poet is 'unaware.' This is as far as Mr. Hardy ever gets on the blest Victorian pathway of satisfaction.

There are certain aspects in which it is not unnatural to see a parallel between Mr. Hardy and George Crabbe. Each is the spokesman of a district, each has a passion for the study of mankind, each has gained by long years of observation a profound knowledge of local human character, and each has plucked on the open moor, and wears in his coat, the hueless flower of disillusion. But there is a great distinction in the aim of the two poets. Crabbe, as he describes himself in 'The Parish 'Register,' was 'the true physician' who 'walks the foulest 'ward.' He was utilitarian in his morality; he exposed the pathos of tragedy by dwelling on the faults which led to it, forgetful of the fatality which in more consistent moments he acknowledged. Crabbe was realistic with a moral design, even in the 'Tales of the Hall,' where he made a gallant effort at last to arrive at a detachment of spirit. No such effort is needed by Mr. Hardy, who has none of the instinct of a preacher, and who considers moral improvement outside his responsibility. He admits, with his great French contemporary, that

'Tout désir est menteur, toute joie éphémère,
Toute liqueur au fond de la coupe est amère,'

but he is bent on discovering the cause of this devastation, and not disposed to waste time over its consequences. At the end he produces a panacea which neither Crabbe nor Byron dreamed of—resignation.

But the poet has not reached the end of his disillusion. He thinks to secure repose on the breast of Nature, the *alma mater* to whom Goethe and Wordsworth and Browning each in his own way turned, and were rewarded by consolation and refreshment. We should be prepared to find Mr. Hardy, with his remarkable aptitude for the perception of natural forms, easily consoled by the influences of landscape and the inanimate world. His range of vision is wide and extremely exact; he has the gift of reproducing before us scenes of various character with a vividness which is sometimes startling. But Mr. Hardy's disdain of sentimentality, and his vigorous analysis of the facts of life, render him insensible not indeed to the mystery nor to the beauty, but to the imagined sympathy, of Nature. He has no more confidence in the visible earth than in the invisible heavens, and neither here nor there is he able to persuade himself to discover a counsellor or a friend. In this connection we do well to follow the poet's train of thought in the lyric called 'In a Wood,' where he enters a copse dreaming that, in that realm of 'sylvan peace,' Nature would offer 'a soft release from man's unrest.' He immediately observes that the pine and the beech are struggling for existence, and trying to blight each other with dripping poison. He sees the ivy eager to strangle the elm, and the hawthorns choking the hollies. Even the poplars sulk and turn black under the shadow of a rival. In the end, filled with horror at all these crimes of Nature, the poet flees from the copse as from an accursed place, and he determines that life offers him no consolation except the company of those human beings who are as beleaguered as himself:

'Since, then, no grace I find
Taught me of trees,
Turn I back to my kind
Worthy as these.
There at least smiles abound,
There discourse trills around,
There, now and then, are found,
Life-loyalties.'

It is absurd, he decides, to love Nature, which has either no response to give, or answers in irony. Let us even avoid, as much as we can, deep concentration of thought upon the mysteries of Nature, lest we become demoralized by contemplating her negligence, her blindness, her implacability. We find here a violent reaction against the poetry of egotistic optimism which had ruled the romantic school in England for more than a hundred years, and we recognize a branch of Mr. Hardy's originality. He has lifted the veil of Isis, and he finds beneath it, not a benevolent mother of men, but the tomb of an illusion. One short lyric, 'Yell'ham-Wood's 'Story,' puts this, again with a sylvan setting, in its unflinching crudity:

'Coomb-Firtrees say that Life is a moan,
And Clyffe-hill Clump says "Yea!"
But Yell'ham says a thing of its own:
It's not, "Gray, gray,
Is Life alway!"
That Yell'ham says,
Nor that Life is for ends unknown.

'It says that Life would signify
A thwarted purposing:
That we come to live, and are called to die.
Yes, that's the thing
In fall, in spring,
That Yell'ham says:—
"Life offers—to deny!"'

It is therefore almost exclusively to the obscure history of those who suffer and stumble around him, victims of the universal disillusion, men and women 'come to live but called 'to die,' that Mr. Hardy dedicates his poetic function. 'Lizbie 'Browne' appeals to us as a typical instance of his rustic pathos, his direct and poignant tenderness, and if we compare it with such poems of Wordsworth's as 'Lucy Gray' or 'Alice Fell' we see that he starts by standing much closer to the level of the subject than his great predecessor does. Wordsworth is the benevolent philosopher sitting in a post-chaise or crossing the 'wide moor' in meditation. Mr. Hardy is the familiar neighbour, the shy mourner at the grave; his relation is a more intimate one: he is patient, humble, un-upbraiding.

Sometimes, as in the remarkable colloquy called 'The Ruined 'Maid,' his sympathy is so close as to offer an absolute flout in the face to the system of Victorian morality. Mr. Hardy, indeed, is not concerned with sentimental morals, but with the primitive instincts of the soul, applauding them, or at least recording them with complacency, even when they outrage ethical tradition, as they do in the lyric narrative called 'A Wife and Another.' The stanzas 'To an Unborn 'Pauper Child' sum up what is sinister and what is genial in Mr. Hardy's attitude to the unambitious forms of life which he loves to contemplate.

His temperature is not always so low as it is in the class of poems to which we have just referred but his ultimate view is never more sanguine. He is pleased sometimes to act as the fiddler at a dance, surveying the hot-blooded couples, and urging them on by the lilt of his instrument, but he is always perfectly aware that they will have 'to pay high for 'their prancing' at the end of all. No instance of this is more remarkable than the poem called 'Julie-Jane,' a perfect example of Mr. Hardy's metrical ingenuity and skill, which begins thus:

'Sing; how 'a would sing!
How 'a would raise the tune
When we rode in the waggon from harvesting
By the light o' the moon!

'Dance; how 'a would dance!
If a fiddlestring did but sound
She would hold out her coats, give a slanting glance,
And go round and round.

'Laugh; how 'a would laugh!
Her peony lips would part
As if none such a place for a lover to quaff
At the deeps of a heart,'

and which then turns to the most plaintive and the most irreparable tragedy, woven, as a black design on to a background of gold, upon this basis of temperamental joyousness.

Alphonse Daudet once said that the great gift of Edmond

de Goncourt was to '*rendre l'irrendable.*' This is much more true of Mr. Hardy than it was of Goncourt, and more true than it is of any other English poet except Donne. There is absolutely no observation too minute, no flutter of reminiscence too faint, for Mr. Hardy to adopt as the subject of a metaphysical lyric, and his skill in this direction has grown upon him ; it is nowhere so remarkable as in his latest volume, aptly termed 'Moments of Vision.' Everything in village life is grist to his mill ; he seems to make no selection, and his field is modest to humility and yet practically boundless. We have a poem on the attitude of two people with nothing to do and no book to read, waiting in the parlour of an hotel for the rain to stop, a recollection after more than forty years. That the poet once dropped a pencil into the cranny of an old church where he was sketching inspires an elaborate lyric. The disappearance of a rotted summer-house, the look of a row of silver drops of fog condensed on the bar of a gate, the effect of candlelight years and years ago on a woman's neck and hair, the vision of a giant at a fair, led by a dwarf with a red string—such are amongst the subjects which awaken in Mr. Hardy thoughts which do often lie too deep for tears, and call for interpretation in verse. The skeleton of a lady's sunshade, picked up on Swanage Cliffs, the pages of a fly-blown Testament lying in a railway waiting-room, a journeying boy in a third-class carriage, with his ticket stuck in the band of his hat—such are among the themes which awake in Mr. Hardy's imagination reveries which are always wholly serious and usually deeply tragic.

Mr. Hardy's notation of human touches hitherto excluded from the realm of poetry is one of the most notable features of his originality. It marked his work from the beginning, as in the early ballad of ' The Widow,' where the sudden damping of the wooer's amatory ardour in consequence of his jealousy of the child is rendered with extraordinary refinement. The difficulty of course is to know when to stop. There is always a danger that a poet, in his search after the infinitely ingenious, may lapse into *amphigory*, into sheer absurdity and triviality, which Cowper, in spite of his elegant lightness, does not always escape. Wordsworth, more serious in his intent, fell headlong in parts of ' Peter Bell,' and in such ballads as ' Betty Foy.' Mr. Hardy, whatever the poverty of

his incident, commonly redeems it by the oddity of his observation; as in 'The Pedigree':

> 'I bent in the deep of night
> Over a pedigree the chronicler gave
> As mine; and as I bent there, half-unrobed,
> The uncurtained panes of my window-square
> Let in the watery light
> Of the moon in its old age:
> And green-rheumed clouds were hurrying past
> Where mute and cold it globed
> Like a dying dolphin's eye seen through a lapping wave.'

Mr. Hardy's love of strange experiences, and of adventures founded on a balance of conscience and instinct, is constantly exemplified in those ballads and verse-anecdotes which form the section of his poetry most appreciated by the general public. Among these, extraordinarily representative of the poet's habit of mind, is 'My Cicely,' a tale of the eighteenth century, where a man impetuously rides from London through Wessex to be present at the funeral of the wrong woman; as he returns, by a coincidence, he meets the right woman, whom he used to love, and is horrified at 'her liquor-fired face, 'her thick accents.' He determines that by an effort of will the dead woman (whom he never saw) shall remain, what she seemed during his wild ride, '*my* Cicely,' and the living woman be expunged from memory. A similar deliberate electing that the dream shall hold the place of the fact is the motive of 'The Well-Beloved.' The ghastly humour of 'The Curate's 'Kindness' is a sort of reverse action of the same mental subtlety. Misunderstanding takes a very prominent place in Mr. Hardy's irony of circumstance; as, almost too painfully, in 'The Rash Bride,' a hideous tale of suicide following on the duplicity of a tender and innocent widow.

The grandmother of Mr. Hardy was born in 1772, and survived until 1857. From her lips he heard many an obscure old legend of the life of Wessex in the eighteenth century. Was it she who told him the terrible Exmoor story of 'The 'Sacrilege'; the early tale of 'The Two Men,' which might be the skeleton-scenario for a whole elaborate novel; or that incomparable comedy in verse, 'The Fire at Tranter 'Sweatley's,' with its splendid human touch at the very end?

We suspect that it was; and perhaps at the same source he acquired his dangerous insight into the female heart, whether exquisitely feeble as in 'The Home-coming,' with its delicate and ironic surprise, or treacherous, as in the desolating ballad of 'Rose-Ann.' No one, in prose or verse, has expatiated more poignantly than Mr. Hardy on what our forefathers used to call 'cases of conscience.' He seems to have shared the experiences of souls to whom life was 'a wood before your doors, 'and a labyrinth within the wood, and locks and bars to every 'door within that labyrinth,' as Jeremy Taylor describes that of the anxious penitents who came to him to confession. The probably very early story of 'The Casterbridge Captains' is a delicate study in compunction, and a still more important example is 'The Alarm,' where the balance of conscience and instinct gives to what in coarser hands might seem the most trivial of actions a momentous character of tragedy.

This is one of Mr. Hardy's studies in military history, where he is almost always singularly happy. His portraits of the non-commissioned officer of the old service are as excellent in verse as they are in the prose of 'The Trumpet-Major' or 'The Melancholy Hussar.' The reader of the novels will not have to be reminded that 'Valenciennes' and the other ballads have their prose-parallel in Simon Burden's reminiscences of Minden. Mr. Hardy, with a great curiosity about the science of war and a close acquaintance with the mind of the common soldier, has pondered on the philosophy of fighting. 'The Man he Killed,' written in 1902, expresses the wonder of the rifleman who is called upon to shoot his brother-in-arms, although

> 'Had he and I but met,
> By some old ancient inn,
> We should have set us down to wet
> Right many a nipperkin.'

In this connection the 'Poems of War and Patriotism,' which form an important part of the volume of 1918, should be carefully examined by those who meditate on the tremendous problems of the moment.

A poet so profoundly absorbed in the study of life could not fail to speculate on the probabilities of immortality.

Here Mr. Hardy presents to us his habitual serenity in negation. He sees the beautiful human body 'lined by tool of time,' and he asks what becomes of it when its dissolution is complete. He sees no evidence of a conscious state after death, of what would have to be, in the case of aged or exhausted persons, a revival of spiritual force, and on the whole he is disinclined to cling to the faith in a future life. He holds that the immortality of a dead man resides in the memory of the living, his 'finer part shining within ever-faithful hearts 'of those bereft.' He pursues this theme in a large number of his most serious and affecting lyrics, most gravely perhaps in 'The To-be-Forgotten' and in 'The Superseded.' This sense of the forlorn condition of the dead, surviving only in the dwindling memory of the living, inspires what has some claims to be considered the loveliest of all Mr. Hardy's poems, 'Friends Beyond,' which in its tenderness, its humour, and its pathos contains in a few pages every characteristic of his genius.

His speculation perceives the dead as a crowd of slowly vanishing phantoms, clustering in their ineffectual longing round the footsteps of those through whom alone they continue to exist. This conception has inspired Mr. Hardy with several wonderful visions, among which the spectacle of 'The Souls 'of the Slain' in the Boer War, alighting, like vast flights of moths, over Portland Bill at night, is the most remarkable. It has the sublimity and much of the character of some apocalyptic design by Blake. The volume of 1902 contains a whole group of phantasmal pieces of this kind, where there is frequent mention of spectres, who address the poet in the accents of Nature, as in the unrhymed ode called 'The Mother 'Mourns.' The obsession of old age, with its physical decay ('I look into my glass'), the inevitable division which leads to that isolation which the poet regards as the greatest of adversities ('The Impercipient'), the tragedies of moral indecision, the contrast between the tangible earth and the bodyless ghosts, and endless repetition of the cry, 'Why find 'we us here?' and of the question 'Has some Vast Imbecility 'framed us in jest, and left us now to hazardry,' all start from the overwhelming love of physical life and acquaintance with its possibilities, which Mr. Hardy possesses to an inordinate degree.

It would be ridiculous at the close of an article to attempt any discussion of the huge dramatic panorama which many believe to be Mr. Hardy's most weighty contribution to English literature. The spacious theatre of 'The Dynasts,' with its comprehensive and yet concise realizations of vast passages of human history, is a work which calls for a commentary as lengthy as itself, and yet needs no commentary at all. No work of the imagination is more its own interpreter than this sublime historic peep-show, this rolling vision of the Napoleonic chronicle drawn on the broadest lines, and yet in detail made up of intensely concentrated and vivid glimpses of reality. But the subject of our present study, the lyrical poetry of Mr. Hardy, is not largely illustrated in 'The Dynasts,' except by the choral interludes of the phantom intelligences, which have great lyrical value, and by three or four admirable songs.

When we resume the effect which the poetry of Mr. Hardy makes upon the careful reader, we note, as we have indicated already, a sense of unity of direction throughout. Mr. Hardy has expressed himself in a thousand ways, but has never altered his vision. From 1867 to 1917, through half a century of imaginative creation, he has not modified the large outlines of his art in the smallest degree. To early readers of his poems, before the full meaning of them became evident, his voice sounded inharmonious, because it did not fit in with the exquisite melodies of the later Victorian age. But Mr. Hardy, with characteristic pertinacity, did not attempt to alter his utterance in the least, and now we can all perceive, if we take the trouble to do so, that what seemed harsh in his poetry was his peculiar and personal mode of interpreting his thoughts to the world. As in his novels so in his poems, he has chosen to remain local, to be the interpreter for present and future times of one rich and neglected province of the British realm. From his standpoint there he contemplates the vast aspect of life, but it seems huge and misty to him, and he broods over the tiny incidents of Wessex idiosyncracy. His irony is audacious and even sardonic, and few poets have been less solicitous to please their weaker brethren. But no poet of modern times has been more careful to avoid the abstract and to touch upon the real.

EDMUND GOSSE.

THE THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION OF THE CLERGY

AT the present time plans for reconstruction and adaptation to new circumstances are being matured in connection with various departments of Church organization and also in the curricula and examinations of the Universities.

It is therefore opportune to call attention to what has for some time been a crying need both in Church and University, and with which both Church and University have just now a chance of dealing in a practical manner.

There is within the Church of England a growing sense that the intellectual training of its ministry is inadequate to the efficient discharge of the Church's teaching office. And, at any rate in that University of which the present writer can speak from personal experience, the time has certainly arrived when considerable changes are called for in its educational system, in so far as students contemplating ordination are concerned. The parts to be played by the Church at large and by the University respectively in effecting the desired increase of educational equipment in theology are different, and they may therefore be discussed separately.

The responsibility of the Church as a whole with regard to the matter before us may most suitably be dealt with first in order; and the fact to which it is in the first instance the concern of the Church to attend is that the duration of the course of intellectual training received by candidates for the ministry is at present much too short, however efficiently the University may fulfil its function in relation to its students during their period of study. No amount of reconstruction of its theological curriculum on the part of the University would avail wholly to meet the deficiency which exists, so long as the present duration of the course of education remains as short as it is, though matters might be somewhat improved; and it is at present doubtful whether any serious reconstruction, as distinct from enlargement of the curriculum such as prolonged residence at the University would enable, will be

countenanced by those with whom the control of theological studies rests.

In the case of other learned professions, such as those of the doctor and the lawyer, the standard required for qualification, as tested by the degree of difficulty of the examinations to be passed, is higher than in the case of the ministry, and the course of preparatory study is considerably longer. Five years is the minimum time for professional training in medicine, whereas for the Anglican ministry three years of University education in theology and arts combined is, for the vast majority, the limit, and many among the students of lower mental calibre (who should require more rather than less time for adequate equipment) receive but one or two years of theological training. Nor does the extra year which in many cases is spent at a theological college add very appreciably to the intellectual qualifications of the student; for the training given in such colleges is necessarily concerned chiefly with the devotional and practical sides of his future pastoral work. Again, when we compare the term of theological education allowed to the Anglican clergyman with that which is secured in other Churches, the Church of England shows itself at a disadvantage. It is still perhaps not uncommonly believed by Anglicans that the ministry of the Church of England is the most learned of all ministries. But if the average of learning may be assumed to be proportional to duration of study, the opposite of this belief must be nearer to the truth. The Presbyterian Church has managed to supply a far longer intellectual training for its ministers than is as yet attempted in the Church of England; and the Roman Church and some at least of the Nonconformist Churches are well ahead of the Anglican in this respect.

It is not, however, this disadvantageous comparison with other Churches that matters chiefly; of far greater importance to the Church of England is the difference between what it has attained to and what the circumstances of this age absolutely require. During the last thirty years education, knowledge, and independent thought have been increasing in degree and spreading in extent through all social classes of the laity. Free education, public libraries, multiplication of journals and magazines, extension of enfranchisement, labour movements, higher education of women and partial

opening to them of learned professions and other spheres of intellectual activity, have caused a change in the mentality of our country during the last generation or so, comparable to the effects of a 'revival of learning.' And with all this change the education of those commissioned to give religious teaching to the laity has not kept pace. Further, apart from such considerations, it is quite obvious that two or three years of theological study, for which practically no foundation is laid (as is the case in other subjects) during the period of school life, is utterly inadequate for the comprehension of what has now become so wide a field. The Christian religion touches life and thought at all points; it has points—or rather areas—of contact with literature, the natural sciences, psychology, philosophy, individual and social ethics, political and social science, as well as with dead languages and ancient and modern history. One cannot, of course, reasonably expect the average clergyman to be an expert theologian, much less a summist; but it is of the first necessity, if he is to be apt to teach, and to be capable of sympathy with the intellectual questionings and difficulties which inevitably follow upon increased knowledge and which trouble the minds of the thoughtful, that he should know more of the contents and the manifold relations of Christian doctrine than can be acquired in so short a time as has hitherto been allotted for his intellectual preparation.

It is a common lament that the Church has for years been losing rather than gaining influence over the more learned and the more thoughtful individuals of the community, and that it does not attract to its ministry its fair share of the best and ablest men. These facts are doubtless due to a multiplicity of causes. But in the case of the former of them, with which alone we are here concerned, it may surely be said that among its causes are to be included the lack of knowledge which characterizes in too many cases the teaching given in and out of the pulpit, and lack of confidence in many a teacher. The waning influence of the Church upon the thought of to-day, and the decline of its power to retain the full sympathy and intellectual allegiance of its own sons—even such of them as continue to value much that it stands for and to wish it well in its practical efforts towards social amelioration—is most conspicuously seen in our Universities, where indeed the

evidence is appalling. And it is by no means there alone where it is plainly to be seen. Not to speak of downright unbelief, there is a widespread and perhaps increasing aloofness which consists in indifference to the Church's doctrine in general more often perhaps than in repudiation of particular doctrines as specifically untenable. And though one may here easily be mistaken one cannot avoid the impression that the significance of these signs of the times is not generally or duly appreciated, if the signs be discerned. But however this may be, it seems plain that the future of the Church of England, as a power to influence national life and thought rather than merely to retain hold of the less strenuously intelligent among the religiously inclined, is bound up with the efficiency of its literature and its oral teaching, and therefore—other things such as spiritual earnestness remaining the same—with the adequacy of the intellectual equipment of its future clergy. For what is to-day the knowledge of or the thought of the more highly intellectual with regard to all that bears on Christian doctrine will, with due modification, be to a large extent the knowledge or thought of the average man a generation hence. It may be submitted, then, that there is no kind of Church reform, and no form of Church extension, which at the present time can compare in urgency, and in the long run in importance, with that of providing the Church with a ministry as competent as it can possibly be made to discharge the paramount functions of the prophet and the teacher. Nothing needs so much as this to be pressed by the laity upon the attention of the leaders of the Church; and if, as rumour tells, some initial step in the direction of enabling poorer theological students to prolong their residence at a University be already under contemplation, no effort towards practical reform can be more worthy of all the encouragement and the financial help which it lies in the power of the laity to give.

Before leaving the subject of the length of the period of theological education, it may be observed that, at least at the University with which the present writer is connected as a teacher, the time devoted to distinctively theological study is generally less than the whole term of residence, which itself is already too short for theological training alone. The candidate for the ministry, unlike the future doctor, lawyer,

and schoolmaster, is urged in very many cases not to proceed to his professional study at once, but to spend a large proportion of his already hopelessly inadequate time on another subject. In what respect theology is unique among University studies, so that it is educationally unsound to study it in isolation from some other subject which may have but remote connexion with it, is not obvious. Indeed, theology, if taught with consideration for anything like true proportion, rather is unique among University studies in providing within its own sphere a liberal education, and in involving the employment of several distinct educational instruments or methods—the linguistic, the historical, the scientific, and the abstract. It brings its students into contact with more departments of thought and knowledge than does perhaps any other line of professional study. It is therefore the last science to need being supplemented from without, rather than the only one that requires to be. If, *as it has hitherto been taught*, it has been found to tend to cramp the mind of its students, or to narrow the range of their sympathies, that may be due to the restricted selection (from the whole sphere of the science) of the subjects constituting the theological courses, and not to any narrowing influence intrinsic to theology as such. And the remedy would then seem to lie in broadening or reconstructing the curriculum ; not in recommending partial desertion of it for another. However far it be from the intention of those who thus direct the student, a stigma seems to be fastened on theology, and the suspicion suggested that theological studies, and they alone, are comparable to a hot-house in which to stay long is unwholesome, if, while at the University, one would preserve one's health of mind. Doubtless the ideal training for a clergyman, if more years of preparation were granted him, would be to send him to the laboratories to learn the scientific habit of mind and to the class-rooms of philosophy to acquire capacity for abstract thought. But similarly the physiologist might be benefited by a course of theory of knowledge, and the mathematician by a couple of years in a curacy ; though *their* advisers do not venture so to direct their educational procedure. The ideal training of a candidate for the ministry, however, can hardly be one which must inevitably endow him with professional incompetence.

The point last discussed furnishes a link between the question of the duration of the term of theological study and the need of reconstruction in our University curriculum. Speaking still only of the theological courses at Cambridge, it is here suggested that as readaptations are now being considered, the present time is an occasion for introducing needed alterations.

The principle on which the courses of study and the examinations in theology at Cambridge are founded is that inasmuch as the student cannot, during his short term of residence, be made a complete theologian, the aim should be to render him competent to become one. He should be instructed how to use the theologian's tools; be taught, not theology, but the essential propædeutic thereto; only lay foundations, and lay them deep and firm; be made a careful, accurate, and critical thinker, rather than an encyclopædia of facts. In the abstract this is a sound principle in many respects, the circumstances being what at present they are. But it presupposes that the student *will* go on to become a theologian—in the somewhat narrow sense contemplated—and *will* build upon his carefully laid foundations, which, as a matter of fact, he generally does not. Thus the foundation remains practically useless, so far as construction is concerned; and the laying of it is by no means the only way by which the student may become a careful thinker. And when we pass from this principle, admirable if it were not out of relation to actualities, to the scheme in which it takes concrete form, that scheme is found to challenge criticism.

For the foundations which it causes to be laid are broad enough for only a narrowly conceived science of theology. The propædeutic and the tools prescribed are not the only ones requisite in the present age. The essentials of Christian theology, when the existing courses of study were drawn up, were considered to be only the Bible and early Church history. Armed with sound, if partial, knowledge of these, the student was supposed to be rendered capable of making himself a theologian and an effective exponent of Christianity. And as it was deemed of paramount importance to have studied parts at least of both Old and New Testaments in detail, it was logically argued that linguistic studies—Hebrew and Greek—were the all-important tools: therefore the student must

acquire Hebrew composition and pointing, and be enabled to retranslate the English New Testament into Hellenistic Greek. So it has come about that a theological education, or rather an education preparatory to theology, for an Honours student, consists of the study of dead languages, of the Old and New Testaments generally and of selected portions of them in detail, and of the history of the Church, its creeds and doctrine, down to the fifth century ; and that the much more numerous students who are unable to aim at an Honours degree are educated on similar lines, Hebrew being optional, study of Old Testament history replacing a general knowledge of the Old Testament, English Church history being substituted for history of the ancient Church (except as a voluntary subject), and doctrine finding no place at all.

Without being by any means insensible to the merits of these courses of study considered in relation to the general aim which they embody, one may doubt the permanent worth and the expediency of their underlying principle and proceed to raise the question whether the selection of subjects now taught remains, in view of the needs of the present day, the best that can be conceived.

In the first place, it will be admitted by those who would retain the existing schemata that they largely fail to enlist the continuing interest of the student in his theological studies. A very large proportion of those who, having gone through these courses, proceed to ministerial work and serve their calling in other respects with zeal, fling aside their former studies, sometimes perhaps with a sense of relief, instead of extending them further. Doubtless this is often due to lack of taste for scholarly pursuits and severe thinking of any kind ; but one cannot avoid the belief that in many a case it is due to the fact that some of the studies pursued at the University are too remote from the living interests of the present day, too archaic to be stimulating. It is dull work learning merely how to use tools, especially when the material on which the practising is exercised is largely of only historical interest. And if the really inspiring features of theology are not at all presented to the student's view, if he be given no glimpse of the edifice which his underground foundations are intended to support, it is not greatly to be wondered at if his course of study inspires him with no zeal to become somewhat of a real

theologian.* Yet, if the subjects selected for his study fail, or are calculated to fail, to excite such interest, the *raison d'être* of the principle according to which their selection was determined is gone. It is expedient, especially in view of the fact that the great majority of candidates for the ministry are not of the Honours standard, and therefore generally not predisposed by nature to intellectual pursuits, that their introduction to theology be such as is most fitted to kindle an interest in some departments of study which it is of paramount importance for them to make themselves conversant with if they are to become teachers of Christianity and of its relation to the life and thought of the present age. And there is no reason why this cannot be attempted without loss of the educational value, as an instrument for mind-development, of the subject-matter taught.

Secondly, it may be doubted whether the selection of the subjects taught in our theological curriculum implies a sound distinction between what is essential and what is not. The view which underlies our present system seems to belong to a bygone generation. The New Testament must of course always hold first place in elementary theological education. But the importance of the Old Testament—not of course from the point of view of its devotional value or of its historical interest, but exclusively from the point of view of its place in Christian theology—is greatly changed from what once it was deemed by theologians to be. This is, one need not say, abundantly recognized by University teachers; but it does not seem to be adequately taken account of in the curriculum which they retain. Detailed knowledge of Old Testament books, rather than a general knowledge of the Old Testament as a record of one progressive *præparatio evangelica*, is nowadays rather of the nature of a luxury with which a student can later easily provide himself, if he so desire; and any such knowledge as requires acquaintance with Hebrew is still more a luxury, rather than a *sine qua non* for the teacher of the Christian religion. Old Testament history, as distinguished from the bare outlines of the development of Hebrew religion, is perhaps a study which can still more easily be dispensed

* 'Whatsoever the mind doth learn unwillingly with fear, the same it doth quickly forget without care.'—ROGER ASCHAM.

with, when elimination of all but the most essential is dictated by circumstances. Not only is this subject of small value as an educational instrument, but in devoting his time to it the student is learning extravagantly more than it behoves him to know, while he is of necessity compelled to be learning —of real theology—vitally too little. There is surely an absence of due proportion if a student, severely pressed for time to fit himself for his great profession, be set to master details of Old Testament history and exegesis, while access to the whole meaning of Christianity, its fundamental ideas and its relations, is postponed to a more convenient season. This rather ought to be done, whether or not he leave the other undone. It is possible indeed (one may say it without irreverence) to make too much of the Bible, or of large parts of it, and too little of other things, where the essence of Christian theology is concerned.

Further, the importance and absolute indispensableness of ancient Church history is perhaps not beyond question. Is it really less important for one who is equipping himself to be a teacher of Christian theology—and nowadays to a large extent a Christian missionary in England—to know what Christian theology and its bearings are, than to know how it came to be what in the fifth century it was? Given some knowledge of the early history of Christian doctrine as expressed largely in obsolete and incomprehensible categories, of objections to it which now fail to grip, and of counter-arguments which seem remote from modern habits of thought, is it certain that the student, further unguided, can follow on to interpret of himself its essence in terms of modern philosophical and psychological conceptions? Is not the converse rather the truth: that given some knowledge of the fundamental Christian doctrines in modern dress, and of their relation to living thought—knowledge which cannot easily be acquired by the student for himself, but can be learned from a lucid teacher—he should be able without difficulty to find out, with the aid of books, the significance of the Arian or other ancient controversies? Here again the student is set to learn too much of the non-essential, too little of what is vital. And from what has been said it will be plain that other prolegomena and other tools—psychology and philosophy or instance—as well as ancient history, Old Testament lore,

and languages instrumental thereto, are required by every Christian teacher who is at all to approach the standard required in these days, when science and philosophy permeate popular literature and find more or less place in the background of the average layman's thought.

As to the linguistic elements in the theological courses, little more needs to be said than has already been insinuated. It is becoming increasingly felt that Hebrew should cease to be a compulsory subject for the Honours candidate; and as even its teachers are no longer unanimous as to the retention of it, it ceases to be worth while to display the reasons which make its removal desirable. Greek, of course, is in a very different case; but in view of the needs of the time, and of the shortness of the period of theological study, the indispensableness of even this far more important tool is beginning to be doubted by a New Testament lecturer here and there. At present some knowlege of New Testament Greek is required by the bishops of their ordinands; but it is doubtful whether in the interests of the Church the requirement should continue to be compulsory. However desirable the possession of some knowledge of Greek be on the part of the average clergyman, it is not an absolute condition of scholarly knowledge of the contents of the New Testament, or of capacity to expound them; and if room is to be found for more indispensable subjects, from the point of view of present necessities, knowledge of Greek may well be made optional.

Thus even if the duration of the period of study at the University be not in the near future increased, though the need for prolongation will still remain, the alterations in the course of study which have here been advocated would, to a considerable extent, allow of the student making some acquaintance with Christian doctrine and its relations to modern thought. It is the fundamental assumption of what has been urged in this article that this acquaintance, made under the direction of the University teachers, is to-day the *sine qua non*, if theology, like other subjects, is to be taught with a view to equipping the student for his professional career. If that assumption fail to commend itself to those who in any way are responsible for moulding the education of the ministry, *cadit quæstio*; but there are probably many who will agree that it will be disastrous to the interest and welfare of the Church if the

present system of University education in theology persist unmodified. There is already a desire among bishops' chaplains that room be found in the University curriculum for subjects such as Christian ethics and what may be termed modern apologetics; and it is in the hope that the wish to see the theological studies of the working clergy centred less about the dead past, and more about the living present, may become more widely spread, that these somewhat technical considerations are here pressed upon the attention of the extra-University public.

And there is one more important aspect of the question which may be singled out for special notice. Our present system of theological education is not calculated to foster independent thought, or to bring the student face to face with the intellectual difficulties which inevitably lie in wait for every theological student when he shall begin to think out his religion at all. The Honours man, indeed, becomes acquainted with Biblical criticism, and so far is both forearmed and forewarned; the Pass man practically escapes the necessity to face even this solvent of possibly inherited prejudices which some day must be dislodged from his mind. But neither is forced to encounter difficulties inherent in the traditional theology of the Church, or difficulties otherwise presented from without—from the spheres of philosophy and science. It has been the tendency at Cambridge for theological teachers to regard a little knowledge of philosophy, provided it be modern and not ancient philosophy, as a dangerous thing, and as knowledge too abstruse for the undergraduate mind. Hence the student is as yet left in ignorance as to the meaning of the philosophical conceptions involved in fundamental Christian doctrines. It is forgotten that within a year or so of leaving the University the student will be called upon to use and to expound these difficult conceptions to hearers, it may be, more highly educated than himself, whether he have coped with their abstruseness or not. The unfortunate man, when then faced with difficulties, is strongly impelled to fall back upon the *authority* of the theology of the ancient Church, and to begin to form a habit of thought with which his educated hearers have nothing in common. Science knows no authority but that of truth; and inasmuch as the temper, the candour, and the disinterested demand for proof,

which characterize science, are appreciated in far wider circles than the strictly scientific, the days are now gone by in which appeal to authority generally commanded respect. If the scientific impulse have been neither aroused nor cultivated in a young clergyman, he will be apt to regard it in others as a foe ; whereas it is both healthy and inevitable, and he himself will be an inefficient minister unless he share it. It is not too much to say that the University course in theology should be such as deliberately to foster this spirit, and to *ensure* the facing of theological difficulties by students before they leave it. For one who has not thought and doubted for himself cannot minister to the intellectual difficulties of others. One fears, however, that in many a parish the clergyman is rather the last than the first man to whom a person in such difficulties would be inclined to go : his point of view and mental attitude are such as to render him incapable of intelligent sympathy, or he may even lack the knowledge which makes honest doubt on some points a possibility. And if distrust, in the intellectual sphere, of clergy by laity, consequent upon generally felt differences between the clerical and lay types of mind, be not to increase, it is perhaps alone by modification of the system of education of the clerical mind in its earliest stages of development that the danger is to be averted. It is the man who has 'thought things through,' and has acquired his faiths not at second-hand but by battling for self-conviction, whose ministerial influence grows with the years ; and a University which would turn out such men must deliberately fashion its educational system accordingly. This is to say that, whatever else be left out—the New Testament alone excepted—room should be found in its curriculum for the essentials and fundamentals of Christian doctrine, as it stands confronted with the science and philosophy of the present day.

F. R. Tennant.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITALY

IN order to understand the history and the present situation of Italian industry and commerce it is necessary to throw a glance backwards to the events of 1876 and the years that followed. The statesmen trained in the school of Cavour had followed, though harshly perhaps, and without imagination, the lines of economic policy which he had laid down. They reduced expenditure to the minimum, they piled tax on tax, they faced popular clamour and bitter criticism, intelligent and unintelligent, but they accomplished their purpose. To quote Minghetti, the last of the Prime Ministers of the Right:

> 'No country has ever laid such heavy burdens on itself in order to meet its engagements. The owner of real estate often pays to the tax-collector one third or even half of his income. The patience of the taxpayer has been wonderful, but at last when revenue had overtaken expenditure, when we had brought the ship into harbour, the country turned against the men who had exacted such cruel sacrifices, and so the Right, which but lately was supported by three fourths of the assembly, has now but one fifth of the votes.'

The Left which then came into power was guided by men who had no experience of office, whose optimism was as unbounded as their inexperience in handling State affairs. They conceived that their mission was to gratify the country by making life easier, and to lead the people from the wilderness of 'arid fiscality' into the promised land of plenty. They flattered themselves that the credit which had been built up by stern economy was strong enough to support a régime of extravagant expenditure. Public works planned on an ambitious scale and demanding huge outlay were projected, and Italians were invited to believe that they lived in a Tom Tiddler's land where a beneficent shower of paper credit would take the place of gold, and drape the careworn Cinderella of the Right with gorgeous robes provided by the open-handed liberality of the Left.

Railway concessions for lines far in advance of the needs

of the country were bandied about, projectors, contractors, and sub-contractors all finding rich pickings in handling the liberal estimates that were passed by uncritical officials. A network of roads was projected through the wilds of the Apennines, useful no doubt, but bearing no relation to the necessities or cash resources of the time. Public works were laid out on a lavish scale and pushed on by questionable finance. In Rome the huge barrack of the Finance Ministry added room to room as the income to be handled diminished. When the Government called the tune it was but natural that the public should join in the dance of millions. The wild speculation in real estate that swept through the capital in the early 'eighties, like small-pox in an Indian tribe, was typical of what happened elsewhere, though in no other town was the gambling so furious. There the atmosphere was like that of a gold strike in the Woolly West. Everyone was ready to deal in lots anywhere and at any price, and the bucket-shop prices fluctuated madly from hour to hour. Ambitious projects for covering the Quirinal, the Esquiline, and districts still further afield, with sumptuous buildings were framed, discarded, and reissued on a more ambitious scale by men who with difficulty could meet their office expenses. When the building programme was actually passed on from the architect to the contractor money was advanced by the banks to meet weekly expenses. As the carcasses crept up from floor to floor, gaping cracks in the walls showed how recklessly foundations had been neglected. Even so the buildings were often left unfinished, or when completed often stood derelict till palaces, planned to house wealthy tenants, were let as tenements to families whose entire income would have been barely sufficient to pay the most modest percentage on the capital sunk, or in other cases were grabbed by squatters, so that sumptuous porticos gave shelter to the needy knife-grinder or were lighted up by the brazier of the tinker.

In the industrial world it was the same. The artificial stimulus of frenzied finance gave an unreal appearance of prosperity, and manufactures were started to provide goods in quantities far beyond what the country could absorb.

As was inevitable, the bottom soon fell out. Between 1881 and 1887 imports had risen from 1,240,000,000 lire to 1,600,000,000, while exports fell from 1,165,000,000 to

1,002,000,000. The breach of commercial relations with France in 1887, one result of Bismarck's master-stroke in alienating the two countries by pushing on France to occupy Tunis, was the last straw. The export and import trade with France withered away. The Paris Bourse was closed to Italian securities, and from 1888 to 1896 Italy was in the throes of an industrial and financial crisis. Events had terribly justified the warning that Minghetti gave to his successors when he handed over to them the reins of office: 'We leave to you 'the country set on the path to prosperity, the national 'balance sheet showing a surplus, the premium on gold wiped 'out. Woe to you if your policy should forfeit all these 'good things!' A reckless and profligate expenditure had in ten years shattered the equilibrium which had been so patiently and laboriously established. The cycle had come full round and the country had to pay the bill with tears and gnashing of teeth. That Italy should have, in a comparatively short time, recovered from such a desperate condition is an eloquent tribute to the elasticity of her resources and the sober enterprise of the business world, no less than to the innate thrift of the people. It creates a good augury that Italy, cast down to Mother Earth, will rise again like a Titan with renewed vigour from the stern trials of the great war.

Meanwhile the national credit was terribly shaken. In 1886 Consols had been bought at 102.87 lire. In 1894 they were sold as low as 82.64 lire. Banks had neglected the ordinary precepts of prudence, had locked up their capital in backing wild-cat schemes, or financing firms which, even if intrinsically sound, had traded far beyond their means. Many of these had from the outset been insolvent, nearly all were tottering, and the banks were impaled on the horns of a dilemma. They might call in advances from clients who could not repay them and would be tumbled into bankruptcy with consequences to themselves which they dared not face; they might persist in the policy of bolstering up dubious concerns on the off-chance that something or other might turn up to save the ship that was drifting straight on to the reefs of insolvency. They chose the latter alternative and so prolonged the agony. At last, about 1890, the crash came which had long been inevitable, which had but been accentuated and possibly accelerated by the criminal transactions of the Banca Romana.

In that year the issuing banks, the Banca Nazionale, the Banca Romana, the Banca Toscana, the Banco di Napoli, the Banca di Sicilia could not meet their liabilities. They could only keep their doors open by refusing to cash their own notes and illegally inflating their circulation. The premium on gold went up to fifteen and more per cent., while the budget showed a quite unmanageable deficit and commerce was shrinking. In 1888 the public revenue was 1,502,000,000 lire, the expenditure 1,989,000,000, and this though the Treasury was freely accused of cooking the accounts; the municipal indebtedness went up from 26 lire per head of population in 1882 to 38 lire in 1894. A more eloquent testimony of widespread distress may be found in the fact that the gross takings of the State lotteries fell from 79,000,000 lire in 1885 to 63,000,000 in 1895, while bankruptcies went up from 717 in 1883 to 2,212 in 1892.

In the hope of evolving order from chaos and of averting ruin the Banca d'Italia was created by the law of August, 1893. It absorbed three of the five issuing banks. The two southern banks, which have no shareholders, were allowed to survive and to continue the issue of notes. The difficulties which the managers had to face were such as might have appalled the boldest financiers. The known liabilities which the new bank shouldered were enormous, the unknown were perhaps even more threatening. There was first the liquidation of the bankrupt Banca Romana; there was the demand by the Government for advances which amounted on the average to 60,000,000 lire; there was a lock-up in assets of doubtful realization of 500,000,000 lire; there were bills which had to be renewed for 25,000,000 lire. In the background there were various finance companies too deeply compromised to survive, but which must be so far backed as to prevent their impending ruin from aggravating the crisis into irremediable disaster. Such were the Immobiliare, the Tiberina, the Banca Generale, the Credito Mobiliare, the Compagnia Fondiaria, the Risanamento di Napoli, and others. All these were practically insolvent, loaded up with land that could not be sold, with buildings that could not be let. It was not till 1907 that the market for real estate in Rome began to recover.

Meanwhile, the Banca d'Italia, under the guidance of its very able manager, Signor Stringher, who had succeeded

Signor Marchiori in 1900, had accomplished its task. It would be going too far afield to follow in detail the steps by which prosperity was evolved from ruin. A few figures must suffice to indicate the results obtained, and they are eloquent. In 1894 the note circulation covered up to 40 per cent. by gold was 808,000,000 lire, and that fully covered was only 43,000,000. In 1908, by which year the era of prosperity had fairly set in, these figures were respectively 496,000,000 and 856,000,000. During the same period the liquid reserve had gone up from 383,000,000 to 1,130,000,000, and the dividend from 2.5 per cent. to 6.33 per cent., while the improvement in the national finances is indicated by the fact that the advances to the Treasury were reduced between 1894 and 1903 from 66,000,000 to 2,000,000. After that this item no longer figured in the balance sheet, and the ground was prepared for the reduction of interest on the national debt in 1907 from 4 per cent. to 3.75 per cent. The record is one of which any bank might be proud, and it is impossible to overrate the services rendered to Italy by the extraordinary ability shown in disentangling the Gordian knot.

While the Banca d'Italia was thus handling a complicated and almost desperate financial situation, the other side of banking, that concerned with developing the industrial resources of the country, was taken in hand by the Banca Commerciale Italiana. Much has been written about this corporation both in this country and in Italy, but few people in England realize how from small beginnings it developed like Jonah's gourd till in a very few years it had become a real *imperium in imperio*. Imagine a huge corporation in London absorbing the business of four-fifths of our joint stock banks, financial trusts, and company promoting firms, controlling all the more important shipping lines, represented on the directorate of nearly all the steel works of the country, controlling half the electric supply companies, holding Lancashire in its grasp, dictating its policy to the *Times* and to scores of the country newspapers, with agents in every important town able to exercise an influence on political and municipal elections as great as the Unionist or Radical caucus; with an influence on the Prime Minister comparable to that wielded by Delane, and making important treaties such as that of Lausanne in its bank parlour. Imagine this

fantastic vision and you get some idea of the power of the Banca Commerciale.

In 1895, when Italy was still in the throes of the financial disorder referred to above, and when the French money market was closed to it, Signor Crispi turned to Germany for help. With the backing of his friend Bismarck he invited German capitalists to found a commercial bank in Italy, and they responded with alacrity. A group of the most important banks took a hand in the business and provided the modest amount of capital necessary and, what was far more important, a staff of directors, some of whom were men of real financial genius. Of the 20,000,000 lire invested 74 per cent. was put up by German, Austrian, and Swiss capitalists. One may fairly assume that in casting their bread upon the waters of what then seemed a turbulent and unpromising sea, the shrewd organizers of the enterprise had two objects in view: to take advantage of the opening for trade provided by the 1891 Italo-German commercial treaty and to exploit the nascent hydro-electrical industry, of which these far-sighted men already anticipated the future importance. This initial capital of 20,000,000 lire has been by successive increases raised to 156,000,000, and, what is still more interesting, whereas the capital was at first almost entirely Germanic it has become preponderatingly Italian. Originally the German shares were 29,700 and the Italian 6,800; in the end the proportion was reversed. In 1914 the Germanic shares went down to 7,400, the Italian rose to 195,400. In spite of this the policy of the bank remained in German hands, and the Italian shareholders were content that it should be so. In 1895 they quite justifiably distrusted both the capacity and the honesty of Italian managers. The lesson burnt into them by the disasters of the past years was too dreadful to be easily forgotten. They trusted the Banca Commerciale, and deposits flowed in till they amounted in 1913 to 232,837,000 lire.

This confidence was justified by the phenomenal success of the bank's operations. It has during the twenty years of its existence taken part in the foundation or development of 150 companies with a capital of 1,333,000,000 lire. It has also had a large share in financing important private firms as well as railway companies. The stimulus to industry given by the Banca Commerciale to investment has been not only

direct but indirect. Of 1,060 public companies now registered in Italy only 160 were in existence before 1894 and 900 have been registered since. Of these latter there are 183 electrical concerns, of which there was not one in 1894; while of the 58 Italian banks, large and small, 33 were founded after that date. How and to what extent the Banca Commerciale furthered the development of the importation of German manufactures into Italy need not here be discussed. That part of the story will be illustrated further on. The above figures furnish, however, some indication of the strides made by Italy towards its evolution from an agricultural into an industrial community.

In spite, however, of the diversion of so much labour from farm to factory (from 1903 to 1911 the numbers employed in industry went up from 1,275,000 to 2,304,000) agriculture has been intensified. Thus the wheat crop increased from 3,631,000 tons in 1881 to 5,845,000 tons in 1913; that of maize from 2,135,000 tons to 2,753,000 tons (note how much larger the absolute and proportionate increase has been in the production of the higher class grain); sugar from 63 tons to 305,000 tons. Notwithstanding the larger home production of wheat, the importation, in spite of considerable fluctuations depending on good or bad harvests, has shown a marked upward tendency from 154,000 tons to 1,810,000. Thus the total wheat available for consumption went up in these years from 3,785,000 tons to 7,655,000. The population in 1881 was 28,300,000; in 1913, 35,250,000; so that in the former year the consumption of wheat per head was 133 kilograms, in the latter 216. This is, of course, not quite exact, as in each year some part of the stock must be deducted for seed and for industrial use, but the increase of say 50 or 60 per cent. is remarkable. In all this there is a very clear proof of improved spending power and national well-being, and similar indications might be found by an examination of the whole range of production and imports.

The greater output of farms per acre is due in great part at least to the increased use of artificial manures. As an indication of the condition in Tuscany in the 'eighties in this respect a personal reminiscence may not be out of place. The present writer was then farming in Tuscany and decided to try artificial manures. With some difficulty he unearthed a small

office in which sat the sub-agent of a Milan firm who seemed to have no more important business on hand than that of smoking 'Toscani' and catching flies. This gentleman was quite pleased to get what was apparently his first order, and eventually some sacks were forwarded from Milan bearing the trade-mark of the St. Gobain factory in France. Superphosphates were practically unknown till about 1893, in which year it was first thought worth while to record their consumption in official statistics. In that year it was 72,000 tons, in 1913 it was 972,000 tons. During these years a great number of *consorzi agrari* (farmers' clubs) were established in Italy. Working on the lines of the Syndicats Agricoles of France, their aim is to promote the use of agricultural implements, seeds, and manures. A glance at the work done by one of them, that of Florence, from its foundation in 1889 to 1913, may serve as a sample of what has been accomplished. The membership increased from 400 in 1889 to 1,684 in 1908. The club has also started several subsidiary clubs in the province, and has spent considerable sums in providing propaganda teachers, who travel through the province giving lectures and practical demonstrations. It is owing at least in part to its work that the production of wheat has in the Florentine district gone up from 7.5 quintals to 11.9 quintals to the hectare. This very small yield per hectare would be far greater but for the fact that the fields in which wheat is grown are nearly always planted with vines and olive trees.

But though the country as a whole has made great strides in advance, this progress has not been equally marked in all districts. The south still lags behind the north. There are several causes to which the relative backwardness of the south is due. The chief factors are, first, the large number of big estates whose absentee owners are content to draw a small rental from neglected farms on which cultivation is carried out on a purely 'extensive' system. Besides this, the introduction of better methods of agriculture is very seriously hampered by the centuries' old custom which allows huge flocks of sheep and goats to be driven in spring and autumn from the lowlands to the hills and back, over 'roads' which give them a recognized claim to over-ride all rights of private property. Their passage is like the passage of a locust swarm. Secondly, it is due to the absence of a prosperous

industrial community such as has almost everywhere, where agriculture is developed, provided the capital for high farming. Besides this, in the south the inhabitants tend to live not on the farms where they are employed, but grouped in villages, which are often situated at a great distance from the place where they work, and thus they waste hours daily trudging to and fro. This habit is due in part to the prevalence of malaria in the low-lying plains, in part to the vicissitudes of local history. The south was till comparatively recent times much exposed to the forays of corsairs. It was not till last century that the robber strongholds of Algiers and Tunis were finally destroyed, and the habit of living in walled villages for safety's sake still survives. Thus in the north half of the kingdom, in spite of its larger industrial population, 42 per cent. of the inhabitants live in small hamlets or in farmhouses. In the south, including the islands, the proportion is only 15 per cent.

The distribution of irrigation is part of the same story. In 1915 there were, in the whole kingdom, 104,000 hectares irrigated by water provided under government concessions. Of these 91,000 were in Lombardy, Venetia, and Emilia. In the Puglie, where such supply of water is especially needed to remedy the effects of drought, there were but 478 hectares so treated. The completion of the great Apulian Canal, which has for so many years been the object of acrimonious political and technical controversy, will alleviate distress. But the whole problem must sooner or later—the sooner the better—be dealt with on a big and comprehensive scale. In this part of Italy more than elsewhere the torrential rains rush down to the sea as soon as they fall on the hills that have been denuded of their forests, spreading devastation where they might distribute fertility, and converting the alluvial plains that fringe the coast-line into pestilential marshes. The process was graphically described by Horace when he tells of a stream

> 'Now gliding gently o'er its bed
> Along to the Etruscan main,
> Now whirling onward fierce and fast
> Uprooted trees and boulders vast
> And flocks and houses, all in drear
> Confusion tossed from shore to shore,

While mountains far and forest near
Reverberate the rising roar
When lashing rains among the hills
To fury wake the quiet rills.'

He had no doubt often looked at scenes which are at least as common now. After a day of heavy rain, one may see the inhabitants of hamlets or cottages by the river side hurriedly carrying off their household goods to a place of safety, while the turbulent stream undermines the cliff on which the houses stand and threatens at any moment to whirl them away in the general ruin.

The remedy for this must be looked for by action on two different lines, which are indeed complementary one of the other: the reafforestation of the hills, and the construction of barrages for the creation of artificial lakes which will regulate the floods and distribute the rainfall evenly throughout the year, providing for irrigation and for a head of water for the service of hydro-electric stations. The development of hydro-electric power will, among other services too numerous to detail, render economically possible the establishment of pumping stations for the drainage of the plains. By the reafforestation of the hills and the drainage of the plains vast areas in Southern Italy now barren can be rendered fertile. It is, indeed, in these southern provinces and in the islands that the true ' Italia irredenta ' is to be found. The desolate sites of Sybaris and Croton might and must again become a synonym for wealth and abundant fertility. Though it may take more than one generation or two to make good the ruin due to twenty centuries of neglect, brigandage, and invasions, it is a safe prophecy to predict that before the end of the century the waste lands that border the Ionian Sea will be reclaimed, and that the squalid villages that disfigure the seats of ancient opulence will be replaced by towns that may in part at least reproduce the glorious buildings and gardens that aroused the admiration of Herodotus and his contemporaries when they visited the most splendid colonies of Magna Græcia. Meanwhile, one great step has already been taken. Last September a viceregal decree of exceptional importance for the southern provinces and the islands was issued, under the provisions of which during the next ten years 150,000,000 lire will be lent at 4 per cent., for the purpose

of assisting agricultural improvements, to associations undertaking the drainage and reclamation of uncultivated land and schemes of irrigation and water storage. A further sum of 20,000,000 lire is assigned for the development of those districts in which for any reason the State itself will undertake the necessary work.

But though it is the contrast in the condition of agriculture between north and south that most forcibly strikes the traveller, symptoms of that diversity which almost divides the peninsula into two distinct nations may be found in many directions.

Take for example emigration, a movement which is indeed pretty closely allied to agricultural conditions. The emigration from the north is mostly that of men fairly well-to-do, who go usually to Europe or the Levant in search of higher wages. From the south emigration is on a far larger scale and is transoceanic. The southern emigrants are either driven out by grinding poverty or allured by the promises of emigration agents. They go either permanently or for long periods. This movement of the population is the main reason why the increase in those districts is so much smaller than that of the kingdom as a whole. That increase is 3 per thousand in the Marche, 4.6 in Campania, 3.9 in Sicily, while in Basilicata there is an absolute decrease of 3.3, and this though the birth-rate ranges from 22 per thousand in Piedmont to 37 in Apulia and 33 in Calabria.

As an offset to this loss by emigration very large sums of money are sent back from abroad by the individual emigrants. Signor M. L. Rossi puts this at 500,000,000 lire a year without taking into account that which is brought back by returning emigrants.* Signor Stringher, a no less competent authority, puts the latter sum at 75,000,000 but reduces the former to 412,000,000. Be that as it may, the observant traveller wandering about central and southern Italy is struck with the fact that there is hardly a village in which one or more English-speaking residents may not be found, many of whom have bought farm or house with the savings of their earnings abroad. Yet there is a very large Italian population living

* It is relevant to note that in Buenos Ayres the demand for Italian 5 and 10 lire notes is so great that they are at times sold at a considerable premium.

outside the mother country. Emigration has, though with fluctuations, gone up pretty steadily from 135,000 in 1881 to 872,000 in 1913, of which numbers 41,000 and 559,000 respectively crossed the Atlantic. The population in the same period has increased from 28,000,000 to 35,000,000 (say, 25 per cent). It is estimated that 5,550,000 Italians reside outside the kingdom, that is, about 14 per cent. of all Italians. Of these 4,445,000 are in America.

Another indication of the higher development of the north is found in the educational statistics. The 'Analfabeti' of six years old and upwards were in 1913 for the whole kingdom 46.7 per cent., for Piedmont 11 per cent., for Tuscany 37 per cent., for Calabria 69 per cent. Criminal statistics tell a similar tale, the south showing a far worse record than the north.

The Italian Government raises a considerable revenue from three government monopolies: tobacco, salt, and the public lotteries. It is often urged that the two latter are gravely prejudicial to the national well-being. The high price of salt sold under the monopoly results in the quantity consumed being insufficient for the maintenance of health and is a serious disadvantage to the cattle farmer. The week by week gamble in the 'lotto' is disastrous. In Naples especially the police courts have constantly to deal with embezzlement and bankruptcies that are traced to it. In the town of Naples the annual 'lotto' expenditure per head of the population is no less than 19.76 lire, and the total takings from the lotto are 26,874,000 lire, as compared with 5,883,000 lire in Milan, that is, 3 lire per inhabitant in Milan and 19 in Naples.

Again, the deposits per head of the population in savings banks and in the post office range from 207 lire in Piedmont, and 197 lire in Lombardy, to 89 lire in Calabria, and 81 lire in Sicily. From the days of Verres till the last of the Bourbons was swept into the rubbish heap amid howls of execration, southern Italy was the victim of misgovernment. The evil that men do lives after them, and traces of that misgovernment still survive to corrupt political and municipal life in the districts which it defiled. One return provides eloquent testimony of this. In Sicily 28.5 per cent., in the Apulia 25.8 of municipal councils were dissolved in the five years 1910 to 1914, 'for serious offences

'or violations of the law.' In the same period the proportion in Piedmont was 2.5 per cent., in Venetia 1.4 per cent. Anyone who was interested in the local politics of Italy some years ago will remember the violent polemics that raged on this subject in the Chamber and in the public press. These offences came mainly under three heads: the 'stuffing' of ballot boxes in political and municipal elections, the corrupt dealing with communal property, such as forests, pasture land, etc., and the iniquitous administration of the Dazio Consumo, under which the goods of wealthy or influential inhabitants were admitted into the towns duty free or at a low rate, while the needy farmers had to pay to the last centesimo on the eggs or fruit or wine which they brought in from their poor little farms. In this connection it may be noted that in one year recently the Dazio Consumo of Naples showed a loss on its working!

In spite of all this the south is making headway towards political honesty and prosperity. Rome was not built in a day, still less Naples. Though much has been done, much remains to do. The vineyards and the orange groves of Sicily, Calabria, and Campania, no less than the big steel works growing up in Naples, and the most interesting development of home industries, embroidery, carpet and rug weaving, etc., in other provinces bear witness to southern enterprise and intelligence, and it is confidently anticipated that after the war the utilization of the latent water-power of the southern Apennines will do much towards giving the southern provinces, and also Sardinia, a share in the industrial 'Risorgimento.'

But if the south still lags behind the north in the industrial development which has been the mark of recent years, taking the kingdom as a whole that development has been prodigious, as is proved by the published statistics of the hands employed in the various branches of manufacture. Moreover, it is important to note that the larger use of electricity as a source of power has brought with it a larger output per head in textile industries.

With regard to foreign trade Signor Lanino has in his volumes* collected and analysed a great mass of information throwing

---

* 'La Nuova Italia Industriale' by P. Lanino (4 vols.).

light on the development of Italian foreign trade during the years under consideration. This has increased *pari passu* with the growth of home production.

With some marked fluctuations, of which the causes and importance will be noticed further on, the growth of both exports and imports has been on the whole continuous. The following table tells its own story :

	Imports.		Exports.	
	Total Million Lire.	Per Head Lire.	Total Million Lire.	Per Head Lire.
1881	1,240	43.7	1,165	41.1
1913	3,650	102.9	2,500	70.9

In the same years the imports and exports from and to the most important States in millions of lire were :

	U.K.		France.		Germany.		U.S.A.		Argentina.	
	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.
1881	307	82	330	524	66	67	63	57	12	20
1913	591	261	284	231	613	344	523	267	166	185

The great development of trade with Argentina must in part at least be attributed to the large Italian population resident there, and is a valuable set-off to any loss to the country due to emigration. Trade follows the flag, but it also follows the man, and the enormous export of Italian goods, including Italian wines, to Argentina is a result of the large Italian population there settled.

The growth of German trade has been phenomenal. Of the total imports in 1913 Germany supplied 77 per cent. of dye-stuffs, 54 per cent. of steel goods, 67 per cent. of optical and electrical instruments, 65 per cent. of railway stock. In the same year the Central Empires absorbed 79 per cent. of fruit and vegetable produce, or 58 per cent. of unprepared vegetable produce, but only 3.5 per cent. of such prepared produce as wine, oil, and preserves.

Of the political events during the period under review the four which had an important bearing on Italian trade were :

(1) The break in commercial relations with France in 1887.
(2) The commercial treaty with Germany in 1891 (three years before the establishment of the Banca Commerciale).
(3) The settling of a *modus vivendi* with France in 1897.
(4) The supplementary treaty with Germany which came into operation in 1906.

The breach with France had disastrous consequences for both countries, but especially for Italy. Both exports and imports, which had for some years been showing a healthy growth, went down with a run. Since 1870 more than half of Italian exports had gone to France. They were reduced by over 50 per cent., and in spite of some recovery after the *modus vivendi* they have never returned to what they were. In 1913, instead of covering half the total, they represented hardly one-twelfth. A very important item had been the export of wine. This was absolutely destroyed by a strictly prohibitive tariff, with deplorable results to the wine-grower. In Tuscany, for instance, where the price had for some years been steady at about 40 lire the quintal, it went down almost at once to 20 lire, at about which price it remained for many years.

It was not until 1898 that Italian exports again reached the level at which they stood in 1876. But it would be a mistake to attribute the whole of this loss to the quarrel with France ; some considerable part at least was due to the financial crisis to which attention has been already called.

The commercial treaty with Germany in 1891 initiated a tendency for Italian imports from Germany to increase more rapidly than her exports to Germany. One argument urged at the time in favour of this treaty, which has, in even greater measure than was anticipated, proved injurious to the industrial districts of the north, was that any loss which the northern manufacturer might sustain would, on balance of national advantage, be countervailed by a development of agricultural exports from the south. This hope has proved to a great extent illusory.

The establishment of the *modus vivendi* with France in 1897 was immediately followed by a remarkable development, especially in imports. The supplementary treaty with Ger-

many in 1906 was also followed by a very marked importation from that country, especially of manufactured goods, which continued till 1912. The ability of Italy to meet this unfavourable balance of trade, amounting of late years to about 1,000,000,000 lire, is due to the large imports of gold (*a*) in the shape of money spent in the country by tourists, and (*b*) to the remittances by emigrants, which together also amount to about 1,000,000,000 lire.

Without going into minute detail, it may be broadly stated that up to the outbreak of war imports of raw material came mainly from the United Kingdom, from countries under British influence, and from the U.S.A.; that in partly manufactured goods Germany had begun to take the lead, closely followed by the United Kingdom and France; that in wholly manufactured goods Germany was easily first, followed by England, who made a bad second, and was followed in turn by France. The Italian market is too important to be neglected by our manufacturers, as it apparently has been of late years, and it will be more important still when Italy has emerged from her purifying purgatory of war *a riveder le stelle.*

For, indeed, those who know Italy feel confident that her star is in the ascendant. Beneath a surface show of frivolity and *poco curantism* there is a sound substratum of sturdy patriotism and strong resolve, which promises to lift the country, in the moral no less than the practical sphere, to a higher level than any to which she has attained in the past. Subjected to the strain of war and want and manifold anxiety the population shows a power of resistance and resilience greater than could have been anticipated. From the Alps to the Ionian Sea the people are being welded into a homogeneous mass on the anvil of war by the heavy hammer of discipline. A community of purpose has, observers tell us, developed in the army a type of expression, if not of feature, which is no longer regional but national.

L'Italia unita sotto il sardo Re becomes now not an aspiration but a fact, and we find in her a survival of the old Roman grit which enabled the Republic to pass safely through the years of tribulation that led from the disaster of Cannæ to the triumph of the Metaurus.

E. Strachan Morgan.

ALSACE-LORRAINE AND DEMOCRACY

1. **The Question of Alsace-Lorraine.** By JULES DUHEM. Hodder & Stoughton. 1918.
2. **Histoire d'Alsace.** By ROD. REUSS. 1916.
3. **Souvenirs diplomatiques de Russie et d'Allemagne.** By LE MARQUIS DE GABRIAC. Paris. 1896.
4. **Les Martyrs d'Alsace et de Lorraine.** By ANDRÉ FRIBOURG. Paris. 1916.
5. **Questions Contemporaines.** By FUSTEL DE COULANGES. Paris.

NOW that Alsace-Lorraine has been given a definite and prominent place among the peace conditions of the Allies, it is imperative that every sensible man outside France should be able to form his own judgment on a question the solution of which is bound to affect the welfare of the world. Too many side-issues have been allowed to obscure hitherto the fundamental point involved in the case. True to their traditional temperament many Englishmen have been fond of laying stress on the sentimental tie which unites France and her lost provinces. Others have been interested in the economic consequences of the return to France of the iron ore of Lorraine. All these are secondary aspects of the question.

The fundamental problem raised by Alsace-Lorraine was clearly defined in a speech by M. Georges Leygues on October 12th, 1917, which received the approval of the whole French Chamber, not excluding the group of the Minority Socialists.

'The history of the nineteenth century (said M. Leygues) is nothing but a long struggle between two conceptions of international justice. The treaty of Frankfort was only the momentary triumph secured by the ancient conception embodied in the Prussian State, that might is right; the uninterrupted protest of France against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine is the affirmation of the existence and vitality of the new international conception, accepted by all the free peoples of the world.'

In other words, owing to historical circumstances the possession by Prussia of Alsace-Lorraine is at the same time

the sign and the condition of the predominance of that ancient conception of State right which was upset by the French Revolution and which has been revived by what we call Prussian Militarism. This is the ground fact of the situation, and when it is fully understood and accepted by the other democracies, they will also understand the attitude of France towards such a question as that of the plebiscite and the intimate relationship existing between the question of Alsace-Lorraine and other problems of nationality raised by the war.

Let us then look at the real import of the Bismarckian decision of 1871. It has been called a crime and, worse than that, as Talleyrand would have said, a blunder. It was an act of brutal political retrogression.

There was at that time in Europe one nation, and one nation only, which was the real embodiment of the right of self-determination. That nation was France. An aggregate of the most various races and, as Nietzsche put it later on, a sort of point of fusion between the North and the South, France had at first grown up, as every other country, under the dynastic principle which was the ancient law of Europe. But the great Revolution came and, for the first time in European history, a national unity became both conscious and voluntary. In face of what we have just been witnessing in Russia, such demonstrations of national common will as took place in Paris on July 14th, 1790, are indeed decisively significant. There was at that time in France no Finland and no Ukraine. Even the revolt of the Vendée was far from being a separatist movement. It was that very unanimity of patriotic feeling which allowed the representatives of the nation not only to proclaim the indivisibility of France but to adopt the principle of self-determination for all peoples.

'The French Republic,' stated the Constitution drafted by Condorcet in 1793, 'will wage war only to maintain liberty, preserve its territory, and defend its Allies. It solemnly renounces the reuniting to its own territory of any foreign country, unless a wish to this effect is freely expressed by the majority of the inhabitants of such a country and only in a case when the countries which are asking for such a union have not been incorporated in and united to another nation by a social covenant embodied in a previous and freely adopted Constitution.'*

* *Gazette Nationale*, February 19th, 1793.

Thus the very existence of the French nation was based on a universal principle which none of the subsequent governments of France, however autocratic, ever dared to challenge. Napoleon III. himself became its champion before the world, and was careful to abide by it when Savoie and Nice were united to France in 1860.

The case of Alsace and of Lorraine was not different from that of any of the other provinces which signed the national covenant of the Revolution. These provinces, like the majority of the eastern districts of France, had been attached for a time to the Holy Roman Empire, but they had never known anything resembling a national sentiment before they became French. Their moral absorption by France had been completed long before the Revolution broke out. Metz, Toul, and Verdun had been French since 1559. The rest of Lorraine came under the allegiance of the King of France only in 1766, but it had been penetrated by French influence and feeling for so many years that in 1792 no province offered a more vigorous resistance to the invader from the east. The main part of Alsace (Upper and Lower Alsace, the Sundgau, the ten Imperial towns, and Brisach) had been given over to France as early as 1648; Strasburg had become French in 1681, at about the same time as Lille and Besançon with the surrounding provinces of French Flanders and Franche-Comté. A skilful administration, which can only be compared with the best type of modern protectorates, succeeded in winning over the goodwill of the inhabitants in a surprisingly short time. The testimony of Schmettau, the Prussian Minister in Paris, writing in 1709, that the Alsatians were more French than the Parisians, is well known. We have had quite recently an even more striking admission on the part of a German professor, Dr. Martin Fassbender, who wrote in the Pangermanist review, *Deutsche Politik*, of January 18th, 1918:

'The French may be a frivolous and hard people (Voltaire, who surely knew his countrymen, calls them a nation as frivolous as barbarous, and we have known them as such during this war), but one has to own that they understand marvellously how to assimilate an annexed people. A remarkable instance of the attitude of France in this respect is to be found in an exchange of letters in 1659 between the Minister Colbert and his brother Colbert de Croissy, the first Governor (Intendant) of Alsace. The minister

urges his brother to see that the inhabitants of Alsace should be better treated than the inhabitants of the other German provinces, and at the same time to take care that the clergy should be so treated as to use their influence to render the inhabitants of Alsace good Frenchmen. The result was that, as early as 1675, when German troops invaded these provinces, they not only met with complete indifference but with hostility on the part of the inhabitants.'

It was, however, the great Revolution which finally riveted Lorraine and Alsace for ever to the French nation. The fact that the Marseillaise was composed and first sung in Strasburg has indeed a symbolical meaning; and no less significant is the fact that it was the Alsatian people themselves who put up, in June, 1790, on the Kehl Bridge, a board with the inscription: 'Here begins the Country of Liberty!' Indeed, no other province in France responded more eagerly to the call of 1789, nor took a more prominent part in the romantic struggle against Europe which recreated the national soul. The very first form assumed by the revolutionary enthusiasm was that of numerous and solemn manifestations in favour of national unity. Each important town insisted on sending a separate address of loyal devotion; so did the delegates for the whole of both provinces. Some of these addresses were couched in a naïve language which is worth recalling. For instance, on March 18th, 1790, the citizens of Strasburg sent to the National Assembly an address in the following terms:

'On this square, where our fathers gave themselves to France only with regret, we have assembled in order to cement our union with her by our solemn oaths. We have sworn, and we swear, to shed our blood to the last drop to maintain the Constitution. If the city of Strasburg had not the glory of being the first to set an example to the other towns of the realm, it will have at least that of being, by the energetic patriotism of its inhabitants, one of the strongest bulwarks of French liberty.'*

Subsequent deeds proved the fundamental sincerity of these utterances. Merlin de Douai could legitimately declare before the National Assembly, on October 28th, 1790, that the time was now past 'when kings, skilfully using the title of 'pastors of the peoples bestowed upon them in another sense 'by the sacred books, could dispose as proprietors of those they

* Reuss, 'Histoire d'Alsace,' p. 226.

'called their flock'; that 'the Alsatian people had clearly 'manifested a year ago their wish to be united to France'; that 'nothing but their will had determined or legitimised 'that union'; that, in a word, Alsace had become French only 'because she wanted to be so.'*

Such was the national union, publicly proclaimed by the people, and made even more intimate by the common ideal for which the country has stood in Europe since 1789, that was broken up by Bismarck in 1871. The violation of what democracy has come to regard as the very essence of international justice was twofold.

In the first place, both provinces were torn from France in spite of the clearly expressed and unanimous will of their inhabitants. If anybody still cherishes the slightest doubt as to the genuineness of the historical demonstration of Bordeaux it is enough to recall that the representatives elected on February 8th, 1871, by Lorraine and Alsace had received a specific mandate as regards the conditions of peace; moreover, that the elections took place in a country which had for several months been occupied by Prussian troops. The representatives of Lorraine and Alsace in the Bordeaux Assembly had therefore an unquestionable right to speak on behalf of their constituents when they read on February 16th the declaration which was to remain for the French, in spite of the enforced acceptance of the treaty of Frankfort, a sort of second Declaration of the Rights of Man.

After stating that Alsace and Lorraine refused to be detached from France and that France could not consent to the annexation of both provinces by Germany, they claimed that Europe could not allow such a wrong to be perpetrated:

'Modern Europe (they said) cannot allow a people to be seized like a vile herd. She cannot be deaf to the repeated protests of the threatened populations. She owes it to her own interest to prohibit such an abuse of power. She knows, besides, that the unity of France is to-day, as in the past, a guarantee to the general order of the world, a barrier against the spirit of conquest and invasion. A peace made at the price of a cession of territory would

* Quoted by Georges Delahache. Alsace-Lorraine, 'La Carte au Liseré vert,' 1911, p. 41. It may be recalled that Mulhouse, which had been an independent Republic, spontaneously voted its union to France in 1798.

be nothing but a ruinous truce and would not be a final peace. It would be for all a cause of internal troubles, a permanent and legitimate inducement to war.'

The end of the declaration is equally worth quoting, in view of the debated question of the referendum :

' In consequence of which we inform our countrymen in France, the governments and the peoples of the whole world, that we hold in advance to be null and void all acts and treaties, *vote or plebiscite* (italics mine), which might consent to the cession to a foreign country of whole or part of our provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. We proclaim hereby to be for ever inviolable the right of the Alsatians and Lorrainers to remain members of the French nation, and we swear, in our name as well as in the name of our constituents, of our children and their offspring, to vindicate that right eternally, by all means and against all usurpers.'

By annexing both provinces in spite of this solemn protest Bismarck clearly revealed what he thought of self-determination. But it may not be generally realized that he went one step further.

Although the constitution of the new German Empire was an autocratic one, the different States destined to be component parts of that Empire were in some way consulted as to the contemplated extension of the North German Confederation. Thus the Parliaments of Baden, Hesse, Würtemberg, and Bavaria were all given an opportunity for expressing their approval of the new constitutional ties which were to unite them henceforth to victorious Prussia. Alsace-Lorraine alone was treated as a kind of extra-European colony. She was made a Reichsland by the Act of June 9th, 1871, without being asked what sort of constitution she would desire. She was deliberately enslaved for the benefit of German unity. The sham constitutions of 1879 and 1911 were granted to her in the same way. Her people were never consulted as regards constitutional matters any more than they had been concerning their nationality.

Merely to express indignation about such a double and continuous violation of the rights of a civilized people is useless. From the point of view of the German world outlook (*weltanschauung*) Bismarck's policy towards Alsace-Lorraine was sound and legitimate.

Bismarck himself laid much stress on the so-called ' glacis '

theory: Germany must keep the whole of Alsace-Lorraine in order to be better protected against France. This is clearly brought out in his conversation with the French Chargé d'Affaires, the Marquis de Gabriac, in 1871:

'I have no illusions Monsieur le Marquis (said Bismarck); it would not be logical to have taken from you Metz, which is French, if an imperative necessity did not compel us to keep it. . . . When the question was examined before the Kaiser, the General Staff asked me whether I could guarantee that France would not, one day or another, take her "revanche." I answered that, on the contrary, I was convinced that this war was not very likely to be the last of those which would break out between both countries. In such a situation, I was told, Metz is a "*glacis*" behind which may be put one hundred thousand men; therefore we had to keep it. I would say the same of Alsace and Lorraine. In taking them from you, we should have made a blunder if peace were to be lasting, for these provinces will be a source of difficulty for us later on.

'A Venetia, with France behind?' said Gabriac.

'Yes,' said Bismarck, 'a Venetia with France behind.'*

At the same time writers like Sybel and Wagner tried to prove that Alsace and Lorraine had been stolen from Germany by Louis XIV., thus wholly disregarding the fact that in 1648 there was no such thing as a German nation. Stress was also laid upon the fact that most Alsatians spoke a German dialect, though it is equally true that the Basques and the peasants of Brittany have an idiom of their own, and half the Belgians speak Flemish. In addition it was argued that the Vosges formed a comfortable geographical limit for Germany; that the Rhine, as old Arndt had already said in 1813, ought to be German from its source up to the sea, and that consequently Alsace and Lorraine must belong to Germany. Such sophistry was easy to refute. It was dealt with by the French historian Fustel de Coulanges, among others, in his famous answer to Mommsen (October, 1870):

'You invoke the principle of nationality, but you understand that principle in a different way from the whole of Europe. According to you, this principle would make it lawful for a powerful State to lay hold of a province by force, provided only that it can be asserted that such a province is inhabited by the same race as the State concerned. According to Europe and to common sense, this principle simply makes it lawful for a province or a

* De Gabriac, 'Souvenirs diplomatiques.' 1896, p. 140.

population not to obey a foreign master against their wish. . . . Reflect where we should be led to if the principle of nationality were understood in the Prussian sense and if Prussia succeeded in making it the rule of European politics. Prussia would have henceforth the right to seize Holland. She would then plunder Austria on the pretext that Austria was foreign to her own German provinces. Later on she would claim from Switzerland all the German-speaking cantons. Turning finally to Russia, she would ask for the province of Livonia, and the town of Riga, which are inhabited by the German race : this is at any rate your own contention.'*

Fustel was undoubtedly right. Unfortunately so also was Mommsen, so were all the German Professors and Bismarck himself in regard to the Prussian faith. What was a crime under the moral code of democracy was a logical and legitimate act under the code of the Prussian Walhalla. How this systematic Prussian conception first originated is a matter of debate. Some writers lay stress on the continuous political tradition inherited from the Knights of the Teutonic Order. Others argue that Fichte† and Hegel were almost as fully responsible for it as Frederick the Great. What is indisputable is that the Prussian doctrine is based on a number of philosophico-political principles which have been, and still are, repeatedly developed by the official leaders of German thought. These principles may be briefly summarized.

1. *There is nothing above the State.* This is clearly laid down by Treitschke :

' The State is the people united by the law and considered as an independent power. The State is the power which has the right and the means of enforcing its will by the force of arms on any foreign will ; it is a free, sovereign power which cannot submit to any other will than its own. What distinguishes the State from all other associations is that it does not recognize any power superior to itself.†

2. *The highest moral duty of the State is to develop its own power.* This is one of Bernhardi's formulas.‡ It is however, directly derived from Treitschke, who was careful to point out that the State could not be bound by considerations of individual or

* ' Questions Contemporaines,' p. 92.
† Treitschke : ' Zehn Jahre deutscher kämpfe.' Vol. II., p. 238.
‡ Bernhardi : ' Germany and the Next War.' French translation, 1916, p. 41

social morality, being itself the very embodiment of the highest good.

3. *There is no international law.* Treitschke again was one of the first to lay down that the State could not bind itself for ever under any agreement of an international character. Three years before this war, his disciple Bernhardi put the point even more clearly:

'There has never been a universal law and there cannot be one. Certain subjects may be dealt with by an international code but the whole of the life of the peoples of the world is not susceptible of codification. Even if this were attempted, even if a universal international code of law were to be framed, no people could sacrifice to such a code its own ideas without renouncing its highest ideal, without committing a wrong in regard to its own conception of right, without degrading itself.'*

4. *The modern principle of nationality must be understood in a purely materialistic sense.* The State being supreme, the right of nationalities does not mean that the national will shall prevail, but that the State may utilize, in view of developing its own power, opportunities derived from racial or geographical circumstances. Moreover, as territory is more important than population from the point of view of the State —for inhabitants may be replaced while territory cannot be removed—territorial considerations must always go first.

This logical consequence was already drawn by the German professors of 1870. How deeply contemporary Germany has been permeated with this view can be gathered from hundreds of candid utterances such as the following one:

'The Frenchman or the Französling, has no right, even if he did form the majority of the population of Alsace-Lorraine, to carry away German land with him. . . . We alone have a right over the land: not only as *beati possidentes*, but for historic, ethnical and geographical reasons.'†

5. *War is necessary and sacred.* This crowning point is again derived from the original conception of the State. Nobody made it clearer than Treitschke:

'War (he wrote) is not only a practical necessity, it is also a theoretical necessity, a logical requirement. The concept of State

---

* Bernhardi, p. 25.

† *Tägliche Rundschau*, October 11th, 1917.

implies the concept of war, for the essence of the State is power. . . . Whoever dreams of perpetual peace is not only asking for an impracticable thing but also for a preposterous one.'*

And again he expressed his views—those of the whole of Prussianized Germany—in the following sentence, which Bernhardi quotes with delight:

'The living God will always see that war shall reappear as a terrible remedy for mankind.'†

Such is the national religion in the name of which Alsace-Lorraine was seized and made a tool to further the ends of the Prussian State. It is the religion of militarism, and to-day it is the religion of the great mass of the German people, not excluding the Social Democrats. If anybody doubts this statement let him read such propaganda pamphlets as *Elsass-Lothringen und die Socialdemokratie* by Hermann Wendel, a socialist member of the Reichstag.‡ There is no doubt that in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the Germans of to-day, as in the eyes of their fathers, no wrong was done by annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Germans do not, indeed, dispute the unwillingness of both provinces to become German; but under the systematic doctrine of State right which they have been brought up to accept, they regard this as only a minor consideration. They hold more or less consciously that the rights of the State go before those of the individual or of the nation, and that Alsace-Lorraine ought to remain German regardless of the wishes of its inhabitants.

Hence the true significance of the Alsace-Lorraine problem in the present war. The question goes far beyond that of simply righting a wrong. Mr. Asquith was the first to proclaim that we 'were out to destroy Prussian Militarism.' We have all said the same. What did we mean by that? Prussian Militarism does not merely signify the predominance of a certain social caste inside Germany. It implies an aggressive conception of the rights of the State which is the very opposite to the common ideal of democracies. And this militarist conception has more or less governed the whole

* Treitschke. Vol. III., p. 469.
† Bernhardi, p. 31.
‡ A pamphlet published in Berlin, 1916, p. 29.

world since it forcibly justified itself by mutilating France. So long as that mutilation is allowed to continue it is useless to speak of a future League of Nations or of putting an end to militarism. The old *Faustrecht* as revived in the modern theory of the Prussian State will be in position to prove that God is on its side ; that what we call wrong is indeed right ; that democracy is an unwholesome dream. Such are the stakes represented by Alsace-Lorraine. France is fully conscious of it. She knows that she is not only fighting to free two millions of her people from a foreign yoke but that this war, which she hopes will be the last, was really begun not in 1914, but in 1792.

Once this fundamental fact has been thoroughly grasped it is easier to get a clear view of the other issues connected with the Alsatian problem.

In the first place, it is obvious that France cannot be content with momentarily recovering her lost provinces. This would leave matters very much as they were before 1870, when, in spite of the liberal views already prevailing in other countries such as Great Britain or in the new Italy, the right of self-determination had only been upheld in Europe by France herself. If the Allies really care to put an end to the rule of militarism, they must not only make a general pronouncement, but enter into a solemn pledge to make the right of self-determination the law of the civilized world ; in consequence, they must also guarantee that the people of Alsace-Lorraine will not be again detached from the nation to which they want to belong. In other words, the union of Alsace-Lorraine with France must be based on the new international law as accepted and sanctioned by the joint forces of democracy.

One need not dwell much longer, at any rate for the present, on a second point, that of the possibility of a compromise between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine. There are reasons to believe that the Germans, before surrendering, will attempt to press upon the Allies all sorts of half-solutions such as a division of both provinces, or, in the last resort, a neutralization of Alsace-Lorraine.* As a matter of fact,

* See an article by the Abbé Wetterlé, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 15th, 1917.

they organized in Switzerland last summer a committee under the chairmanship of a certain Bauer, who issued on September 5th last, in the *Freie Zeitung*, an appeal in favour of neutralization. This appeal met with no sort of success. What such a neutralization would mean is sufficiently plain to those who are acquainted with the methods and aims of German so-called economic penetration. But the root of the matter lies deeper than this. You may bargain over a property, you cannot bargain over a living principle of public morality such as that which is involved in the Alsace-Lorraine question. Either the will of the people, violated in 1871, must be made to prevail or democracy must confess itself beaten and allow militarism to keep its spoils. There is no middle course. The very idea of seeking a compromise on a question which affects the soul of a nation is, indeed, an indirect homage to Treitschke.

There is a third and last point which deserves somewhat fuller consideration, for it has already been much debated and occasionally leads to some misrepresentation as regards the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the French, not excluding the French Socialists. The French Government have repeatedly declared that the return of the lost provinces to France must not be made conditional upon a new consultation of the inhabitants concerned. The French Socialist Party, while recommending that the people of Alsace-Lorraine should be given an opportunity for proclaiming their will after their reunion to the French nation, have never wavered since their original resolution of December 29th, 1915, in expressing their decided opposition to a previous consultation.* Hence an apparent contradiction between the advocacy by France of the right of self-determination for Alsace-Lorraine and the way in which she insists on interpreting that right. The German Press has been quick to make the most of this point, and to assert that France declines to consult the people of the Reichsland because she knows only too well that the present inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine do not care to be reunited to the French nation. There is no doubt

---

* The 1915 motion was endorsed by 2,736 votes against 76. It was again voted in almost similar terms on February 18th, 1918, by 2,618 votes against 218.

that if France were not to clear herself of such a poisonous insinuation, her cause would be greatly damaged. She needs the approval of the world. She neither can nor cares to force that approval. It is therefore vital that the concrete facts connected with the famous question of the previous consultation should be laid before every impartial man.

Most people who inquire into the matter will find that, although a 'previous consultation' may appear to be desirable from the sublimely detached point of view of persons totally ignorant of history, such procedure is in reality futile, impracticable, and unfair. This is a truth, indeed, applicable not merely to Alsace-Lorraine; it applies also to many another problem of nationality raised by this war.

Roughly speaking, the case, as far as Alsace-Lorraine is concerned, is very simple. Alsace and Lorraine had concluded with the rest of the French nation a free contract under the great Revolution. That contract was broken against the expressed will of both provinces by the treaty of Frankfort, a treaty imposed on France by sheer violence. Now that Germany has herself torn up the Treaty of Frankfort, there is no principle in the civilized world that can stand against that national contract automatically recovering its binding force. To demand a fresh consultation is tantamount to repudiation of the most essential of national rights, as defined by Condorcet in 1793 and as implicitly endorsed by Abraham Lincoln when he refused to allow the Southern States to secede. On the other hand, let us admit without hesitation that the moral position of France would be weakened if it could be argued that the sons of the Alsatians and Lorrainers of 1870 do not fully endorse the pledge taken in 1871 at Bordeaux by their fathers. But indisputable facts clearly establish the contrary.

Consider the history of Alsace-Lorraine from 1871 until 1914. It begins in 1874 with another famous protest, that of the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine in the German Reichstag, the only dissentient voice being that of the Bishop of Strasburg. The movement of protest went on openly up to and including the general elections of 1887. After that period the protest movement was to some extent replaced by a movement for autonomy. The Germans did not hesitate at the time to call the leaders of this new movement

'disguised protesters' (*Verkappte Protestler*), but to-day they are at great pains to prove that it was in spirit pro-German. Yet the Alsatian leaders such as Wetterlé, Blumenthal, and others themselves insisted that their advocacy of self-government for Alsace-Lorraine did not imply the slightest renunciation of the ideals of their fathers. In any case, the Germans cannot deny that the attitude of the Alsatian and Lorraine population towards Germanic rule was never worse than in the last years of that period. This is amply shown by such incidents as the Graffenstaden case in 1912, by the forcible dissolution of the *Souvenir Alsacien-Lorrain* in 1913, and by the famous Saverne trial. It is also shown by the official German statistics of emigration; for while the steady outflow of the people of Alsace-Lorraine decreased during the period 1895-1905, it rose again very rapidly after 1905, the percentage of the emigration to France being nearly as high in 1912 as it had been from 1873 to 1881.* The decisive fact is that at no time since 1871 have the people of Alsace and Lorraine, either by accepting German domination or simply by approving of any of the Constitutions that were forced upon them, shown the slightest inclination to renounce the solemn protests of 1871 and 1874.

What has happened during this present war is also illuminating. Since August 1st, 1914, Alsace-Lorraine has been subjected to a system of terrorism which clearly shows that her German rulers distrust her attitude. Courts-martial, both ordinary and extraordinary, have been continuously busy in Metz, Strasburg, Thionville, Sarreguemines, Mulhouse, Colmar, and are still at work to-day. M. André Fribourg has collected the documents published on this subject by the Germans themselves. The most interesting features of this evidence are not so much the harshness of the German judges, inflicting heavy sentences of imprisonment not only on men but on women, boys, and girls, as the extraordinary number of cases affecting not the *bourgeoisie*, but the working classes. Eugéne Burner, a

* See 'Statistische Jahrbücher für Elsass-Lothringen,' 1913-14, pp. 43 and 45. The percentage of emigrants to France was 70.4 from 1873 to 1881. The lowest percentage was 52.9 in 1907. It reached 68.6 in 1912.

navvy of Strasburg, is sentenced to three months' imprisonment for singing French songs in an inn at Siegen. Karl Gärtner, a day labourer, gets eight months' imprisonment for having told a number of children not to be afraid when the French came. There are hundreds of cases of the same sort involving peasants and working-men. The process is still going on. The *Strassburger Post* of December 19th, 1917, announces, for instance, among a number of other awards, that day labourer Merkle, of Strasburg, has been sentenced to one month's imprisonment for singing French songs 'in a 'provocative manner.'*

Another piece of curious evidence may be found in the secret orders issued by the Germans concerning the men from Alsace-Lorraine incorporated in their army. These orders stand in strange contrast with the official declaration made by generals like Deimling, or by the Kaiser himself. Here, for instance, is the beginning of an order issued by the War Office in Berlin on January 11th, 1916:

'In consequence of the numerous manifestations of anti-German tendencies which are known to have taken place among the men drawn from Alsace-Lorraine, it has been suggested that soldiers from Alsace-Lorraine should all be transferred to the interior of Germany or to the Eastern front, etc. . . .'†

On a more recent date (January 25th, 1917), we find a regimental order issued by the Colonel commanding the 34th Reserve Infantry Regiment, and beginning thus:

'Three men from Alsace-Lorraine having lately deserted, all men from Alsace-Lorraine in the Regiment are hereby declared to be suspect, etc. . . .'‡

This last declaration is the logical sequence of the frank confession made by von Caprivi, many years before the war.

---

* In his speech at the Sorbonne on March 1st, 1918, M. Paul Deschanel, President of the French Chamber, stated that the deportations of Alsatians and Lorrainers during the war reached 10,000, and that the German judges had inflicted 6,000 years of imprisonment.

† Quoted by André Fribourg, op. cit., p. 136.

‡ Quoted by the *Freie Zeitung*, of Berne, November 17th, 1917. To this evidence should be added the fact that over 16,000 soldiers from Alsace-Lorraine, who have deserted since the outbreak of the war, are now serving in the French Army.

'It is a fact,' he said in the Reichstag on June 10th, 1890, 'that after nineteen years' annexation the German spirit has 'made no progress in Alsace.' We have had many more admissions of the same sort during the war. We are still having them every week. Here are some of the latest:

George Wolf, one of the few Alsatians who have gone over to the enemy, writing in the *Deutsche Politik* of September 14th, 1917, says:

'We must unfortunately confess that the policy followed hitherto has been a steadily increasing failure. In its manner of treating the *Reichsland* the Empire has never acted in a masterly way. The younger generation therefore lost patience and the agitation in favour of France, under the pretence of regionalism, found a favourable ground.'

He then urges Germany to grant self-government to Alsace-Lorraine, and concludes:

'The German Empire, having then a clear conscience, will be in a position to confound its enemies by making an appeal not to force, but to right, if the Entente insists on making the question of Alsace-Lorraine a subject of debate at the Peace Congress.'

In answer to the preceding suggestion, the *Kölnische Zeitung* wrote on December 6th, 1917:

'The institution and organization of autonomy would only separate Alsace-Lorraine more and more from the Empire and from Germanism, and thereby create a very serious danger for the unity and integrity of the Empire. From the interior of the country would soon spring up—and in a much graver way than before the war—Francophil aspirations, which, in case of a new conflict between France and Germany (a conflict which must be expected with certainty, in view of the evolution of events), would surrender Alsace-Lorraine to the enemies of the Empire.'

With equal frankness from the opposite point of view the *Tägliche Rundschau* of January 13th, 1918, writing in support of the autonomists, says:

'One cannot wonder that the Alsatian, when he turns himself towards France, should be in such a high degree conscious of his own value, whereas he loses such consciousness when he turns himself towards Germany, who seeks to imprison the Alsatian mind in a narrow cage and is unable to give it a field of activity and expansion. Unfortunately the example of France has never been of any use to the Germans; yet if we do not imitate France we shall never win over the soul of the people of Alsace-Lorraine.'

Again, the *Kölnische Zeitung* of January 16th, 1918, makes this remarkable statement:

'The Frenchified *bourgeoisie* managed to keep up the original opposition between natives and immigrants (in Alsace-Lorraine); it managed to discredit among the people all participation in German life, to cover the country with a varied network of associations, which bred hostility against the Empire; in a word, to develop that complicated and skilfully combined system which tended by every device to keep open the wounds of the country and which, under the false pretence of keeping up the properly Alsatian traditions, had no other ultimate object than to familiarize the people with the idea of betrayal. The real extent and the complete success of this movement, the way in which the soil had been mined under our feet, all this was first revealed by the present war. . . . The countless cases of hatred and treason of all sorts which have occurred here owing to the war and which have been officially registered, the conclusions which have been drawn from them as regards the past and the prospects they have opened have irrevocably revealed the danger which the position of both provinces would entail to the Empire, were they to become a separate State. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is, therefore, neither a question concerning both provinces, nor a question of public right, but a question concerning the whole of the Empire and its safety. . . . This is not a question of liberty or servitude, but of the adaptation of means to a certain end and of the general interest of the Empire.'

Two days later Professor Fassbender made an equally clear admission, with regard to Poland as well as to Alsace-Lorraine, in an article in the *Deutsche Politik* of January 18th, 1918, from which a quotation has already been made above:

'The reproach which is unfortunately being made against us by other nations, namely, that we do not know how to assimilate conquered regions, and that, furthermore, these conquered regions remain a foreign body inside the German Empire, this reproach is only too well founded.'

Herr von Jagow, the head of the Berlin police, summed up the whole case when, at the time of the Saverne trial, he uttered the famous phrase: 'We are camping in enemy country.'*

Quotations of this sort might be indefinitely multiplied. If anybody distrusts the sincerity of French or Alsatian documents as to the real feelings of the Alsatian population, the best thing he can do is to read the German press.

---

* Reuss, op. cit., p. 447.

Why, then, it may be asked, should not the population of Alsace-Lorraine, whose French feelings are so emphatic, be consulted before reuniting their provinces to France? Would not such a previous popular consultation be at any rate morally useful in helping to remove the last possible shadow of a doubt?

The answer to these questions is that there is no means of securing a free vote such as would be secured in England if the British Government thought it desirable to ascertain whether the inhabitants of Yorkshire, for example, wished to remain a part of the United Kingdom. In such a case there would be no difficulty in determining who was entitled to vote and what authority was to preside over the polls; and there would be no reason to fear lest the voters should be subjected to any sort of unfair pressure. Conditions, however, would be very different if a plebiscite were to be held in Alsace-Lorraine as a previous condition to her reunion to France. It has been justly and repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact of Alsatian emigration and German immigration since 1871 make it almost impossible to organize a fair consultation of the people. Out of a total population of 1,874,000, the Germans themselves assert that about 400,000 represent the newly imported German element in Alsace-Lorraine, including their offspring.* The steady outflow of the original population between 1871 and 1910—an outflow which was still on the increase when the war broke out—is estimated by the German official statistics to have been by 267,000 in excess of the German immigration. This shows that between 500,000 and 600,000 people have left their homes since 1871, mostly to settle down in France—a figure which very likely does not include their offspring.† It would be obviously unfair to allow the German immigrants and their descendants to have a vote, while a very large part of the original population which was more or less driven out of the country in the name of the old Prussian god had no say in the matter. Again, who is going to preside over the said consultation? Even an authority set up by a League of Nations would be rightly suspected of not being without a certain bias in favour of this or that side.

---

* See the German propaganda pamphlet: 'Wohin gehört Elsass-Lothringen?' Zurich, 1915, p. 44.

† See 'Statistische Jahrbücher für Elsass-Lothringen,' p. 43.

But these practical difficulties are nothing compared with the moral objections. It is here that Anglo-Saxons must make an effort of imagination to realize what the conditions in Alsace-Lorraine will be at the close of a war like the present one. Not only have the people of both provinces been so shut off from the rest of the world that even the deserters who come over to the French side confess that they have been made to believe that it was France who declared war upon Germany, but they have been and still are submitted to such a system of terrorism as might shake the nerves of the bravest of men. If an Alsatian showed the slightest inclination to vote for France he would be sure to be put in prison, to be deprived of his property, to have every member of his household ruthlessly persecuted. Moreover, nobody in Alsace-Lorraine would believe that the ballot would be secret; what could a district or a village expect in the future if it voted for France and was ultimately left in Germany?

Those who will take the trouble to go into all these facts will perhaps understand why the representatives of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 already objected beforehand to the organization of any future 'vote or plebiscite'; also why to-day not only those Alsatians who are free to speak out,* but the whole of the French nation, not excluding the immense majority of the Socialists, refuse to have anything to do with the so-called 'previous consultation.' Whoever insists on that preliminary condition shows that he does not grasp the real terms of the world problem involved in the question of Alsace-Lorraine. *The question has never been whether the inhabitants of both provinces preferred to be French or German. On the admission of the Germans themselves, the single fundamental issue lies between the will of a certain population to belong to another nation than Germany, and the will of Germany to hold that population against their wishes* No tricks, however cunning, played at the last hour, will manage to obscure that issue. Either the democracies of the world are really determined to uphold the right of self-determination for all peoples,

---

* See the formal protest against a possible 'previous consultation' issued on August 15th, 1917, by the Congress of Alsatian Societies in Bordeaux. Alexandre Zevaes, 'La Question d'Alsace-Lorraine et le Socialisme,' 1917, p. 87.

in which case Alsace-Lorraine must automatically return to France ; or they will surrender to the old militarist God of Treitschke and Bismarck, in allowing Alsace-Lorraine to remain in German hands. The 'previous consultation' device is nothing but another attempt at reaching an unfair and impossible compromise between two opposite views of international right and morality, one of which must necessarily prevail over the other.

Although the case of Alsace-Lorraine is bound to be exceptionally convincing, it will be found, I believe, that the difficulties connected with previous popular consultation are equally great in most other parts of Europe. Take, for instance, the case of Poland. The first objection there is of a geographical nature, for the limits of Poland are not as well defined as those of Alsace-Lorraine, and it will be always possible to contend that the previous consultation ought to have been extended to other regions than those actually consulted. But the root difficulty lies in the fact that the three parts of Poland have lived hitherto under three separate autocratic régimes, and that the Poles are therefore neither politically nor morally prepared for a common popular consultation, be it a referendum or a general election. You cannot improvise democracy even among a highly educated people. Perhaps it will be worth while recalling that, according to such high authority as Lord Bryce, the American constitution itself, to-day fully endorsed by an educated nation, could not be submitted at the outset to the decision of the people.

'Had the decision been left to what is now called the voice of the people (he writes), that is, to the mass of the citizens all over the country voting at the polls, the voice of the people would probably have pronounced against the constitution, and this would have been still more likely if the question had been voted on everywhere upon the same day, seeing that several States were influenced by the approval which other States had already given. But the modern "plebiscital" method of taking the popular judgment had not been invoked. The question was referred to conventions in several States.'*

What was true of the early Americans may be even more true of a people such as the Poles, a large number of whom

* Lord Bryce, 'The American Commonwealth,' 3rd Edition. 1903. Vol. I., p. 26.

have been deliberately kept in a state of complete illiteracy. The difficulties would not be much less as regards, for instance, the Rumanians in Transylvania or even the Italians of the Trentino and Trieste, as the methods of Austrian and Hungarian autocracy have been very similar to those of Prussia. There has never been in the past of Europe any consultation of the people held before their reunion to the mother-country.* Were we to inflict the procedure of the previous consultation on the unfortunate nationalitites now under the Austro-German heel, it would result in a number of preposterous comedies, if not in an actual wrong done to the people concerned.

It has been the lot of France to suffer and fight for the basic ideas that make life worth living. Her present fight, which she entered upon against her will, is no exception to the rule. No idle pride or imperialistic ambition is responsible for her insistence that the wrong of 1871 should be righted. She is well aware that this insistence is the last barrier that can prevent the reactionary conception of State Right asserted by Prussia from swaying the whole of Europe, perhaps the whole world. Were the democratic idea to go under and Alsace-Lorraine to be enslaved for ever, then, in the words of M. Georges Leygues, on October 12th, 1917 :

'Belgium would no longer be Belgium, Holland would no longer be Holland; the provinces of Northern France would become parts of the German Empire; Amsterdam, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Calais, would fall into the hands of the enemy; the international balance would be so upset, that Germany would erect on the ruins of Europe a power to which no other in the whole world could be successfully opposed.'

Alsace and Lorraine are much more than a little patch of land between the Vosges and the Rhine : they are the very battle-ground where the two leading ideas of the present time are fighting each other to the death.

A French Soldier.

---

* See, for instance, all the plebiscites organized in different parts of Italy between 1859 and 1870, or the consultation of Savoie and Nice in 1860.

THE DISABLED SOLDIER

FROM the earliest times civilized governments have recognized that it is the duty of the State to make provision for soldiers who have been disabled in their country's cause, and various methods more or less effectual have been adopted in order to meet this obligation. So far as our own country is concerned the history of its previous efforts in this direction does not make good reading. It has apparently been considered that the obligation of the State was discharged when a monetary payment of a somewhat niggardly amount had been extracted from the public purse, and anything beyond this was left almost entirely to the individual or collective efforts of the charitably-minded. It may be that when our army was a professional one, and comparatively small, the duty did not obtrude itself upon the public conscience.

When it became apparent that the struggle upon which we had entered would involve the employment of armies of an unprecedented size, and that for Great Britain to play her part she must call upon the whole manhood of the country to share in the bearing of arms, not only voluntarily but under compulsion, the obligations which perforce fell upon the State assumed greater dimensions. When it came to be a question of fighting with millions, having regard to the ferocity with which modern war is waged, together with the diabolical death-dealing and maiming devices which it seems to be the mission of the higher civilization to invent and employ, the casualties produced were bound to be on an absolutely unprecedented scale. The necessity for immediately establishing an enormous fighting force was obviously the paramount consideration. It was impossible to use that discrimination which might have been exercised in selecting the combatant material had the need been less urgent, and some proportion of the men enlisted proved physically unfitted to stand the stress of training. As the country rose to the necessities of the occasion, and provided in an incredibly short time an army of a size and quality altogether unexampled, so it set about the task of dealing with

the problem of the disabled. When one looks at what has been done in this direction one can view the results with profound satisfaction—not that the last word has been said by any means; but the direction in which the efforts are trending gives great promise of a far more satisfactory solution of the difficulties than might reasonably have been anticipated. As the services of the finest intellects and organizing powers were placed at the disposal of the country for the creation and equipment of its armed forces, in like manner have similar services been available for setting up the educative and remedial institutions necessary for fitting the disabled to resume, as far as possible, their civilian life.

For the purpose of ascertaining to what extent the State should incur further liability, and the direction which its efforts should take, a Committee under the chairmanship of Sir George Murray, G.C.B., was appointed. Briefly summarized, the report of this Committee was to the effect that the State should charge itself with the duty of (1) restoring the man's health, where practicable; (2) providing training facilities, should he desire to learn a new trade; and (3) finding employment for him when necessary.

This view being adopted, it was found requisite to form a special State Department to deal with the responsibilities thus assumed, and the Ministry of Pensions has accordingly been founded. Mr. Hodge, formerly Minister of Labour, was selected by the Prime Minister to be the first Minister of Pensions, and time has fully justified this choice. The powers of the Ministry are very great. Its actuating principle is to see that each individual case is appropriately and promptly dealt with, whether by pension, treatment, service, or a combination of them. Its motto is *bis dat qui cito dat.* The allocation of the actual pensions is a comparatively simple matter, and though, perhaps, in the earlier days there was some ground for complaint as to the amount, the provisions at the present time cannot be regarded as illiberal. Pension rates for general cases have been fixed, and a comprehensive scale covering many of the specific injuries has been drawn up on the basis that those injuries involve the loss of a certain percentage of capacity, *e.g.*, the loss of the vision of one eye is equal to fifty per cent. Most of the men discharged from the army as unfit have, as was to be expected, returned to their own

homes; this, although the most desirable course, has added to the difficulties of administration, but the machinery established by the Ministry for keeping in touch with each case is most effective, and need not be described here. Suffice it to say that district and local committees have been set up, charged with the duty of seeing that each case has individual attention, and receives appropriate treatment. Some cases can be dealt with efficiently by the local means available, but others require treatment or training, which can only be obtained at one of the special institutions, which have been established, as far as possible, in the most convenient centres. Every inducement to undergo such treatment is offered to those who would benefit by it; everything is provided free of all expense, and liberal maintenance allowances are made to dependents, as well as to the men themselves, during the period thus occupied.

A very serious matter for consideration was the provision of the necessary medical service and training staff, to say nothing of curative institutions. The depletion in the ranks of doctors caused by the enormous demands of the army, which obviously had to take precedence, made it of paramount importance to utilize in the most scientific manner the remaining material. Existing institutions for curing diseases and remedying defects were far below what could be considered a satisfactory standard even in peace times; for when the war broke out England was only just beginning to waken to the importance of dealing with the problem of health on a national basis, instead of regarding it as a matter solely of private concern and a subject for individual effort alone.

One cannot but lament the lack of facilities with which we were faced in the early days, for undoubtedly many have suffered in consequence. It is essential in the majority of cases that the appropriate treatment be applied as early as possible, otherwise joints become stiff, muscles are atrophied, and in consequence movements are restricted. Bad habits are contracted through ignorance of the proper methods of counteracting a shortcoming; consequently, when the case is eventually taken in hand, more time and trouble are involved, and less success is attained. Fortunately, although no magician's wand was at hand, the deficiency which resulted from our unpreparedness is now being daily overcome. This is

due in no small measure to the untiring energy and splendid devotion of the medical profession and those associated with it. I am second to none in my admiration for our fighting men, but I find almost as great cause for pride in the efforts of those who are ministering to the soldiers' needs.

So that no portion of the slender resources at our command should be wasted or misapplied, the experience of experts in each particular branch, freely placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Pensions, was gratefully accepted. The economical disposition of our forces was anxiously studied. Conferences were held with our Allies so that we might have the advantage of their experience, and equally place ours at their disposal. We even did not disdain to profit by anything we could learn from the curative methods of our enemies. In the light of the knowledge thus obtained the maximum amount of efficiency has been derived from the minimum expenditure of material. At the same time it has been recognized that success must not be jeopardized by a stint of service.

Remarkable as the medical and surgical results obtained have been, the mechanical means devised to supplement them are no less so. Mechanical equivalents of surprising ingenuity and effectiveness have been forthcoming; and where these have not been sufficient to overcome the disability entirely, efforts have been made in other directions. Adjustments in various machines have made them capable of being operated by men suffering from a degree of restriction of movement which would otherwise have rendered them useless for that purpose. Some of the patients have themselves contributed in no small measure to the solution of many problems, and have proved of the greatest assistance in helping others to overcome their disabilities. There is no better teacher than the man who knows from his own experience exactly what is wanted, and has discovered for himself the best way of doing it; he also presents an object-lesson which is stimulating and encouraging.

However admirable the arrangements made by the State may be, they must be supplemented by individual effort. It is satisfactory to know that the number of men to whom the term 'disabled' can be applied in its exact sense is relatively small. In their case little more can be done by the State than provide monetary compensation; but all who are brought into

immediate contact with such sufferers can do much to ease the burden of those who have given all but life itself. As to some of the remainder, when all possible means have been adopted to fit them to take part in the activities of life, they will still be at a disadvantage, and it will be incumbent on us all to do everything in our power to alleviate their difficulties. Let me here emphasize the necessity of refraining from fussiness or ostentation in performing any service which it should be our privilege to render. The maimed man is almost invariably sensitive and naturally inclined to resent anything which accentuates or brings into prominence his misfortune; we should therefore bear in mind the example of the real little English gentleman of five summers who ate his pudding with his left hand in order to put at ease the visitor who had lost his right arm in Gallipoli.

Although we are all becoming accustomed to thinking in millions, and are shouldering burdens now at which we should have stood aghast but four short years ago, the financial aspect of the problem is by no means the least formidable. Wide as is the discretion vested in the Ministry of Pensions, and liberal the provision made for its services, one Department of State obviously could not be given unlimited spending powers, and beyond certain well-defined limits it is unable to proceed without the sanction of the Treasury. It has been possible to reduce to a large extent the delay in putting into operation beneficial measures occasioned by this necessary control, and to assume liabilities which the Government at first hesitated to incur. By the generosity of the public the Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem have been put into possession of large funds. These societies have taken the view that they can best discharge the trust reposed in them, so far as ameliorating the condition of those broken in the war is concerned, by working in close co-operation with the Ministry of Pensions. Before the Treasury fully accepted, as it now does, the responsibility for the provision of special institutional treatment such as is now afforded by the Ministry's Home of Recovery for Neurasthenics at Golders Green, a special Committee was formed, composed of representatives of the Ministry, the Red Cross Society, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and the War Office, under the Presidency of Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary

to the Ministry of Pensions. This committee promptly and thoroughly examined proposals for new institutions suggested by its expert advisers, and if approved the necessary capital outlay was provided from the funds of the societies, the expense of the upkeep alone falling on the State. In this way a degree of celerity in putting into operation many beneficial measures was obtained which otherwise would have been impossible.

Not only is the number of cases to be dealt with enormous, but the injuries and disabilities are infinite in their variety. The military operations have been conducted on a scale and with a continuity altogether unprecedented. There has been no wintering in comfortable quarters; the grim struggle has continued in spite of seasonal changes. Rain, snow, wind, and flood have combined to render theoretically untenable some of the plains of Flanders; yet these positions have been held—by whom? By men who, for the most part, had followed sedentary occupations in civil life, and been accustomed to at least the ordinary comforts of civilization. Compelled by the exigencies of circumstances to remain for days at a time exposed to the inclemencies of a severe winter, working for the most part in mud or semi-frozen slush, it is marvellous to contemplate the number who have come through unscathed; but, as could only be expected, latent germs of phthisis and other pulmonary complaints became active, while frost-bite and rheumatism claimed many victims. When the casualties arising from these causes are added to those which inevitably result from a struggle between immense armies equipped with offensive weapons of the utmost precision and far-reaching effect, a total is reached that might well dismay those whose duty and privilege it is to alleviate and cure.

Nor is this all. Consider the state of things in which a man is in a trench, probably waterlogged and rat-infested, where if he raises his head above the parapet a sniper's bullet may be his end; behind him the constant roar of innumerable guns of varying calibres, each contributing its own peculiar note to the deafening volume of sound produced by their united efforts; in front of him a similar array producing an equal din; around him are falling shot and shell, shrapnel, high explosive or poisonous; beneath him may be the dreaded mine of whose explosion he will have no warning; above, a flight of aero-

planes from which a bomb may find its way into the confined area he occupies ; insidious clouds of asphyxiating vapour may creep close and overwhelm him, or the scorching breath of *flammenwerfer* sear his flesh ; death may reach him from any quarter. To him is denied the exhilaration of personal combat when man opposes man—he simply waits and watches. This is no nightmare which passes with the dream, but is endured through every minute of each long hour. When he goes 'over the top' there is no marching shoulder to shoulder against the foe. In open order he crosses the shell-pocked No Man's Land through the inferno of a high explosive barrage, only to meet on the other side storms of machine gun bullets which are veritably showers of leaden hail. What can be expected when many of those engaged are delicately nurtured youths who are attaining their manhood under these conditions ? It is surprising that no more than twenty per cent. of the men discharged from the army as unfit are suffering from neurasthenia or shell-shock. It speaks volumes for the pluck and endurance of the men that the percentage is not far larger

There must be, of course, great difficulty ultimately in incorporating in the ranks of the industrial army those men who, by reason of the loss of limb or organ, or other physicial defect, are labouring under varying degrees of incapacity. It has been recognized that the necessity for obtaining from each individual the maximum amount of economic effort is so great that, while increased incapacity may be sufficient reason for enlarging a pension already granted, no pension will, when finally settled, be reduced because the recipient has succeeded in overcoming to a partial, or even complete, degree the incapacity from which he suffered. This has removed what might have been a great deterrent to necessary effort. Morally and physically it is of the utmost benefit to a disabled man that he should be as fully and usefully occupied as his condition permits.

Special institutions under the Ministry of Pensions are already doing excellent work. Institutions for training the blind, orthopædic hospitals, homes of recovery for neurasthenics, and re-education centres for the maimed, all have marvellous achievements to spur them on to further efforts. In addition, colonies, sanatoria, and homes for paraplegics, epileptics, and consumptives have been established, and are

doing much towards ameliorating the condition of those unfortunates. The Star and Garter Home for paraplegics and the institution at Chalfont St. Giles for epileptics are admirably planned and equipped for their purpose, and will be reproduced as occasion requires. The needs of the limbless men have been carefully considered, and the improvement of mechanical substitutes has been a constant subject of study. Institutions such as that at Roehampton are justly earning the gratitude of many who had deemed themselves hopeless cripples. Orthopædic centres have been established at which the most scientific methods for the correction of deformities and the restoration of lost physical functions are employed. Curative workshops have been provided in which interesting and congenial occupations take the place of monotonous exercise. A man suffering from dropped foot, instead of being set to pedal a dummy bicycle, is taught to work a treadle sewing or fret-saw machine; and the man with an injured arm or hand uses a plane, saw, or similar tool, for real work. By these means recovery is greatly accelerated because the mind is occupied and the patient feels that he is capable of useful activity. The associations of which the Earl Roberts' Memorial Workshops are typical are doing most valuable work by providing suitable employment for the more seriously incapacitated. Electric and massage centres now exist throughout the kingdom at which all those who can be benefited by such treatment may avail themselves of it. In cases where severe disfigurement remains after the surgeon has done his utmost, the skill and ingenuity of the sculptor and modeller have been requisitioned, and artificial noses and facial plates of extraordinary merit have been supplied. Every discovery or improvement in methods which tends to lessen disablement, or promote well-being, is eagerly sought for and put into operation as speedily as is practicable.

What of the material with which the Ministry of Pensions and its medical staff have to deal? The spirit and qualities which enabled our men to leave their workshops, their counters, and their office stools, and oppose themselves in mortal conflict with the most highly trained and remorseless foe that has ever taken the field—and beat him—are also brought to bear to overcome the misfortunes sustained and the disabilities

incurred. The task of healing would indeed be almost impossible of accomplishment if it were not for the dogged persistence with which the patients second the healer's efforts. The fortitude and cheerfulness displayed by them act as a constant spur to further efforts in their behalf. It might be supposed that to be in close and continuous contact with the suffering which must inevitably exist where large numbers of maimed and disabled men are being treated is very depressing; but the heartache which the sight of so much splendid manhood reduced to invalidism induces is obliterated by the pride one feels in knowing that these men are our kin, and that their spirit is indicative of that which permeates the nation as a whole. Experience has shown that, as a rule, their great desire is to regain as much of their normal power as possible, and, if only the means are forthcoming by which they may attain their object, failure will not be due to lack of effort on their part. Not only do they aim at fitting themselves for useful occupations, but also for participating in most of the amenities of life. It is indeed a heartening spectacle to see a man who has lost his right forearm as well as his left leg playing golf-croquet with no mean opponent, even backing himself for a shilling a game and winning on balance; and when you hear him declare that as soon as he and his artificial limbs are better acquainted he intends to take up golf—without the croquet—it makes you thank God for the indomitable pluck of the men of our race and feel that the outlook for the future is bright.

Human nature being so diverse, there are undoubtedly some 'old soldiers' who make the most of their disabilities, and would fain exploit them to the uttermost, but these are the exception, and patience and proper treatment will eventually convert even these into self-respecting citizens. It has been suggested that treatment and re-education should be compulsory, but, so far as England is concerned, that view has not been adopted. Some degree of good might possibly follow from such methods in certain instances, but really successful results can only be obtained when the hearty co-operation of the person proposed to be benefited is enlisted. If persuasion and the certainty of attaining a far more eligible position are not a sufficient inducement to effort, compulsion would be no valuable adjunct. Experience proves that even persuasion is

not required in the majority of cases, for there is generally displayed a whole-souled desire to overcome disadvantage. Once a man's feeling of helplessness is removed and the direction in which his energies can be utilized is discovered there is seldom any need for urging: it is rather restraint that has to be exercised.

Neurasthenia and its allied complaints had, prior to the war, probably through the stress of modern life, become a subject demanding particular attention, and fortunately our knowledge of neurology had so advanced that we were able to appreciate the condition, and have a fairly sound idea of the curative methods to be adopted. As it was known that it was possible for a person to be really ill from merely witnessing an accident, although no physical injury was sustained, and that a serious derangement of the nervous system, involving marked loss of function, could result from emotional causes alone, the soldier with no apparent wound or injury to show to justify his condition became the object of greater solicitude than otherwise might have been the case.

With every case of neurasthenia presenting its own particular problem, when a course of procedure which would be admirable in one instance would be disastrous in another, the utmost care has to be exercised in the selection of those to whom is entrusted the vital task of regeneration. No detail in relation to the surroundings and conditions in which the work is carried on is unimportant. The Homes of Recovery which have been established are conducted on lines which are calculated to give the best results. Interesting occupation, fresh air, good food, and, above all, the optimism and enthusiastic belief in success of the doctors, nurses, and staff tend to produce most encouraging results. It is ground for much congratulation that our methods for regenerating the human débris of the battle-field are now an example to all nations and the subject of their unstinted admiration.

The words 'Neurasthenia' and 'Shell-shock' come glibly to the tongue, not only of the physician, but of the soldier and the war worker, and it has become a favourite theme in the daily newspapers. Familiarity with medical subjects and their details is never a healthy sign, and this increasing acquaintance of the general public with the effect of high explosives, and military service generally, is unfortunate. In these times of

tension we too often get what we look for, and a devil-may-care attitude is more likely to carry a man through than a timorous regard of possibilities of what the shock of battle may produce.

What is shell-shock? Perhaps the technical nomenclature of the medical profession explains it better than anything: *Commotio cerebri*. The brain is concussed often without any direct physical violence, but it should be remembered that the teachings of modern authority indicate that high explosives produce visible and microscopic changes, as might well be expected when it is remembered that the body is subjected, in many of these cases, to a pressure of ten tons to the square yard. Concussion is caused without contact of solid material, without burial, and without any evidence of injury of any kind. The difficult, and to some extent confusing, factor which enters into the whole question of shell-shock, and upon which so much of the diagnosis and treatment depends, is the fact that a very large proportion of the cases of shell-shock which we see in this country are produced by emotional causes. From the point of view of treatment and recovery this is a matter of the most fundamental importance, for it is obvious that cases of, for instance, aphonia, deaf-mutism, and those which show symptoms of loss of self-control and confidence, vague feelings of apprehension, and symptoms not easily distinguishable from hysteria, are eminently suitable for psycho-therapeutic treatment; whereas the rest and quiet so necessary, at first at any rate, for those whose symptoms are the result of organic changes is wholly unsuitable for this class of case.

Hence it is that the army authorities have instituted clearing houses behind the front lines where cases of the emotional type are differentiated from those obviously organic in origin. The former, something like 80 per cent. of the whole, after judicious treatment, much encouragement, and absence of all fussiness, are returned to the fighting line, often within a fortnight; whilst the latter are sent down the line and are at once evacuated to England. The severer types of *Commotio cerebri*, which command a rare degree of sympathy, although it is by no means wise to show it, are appropriately treated in the neurological centres before the sufferers are discharged from the army.

In cases of the emotional type, where, as far as can be judged, no gross microscopic changes have been found, it may

be, from the point of view of treatment, best to assume that no microscopic changes at all, as we know them, have taken place. One or two of the worst cases of neurasthenia or shell-shock I have seen have occurred in men who have never crossed the Channel.

Many men, many brave men, are temperamentally and neuropotentially wholly unfit for the ghastly work of modern warfare, and they know it. One cannot blame the Recruiting Officers or even the examining Medical Officers who pass such men as fit for active service ; physically they come up to the necessary standard. It would be obviously unsafe to be influenced by the opinion of a recruit as to his unsuitability because of alleged psychological defects. It is true a great deal more could be done if we were not at war, but, as things are, the rough-and-ready method of choosing the conscript is inevitable. The result is that a vast number of potential neurasthenics, men who are to become the victims of shell-shock on either side of the Channel, are accepted, and include the type of man who after he has cunningly trapped a mouse would shudder at the thought of giving it its *coup de grâce*. Such men are seriously expected to do their 'damndest' in a night attack, and to pass through the barrage of the enemy. Thousands break down in training, or take refuge in simulating or magnifying existing small disabilities, and are in consequence posted either for service at home or garrison duty abroad. Others find themselves eventually in the front line, for a highly-strung neuropathic temperament is not cowardice, and introspection and gentleness are not incompatible with a high sense of duty. Many of these men find themselves face to face with the enemy. They are anxious to quit themselves like men. Their only fear is the fear of being afraid. God help them and forgive those who sent them out. They are less suited to bayonet Germans than the most wrong-headed Nihilist is to shape the destinies of all the Russias, and yet, *mirabile dictu*, many do it. What of those who do not ? Some pass from beneath the awful cloud of earth's universal hate and are at peace ; some harden their hearts, steel their wills, and come home with doubly earned honours. Others become acutely ill, they are introspective, subjective sensations obtrude themselves, they complain of lassitude, giddiness, loss of power of

concentration, a general feeling of nervousness, and all exhibit a lamentable loss of self-control and confidence. They are obsessed by self-pity.

The keynote to understanding these cases is to try to appreciate the extraordinary influence that the mind has upon the body. The profundity of this influence is illustrated by the following incident, which occurred in my experience when in practice :

B.T.'s temperature appeared to range between 97.4 degrees and 103.4 degrees F. When the doctor took the temperature in the morning it was always normal or subnormal ; the patient himself took it as often as six times in the day, waking occasionally in the middle of the night for this purpose. Neither the doctor nor a consultant who had been called in could form any opinion as to what was the matter with the patient. It was found that if the doctor did not call once daily he was always sent for in a hurry—that the patient was very nervous and worried. His wife was hourly expecting her baby. There was only one bed in the house, and I suspected that his anxiety to get well before the event was keeping up his temperature. I induced the doctor to take away the thermometer. He did so, and called subsequently once or twice in the afternoons, when the temperature, which previously had always been above normal, was found to be normal. From the day the thermometer was taken away from him the patient made a rapid and uninterrupted recovery !

Experience shows that, subconsciously, shell-shocked soldiers live, and not unnaturally live, in an unknown, but none the less real, fear of returning to the horrors of the battlefield, and during the passage through Parliament of the Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act, the present writer was instrumental in having neurasthenia (which term includes shell-shock) added to the list of complaints which entitle men to be exempted from future service.

The reproduction of certain of the millions of mental impressions which are stored up in the brain is more easy of accomplishment by some than by others. These impressions run along the lines of least resistance ; trodden paths are well known to be more passable. Physical, and more especially mental, idleness leads to brooding and the recalling of unpleasant memories. Those who are familiar with the practical working of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 are well aware of the mental attitude towards the conscious or unconscious

prolongation of disability of those who are entitled to avail themselves of its provisions. For instance, the number of cases claiming sick pay from the fourteenth to the twenty-first day in 1908 was 78,264, whilst in 1913 it had risen to 136,304, or an increase of 74.15 per cent. in five years. Is it too great an assumption to make that the working man had begun to appreciate that the man who had been injured but returned to work before the end of the first week received no compensation, and that it is only when he is on the sick list for more than fourteen days that his compensation dates back to the day on which the accident occurred? It would be a libel on the working man to say that the vast increase of abstentions from work during the third week after slight injuries was an evidence of malingering, and that it was a proof of fraud. Nothing of the sort. It merely shows that as long as there are material advantages to be gained the desire for recovery and return to work is subconsciously retarded.

Neurasthenia is not fraud; far less is it cowardice or malingering or wicked self-deception. It affects the true soldier as well as the raw recruit. I have known many instances of very brave men losing their nerves. Neurasthenia, when genuine, is no reflection on a man's courage. The following instance exemplifies the point:

A boy, after leaving Eton, joined the Flying Corps. After bombing an ammunition dump in Constantinople he had the misfortune to land in the sea, and he and his companions were left floating in the water by the sinking of their aeroplane. In spite of their shouts, although many ships passed, they remained in the water for three hours, and only as night was falling were they saved from what they must have fully expected would be a sure and lingering death. With the rough-and-ready methods which in war time are, perhaps, inevitable, the lad was ordered to 'carry on,' and within a week, whilst carrying despatches and attempting to board a friendly ship in mid-ocean from the aeroplane, he missed it, and found himself struggling beneath the surface of the water among the connecting rods of his aeroplane, which had become a veritable wire entanglement. He was rescued; and these two experiences occurring to a lad of about twenty were too much—even for a flying man. To his great regret he was transferred to a line regiment, and he made frequent but unsuccessful applications to be sent to the front line in France; instead he was detailed to do patrol duty during air raids in London. It was after one of these raids that I was consulted. I was informed that he was nervous and unstrung, and had had palpitation for four days; it was evident that he had

'lost his nerve.' The boy was modest and unassuming, and had I not had large experience both of cowardice concealed by brave words, and brave deeds cloaked by modesty, I would have had difficulty in appreciating that this neurasthenic was in reality a hero.

If circumstances had permitted the differentiation between those who are and those who are not potential neurasthenics a vast waste of time, money, and man power could have been saved by preventing potential neurasthenics being trained for active service in the trenches; and many of the professions and industries of the country would not have been denuded of the man power they so sorely need. A not uncommon manifestation of functional nerve disease is complete loss of power of the muscles which perform certain actions in a limb, or it may be complete paralysis of the whole limb. A patient who has been subjected to a terrific bombardment, lasting, it may be, for many hours, finds himself, in consequence of some comparatively trifling injury, in hospital alongside a comrade whose shattered limb and torn nerves have produced the characteristic drop-wrist which, alas, has so frequently been seen during the last few years. The mental impression of his comrade's total incapacity to extend his wrist produces an unknown but profound impression, and in a few days, to his astonishment, he also is wholly incapable of using his hand. He has suffered no injury which has affected the muscles which control his wrist or arm, yet he is as profoundly and (if one may use the word) as genuinely incapable of grasping as is his neighbour with the mangled nerves; but if a mild electric current is applied to the muscles which pull upon the wrist everything is found in order. The muscles straighten out, and act upon the wrist independently of the patient's will. His condition, therefore, unlike that of his neighbour whose telegraph wires have been cut, is not organic, but functional. It is obviously remediable, for has not the electric current replaced the nerve impulses which travel from the brain to the muscle? There is no solution of continuity in the nerve tracts. The muscles having been stimulated have done their duty quite independently of will-power, and he is a dull man indeed who does not then appreciate that all that is required is a strong effort of will, that the cure lies with himself, that the muscular reaction following the electric current is evidence of latent capacity,

and that if, and when, the stimulus starts from his brain instead of the electric battery all will be well.

Functional nerve disease is the result of a strange combination of what appears to be reality and unreality. Everything is in good working order; nothing is absent save the capacity to switch on the motor power. When such a patient is induced to appreciate that his fear of incapacity is an abnormal mental condition, and that it is his mental outlook which is perverted, all goes well and recovery is assured. This localized functional nerve paralysis is hopelessly incurable in the hands of those to whom abnormal psychology is a *terra incognita*, yet readily amenable to rational and common-sense methods when applied with sympathetic intelligence. And yet many broken soldiers are drawing liberal pensions and evoking much sympathy whose paralyses are of this type, and whose economic value is lost to the State because the nation is in the throes of a life struggle and the battle-fields have commandeered the highest medical talent. Our Homes of Recovery cater for these cases.

It is not easy to teach a neurasthenic to make (as Dubois suggests) 'an optimistic inventory of his mentality,' yet this is the keynote of all successful treatment. Re-education, mental and physical, is the be-all and end-all of cure. These men are facile, their minds are in a pliable condition, their thoughts run along the suggested lines of least resistance, and can be set in any mould. It is the duty of the physician to see that they set in the right mould. Environment is everything; these cases cannot be treated *en masse*. Each case requires individual attention, every case requires a strong will in contact with it, and each individual must be treated not as a case, but as a personality. By judicious but reserved sympathy, and by heart-to-heart talks which evoke confession, the physician gets to know his patient, and in time will be qualified to 'rase out the written troubles of the brain.' The doctor must abound in self-confidence, and must be able to commandeer the confidence of his patient. Finally, the psychotherapeutic method cannot be practised as a duty: it is essentially a labour of love.

JOHN COLLIE.

MERCHANT SHIPPING AND STATE CONTROL

Report of the Committee of the Chamber of Shipping, and the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, July, 1917.

IN the course of the war industry and commerce have been subjected, in every belligerent country, to an extent and degree of State control unknown since the Middle Ages. Even in Great Britain, despite libertarian traditions, vast sections of economic activity have passed by successive steps under the direction of the State, until to-day the great majority of businesses throughout the country have ceased to be autonomous concerns, free to buy and operate and sell at their own discretion, and have become virtually State services carried on under official regulation as to work, wages, prices, and profits.

Though applied as an emergency expedient, State control for the war period can now be looked upon—is in fact being looked upon—in the light of an experiment and even as a first step to a new economic order. Under the pressure of war the doctrine of 'public ownership and control of the means 'of production, distribution, and exchange,' so long advocated, has been hurriedly and almost violently applied. It has become a familiar feature of the new war-born order, and there are many who mean to make the most of the circumstance. They will include, as the Labour Party 'Report on Reconstruction' shows, the vast majority of trade unionists; many of the new bureaucracy, which has by now acquired vested interests, will be in favour of continuance, as will many who hold that the economic system must in future be kept constantly in war trim. The after-war relation of the State to industry is therefore a very real issue, and since moves and countermoves are already taking place, it is none too early to weigh the experiences of the war period and endeavour to draw conclusions from them.

The shipping industry is only one among the number that have thus fallen under official regulation during the war, but

it is one in which the application and working of State control calls specially for examination. This for several reasons: it exhibits in a pronounced form the leading characteristics of autonomous industry; it has been subjected to a more than average degree of State control; it is an industry of exceptional importance to the future position of this country as a world Power and a trading community; and since it is peculiarly subject to foreign competition, any policy which affected it adversely would result in its speedy decline. The question of the continuance or abolition of the State control of merchant shipping after the war is therefore of pressing and vital importance not only to the prosperity of the shipping industry but also to the welfare of the community and the strength of the State.

At the outbreak of war more than one-half of the world's carrying trade was performed by British ships, and British shipyards were responsible year by year for nearly two-thirds of the world's output of mercantile tonnage. We are apt to take this as a matter of course, but we ought rather to regard it with wonder. The insular and geographical position of Great Britain was all in her favour; her coast had the making of good harbours; her people had the spirit of enterprise and adventure. These were great national assets; and when wood and sail gave place to iron and steam, our mineral resources and the mechanical genius which the opportunity disclosed and fostered had given us already the material and means of taking a leading place in the world of shipping; but the degree to which we have kept that lead in the face of the inevitable industrial development of other countries is not to be explained entirely either by our earlier start or by our natural advantages.

By what, then? Not by State protection or assistance. Since the repeal of the Navigation Laws, political action has played no part in maintaining the supremacy of British shipping, and these laws had passed from a stimulus into a drag-rope before the steam era had begun. Ap rt from certain subsidies granted in return for definite services rendered, on conditions which often made the transaction one of doubtful benefit to the shipowner, a few subventions to promote experimental developments which would not have been justified as commercial ventures, and certain loans—all amounting to

the merest drop in the ocean of shipping and shipbuilding enterprise—the State may be said to have merely looked on while the shipping industry, left to its own devices, made its own headway. It might even be said that the State imposed on British shipping obligations and regulations which handicapped it in competition with the shipping of other countries. All things considered, it is broadly true to say that the astonishingly successful bid of the British shipping industry for the lion's share of the sea-carrying trade of the world owes nothing, or less than nothing, to direct State aid.

That feature is, of course, common to all British industries, but it has a special bearing in the case of the carrying trade in that British shipbuilding and shipping have had to compete, and have competed successfully, with rivals enjoying State aid. In addition to mail subventions and payments on account of ships held at the service of the State as merchant cruisers in time of war, the shipowners of many of our chief maritime rivals receive direct State assistance in every conceivable form—construction bounties on new tonnage built, navigation bounties on the mileage run, reimbursement of the Suez Canal dues paid, special subsidies in respect of the maintenance of particular services. In recent years the total amounts thus annually received by French shipowners have exceeded £2,750,000; the Japanese shipping companies have drawn about £1,250,000 a year; Austro-Hungarian and Italian owners have been subsidized to the tune of about £1,000,000 each. If these figures are compared with the tonnage owned by the respective countries, it will be seen that had British shipping required or received financial support in the same proportion, the annual cost to the State would have been not less than £15,000,000 to £20,000,000. The great German lines, it is true, are in receipt of only comparatively modest subsidies, but the preferential rates granted by the German State Railways on goods exported in German bottoms amount, in practice, to a subsidy of incalculable value. Yet in face of this bounty-fed competition the British mercantile marine has not only shown a steady expansion in actual tonnage and volume of traffic, but has almost maintained its relative position, despite the natural making-up of leeway by belated starters. It is pertinent to our inquiry to remark in passing that the receipt of subsidies, in many cases, entails a large

measure of Governmental interference in the running of foreign lines, and that some, at least, of the most heavily subsidized companies are conspicuous for the inefficiency of their services and the poverty of their financial results.

The British shipping industry is not a contrivance of the State; it is a creation of spontaneous individual enterprise. It has come into being, not by decree, but as a result of the cumulative independent activities of men and groups of men engaged in their own concerns. The active principle in its growth and maintenance was neither State dictation nor State solicitude; it was the initiative, energy, judgment, and skill of individuals and groups working for their own ends, and served by the most capable artisans and seamen in the world.

It is a commonplace, but one calling for reminder, that these multifarious activities were undertaken for the rewards they would bring. By the test of 'will it pay?' and 'will 'this or that pay best?' every separate item of design and equipment had to be settled, every decision as to route, cargo, stowage, discharging, loading, had to be made; in pursuit of profitable trade the ends of the earth were raked for cargo. By that test every undertaking shaped its course to success and extension, or to stagnation and bankruptcy. Thus the shipping industry, when the war broke upon the world, was an industry adjusted in every part and in every phase of activity from top to bottom to the test of profit, whether as the condition of survival, the reward of effort, or the index of personal ability and achievement.

The war has occasioned, very naturally and properly, a feeling of resentment against the making of inordinate profits. It is rightly felt that in a time like the present, when life is being given freely or commandeered forcibly for the service of the State, the active snatching or passive receipt of particular gain out of the general loss is monstrous, and it is no less strongly felt that the incentive of gain, in the circumstances of the present, ought not to be required to induce the best service. No decent-minded person will quarrel with that view; but the feeling has affected understanding of the part profit plays in the economic system, and has blinded many to the reactions that the elimination of the profit factor from a system created and shaped by the profit motive and

test must cause. Profit is something other than plunder, something more than an incentive : it is also an apparatus with a function. Since this is by way of being forgotten, and since it has an important bearing upon the extension of State control during the war and the question of its continuance after the war, it will be worth while to recall the ' laws ' which ruled, by their interplay, economic operations as they were conducted before the war. These may be summarized briefly as follows : (*a*) when demand exceeds supply price goes up ; (*b*) high price spells large profit ; (*c*) large profit attracts capital and enterprise ; (*d*) supplies increase ; (*e*) competition between suppliers brings prices and profits down ; (*f*) the weaker or less efficient suppliers are stimulated to better service or, in default, they fail and fall out.

So far as economic activities are subject to this cycle of impulses and checks, it may be said that self-interest is the mainspring, price the regulator, and competition the safeguard and selector of the economic machine, and that profit is broadly conditioned by value of service rendered. Needless to say, in the actual world of business, things do not work in the beautifully simple and self-checking fashion which such a statement would suggest. The actions and reactions are neither free nor instantaneous ; they are subject to concerted manipulation, which often results in profit being derived from disservice rather than service, from exploitation rather than reciprocal advantage, even though it often results also in the curtailment of the waste of competition. Yet the force of the ' law of demand and supply ' is by no means spent. If to hold it as a fetish was absurd, to dismiss it with a gesture is folly. Price is still a dominant co-ordinator of demand to supply ; competition is still a potent safeguard over the greater part of the industrial domain; and profit, which is still broadly conditioned by the value of service rendered, is also still an integral part of the apparatus of production and distribution.

The shipping industry had developed to a special degree under the formative influence of these incentives and internal checks which, by reason of the very nature of the shipping industry, were less open to concerted manipulation than in the case of, perhaps, any other of the great industries. Before the war, two-thirds of the total tonnage of the British mercantile

marine was 'tramp' shipping, and in the tramp trade competition is as fluid as the element on which the boats ply. The good freights to be got wherever the needs of shippers chance to be in excess of the carrying facilities attract capital and enterprise, in the shape of additional vessels, more readily than in any other industry; whenever the world level of freights has risen, capital and enterprise have been drawn into shipbuilding as by a magnet, and after the lapse of sufficient time for construction to overtake requirements, freights have fallen, under competition, down to and below normal. This alternate lagging and overtaking of construction in relation to cargoes offering has caused freights to fluctuate as much as 30 per cent. above and below the mean, but the mean has been no more than commensurate with the value of the services given. World freights cannot be held up by concerted action. It is inordinately difficult for any even partial or temporary monopoly to be created, for any merchant captain who has saved up or can obtain credit enough to acquire a single vessel can start as an owner in the tramp trade, and even the single boat is an effective self-contained competitive unit. Thus the freezing out of new rival undertakings, or the concerted blocking of new accessions when the service as a whole is inadequate to the volume of world trade, is less possible in the shipping industry than elsewhere. The liners are in a rather different category. To run a liner service requires a larger organization and a larger aggregation of capital; and the conditions are more favourable for the creation of a semi-monopoly. Competition on the liner routes between rival lines is not a nibbling away of trade: it is a battle royal between giants, who have learned by costly experience to come to understandings. Hence the shipping rings and conferences which have caused so much perturbation in many minds. But no arrangements between the lines can in practice bolster up freights far above their proper level, for although deferred rebates may tie up shippers for a while, the experience of most of the 'rings' shows that a new line, when backed by sufficient capital and directed with sufficient ability, can generally force its way into the trade, while the competition of the tramp is always a potential check to the undue raising of freights. Competition has, on any broad survey, been the determining influence, and in the face of such mobile and

fierce competition, incompetence has been drastically weeded out. The shipping services may therefore rightly claim to represent the survival of the fittest, and the fittest here represents, not only the fittest to make a profit, but by the same token the fittest to serve the world's needs to the best purpose.

Only now, when the routes to be followed and the nature and priority of the cargoes to be carried are prescribed by Boards and Committees and Departments of Ministries, do we reflect with a certain wonder upon the fact that before the era of State control these things settled themselves ; that without any centralized direction ships fetched the goods most needed, in the order of the greatest urgency, from wherever they might be in the world, loaded them in the most suitable way, and carried them by the most advantageous routes in the best adapted vessels to where they were most wanted, and did all this at a charge which could certainly not be called extortionate. Yet the shipping industry, like other industries, did in fact thus serve the needs of the world, and did it, on the whole, with a degree of success which now commands a wistful if belated appreciation.

It is not contended that the shipping industry under this régime of economic autonomy was without spot or blemish. It was marked by at least the usual amount of short-sighted selfishness and wasteful competition, and by perhaps more than a usual amount of tyranny and callousness with regard to the treatment of the men by whom the ships were run. The difficulty of maintaining a decent standard of hygiene and conduct under seafaring conditions are too well known to need emphasis, but the returns of suicides of seamen and firemen and of deaths from diseases due to close confinement in unhealthy quarters none the less make unpleasant reading. The responsibility for these evils cannot be laid at the door of any one class or section, and their mitigation must necessarily be slow, uphill work. And if there are shipowners whose general attitude evokes a mild wonder at the forbearance of the Destroying Angel, it must be remembered that human depravity and human stupidity are not confined to any one class or any one profession. It may be doubted whether even the ranks of Government Departments are immune. While to accept the occasionally implied claim that the

shipowner is the noblest work of God puts an undue strain on the faculty of adulation, the contention that he is charged with a triple dose of original sin is equally questionable. Such as he was, he performed with undoubted efficiency and at moderate cost functions of enormous importance to the welfare of the world. The question at issue is whether any other system would ensure the performance of these functions with greater, or even with equal, success.

That the cost of sea-carriage had been cut to a very fine point in the years before the war is borne out by a consideration of the dividends paid by shipping companies. The business is peculiarly subject to fluctuation, and occasional years of large profits are balanced by others during which earnings are small and losses heavy. But taking the ten years 1904-1913, inclusive, the average dividends of a representative list of cargo-boat companies, representing £14,000,000 of subscription and loan capital, amounted to no more than $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., and this though the amount written off for depreciation was less than prudence might have dictated. Moreover, the computation takes no account of the losses suffered by shareholders in companies which failed. Dividends represent, of course, only the return to capital invested, and low dividend returns might be compatible with high real returns absorbed by the overpayment of labour or management. It will not be contended that the wages of officers and crews were extravagantly high; but as regards the payments to management there is a good deal of mystery and even mystification. Many balance sheets may be searched in vain for an account of the sums paid to the management, whose remuneration often consists in a percentage on the gross freights, so that even when freights are so low as to result in very small dividends or even loss to the shareholders the managers may nevertheless be making a substantial income. There is little analogy between this and the case of the salaried manager of a works, for the shipping managers are a separate commercial concern. Here is a manifest soakaway for earnings, and on this account the real profits of the shipping industry are not precisely ascertainable, but it is hardly likely that the sum total of payments to managers affects very substantially the financial records of the mercantile marine, or vitiates the statement that the rewards of the shipping industry

as a whole were no more than commensurate with the services rendered.

On the declaration of war this progressive equilibrium, under which the services of the mercantile marine were automatically adjusted to world requirements, as indicated by the freight index, was violently disturbed. The cessation of trade with the Central Powers, the world-wide financial crisis which followed the outbreak of hostilities, and the uncertainties inseparable from a state of war caused something like a total cessation of chartering, and until the naval situation had been cleared up and the markets of the world had readjusted themselves to some extent to the new conditions, there was little effective demand for tonnage. Freights fell to an altogether unremunerative level and many owners contemplated the laying up of their vessels. Within three or four months, however, returning confidence and the development of new avenues of trade brought about a rapid change in the situation. The demand for tonnage revived and was accentuated by the requisitioning of ships as naval auxiliaries and transports. By November, 1914, freights had begun to rise, and by the end of the year the demand for tonnage was in excess of the supply. At the beginning of 1915 shipowners were in a position to demand freights much in excess of those prevailing before the war, or, to put it less invidiously, were in the position of receiving constantly advancing competitive bids for cargo space, with no particular reason for accepting other than the highest offer.

This increase in freights, it may be said at once, did not all represent increased profits, for the working expenses per ton of cargo carried had risen considerably. Bunkering had become very costly, through the rise in the price of coal, especially at foreign ports, and the cost of loading and discharging cargoes also showed an upward tendency. Congestion at the docks led to serious delays in port, which diminished the earning powers of vessels by reducing the number of voyages that could be made in a given period, and this loss could only be covered by increasing freights for those actually accomplished. Even more serious was the effect of the falling-off in export cargoes, for many ships were obliged to leave British ports in ballast or only partly loaded, and it was necessary to raise inward freights in order to

cover the expenses of the outward voyage, while diminished exports and the partial disappearance of passenger traffic bore heavily upon the liners.

Nevertheless, these factors do not suffice to account for the great advances recorded. Why, then, we may ask, had shipping profits risen disproportionately to the rise in the value of other services and commodities? The answer lies in the disparity between the demand for cargo-space and the tonnage effectively available. At the end of the first six months of war the position was approximately as follows: The Admiralty had requisitioned as fleet auxiliaries, or for the transport of men, stores, munitions, and supplies, both military and naval, 20 per cent. of the British mercantile tonnage—or about 10 per cent. of the total tonnage of the world. Practically the whole of the shipping of Germany and Austria-Hungary, amounting to about 14 per cent. of the world's tonnage, was lying idle. Thus the tonnage available for the shipment of civil supplies was diminished, on these two counts alone, by 24 per cent.—perhaps by 26 per cent. if the absorption of French vessels for naval purposes and the loss of Allied ships interned in enemy ports is included. The demand, on the other hand, was reduced by the complete cessation of trade between the Allies and the Central Powers, the suspension of the bulk of Russian sea-borne trade, and of traffic with the occupied areas of Belgium and Northern France. This diminution of trade was, roughly speaking, equivalent to the diminution of tonnage, and had not other factors intervened the equilibrium would speedily have asserted itself. Unfortunately the carrying power of the ships available for trade was greatly reduced. The restrictions on navigation incidental to a state of war lengthened the voyages to be made; the closing of certain ports to commercial uses dislocated the liner services and necessitated a redistribution of traffic; this redistribution of traffic, together with the enlistment of some six thousand of the best dockyard workers, led to the port congestion which has already been referred to, and which did more perhaps than anything else to reduce the carrying power of the mercantile marine. The long ballast voyages consequent upon trade readjustments, the long delays in the shipment of grain at the Plate, due to a late harvest and financial difficulties, the failure of the Australian

crops, and the closing of the Dardanelles, with the consequent concentration of demand upon the North American market, all played an important part.

It may be asked why, if the 'law of demand and supply' is valid, these aberrations proceeded so far; why abnormal profit, and the prospect of still higher profit, was not effective in attracting new capital and enterprise and bringing freights down by competition. The question has only to be stated to answer itself. The self-regulating principle in the competitive economic system, like the governor of the steam engine, requires time and freedom to operate, and can only ensure steady running when the relative movements of demand and supply are gradual. Here the movement had been sudden and violent, and was governed by factors outside ordinary commercial considerations. Again, even had the shipyards been free to accept bonuses for earlier delivery or orders for new vessels it would have been many months before the supply of tonnage could be augmented to meet the demand. But they were not free. Mercantile shipbuilding had to give place to naval construction, and reckless enlistment of skilled workers accentuated the difficulty. Thus the incentive of high profits, though it could draw vessels out of less useful or active employment into more useful and active, could not, except against many restraints, produce new tonnage. Competition did serve to equalize freights as from route to route, but it could not bring down freights.

The increase in freights, it is necessary to observe, was world-wide; indeed, freights between neutral ports had risen more than between British and overseas ports, so much so that shipowners were charged with causing a shortage of tonnage in the out-and-home routes by going after the higher freights ruling between foreign ports, and it was urged that the Government should forbid British ships to carry cargo except to and from British ports. The proposal illustrates the persistent failure to observe that there is a world pool of shipping and that British shipping cannot be treated without consideration of the rest. Had British ships been confined to home routes the shortage on other routes would have drawn away all neutral shipping from the trade of the United Kingdom. In other words, neutral shipowners would have monopolized the most remunerative traffic, while British

shipowners were confined to the less profitable. At the same time there would have been a general shifting round of the world's tonnage which would have taken vessels from the voyages to which they were best adapted and forced them on to other work. So, with the compulsory fixing of low freights for vessels arriving and departing from British ports, British shipowners might be constrained to accept the reduced rates, but no such compulsion could be exercised over the neutrals, who at that time were bringing in one-third of our imports.

In one respect the shipping industry was already, in the first week of war, leaning upon the State. The shipowners had matured long before the war a scheme of mutual war insurance, and concurrently the Committee of Imperial Defence had worked out a scheme of State subvention. On the outbreak of war these schemes were put into operation. The insurance of British steamers was entrusted to the shipowners' mutual associations, the Government assuming 80 per cent. of the risk and leaving the shipowners to bear the remaining 20 per cent. The insurance of cargo was arranged through a State office, also on the basis of a flat rate. There can be no doubt that but for these arrangements insurance rates would have run so high as to dislocate British commerce and industry to a serious degree and to affect adversely the international exchanges. In averting these evils the State Insurance Scheme was of inestimable value, and though it is pertinent to observe that the risks which the State helped to cover arose from the action of the State itself and lay altogether outside ordinary commercial considerations, yet, since the rates charged in the case of both ships and cargoes during a very considerable period of the war were altogether inadequate to the risk, the transaction worked out virtually to a subvention to the shipowners and the merchants, who were able to charge freights and prices based on perils against which they were covered at nominal premiums.

With the assistance of the State Insurance scheme and the incentive offered by a rising freight market, the British mercantile marine did, during the first eighteen months of the war, succeed to a degree which could hardly have been anticipated in maintaining the volume of imports—food supplies, munitions, and raw material—on which not only

Great Britain but her Allies depended for the continuance of the struggle. During this period seaborne trade remained, generally speaking, in the hands of private shipowners and traders. Early in 1915 the first step in a new direction was taken by the requisitioning of all insulated space for Government purchases of frozen meat, but in the main the employment of the tonnage available for commercial purposes was dictated by the operation of economic demands.

In the meantime, however, this tonnage had been still further depleted by requisitioning for naval and military purposes. The work of the auxiliary patrols and examination service absorbed a greater and greater number of vessels. The demands for transport of men, munitions, fuel, and stores for the supply not only of the British but the Allied armies constituted a continually increasing drain. By the end of 1916 about one-third of the British Mercantile Marine had been requisitioned for these purposes, or for the carriage of Government purchases of foodstuffs, and an account must now be given of the terms on which they were taken over.

In the opening days of the war there was no time to fix rates or sign charter parties, and the vessels required were taken under Royal Proclamation, the terms being left for subsequent agreement. At the end of August a Board consisting of representatives of shipping associations, chambers of commerce, trade unions, etc., was appointed for this purpose, and the Board constituted a number of panels of shipowners to recommend conditions and rates of charter for the different types of vessels. Within a few weeks these panels submitted a composite report recommending for each class of vessel a monthly rate of hire per ton gross register, and varying according to the speed of vessel. These proposals, since known as the ' Blue-book rates,' were favourably received by the government, and by the end of the year were formally agreed.

The significance of this system of Blue-book rates lies, for our immediate purpose, in the fact that under it the shipowner had no longer any financial interest, except within a narrow margin of working cost economies, in the efficient working of his ship ; his remuneration was a fixed sum—the same whether the ship was idle or working full pressure, whether

it carried much cargo or little. In the operation of vessels taken under the requisitioning scheme the index and incentive of profit was therefore ruled out. Whatever bearing this might have upon the working of vessels taken up as naval auxiliaries or transports, it became a factor of very great importance when, as will be seen in a moment, requisitioning at Blue-book rates was extended to the whole of the mercantile marine, whether employed for military or civil purposes.

It is instructive to trace the steps by which requisitioning for naval and military requirements led up to this final goal. From a very early period of the war the government had become importers, not only of munitions of war, but of sugar, meat, grain, and raw materials, for domestic consumption as well as for the supply of the armies. Meanwhile, freights were steadily rising, in consequence, to a great extent, of the shortage of tonnage caused by the Government's own demands. In order to avoid payment of these inflated freights the Government resorted to the practice of requisitioning, for the shipment of their purchases, cargo space on the liners, or entire vessels of the tramp class. Where the ship itself was requisitioned the agreement was governed by the Blue-book rates for time charter, thus placing the vessel on the same footing as those taken up for naval and military use. Cargo space on liners, on the other hand, was requisitioned at 'agreed' freights, the agreement being of the voluntary-compulsory kind; and although these freights were far below those ruling in the open market, this arrangement had the advantage that the loading and discharge of the cargo was still under the control of the shipowner and not of the State, and that the shipowner was paid according to work done and not on a time basis.

During the next twelve months, from February, 1916, to February, 1917, the intervention of the State in the running of the mercantile marine was continually on the increase. The requisitioning of ships at Blue-book rates, alike for military and civil employment, proceeded apace, and by the beginning of 1917 over 40 per cent. of British tonnage had been thus absorbed under time charter by the Government. The management of the remainder was still left in the hands of the owners, and the cargoes carried were, in the main, provided by traders in the ordinary way, but the jurisdiction of the Ships Licensing

Committee, at first confined to ships trading between foreign ports, was extended to cover the whole shipping of the country, and every voyage proposed had to receive the approval of the State.

It is already a commonplace in every department of economic activity that each new encroachment by the State upon the private conduct of industry provides an argument for further extensions. The requisitioning of shipping proved no exception to the rule. The larger the amount of tonnage taken up the less easy was it to call a halt, for every additional ship requisitioned for the carriage of civil supplies drove still higher the freights obtainable by the remaining free ships. Moreover, the overseas purchasing of sugar, wheat, ore, wool, etc., for import was being undertaken to an ever-increasing extent by agents of the Allied Governments, and the distribution of foodstuffs and raw materials after their arrival at port was also passing under State control; so that sea-carriage, in so far as these commodities were concerned, had become little more than a loose link between two controls, and the inevitable tendency was towards making the link a part of one comprehensive control system.

It is one of the ironies of the situation that the Blue-book rates were proposed by the shipowners themselves. The fact is a testimony to their moderation which it would be ungenerous to overlook; but it is equally a reminder that they were as much at a loss as anyone else in regard to the course events would take. The rates were fixed in October, 1914, when freights were still at a low ebb, and though for some types of vessel they were liberal, for tramp steamers they were not enough even to cover expenses in the circumstances then existing. No stipulation was made by the shipowners for a sliding scale whereby the rates would rise in accordance with the expenses of running and freights current. So far as the point was considered at all, it was assumed that periodical readjustments would be made; but this assumption was not embodied 'in the bond,' and with the exception of an increase in the rates for tramps and a reduction in the rates for some other vessels the Government has insisted, through three and a half years of rising expenses and rising freights, on the rates proposed, while the future was still hidden in obscurity.

So long as only a comparatively few ships were taken this mattered little, for the earnings of the 'free' ships were so high as to make up for the more modest earnings on the requisitioned ships, and a fleet with even half its vessels in cargo-space under requisition could still give handsome returns on the average of all the vessels; but when the whole of the ships came to be requisitioned things assumed a different aspect. True, the Blue-book payments, as modified, still afforded a profit, on the basis of pre-war values, that would have been regarded as eminently satisfactory in an average normal year; but in comparison with the earnings of neutral companies, with whom the British owner will have to compete after the war, they were small indeed.

All this time freights were rising by leaps and bounds. The reason is not far to seek. By the end of the second year of war the normal carrying power of the ships engaged in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom was only 60 per cent. of that available under peace conditions, roughly two-thirds of this representing British and one-third foreign tonnage. Under the stimulus of high freights and plentiful cargoes the weight of goods carried per hundred tons of shipping had been greatly increased, and the shrinkage in import weights was only some 22 per cent.; but the demands of shippers for cargo-space had grown rather than abated; and it was solely to the consequent preponderance of demand over supply that the increased price of transport was due. If December, 1913, a month of rather low freights, be taken as a datum, the movements of 'free' outward and inward freights for a series of five Decembers are approximately as follows:

	Dec., 1912.	Dec., 1913.	Dec., 1914.	Dec., 1915.	Dec., 1916
Inward ...	140	100	220	500	700
Outward ...	140	100	170	600	1,150

When the fullest allowance is made for increased expenses for the quadrupled cost (only partially covered by insurance) of replacing or providing for the replacement of vessels lost

by enemy action, and for the decreased purchasing power of money, it remains true that freights had risen enormously and fantastic profits were being made. True, the increase was not only in British but in world freights, and the higher cost of carriage was responsible for but a fraction of the increased price of imported commodities; but the indignation of the public was stirred, and found by no means overheated expression in the words of Mr. Bonar Law: 'It is 'utterly disgraceful that, in a time of war, any class of the 'community, while others are suffering every kind of privation, 'should be allowed to make such profits. I do not say it 'is the fault of the shipowners—I think it is the fault of the 'Government—but it is absolutely disgraceful that it should 'have been allowed.' *

In advancing freights the Government found a reason for that all-embracing extension of State control for which the political appetite for authority already provided the inclination. It is not disputed that the situation called for State action, and it may now be asked what that action ought to have been. The problem was how to deal with the scandal of enormous profits while at the same time maintaining, and even improving, the efficient conduct of the mercantile marine, and how to do it in such a way that foreign ships were not driven away from our ports, that the difference between the market rate and any lower rate enforced was not simply handed as at present to the foreign exporter, and that due financial provision was made for the restoration of the mercantile marine after the war.

That an ideal solution of this problem was all the while at hand is now scarcely disputed. This ideal would have comprised four measures: (1) the maximization of the carrying power of existing ships by removing all causes of delay; (2) the augmentation of carrying power by speeding up the construction of new ships; (3) the limitation of imports, so as to bring the demand for freights within compass of the supply; and (4) the application of excess profits duty to shipowners, with compulsory provision for the building up of reserve funds against the time of restoration of the fleets.

The dilatory spirit shown in regard to the first of these

* 'Hansard,' July 3rd, 1917.

vitally important measures seems now to everyone almost incredible. The pressing needs of the situation were, first, an effective co-ordination of the military and civil demands on the shipping, ports, and railways; second, the pooling of railway trucks and retention of adequate labour on the railways so as to facilitate the flow of traffic through the ports; third, the prohibition of the use of quays and transit sheds for other than transport purposes; and, fourth, the maintenance of a sufficient supply of labour at the ports. To propound this is not to be wise after the event, for all these measures were urged by the shipowners as early as the month of January, 1915.

In the same way mercantile shipbuilding was for long months treated as a matter of small account. It was inevitable that civil orders should at first give place to naval requirements; but the original error of permitting recruitment from the shipyards and the subsequent resistance of the War Office to the release of recruited shipwrights, appears inexcusable, even when judged from the standpoint of the time. The upward trend of freights might have indicated, so far back as the beginning of 1915, the need for accelerating, or at least facilitating in every possible way, the output of merchant vessels, but it was not until the submarine menace had already become formidable that any real attention was given to the matter. And even when a vigorous programme was at last adopted, the notion that State direction must of necessity be better than commercial judgment and experience found expression, with the usual paralysis of effort. How far the recently revealed diminution in output at the commercial yards is due to the slackness of the workers or employers, and how far to the insidious effects of State control, has yet to be ascertained; but there is reason to suspect that State control has played a grievous part.

It is quite conceivable that the removal of all obstacles to the rapid 'turning round' of ships at the ports, and the acceleration of shipbuilding, would by themselves have provided carrying power sufficient to leave a floating surplus of tonnage over cargoes on offer, in which case freights would speedily have fallen to a reasonable level. But even if a margin of unsatisfied demand remained a sure remedy was at hand. In ordinary circumstances the effective demand

for tonnage for the carriage of particular commodities, as indicated by the freights obtainable, affords a reasonably accurate reflection of the real needs of the community; but in the abnormal circumstances of war this test becomes less trustworthy, and it was well within the competence of the Government to say what goods were essential, and with what others, and in what proportions, it was possible to dispense. The volume of cargo which could be carried by the tonnage available could be calculated; and all that was necessary to bring down freights was for the Government to prohibit unessential imports to an extent sufficient to provide the necessary margin. It must be put to the credit of the shipowners that they persistently urged this policy, which was all against their own pecuniary interests. But it needed less courage and resolution to let the merchant and manufacturer compete for imported goods and find it impossible to get them than to tell them plainly that they could only have a reduced quantity, or none at all; and for two and a half years successive Governments shirked the unpleasant duty, finding it easier to commiserate the importers than to restrict their imports, and to be scandalized at high freights than to curb their cause. Some steps in this direction had, indeed, been taken by the Imports Restriction Committee; but it was not until February, 1917, when Mr. Lloyd George announced fairly drastic import restrictions, that the question was seriously faced.

Had this course been adopted from the commencement of the shipping shortage, or even in October, 1915, when it was first urged upon the Board of Trade by one of the principal shipowners' associations, freights might have been kept down to any level consistent with the retention of foreign vessels in the import trade, and could have been stabilized by agreements between shipowners and merchants in collaboration with the Government. If, even so, the profits of shipping firms had continued to be excessive, there was every ground for a special adaptation of the excess profits duty. Under the provisions of the Finance Acts of 1915 and 1916 a duty of 50 per cent. for the first year and 60 per cent. for subsequent years (it was afterwards raised to 80 per cent.) was payable on all profits over and above 'the average of any two of the 'last three pre-war trade years to be selected by the taxpayer.' This provision chanced to be particularly favourable to the

shipowner, for the years 1912 and 1913, which were open to his choice, had been two of the rare boom years for shipping, and the profits in those years had averaged more than 20 per cent. over the whole mercantile marine. Thus the datum line for the shipowner's excess profit assessment was at an exceptionally favourable level and there was a valid case for fixing a standard which would put shipping on approximately the same footing as other industries. The argument of the shipowners against any such particular treatment—that it was necessary for them to build up large reserves in order to restore the depleted fleets after the war—will hardly hold water in view of the dividends distributed during the boom of 1915-16. It was right and proper that special provisions for wastage and the accumulation of reserves should be made, but this was not incompatible with a readjustment of the excess profits duty, and the somewhat vehement opposition of individual shipowners to the proposal was the cause of much justifiable public indignation.

But while there was every reason for putting shipping on a special taxation basis it was no less desirable that such profits as the shipowner was allowed to retain should continue, so far as was practicable, to be in the nature of payment by results. It will be evident, however, from what has been said above, that the sphere within which that principle could operate was already narrowly circumscribed, and it must now be added that conditions were developing under which the earnings of a ' free ' ship were dependent far less on efficient working than on the hazards of the sea routes, the navigation directions of the Admiralty, and the chances of convoy. Even had the shipowner's earnings remained dependent on cargo carried, one vessel might take a week and another a fortnight over the same voyage through circumstances almost wholly independent of the skill, foresight, judgment, or energy of either the shipowner or his servants: hence the primary essentials of a satisfactory system of payment by results had in large measure disappeared. Had the policy sketched above been vigorously pursued at an earlier stage it is unquestionable that the mercantile marine would have been operated to better national purpose during the first two and a half years of war, and the evil day of entire State control could have been at least postponed. But now there was little choice The

announcement in February, 1917, of the new policy of import limitation was followed within a few days by the general requisitioning of the entire mercantile marine. From that time forward every vessel in the British merchant service has been worked under departmental direction at a fixed rate of hire per month, and the shipowner has had no pecuniary interest in the efficient working of his vessels. Not only has the incentive of profit been removed, but the one tangible criterion of efficiency has been abolished, and his personal responsibility overshadowed by bureaucratic control.

Thus in shipping, as in many other industries, economic autonomy has given place, under pressure of war, to State hegemony. It is not disputed here that a State at war has as much claim upon industrial service as upon military service; neither is our argument concerned with the issue between voluntarism and compulsion. Granting that the State had power and sanction to commandeer industry on the State's own terms, and granting that war involves much exercise of authority by the State over property and activity, it remains a practical question, to be answered by a careful weighing of pros and cons, how far, in the State's own interest, that authority should be extended. Surveying broadly the course of State action in Great Britain during the war the conclusion can hardly be avoided that wherever the choice between individual and State control has been open, the leanings have been towards control by the State, and that in consequence State control has been stretched far beyond the actual requirements of the situation.

And what have been the results of this undue extension in the case of the mercantile marine? No precise answer can be given, not so much for reasons of 'national interests' as because the period of general requisitioning has coincided with the development of the 'unlimited' submarine campaign. The necessity for wide deviation and for sailing in convoys has added considerably to the length of voyages and occasioned much inevitable delay in sailings. It is difficult, therefore, to distinguish clearly the effects of these two causes, or to say how far any apparent defects in the utilization of shipping can fairly be charged to the new method of direction. All that can be given is a general impression, formed as far as may

be without preconceptions or bias, derived from an examination of the records of the last twelve months of cargo landed in relation to tonnage employed, and from careful consideration of evidence from many quarters as to the working of the system.

The impression gained is that the passing of the mercantile marine under State control has resulted in a lowering of the level of efficiency and a material reduction in the carrying power of the shipping. There is no occasion to recall here the innumerable instances of gross misuse and mismanagement of vessels under official direction, of departmental rivalry, and of divided responsibility. Allowance must be made for the fact that the machinery of control has had to be hastily improvised under conditions of abnormal difficulty, and it may be admitted that such occurrences do not demonstrate the impossibility of obtaining better results under peace conditions; but it must also be remembered that there has been less criticism and more resignation under control than could be counted on in time of peace, and that the worst faults attaching to the State administration of business have not yet had time to work to the surface.

It is vain to expect any reversal of policy between now and the end of the war; but after the settlement—what then? It will admittedly be impossible to abolish State control at a stroke on the signing of peace, but the question at issue is whether it shall be rendered permanent, or whether it shall be allowed to lapse, and if so—when? If it is to be continued what arrangements will be made for the provision of the capital necessary to restore the mercantile marine to its former strength? One of two things—the State must either guarantee dividends or provide the capital from State funds; and either course leads inevitably to the nationalization of shipping.

What advantages are supposed to be offered by such an outcome? That State control or ownership could give a more efficient service is unthinkable. If the expectation is that State control would be a safeguard against exorbitant freights, it may be pointed out that under the control régime of the last fifteen months freights have been raised by the Government by anything from 20 to 200 per cent. over the rates previously imposed upon shipowners for requisitioned

cargo-space. Doubtless considerations of revenue and import limitations had much to do with this governmental 'profiteering'; but there was little choice anyway, for even a government cannot without serious ill-consequences charge freights much below the world level. Moreover, even in normal times, freights must be such as to cover the cost of working, otherwise the service must be subsidized; and since the fact of reduced efficiency is not in dispute, the lower freights would only be obtained at the cost of the taxpayer.

One thing seems indisputably clear: if British shipping is to hold the same pre-eminence after the war as before, it is essential that its economic freedom shall be restored as soon as conditions permit. No State service can supply the initiative and resource upon which the successful management of trading vessels depends, and which have been developed under a system of individual responsibility and under the spur of a definite criterion of efficiency. No State department, so far as present experience goes, can make the quick decisions and take the prompt action required at every turn of the industry. No centralized administration can determine so accurately the needs of traders and consumers or respond so promptly to the fluctuating demands of a world commerce.

Nor is it clear that the advocates of State control have fully realized how far their project must inevitably carry them. Any attempt to regulate freights after the war must entail the subsidization of shipbuilding, the guarantee of cargoes, and a revival of the Navigation Laws to bar out all competing foreign vessels from the ports of the Empire. Such a step must inevitably tend to the withdrawal of British shipping from the general carrying trade, and, indeed, the entry of a nationalized or State controlled mercantile marine into competition for the carriage of cargoes between foreign ports presents almost insuperable difficulties. But the services rendered by British shipping as the common carriers of the world form an item of the utmost importance in the adjustment of our trade balance, and it is not clear how the deficiency could be made good.

There are other considerations, such as the prospect of increased fear of British 'navalism' abroad, and the opportunities given for discrimination against British state-owned

shipping as a form of diplomatic pressure, to which it is impossible to do more than allude, but which must not be left out of account. These considerations will have to be weighed in the balance against the arguments drawn from the necessities of national defence, and the various schemes for a reconstitution of the social and economic order.

JOHN HILTON.

THE POWER OF THE PRESS

IN earlier stages of English history one of the main anxieties of lovers of liberty was to secure the freedom of the press; to-day a good many people seem more concerned to curb the power of the press. During the past few months complaints have been loud that the country is governed by a newspaper dictatorship, and the philosophers amongst us have begun to suggest that the press, like so many other human institutions, has changed its character as it has grown in strength—beginning as a suppliant it has developed into a tyrant. It may be so, but the recent controversy about the power of the Northcliffe press forms a somewhat narrow basis for so broad a proposition. The main facts with regard to this controversy are matters of common knowledge. It is generally well known and hardly disputed by anybody that Mr. Lloyd George owes his position as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the support of the newspaper press, and especially to the support of those newspapers which Lord Northcliffe controls. It is also notorious that attacks made in the press on prominent soldiers and sailors have been followed by the dismissal of these high officers of State. Further, it is notorious that Lord Northcliffe has been employed by the Government on work of great public importance, involving of necessity confidential relationships with the War Cabinet; that Lord Rothermere, who is a brother of Lord Northcliffe, and also a newspaper proprietor, has been appointed in succession to two important offices; and that Lord Beaverbrook, who is again a newspaper proprietor, has received another ministerial appointment.

From these accepted facts the inference is drawn that the controllers of an important section of the press also control the Prime Minister and dictate to him the policy he shall pursue. That such a possibility should be regarded with dissatisfaction by the House of Commons is natural enough. For approximately two hundred years the House of Commons

has controlled the executive government more or less completely, and the members of that House cannot be expected to regard with indifference the loss of their most valuable power. In the debate which took place last month the House of Commons' view of the matter was expressed by Mr. Austin Chamberlain, and a better spokesman could not have been chosen. By his straightforward action in connection with the report upon Mesopotamia, Mr. Chamberlain demonstrated that he takes a higher view of the honourable obligations of political life than is taken by the average politician. Consequently, in criticizing the relations of the Prime Minister to the press, he had the advantage of being free even from the suspicion of acting from any personal motive. That is no small matter when political issues are under discussion. In the course of his speech Mr. Chamberlain frankly admitted that the House of Commons no longer exercises the same authority, or commands the same confidence from the country, as previous parliaments have done. He went on to argue that the decline in the reputation of the House of Commons did not justify Mr. Lloyd George's subservience to the press, for the country had no more confidence in the press than it had in parliament. That is possibly true, but it does not affect the real issues involved in the relationship between the present Prime Minister and a section of the press.

It has been generally overlooked that the setting up of a non-party system of government for the purpose of carrying on the war has necessarily altered the relationship of the press to the ministry of the day. In the relatively happy years which now seem so far remote, when we had peace abroad and party warfare at home, the influential newspapers were divided on party lines. Each party had its own press, and where party issues were concerned the party press had exactly the same standard of honour and veracity as the party politician. Everybody understood the system; few people complained; it seemed a law of nature. But the press had far less power over the ministry than that which the Northcliffe press is alleged—in the main justly—to exercise over Mr. Lloyd George's ministry. And the reason is very simple. In the first place, the opposition press in those bygone days had no direct influence at all over the government.

It was the business of the opposition press, as of opposition politicians, to represent everything that the government did in the worst possible light, and therefore ministers clearly could not take their policy from that section of the press. Had they done so, the leader writers in the opposition press would quickly have discovered that some detail in the government scheme was wrong, and on the strength of that detail would have proceeded to a fresh demonstration of the absolute incapacity of the party in power. But if, for these fairly obvious reasons, the opposition press could not control the government, surely, it may be argued, the ministerial press must have had an overwhelming influence. On the contrary, the influence of the ministerial press on the policy of the government was little if at all greater than that of the opposition press, the reason being that the government did not exist by favour of the press, but by favour of the caucus.

That is the real distinction between present and past times which most of the participants in the recent controversy have tacitly ignored. They have ignored it because caucus control of the government is at least as ugly in its moral aspects, and probably more injurious to the interests of the nation, than the newspaper control which the politicians denounce. Governments in those good old days were kept in power by an elaborate piece of living mechanism with its brain in the Whips' Office in Westminster and its tentacles stretching out to every constituency in the kingdom. The life blood of the mechanism was money, to a large extent corruptly obtained by selling titles of honour, while the tentacles were kept in a constant state of activity by a frequent distribution of 'J.P.'-ships, factory inspectorships, and minor government jobs. The machine was in daily touch with the Cabinet. Its business was to ascertain whether any suggested policy would be likely to pay from the electoral point of view, and especially whether it would command the enthusiasm of the party zealots, and at the same time attract wavering voters. Provided the machine reported that the policy meant good electoral business, the government could safely ignore any casual criticism that came from its own party organs. Indeed, such criticism would not be long maintained, for any party leader writer who had momentarily been rash enough to examine a proposed policy on its merits from the point

of view of the interest of the nation would quickly be told that the matter had been fully considered and that the party must speak with one voice. Thus, in pre-war days, neither the opposition press nor the ministerial press had any effective power of control over the government of the day. As regards those newspapers which kept themselves free from party entanglements it can only be said that they possibly helped to form neutral opinion, and so served a useful public purpose, but they certainly did not control the policy of the government. Any ministry that felt confident of maintaining its party majority in the House of Commons could snap its fingers at any section of the press, however widely read. In the final resort it was the efficiency of the caucus, not the circulation of the press, that counted.

But the whole situation was altered by the outbreak of war. The Unionists, who were then in opposition, patriotically—unlike the Whig opposition in the Napoleonic wars—offered to support the government in any measures necessary for the effective waging of war against the country's enemies. Party warfare was entirely suspended, and the government could count upon a united parliament. Later came a definite fusion of the parties for the formation of a coalition ministry. Throughout the country the Liberal and Tory caucuses declared a truce, and joined forces for the purposes of helping in war propaganda, or for other objects of national importance. The old issues had disappeared. Even the question of Home Rule, which had nearly involved the country in civil war, was postponed by agreement. The Labour Party also joined in the truce: it contributed representatives to the coalition ministry, and for a time suspended its own special activities. These fundamental changes in the attitude of political parties to one another necessarily involved a change in the functions of the press. The old business of attacking or defending this party or that on purely party lines had ceased; the only business left to the press was to criticize the government of the day from the point of view of national policy. Naturally, newspapers have differed in their interpretation of this point of view. Their criticism, indeed, would have been of little value if they had all chanted the same tune in the same key. But, in fairness to the Northcliffe press, it must be stated that it has never failed to advocate a vigorous prosecution of the

war till victory is achieved, and that it has frequently been in advance of average opinion in urging definite measures that subsequent experience has proved to be desirable. Its influence with the nation is probably due to these facts at least as much as to tricks of style intended to catch the popular taste, and to extremely clever business methods of promoting circulation.

When, therefore, the country began to feel that the coalition ministry was moving too slowly, the Northcliffe press was on strong ground in advocating a change of government. Other newspapers outside the Northcliffe group, and even opposed to it, took the same view; but the newspapers controlled by Lord Northcliffe were most skilful in beating the big drum, and in suggesting that they were the authors of a change which a large part of the nation, and also of the House of Commons, had come to desire. It is also reasonable to assume that Lord Northcliffe, in his individual capacity, counted for a good deal in the negotiations behind the scenes which led to the displacement of Mr. Asquith. At any rate, it is notorious that Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe have long been in close co-operation, and it may safely be said that without the aid of the latter the former would never have become Prime Minister.

Having reached the pinnacle with the aid of the Northcliffe press, Mr. Lloyd George dare not dispense with that aid. For he has nothing else to depend upon. He has no party caucus behind him as previous Prime Ministers have always had. The Liberal caucus remains under the control of Mr. Asquith, with those leading members of the Liberal Party who have joined their fortunes to his; the Tory caucus is apparently still under the control of Mr. Bonar Law. For the moment both machines are giving their support—somewhat half-heartedly—to the Lloyd George Ministry; but he cannot count on either. He has, it is rumoured, been making desperate efforts to get together a party machine of his own, and the enormous multiplication of titles of honour is probably in part due to this ambition. But though money can be raked in by the sale of titles, it is impossible to build up within a few months an efficient political machine with its necessary coteries of wirepullers and canvassers in all the principal constituencies. Except for the support of the press Mr. Lloyd George would be

standing on air. That is the final explanation of the control which the Northcliffe press exercises over the Lloyd George Cabinet.

It is natural enough, as pointed out above, that members of parliament should resent this situation, and should regard as blacklegs the people who have taken their job. But from the national point of view it cannot be said that there is any obvious loss. The House of Commons in the past has kept in power ministers who were palpably working against the nation's interest. For example, not many years ago it permitted Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill to intrigue together to cut down the navy, even in opposition to the policy of the Cabinet of which they were members. Nor ought it now to be forgotten that the present House of Commons forced into law a Home Rule Act which could only have been put into operation at the cost of civil war, and which probably no single individual on either side of St. George's Channel now wants. If we looked further back we should without difficulty find multitudes of instances where measures have been passed solely to please a political faction, and it is certain that if the House of Commons again comes under the alternating control of rival caucuses both legislation and administration will become even more partisan in character, and the general well-being of the nation will be even more frankly disregarded. The most hopeful chance of avoiding this outcome of parliamentary government dependent upon a gigantic popular electorate lies in the adoption of such measures as proportional representation and the referendum. Yet Mr. Chamberlain, who took the lead in attacking the influence of the press upon the government, is the bitterest opponent of proportional representation, and was equally violent a few years ago in opposing the introduction of the referendum. His ideal, apparently, is the unchecked tyranny of the caucus. Even the tyranny of the press is better than that.

But it is relevant to ask whether there is any necessity that the country should reconcile itself to either form of tyranny. That we must in time of war submit to the loss of a great many of our accustomed liberties is obvious ; but the extent of this necessity has been exaggerated, and the press has suffered not a little from the censorship which has been established. Even the members of the Press Bureau

themselves would hardly claim that their office has been a brilliant example of successful State control. Frequently the Bureau, acting on superior orders, has suppressed news of importance for no other reason than the fear that the public might be discouraged because the news was bad. On other occasions it has suppressed, or attempted to suppress, public criticism because the criticism was disagreeable to members of the government.

The most notable illustration of this latter type of tyranny was the prosecution of Colonel Repington, the well-known military critic, and Mr. Gwynne, the editor of the *Morning Post*, for writing and publishing an article attacking the proposal to send British troops from the western front to Palestine. That a technical offence was committed is indisputable, for the Defence of the Realm Regulations are so widely drawn that they can be made to cover any reference whatever to the movement of troops. But the only legitimate purpose of these regulations is to prevent newspapers from publishing information which might be useful to the enemy. If the case had been decided on this ground the prosecution would have failed, for all the facts alluded to in the *Morning Post* article had already been published in German as well as French and Italian newspapers. But the magistrate, whose tone throughout the trial was painfully inconsistent with the best traditions of the English bench, took the narrow, bureaucratic view that any breach of a bureaucratic order is a serious offence which must be punished. There would be few English liberties to-day if that had been the attitude adopted by English judges in the past. The prosecution was obviously undertaken for no other purpose than to punish a critic who dared to oppose a policy dear to the Prime Minister. Had a similar article appeared from another pen in one of the newspapers which supports Mr. Lloyd George there would have been no prosecution.

The case is important because it shows that the destruction of the liberty of the press may proceed *pari passu* with a growth in the power of the press. If a British government can, with impunity, disregard that English tradition of liberty which is the ultimate bond uniting the whole British Empire, it will not hesitate to shower favours on one section of the press, while straining the law in order to suppress the criticisms of

another section. To-day the Northcliffe press receives the favours, and the *Morning Post* the cuffs; a year hence the positions may be reversed.

A word may be said about the plea that 'the law must be 'enforced.' Where that plea is honestly used it is unanswerable. Where the law is in substance broken, the men who break it must be substantially punished if the oncoming of anarchy is to be prevented. But a ministry which allows Irish Sinn Feiners and English and Scottish trade unionists openly to defy laws essential to the peace and good government of the country cannot honestly claim that mere technical breaches of bureaucratic regulations should be punished as if they were serious offences. Yet it is in this spirit that the law is being administered to-day by magistrates who appear to have lost all sense of proportion. Analogous to the *Morning Post* case is the case of Lady Ela Russell, who was ordered by the Hertfordshire War Agricultural Committee to plough up certain land which was being used by her for keeping cows. The chairman and the vice-chairman of the Local Food Control Committee and the chairman of the Urban District Council all gave evidence that in their opinion the existing use of the land was the best use to which it could be put, and that Lady Ela Russell was doing a real public service by supplying milk to the district. The local magistrates, taking exactly the same line as Sir John Dickinson in the *Morning Post* case, refused to go into the merits of the matter. For them, as for him, an order must be obeyed, however foolish it might be, and they imposed the maximum penalty of £100 and costs. It may safely be said that if cases similar to these had been brought into court before the war they would either have been dismissed or a nominal fine of one farthing would have been imposed.

The real root of the trouble is the extravagant extension of the functions of the government. A government can only act through officials, and it is inherent in the nature of officialdom to arrogate to itself arbitrary powers. At the same time the average capacity of officials must necessarily decline as their numbers are increased, and as the range of their operations is extended. When the functions of government are limited to what is strictly necessary for the well-being of the nation, the civil service can consist of a few picked men,

and their judgment on the limited range of questions entrusted to them is probably the best obtainable. As a rule, moreovér, men of this calibre, from the very fact that they are competent, are also modest; they are willing to seek advice and proceed by agreement instead of attempting to impose by force hastily formed opinions. But when a vast army of new officials is created, many of them with a very limited general education, and most of them with no technical knowledge of the subjects with which they are called upon to deal, it is certain that their arrogance will be in almost direct proportion to their ignorance. The country which accepts such a form of government will be subjected—as Great Britain is to-day—to a multitude of regulations which quite needlessly interfere with the liberty and initiative of the individual citizen. Yet it is the individual self-supporting citizen who has finally to bear upon his shoulders the whole cost of the State, including the cost of the bureaucrats who handicap his productive efforts.

In a word, to debate the power of the press, or of any other instrument of government, without first asking what the functions of government are to be, is necessarily futile. If the functions of government are unduly expanded the destruction of liberty is certain, whether the government be controlled by the press or by the caucus.

EDITOR.

THE ROMANCE OF THE BATTLE-LINE IN FRANCE

PART II.

(Copyright in the U.S.A.)

ON September 5, 1914, two days after the departure of the government of the Republic from Paris to Bordeaux, the French official *communiqué* announced that 'les troupes ennemis ont évacué la région Compiègne-Senlis.' By this time the Germans had advanced so far south as to be within a march of Paris, and on the boulevards was distinctly heard the sound of the guns in the decisive battle of the Marne. This is not the place to tell of the great part we took in winning that victory. The story of how our little army joined with the French in keeping the Germans from once more investing the beautiful capital ought to be familiar to us all. The small British forces, the last of our old standing army, were of such admirable quality that they succeeded in forming with the French an impassable barrier on the east of Paris, until the danger was conjured and the Germans were in retreat.

It was not far from Meaux that the enemy came nearest to the capital, and around that city furious battles were fought. In the words of one of our soldiers' songs: 'We 'got them on the go at a little place called Meaux.' There is no town in the Île de France fuller of historical associations. Before the war there stood on the terrace of the modern Hôtel de Ville a venerable antiquity—a mortar, one of the first ever made, taken from the English near Meaux in the Hundred Years' War, five centuries ago. But the most vivid tradition of Meaux is of a later date, when Bossuet, already a bishop, was translated in 1682 to that see, over which he presided for twenty-two years. In the noble cathedral, where a monument marks his resting-place, the anniversary of the battle of the Marne has been celebrated each year since 1914 by a solemn Mass, sung by a priest who served in the French army as a combatant officer. The

patriotic spectacle of a priest coming from the battle-field to officiate at the high-altar of the church which was the scene of the eloquent pastorate of the Eagle of Meaux, gives cause for reflexion. The submission of the French clergy to military service, enacted before the separation of Church and State, was the work of the anti-clericals, and was opposed by the episcopate and by Catholics generally. When the war came the anti-clerical cry of ' Les curés sac au dos ' had an effect on the nation which the military service of the clergy in peace-time had failed to produce and which the adversaries of the Church had not anticipated. The spectacle of seminarists and priests fighting in the ordinary ranks of the army and dying for France gave to the clergy a popularity which, except in certain regions, they had not enjoyed under the Third Republic. It was confidently predicted that when peace was restored and the anti-clericals could no longer reproach the clergy with being a caste enjoying the invidious privilege of exemption from taking part in the national defence, the curés who had fallen in battle would be remembered in their parishes as heroes, while those who returned from the war to resume their ministry would be respected as heroes. The prospect perturbed the minds of the anti-clericals, who dreaded a religious revival. Had the French episcopate been inspired with the national spirit of Bossuet the anti-clericals might have been at a loss for arguments to discourage such a revival. But the enemies of the Church in France, always indefatigable, had an ally in the Vatican. From the moment when the Austrian cardinal at the Conclave of 1903 vetoed the election to the papacy of Rampolla, who represented a policy conciliatory to France, the Vatican has been considered, rightly or wrongly, as an Austro-German agency. But for Rampolla's defeat it is probable that that admirable instrument, the Concordat, would not have been abrogated, the rupture of which has removed the last trace of Gallicanism from the French episcopate. The policy of the new Pope, elected in the first weeks of the war, has, justly or unjustly, persuaded impartial spectators of the European tumult, who have no love for anti-clericalism, that the Vatican desires and works for the victory of Germany and Austria, and the abasement of France, of Italy, and of England. The position of the French bishops is one of painful difficulty. Of patriotism beyond reproach, they are compelled by their

dependence on the Holy See to express their loyalty to it, a dilemma of which the anti-clericals are not slow to take advantage. The sacrifices of life and limb and health made by thousands of the younger clergy has had its effect counteracted by the allegation that the clergy is a body primarily owing allegiance to a power which in the European conflict is hostile to France. Reflexions such as these are inspired by the sight of a soldier-priest, who won military promotion while fighting for a cause not favoured by Rome, officiating at the altar by the pulpit of Bossuet, the greatest churchman ever born of France, the eldest daughter of the Church. It was here at Meaux that the champion of Gallican liberty, the opponent of the influence of Rome in any but the spiritual domain, preached week after week with that eloquent tongue which neither old age nor suffering could silence. It was here that he died without attaining the Cardinal's hat, which Rome denied to the most illustrious of the French episcopate of all time.

The Brie, of which Meaux is the principal town, is a country full of charm from early spring to late autumn. It is a region of great forests, most of them belonging to the State, of ancient market-towns and villages, of pleasant châteaux, of farms which supply the needs of Paris, and, in the direction of Champagne, of vineyards covering the hill-sides. It looked as though the peaceful landscape had never been disturbed by war and devastation. Yet its fate in 1914 was no new experience for the region flanking the capital on the east. The name of every town and village in it recalls some important or romantic incident in peace or in war. There is Jouarre, for example, with the remains of the abbey between the Grand and the Petit Morin, those tributaries of the Marne which few English people had heard of before they became sadly familiar names in September, 1914. Many pages might be written about the Abbesse de Jouarre—not the creation of Renan's unseemly fancy, but the real Abbess who vexed the soul of her neighbour Bossuet and caused him incidentally to write three large volumes.

The wealth of historic associations in all the war-zone makes it necessary to select a very small proportion of them for exposition. Certain correspondents who were sufficiently interested in the first part of this article to write to the author

about it, suggested that if reminiscences had to be omitted for reasons of space it would be better in the remaining pages to sacrifice those referring to far-off times and to give the preference to *choses vues*, and to incidents the relation of which had come direct from the lips of witnesses or contemporaries. The latter category will take us back over a long space of time ; for it is not many years ago that there were old people alive in France who loved to talk about their recollections of the Napoleonic period. Such was an aged Canon of Saint Dié in the Vosges, who, when questioned about the invasion of 1870, declared that the invasion which was freshest in his memory was that of 1814. The remainder of these pages, then, will deal almost exclusively with incidents of recent date or which were within living memory not many years ago.

The battle of the Marne not only saved Paris and Europe : it also disarranged the personal plans of the German Emperor. He had intended to supervise the investiture of the capital not from Versailles, as his grandfather had done, but from Ferrières, Baron Rothschild's sumptuous château between Meaux and Paris, the amenities of which had been tested by William I., the Crown Prince Frederick, and Bismarck, in 1870. But the armies of England and of France stood in the way, and the imperial party never got as far west as Ferrières. A fortnight after Sedan, the King of Prussia, not yet Emperor, with his satellites, left Reims after an agreeable visit at the Archbishop's palace (which his grandson's artillery was to demolish), and on September 15th arrived at Meaux, where he occupied a house on the beautiful promenade which leads towards the Cathedral. Here a young English diplomatist was waiting for the Chancellor, Edward Malet, afterwards our well-known ambassador at Berlin, the bearer of a letter from Lord Lyons, British Ambassador to France, asking Bismarck if he would enter into negotiations with Jules Favre, acting on behalf of the French Provisional Government. The Chancellor assented, but Jules Favre did not appear at Meaux, and on the 19th the party drove over to Ferrières, where they remained for sixteen days. That remarkable house is as unlike a French château as any human habitation can be. It stands four-square on a high terrace, each corner flanked by a tower in the style of the Italian Renaissance, overlooking gardens of great beauty. It was built by Baron

James de Rothschild, in rivalry, it is said, of Mentmore, the head of the French branch of the famous cosmopolitan firm being determined that he would not be less magnificently housed than his relative in England, and the architect he employed was not a Frenchman, but Sir Joseph Paxton, the celebrated gardener of the Duke of Devonshire, who designed the Crystal Palace. Within the house is even more sumptuous than without. The *grande salle*, of the dimensions of a public building, is a treasure-house of pictures and of other priceless objects of art. Here William I. and his band made themselves extremely comfortable after Bismarck, with threats of torture, had persuaded the house-steward to reveal the secrets of the wine-cellar, and hither came the unhappy Jules Favre. He left behind him a tradition inferior to his merits; for it was his sad lot to sign with M. Thiers the fatal Treaty of Frankfort, after his patriotic vaunt that 'ni un pouce de notre 'territoire ni une pierre de nos forteresses' should ever be surrendered. It was to soften the heart of Bismarck on this point that he undertook the humiliating mission to Ferrières. He deserved to be treated with respect. He was older than Bismarck, a most eloquent leader of the Bar, and a member of the French Academy. Yet the Chancellor treated him with that brutality which all who fall into the power of Germans experience. He rejected his overtures but invited him to drink a favourite concoction of the Bismarcks—champagne and porter mixed in a goblet and stirred with a red-hot poker. This is no fiction. When fourteen years later Herbert Bismarck was attached to the German Embassy in London, he used to invite his companions to drink the historic mixture which his father offered to Jules Favre. If they did not like it he would tell them in his voice of thunder that they were no better than Jules Favre, comparing him contemptuously with General Sheridan of the U.S.A. Army, who had drank freely of champagne and porter when dining with the Chancellor at Pont-à-Mousson, where he was staying during the fighting around Metz, four days after Herbert Bismarck was wounded in the charge at Mars-la-Tour. The late Baron Alphonse de Rothschild, the son and successor of James, used to show his guests at Ferrières the visitors' book of 1870, where were inscribed the signatures of William and Frederick, of Bismarck and Moltke. On one occasion he produced an

earlier register of not less historical interest. With the game-book it showed that on November 3rd, 1865, Bismarck shot the Ferrières covers, with Galliffet and other guns. From the Baron's table that evening he left to catch a train in Paris which took him to Biarritz and to Napoleon III., whom he completely cajoled into the calamitous policy of allowing Prussia to crush Austria in 1866. General de Galliffet, one day looking at his signature on the same page as the Chancellor's, ejaculated that if he had only let fly at Bismarck in the covers and prevented his visit to Biarritz, there would have been no Sadowa and no Sedan—where Bismarck, in the group surrounding King William, which included Moltke, Roon, and Billy Russell, from the eminence at Fresnois, saw Galliffet leading the forlorn cavalry charge at Floing after General Margueritte had fallen, which called from the King of Prussia the exclamation: 'O les braves gens!' So William II. would have had quarters full of gratifying reminiscences if British and French troops had not barred the way to Ferrières.

Ten miles nearer to Paris than Ferrières is the village of Sucy-en-Brie, where the Germans came in 1870 and where every preparation was made for their reception in 1914. The village has remained unchanged since the Revolution, though so near to Paris that a fine panorama of its domes and spires is seen from a terrace by the churchyard—one of those wonderful 'horizons de la banlieue de Paris' of which the outskirts of London have no counterpart. Sucy stands on a high hill, while the little railway line which serves it is far beneath in the valley; so it has retained its primitive aspect. It is a 'petit pays,' where fine châteaux abound. The Château de Sucy, a noble example of the architecture of Louis XIII., is better known to the writer of these pages than any country-house in France. On the way down the hill is the pretty place where Madame de Sévigné wrote her earliest letters. Near the banks of the Marne is Grandval, which became famous when Baron d'Holbach entertained there Diderot and the Encyclopædists. On the heights, just beyond the park of the Château, is Haute Maison, where the late Ludovic Halévy, most charming of neighbours, used to spend his summers. One day in the library of the château he took from a shelf a volume of Thiers' 'Empire,' and found its fly-leaf disfigured with criticisms of the account of the

campaign of 1806, written in German—a reminiscence of 1870, when some Würtembergers were quartered there. Instead of expressing indignation at the outrage, Halévy exclaimed, 'Ils ont bien fait!' He had no love for M. Thiers. Perhaps if the historian of the Consulate and the Empire had lived to be a colleague at the French Academy of the author of 'l'Invasion' and of 'l'Abbé Constantin,' they might have learned to understand one another. A little episode which occurred on the Halévy property just before the battle of the Marne brings home to people who have never seen a hostile army on their soil the cruel necessities incident on invasion. In the grounds of Haute Maison there was a cottage which was lent to members of the family or to friends. Before the Germans were decisively turned away from Paris, a French officer came to tell the occupants of the cottage that it might be necessary to remove the roof or even to demolish the building, as it stood in the line of fire from the fort which was ready to be used to check the advance of the Germans. Fortunately they were pushed eastwards out of range of Sucy-en-Brie.

Our British troops went much further south, to the confines of the forest of Fontainebleau. There, at Melun, the capital of Seine-et-Marne, where General French established his staff, they found a panic-stricken population increased by the inroads of refugees from the invaded territory, and even from Paris. On September 2nd, in spite of the presence of the British, Melun had an alarm. The cannon was heard thundering in the direction of Provins, where the world-famed rose-gardens were sadly damaged—the most southerly point attained by the enemy. The refugees, pouring into the town laden with their poor chattels, were spreading stories of German horrors, when the cry was raised of 'Les Allemands.' Consternation soon turned into joy and acclamation. A body of soldiers swinging along the steep streets, as though the retreat from Mons had been a morning's route-march, were not Germans, but our glorious Highlanders, whose unfamiliar garb had scared the good people of Melun.

On the way to this southern limit of their advance our troops traversed a country every mile of which is full of historic or romantic interest. They passed near Gros Bois, the château

occupied by the Director Barras until the First Consul turned him out and gave it to Moreau, and later to Berthier, whose descendant, the Prince de Wagram, still owns it. It was thither that Josephine came by night veiled, after the Coup d'État of Brumaire, to discuss the new situation with her old lover, the fallen Director. A mile or two further is the site of Cour de France, the posting-house on the roadside where, wandering on the night of March 30th, 1814, Napoleon heard of the capitulation of Paris to the Allies and knew that his Empire was ended, and turned his post-chaise to Fontainebleau, where the final scene took place. Arrived at Melun our soldiers were only 'a quarter of an hour' —so d'Artagnan assured Louis XIV.—from the château of Vaux-le-Vicomte, the superb creation, worthily preserved, of the combined genius of Levau, Le Nôtre, and Le Brun—a remarkable contrast to Paxton's great pleasure-house at Ferrières. Built by Fouquet, it was the scene of the regal house-warming with which he hastened the jealousy of the king and his own downfall. At this point we must retrace our steps. On September 10th, 1914, the Germans were in full retreat towards the Aisne and the Oise, and thither we must follow them.

Between the cities of Soissons and Laon there is a once prosperous and picturesque country which has been the scene of carnage every week since August, 1914. A hundred years before, when Napoleon was making his supreme desperate stand against three armies, every yard of this bloodstained area was fought over. There is the Chemin des Dames, which our soldiers knew early in the war and which now is a name of sinister significance to our French allies, because of the suspicious circumstances connected with a reverse they suffered on that line. Since then it has had an association of good omen, as it was there in 1918 that American troops made their first attack. The road was so called because it was constructed for the periodical journeys of 'Mesdames de France,' the spinster daughters of Louis XV., when they went to stay with M. de Narbonne at La Bove on the Aillette. Here Napoleon fought overwhelming masses of Russians and Prussians who could not claim a victory in this battle named after the plateau of Craonne, which has been anew drenched with blood in the present war. Then they concentrated near Laon,

from which position he failed to drive them. At that date in March, 1814, only a fortnight before he finally succumbed, he had in a month won twelve battles against enormous odds. Blücher watched the battle of Laon from the summit of the mountain where stands the noble four-towered church, formerly a cathedral, which is a conspicuous object from the express line to Bâle, though few English tourists have had the curiosity to halt and enjoy one of the finest prospects in France. Fifteen miles to the west a huge mass could be descried, which on closer view was seen to be the well-preserved remains of a colossal castle. If three of our medieval castles, such as Rhuddlan, Conway, and Carnarvon, had been rolled into one it would have looked small by the side of Coucy, which seemed to be built for eternity. After standing for seven hundred years it is now a shapeless heap of débris. Why the Germans, on evacuating Coucy wantonly blew up this unique relic of the Middle Ages, useless for modern purposes of warfare, is a question which the ruins of Ypres and Reims may answer.

Ham, seventeen miles north-west of Coucy, had a château just as old which met with the same barbarous fate. Unlike Coucy it had rarely ceased to be inhabited, and it had been used as a lodging for distinguished political prisoners, from Joan of Arc to General Cavaignac and other 'victims of 'December, 1851.' The author of the Coup d'État of that date spent several years in that interesting building, which has been blown to pieces by barbarians, who have no regard for historical associations or for any other tradition which civilization respects. In August, 1840, Louis Napoleon, encouraged by the enthusiasm aroused in Paris by the news that the remains of the great Emperor were to be brought home from St. Helena, came over from his exile in England to Boulogne with a bale of proclamations and a tame eagle. He was arrested under ridiculous circumstances, tried by the Chamber of Peers, and sentenced to detention in a fortress for life. Ham was chosen for his prison, and he was lodged in the apartments occupied in 1830 by the fallen ministers of Charles X. There the imperial pretender remained till his escape in May, 1846, when, taking advantage of repairs being executed in the castle, he disguised himself in a workman's clothes and walked out to freedom. His sobriquet of 'Badinguet,' which, when he was Emperor, was given to him

by journalists and caricaturists of the Opposition, is said to be derived from the name of the workman whose garments he borrowed on that occasion.* Bearing a plank on his shoulder he passed the sentry on the drawbridge. Not far away a carriage was waiting which took him to Saint Quentin. Here the precaution had been arranged of a change of carriages ; but the relay was late and the fugitive had to wait a long time, only ten miles from Ham, where his absence would soon be noticed. At last the vehicle appeared, and by Louis Napoleon's escape from recognition Saint Quentin became one of those places where the destiny of the world has been changed by fortunate or unfortunate hazard. It may thus rank with Varennes, which we shall pass on our eastward way, where Louis XVI. and the Queen, less lucky, were stopped on their attempted flight to the frontier in 1791. Had Louis Napoleon been so arrested at Saint Quentin, there would have been no second Empire, no Franco-Prussian war, no unity of Germany, and no universal war to-day—and it is useless to conjecture what other events of equal importance might have taken place. As it was, the carriage came in time to convey the Prince to Valenciennes, whence by train and boat he travelled back to London and Gore House and Miss Howard ; and two years later the prisoner of Ham was Prince President, and on his way to be Emperor of the French.

Saint Quentin, to which the British line has been extended, possesses two monuments, the fate of which will trouble the minds of all lovers of fine architecture, until it is known that they are not irreparably damaged. There is the exquisite Hôtel de Ville and the Collegiate Church, which is one of the

---

* Another derivation of the nickname is from a Demoiselle Badinguet who was said to have solaced the Prince's weariness at Ham, as in that fortress State prisoners were permitted certain amenities not usual in a gaol. My eminent confrère of the Institute of France, M. Pierre de la Gorce, the brilliant historian of the Second Empire, writes to me that the popular attribution of the origin of 'Badinguet' to the name of the workman is probably correct. M. de la Gorce is a distinguished son of the war-zone. At his reception last year at the French Academy it was mentioned that he was descended from an officer of Malplaquet, that the home of his childhood was Maubeuge, that he was at school at Douai, and a magistrate at Montreuil, Béthune, and Saint Omer, all of which places have seen our British forces during the war.

stateliest Gothic edifices in France. It so dominates the town that it is often called the 'cathedral,' with less excuse than when that term is applied to the great churches at Laon, Noyon, and Senlis, which were episcopal sees until the Revolution. Whatever the fate of its precious glass and frescoes, we know what has happened to another of the treasures of Saint Quentin. This is the wonderful collection of a hundred pastels by the greatest master of that art, Quentin de Latour, who was born here in 1704, and died here at the age of eighty-four. Saint Quentin, though on the way from Paris to Brussels, is so far from the track of English travellers that few of them have inspected the Latour collection in his native town. But every lover of French art in the eighteenth century has gazed with admiration on his dazzling portrait of Madame de Pompadour at the Louvre. We know what has become of the Saint Quentin collection, which, unhappily, was not removed to safety when invasion was imminent in 1914. Some German experts in art in a reserve corps at Bapaume, between Arras and Péronne, devoted their leisure to compiling an 'artistic monograph' on the pastels of Latour, which were stolen by German methodic hands from Saint Quentin. Six thousand copies of the monograph were issued from the 'Korpsverlagsbuchandlung, Bapaume,' and these gems of French art are prisoners of war in Germany.

At Saint Quentin we are on the Somme, the valley of which we left at Albert-sur-Ancre on our southward way. The great battle-field of the Somme lies some miles west of Saint Quentin, most of its area being in the department named after that river. Before the war it was a plateau of placid aspect, which, with its poplars and willows, its sedgy marshes and its ponds, had a Corot-like beauty of its own, especially in the spring when the orchards were in flower. It was one of the best cultivated regions in France, and was studded with prosperous villages, of which more than one hundred and thirty had names which terminate in 'court.' To-day the Corot landscape has the appearance of an American prairie after a drought—treeless, and covered with rank yellowish vegetation. Every village and village church is destroyed, in most cases razed to the ground. The orchards are cut down, the woods laid low by shell-fire, and the country-side deserted. One curious phenomenon has been noticed. Botanists have discovered in the

shell-holes, where the earth was turned up as by a convulsion of nature, plants and wild flowers which never before grew in the region, and nobody knows how the seeds were conveyed thither. This was the scene of the series of fierce and bloody combats in which the British troops covered themselves with glory at the cost of thousands of young lives—Guards and Rifles, Marines and Highlanders, Irishmen and Welshmen, with regiments from half the counties of England and from all our oversea dominions.

At an earlier period of the fighting on the Somme there was a tragic case of a French officer who was slain almost at the gates of his own home. This was the Duc de Rohan, whose duchy was created by Louis XIV. in favour of Henri Chabot on his marriage with Marguerite de Rohan, the only child and heir of the great Calvinist leader, Henri de Rohan, whose descendants conformed to the Catholic religion. The title is of 1648, so is older than any English dukedom, excepting those of Norfolk and Somerset. Duke Josselin, who fell on July 13th, 1916, at the age of thirty-seven, as a boy had done his military service in the ranks, as did all young Frenchmen whatever their social position, and as colour-sergeant he had seen active service in the Far East. He was the grandson of the old duke, who had been brought up among the survivors of the court of Marie-Antoinette, and was a picturesque and agreeable figure in Parisian society five-and-twenty years ago. The old Breton castle of Josselin is the chief family seat, but they had a charming château a few miles from Péronne at Manancour, quite near the woods of Sailly-Saillisel, of sad memory in many an English home. It was at Hardecourt that the gallant Captain de Rohan died, a pleasant woodland ride from his mother's house, which is now a mass of ruins. Péronne has suffered more severely than it did in centuries of wars. It was there that took place the amazing incident in 1468, when Charles the Bold, at the conclusion of an interview with Louis XI., imprisoned his redoubtable enemy in a tower of the old castle,—which now has had the fate of Coucy and Ham. In January, 1871, Péronne experienced a foretaste of German methods, when during the siege, before the valiant town capitulated, it had one-eighth of its houses totally destroyed, and three-quarters of them damaged by bombardment, which

called forth a protest from the French Commander, General Faidherbe, in words which might have been written to-day: 'Le bombardement de Péronne est un des exemples les 'plus odieux de cette férocité calme et méthodique que les 'généraux du roi Guillaume prétendent introduire dans 'les usages de la guerre' ('L'Armée du Nord,' p. 51). Yet how mild was this aggression on a civil population compared with the daily acts of the Germans in the present war. A British officer who recently rode through Péronne reports that its outward aspect had then suffered little compared with that of most of the towns and villages on the battle-ground of the Somme; yet there was scarcely a house left fit for habitation in the town.*

At Saint Quentin the British line terminates. It would be rash to predict that by the time these pages are printed it will have been extended, in conjunction with the reinforcements of our American allies, towards Verdun. Meanwhile, we must pass over the intervening country as not coming strictly within our purview, though it contains some of the most interesting places in the war-zone, from Reims with crowds of associations, ancient and modern, which linger around the ruins of its matchless cathedral, to Saint Ménéhould, where postmaster Drouet recognized Louis XVI. and had the royal fugitive arrested at Varennes. But when we arrive at Verdun we are in sight of an English line of battle, not on the blood-stained ground, where our French allies have made their glorious stand against the enemy, but in the air. Verdun is a town of unique characteristics. It is built on several hill-sides and access from one quarter to another is obtained by precipitous flights of steps. At the highest point stands the cathedral, inferior in architecture to the churches of the other cities of the Trois Evêchés, Toul and Metz, yet imposing from its lofty towers, which command a wide view over the valley of the Meuse. The wooded landscape is unrecognizable now, and if those cathedral towers have escaped the German shells which laid low entire streets in the town, there must have been

* These pages were written early in March, some weeks before the German advance, which has gravely affected many of these places in the war-zone.

a miracle. Whatever pacific ideas prevailed in France further from the frontier there was no such illusion at Verdun in 1913. The weekly *retraite aux flambeaux* was no mere show to entertain the population as it was in western towns; it seemed like a solemn parade of actors about to play in a very big drama. The *musique militaire* in the gardens down by the river on a Sunday night was not the ordinary promenade concert for the good people of a provincial centre. Amid the vast crowd of uniforms, which far outnumbered the civilian costumes, it seemed like the relaxation of an army on the march at a bivouac. There was a little corporal with a beautiful baritone voice, who sang 'J'aime le son du 'cor le soir au fond des bois,' and Alfred de Vigny's words—with their evocation of Ronald and his Paladins—accompanied by the horns and trumpets of the regiment, suggested not the plaintive end of a hunting day, but the bugle calls soon to be heard for another kind of chase in the forests of the Meuse. What has become of 'Corporal Flisch,' whose name shows that he came from Alsace? Is he still fighting for the restitution of his native land, or is his voice as silent as those of hundreds of his comrades who applauded him just a year before the call to arms?

Between Verdun and Metz there were many peaceful-looking châteaux and farms which the least foreseeing traveller knew must enjoy a security less than that of buildings on the slopes of Vesuvius. After Conflans, the railway junction for Nancy, often bombarded not by the Germans but by the Allies, as it is in the hands of the enemy, the fields are seen to be dotted with white crosses. At first they look as though they might mark the frontier, which is close at hand. That is not their purpose. They mark the burial places of soldiers on the battle-fields of 1870. At the frontier station Amanvillers, less than a year before the present war, British subjects were permitted to enter German territory without passports or the least formality, though French people were submitted to rigorous restrictions. The arrival at the great strategic station of Metz was a reminder of the Germans' perfected preparation for war with their neighbours. Outside it had the appearance of a huge castellated fortress rather than a railway station; inside it was so vast that a regiment entraining with its band playing on a distant platform did

not disturb the traffic or cause any encumbrance in the wide area.

Of all the places passed in review there is none so abounding in memories of tragic romance as the ancient French city of Metz. Its story in 1870, from the approach of the Germans at the end of July to the traitorous capitulation in November, is one series of moving episodes. At the beginning we see Napoleon III. like a fugitive phantom at first accompanied by his pathetic little son, making his headquarters at the prefecture, retiring to a villa in the suburbs as the enemy drew near, spending the night of his last 'Fête Napoléon' at Gravelotte, on the eve of the battle, and escaping to meet his destiny a fortnight later at Sedan. Nothing was more moving than to follow his wanderings and to visit the battle-fields, especially if one had authorization to cross and recross the frontier, visiting here a place which remained French, such as Mars la Tour, and neighbouring villages, such as Gravelotte and Rezonville, which Germany annexed in 1871. One of these is Saint Privat, where the Prussian Guard perished on August 18th. So the old Kaiser, when the new boundary was being settled, declared that the graveyard of his Guards should belong to Germany, and it was part of the price paid by France for the retention of Belfort. Mars la Tour until 1914 remained a characteristic French village, untouched by German proximity. The 'adoration perpétuelle,' in the diocese of Nancy, was so organized that here it should be an anniversary service of August, 1870, and Mass was sung in 1913 by the curé of Tronville, another village on the battle-field rescued from Germany. Crowds came from villages on both sides of the frontier to hear the Abbé Faller, the old curé of Mars la Tour, who had been placed there sixty years before by Mgr. Dupont des Loges, the good Breton Bishop of Metz, and who after the service did the honours of his war-museum. Most of the curiosities were collected by the brave curé himself, and though nearly blind he could point to each of them, calling special attention to a series of bloodthirsty proclamations worded in passable French, warning the inhabitants that death was the penalty for any infringement of the rules laid down by the invader—and these documents were signed 'Frederick,' whom English courtiers called 'Frederick the Noble.' The

old Abbé died when the Germans once more took possession of his village, which they bombarded, choosing with insolent cruelty August 16th, the anniversary of the battle of Mars la Tour. If any of the old curé's relics survived the bombardment it is improbable that the Germans have preserved the proclamations of the Crown Prince Frederick with the care they bestowed on the stolen pastels of Quentin Latour.

The general impression taken away from Metz on the eve of the war was the lamentable progress of Germanization. In the streets little children at their play were heard chattering German, which their predecessors would not have understood twenty years before. In the villages of Lorraine the people still talked French. There was a group of peasants passing across the esplanade where the inevitable effigy of 'Wilhelm der Grosse' dominates the statues of Marshal Ney and of other worthies of Lorraine, and the leader of the party, pointing to the old Kaiser's statue, exclaimed: 'Voilà Napoléon'—a misapprehension refreshing to the ears in the Germanized capital of French Lorraine. That esplanade and the chief streets of the town were that week decorated with flags and arches and coloured lamps. It looked as though an imperial visit were expected for the anniversary of the battles around Metz. The beautifying of the city was only in honour of a Catholic congress, and the action of the government in authorizing it was most significant. A few miles away across the frontier of 1871 not even a parochial procession on the Fête Dieu was allowed in the streets of a French town. But in Lorraine, annexed to Germany, a Roman Catholic gathering was officially celebrated with much greater display than is seen in a French city even on the National Fête of the 14th of July. The policy of conciliating a powerful section of the population whose religion is not that of the Chief of the State may account for the alleged willingness of certain German leaders to submit the future of Alsace and Lorraine to a popular plébiscite.

It was far east of the annexed provinces that the battle-line in France was made inevitable. It was in Berlin that every detail of the coming invasion was studied and perfected. The great National Fête of that capital was Sedanstag, the anniversary of the battle in France, which gave Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. To celebrate it, just a year before the battle of the Marne, the Kaiser held his final parade on the

great Tempelhofer Feld at Berlin. There he sat on his horse motionless for hour after hour while his hosts of every arm defiled before him—and they were only a handful of the German army, the garrison of Berlin. How could Europe remain impassive before such a warning and defiance ? Such a thought assailed a mere spectator of European affairs, three days later, when passing over another battle-area on which at all events we thought ourselves supreme. From the deck of an Atlantic liner the shores of Germany were becoming dim when a battle squadron led by the *Moltke* came steaming past as much as to show that the German fatherland was no longer confined to the continent. Then in the direction taken by the ships of war was seen a white mass rising from the sea. This was Heligoland, the priceless outpost of the German Empire, obtained from England for nothing, and the monument of the criminal folly of a British Minister.

J E. C. Bodley.

No. 465 *will be published in July*, 1918.

464

INDEX

Titles of Articles are printed in heavy type.

After-Life, The Riddle of, 253–271
Agnosticism, 253
Agriculture, revival owing to the war, 25
Agrippa, Cornelius, 60, 65.
Aguinaldo, 214
Alamanni family, 98, 103
Alamanni, Pietro, 104
Albert, 200
Alessandro, murder of Duke, 100
Alexander II. of Russia, 132. 135
Alexander III. of Russia, 137
Alexandra, late Empress of Russia, 137, 141
Alsace - Lorraine and Democracy, 322-42; provinces and French national unity 322; Prussian annexation and policy, 327; reasons against a new consultation of inhabitants, 333; repressive measures during the war, 336; German self-government proposals, 337
Animism, Sorcery, and Spiritualism, 49–67
Antiquities, ecclesiastical. *See* Ecclesiastical Antiquities
Apostolic succession. *See* Episcopacy
Archer, Mr. William—suggestions for Indian Reforms, 183
Argentina: Italian trade with, 319
Argyll, Eighth Duke of—on Indian defence, 173
Arras, Associations of, 198
Ascension, The, 255
Ascham, Roger: on learning, 301
Ascoli rebellion, 107

Bacon—effects of British Food Control measures on American production, 120
'Badinguet,' 400–1
Baines, Edward, 36
Balsano, Joseph ('Count of Cagliostro'), 59, 65
Banca Commerciale d'Italia, 310
Banca d'Italia, 309
Bancroft, *quoted*, 18
Barnes v. *Roosevelt* (libel action) 226
Barrett, Sir William, *quoted*, 262
Bateson, Professor, on population, 242
Bede, The Venerable, 3, 9, 11
Beer duty, 148
Bernhardi, General, *quoted*, 329
Besant, Mrs. Annie—propaganda in India, 185
Bethune, 197
Bible—and immortality, 255; study: position in theological training, 299 *et seq.*
Biology and immortality, 266
Birth-rate—control, 232, 252 *passim*; fluctuations used as an argument against immortality, 264
Bishops. *See* Episcopacy
Bismarck, 308, 327, 396–7
Bland, Mr. J. O. P., **Population and Food Supply,** 232–52
Bodley, Mr. J. E. C., **Romance of the Battle-Line in France,** I., 188–208; II., 392–408
Bordeaux Assembly, declaration of delegates from Alsace and Lorraine, 326
Bossuet, 394
Bracegirdle, Mrs., 89
Bread, effects of Food Control measures, 119
Brend, Dr. W. A., *Health and the State*, 26, 37, 41
Brie, 394

Bright, Dr., *quoted*, 9
Bryce, Lord, *The American Commonwealth*, *quoted*, 341
Bülow, Prince von, *quoted*, 236
Burnard, F. C., 85 *et seq.*, 94

'Cagliostro, Count of.' *See* Balsano, Joseph
Cambridge University: theological courses, 299
Caprivi, von, on Alsace-Lorraine, 336
Carlyle, Thomas: on population and food supply, 238
Carpenter, Edward, *Towards Industrial Freedom*, 36
Carr, J. W. Comyns, 87
Carroll, James, 195
Cassel, 195
Caterina, widow of Giovanni da Filettole, 102
Cellini, Benvenuto 47
Chadwick, Edwin, report on insanitary conditions of towns in 1842, 43
Chamberlain, Mr. Austen, Indian Administration, 174; speech on Government and the Press, 384
Chemin des Dames, 399
Child labour, 45
China—over-population, 244
Christianity—progress in England 1–24 *passim*; and immortality, 255; theological education 294–305 *passim*
Church History, theological study and, 299, 302
Church of England. **The Church of England**, 1–24; orgins, 2-4; the connexion with Rome, 10; nationl Church emerges from Reformation, 13, 16; effects of controversies with Rome and Nonconformists, 19; justification of national claims, 21; disestablishment and disendowment, 21, 23
Clergy—the submission of the clergy 13; birth-rate among, 241; theological training, 294–305
Coleman, Mrs., 88
Collie, Sir John, **The Disabled Soldier**, 343–358
Colonies—development, 30
Communion with the dead, 255
Compiègne, 202
Condorcet, 323
Convocations, 13, 17
Cookesley, W. G., 86
Corbie, 201
Corn-crops — increased home production, 114
Corruption, political, 226
Cosimo I. Duke of Florence, 102
Cost of living—upward movement of prices, 246
Cossacks, 143
Coucy, 400
Courcelles, 205
Crabbe, George: compared to Thomas Hardy, 285
Craonne, 399
Currency note issues, 165
Curzon of Kedleston, Lord—controversy with Lord Kitchener over Indian Army reorganization, 172

Darwin, Charles, 268
Dead, communion with, 255; resurrection, 256
Death—influence of changing theories on religious beliefs, 258
De Gabriac, Marquis, on annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 328
Delium, battle of, 72
Del Re, Arundel, Catalogue of the Medici Archives, 97
Democracy—influence of the towns, 33, 46; **The Problem of Democracy**, 209–31
Devonport, Lord—food control measures, 118 *et seq.*
Disabled Soldier, The, 343–358
Dissenters. *See* Nonconformists
Drama—**Theatrical Landmarks**, 85–96
Dumas, 197, 203
Dunes, battle of the (1658), 194

Ecclesiastical antiquities, English—revived interest in, 8
Edinburgh—Sir Walter Scott on changes at, 43
Elizabeth, Queen, and the Reformation, 16, 17
Emmett, Rev. C. W.—on passing of belief in hell, 271
Episcopacy—position of bishops in English Church, 17; Apostolic Succession, 18
Escott, Mr. T. H., **Theatrical Landmarks**, 85–96
Essen, 43
Euripides, *quoted*, 72, 79
Excess profits duty. *See* Profits duty
Expenditure, national — war increases, 148 *et seq.*, 161 *et seq.*; demand for economy, 150; taxes on expenditure, 158, 160

Faller, Abbé, 406
Farmers—income tax, 156
Fassbender, Dr. Martin—on Alsace-Lorraine, 324, 338
Favre, Jules, 396
Ferdinand, King of Naples, 104
Ferrières, 396
Feudalism—power broken largely by towns, 33
Finance of the War, The, 146–165
Finns, 144
Fleming, Canon J. B., 192
Florentine Republic: the Medici Archives, 97–105
Food—**Early Phases of Food Control**, 108–30; **Population and Food Supply**, 232–252.
  Distribution, 123
  Prices, increased: statistics, 247
  Profiteering, 126
  Rationing, 128
France—**Romance of the Battle-Line in France**, I., 188–208; II., 292–408; Italian trade with, 320; **Alsace-Lorraine and Democracy**, 322–42; origin of national unity, 323; anti-clericals and clergy's sacrifices during the war, 393
Francesco di Giuliano, 100
Fraser, Mr. Lovat, **Problems of Indian Administration**, 166–87
Free-will, 268
Freights, shipping—effects of the war and state control, 359–87 *passim*
French *industriel*, 196
French Revolution—influence abroad, 189; and democracy, 212, 222
'French Soldier, A'; **Alsace-Lorraine and Democracy**, 322–42
Friars—influence on English Church, 7
Fribourg, M. André, 335
Fustel de Coulanges, M., on annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 329

Galliffet, General de, 396–7
Gamberelli of Pisa, Canon, 102
Garrick, David, 89
George V., King—personal gift to Treasury, 151; visit to India (1911), 168
Germany—food control in, 124, 128; pre-war relations with Russia, 136, 140; increase of population and the demand for territorial expansion, 236; increased food prices, 247; declining birth-rate, 249; economic policy in, and trade with Italy, 311, 319; **Alsace-Lorraine and Democracy**, 322–42
Giovanni de' Medici, Cardinal, 100
Giulio de' Medici, Marchese, 102
Gladstone, late W. E.: reconciliation to death, 261
Gorce, M. de la, 401
Gosse, Mr. Edmund, **Mr. Hardy's Lyrical Poems**, 272–93
Government—representative system, 212, 231 *passim*; balance essential, 230; influence of the Press, 383 *et seq.*; extension of functions, 389
Greece, Usages of War in Ancient, 68–84

Greek, study of—place in theological training, 299, 303
Gregory of Tours, 3
Gruner, Justus, on Essen at end of eighteenth century, 43
Guicciardini, Vincenzo, 100
Guidoguerra, Count, 100
Guizot—in Rome, 27
Gwatkin, Dr. H. M., *Church and State in England to the Death of Queen Anne*, 14–21

'H. S.,' **Early Phases of Food Control**, 108–30
Halévy, 397
Ham, 400
Hammond, J. L. and Barbara, *The Town Labourer*, 1760–1832, 28, 35, 40
Hardy, M., on food supply and population, 247
Hardy, Mr. Thomas—**Mr. Hardy's Lyrical Poems**, 272–93
Hebrew, study of: place in theological training, 299, 303
Hell—passing of the belief in, 271
Henderson, Mr. Arthur—on taxation of wage-earners, 156
Henry VIII., King, and the Reformation, 13, 15
Henson, Rt. Rev. H. Hensley (Bishop of Hereford)—**The Church of England**, 1–24
Herodotus, *quoted*, 73, 77
Hilton, Mr. John, **Merchant Shipping and State Control**, 359–383
Hogg, Hon. Mr. Malcolm, *quoted*, 183
Holcombe, Mr. Arthur N., *State Government in the United States*, 224
Holland. *See* Netherlands
House of Commons (British)—Jefferson on, 225; decadence, 384, 388
Howorth, Sir Henry—*The Golden Days of the Early English Church from the arrival of Theodore to the Death of Bede*, 2, 10
Hume, David—on government, 212
Huxley, Prof., 253
Immortality, personal, 253–271; Mr. Thomas Hardy's attitude, 292
Imperialism, democracy and, 212
Import restrictions, 376 *et seq.*
Income tax—war increases, 148, 152; application to wage-earners, 152; weekly deductions urged, 153; position of farmers, 156
India—**Problems of Indian Administration**, 166–187
Army reforms, 170
Executive Council, 175
India Office, criticism of, 181
Over-population, 244
Secretary of State: position discussed, 174
Self-government considered, 182
Viceroy, position of, 175
Wheat exports (1914–5), 110–1
Industrial revolution, the, 36, 37
Infant mortality, 241 *et seq.*
Inge, Dr., on limitation of the birth-rate, 240
Initiative, popular; American experiments, 228
Insurance, war risks, 370 *et seq.*
Irving, Sir Henry, 92
Islam. *See* Mahomedanism
Islington, Lord, and Indian decentralization, 180
Italy—influence of Lorenzo il Magnifico on present policy, 97, 102–7; **The Development of Italy**, 306–21; financial crisis of 1890 and ensuing reorganization, 309 *et seq.*; agricultural development, 312; irrigation, 314; emigration, 316; education, 317; government monopolies, 317; corruption of local politics, 317; foreign trade, 318

Jagow, Herr von, *quoted*, 338
James, Mr. H. R., **Usages of War in Ancient Greece**, 68, 84
Jefferson, *quoted*, 215, 225
Jerrold, 85
Jerusalem, 31
Jews, Russian—revolutionary influences, 138

Jouarre, 394
Judgment, final, 259

Kant, Immanuel, *quoted*, 210
Kean, Edmund, 90
Kitchener Lord—reorganization of Indian Army, 171
Kornilov, General, 143
Krivoshein, M., 136

Labour—changed conditions due to industrial revolution, 39, 45; child labour, 45; modern workman's pride in his work, 47
Labriola, *quoted*, 217
Lambeth Conference (1908) and birth control, 236
Land values, duties, 150
Lanino, Signor P., *La Nuova Italia Industriale*, 318
Laon, 398
Law, Mr. H. Bonar—budget of 1917, 161; on shipping profits, 375
Lebon, Joseph, 199
Lee, Richard Henry, *quoted*, 225
Lenin, 138, 141, 142
Leygues, M. Georges, on Alsace-Lorraine, 322, 342
Little, Mr. A. G., *Studies in English Franciscan History*, 7
Lloyd George, Mr. D.—first war budget, 147; relations with Northcliffe press, 383, 387
Loans, war, 163
Lodovico, 105
London—Tacitus on, 30; conditions in Henry VIII.'s reign, 41
Long, Mr. Walter, on birth-rate, 237
Lorenzino de' Medici, 100
Lorenzo il Magnifico, 97, 102
Louis XIV., 204
Louis XVI., 401
Louis Napoleon, 400

Macready, 91
McKenna, Mr. Reginald—budget of Sept. (1915), 151
Mahomedanism and immortality, 261
Malet, Edward, 395
Mallet, Sir Bernard, on declining birth-rates, 235
Mallock, Mr. W. H., *The Limits of Pure Democracy*, 209 *et seq.*
Malplaquet, 192
Malthusian doctrine, 232–52 *passim*
Manu, ordinances of, 244
Marne, battle of the, 392
Mars la Tour, 406
Meat—effects of control, 121
Meaux, 392
Médailles sur les principaux événements du régne entier de Louis le Grand, etc., 191
Medici Archives, Catalogue of the, 97–107
'Melian Controversy,' the, 76, 79
Melos, the Athenian attack on, 75
Melun, 398
Merchant Shipping and State Control, 359–82
Mercier, Dr. Charles, Animism, Sorcery, and Spiritualism, 49–67
Merlin de Douai, *quoted*, 325
Mesopotamia campaign—relation to Indian reforms, 169, 174
Metz, 406
Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act, 355
Michels, Professor Robert, *Political Parties*, 217, 219
Mill, John Stuart, *quoted*, 232–52 *passim*
Ministry (Coalition), 386
Ministry (Lloyd George)—relations with the Press, 383–91
Ministry of Pensions, 344 *et seq.*
Minghetti, on Italian economic policy, 306, 308
Mirabeau, *quoted*, 214–15
Monasticism, 4, 5, 11
Montagu, Mr. Edwin—mission to India, 166–70
More's 'Utopia,' and immortality, 260
Morgan, Mr. E. Strachan—The Development of Italy, 306–21

Morley, Lord, *quoted*, 171, 174; Indian administration criticized, 175
Morning Post, prosecution, 388
Murray, Sir George, 34
Murray, Prof. Gilbert, on Euripides' 'Troades' and the Melian affair, 79

Nancy, 43
Napoleon, 204
Napoleon III., 206
National Unity, Prussian view of, 323
Natural selection and immortality, 263 *et seq.*
Nature: Mr. Thomas Hardy and, 286
Naumann, Herr, on birth-rate, 248
Navigation Laws, 360, 381
Netherlands—birth-rate, 242, 250
Neurasthenia (shell-shock), 352
Newman, Cardinal, 258, 263, 268
New Zealand—birth-rate, 242
Nicholas II., late Emperor of Russia, 137, 207
Nonconformists—persecution at the Restoration, 19
Northcliffe, Lord—relations with Mr. Lloyd George, 382, 386
Noyon, 202

Okhrana, 135
Oligarchy—an essential element to democracy, 217
Owen, Robert, and child labour, 46
Oxford—historical associations, 189
Oxford Movement—influence on historical studies, 9

Paley, *quoted*, 37, 39
Paoli, M. Xavier, 207
Papacy—influence, in English Christianity, 10; development of anti-papal feeling in England, 12; effect of the Reformation, 14
Paris—condition during reign of Charles VI., 41
Parliament—declining prestige, 383, 387
Party system. *See* Political Parties
Patmore, Coventry—urges Thomas Hardy to write verse, 276
Peloponnesian wars, 75, 76
Pensions, Ministry of, 344 *et seq.*
Peronne, 402
Philippines—America and self-government, 214
Phillips, Prof. W. A., **The Problem of Democracy**, 209–231
Philosophy—place in theological study, 304
Piero de' Medici, 104
Pio del Pinar, 214
Plato, *quoted*, 80–4
Pobedonostsev, 136
Poland: difficulty of conducting popular referendum, 341
Political parties—democracy and, 218, 226; American experience, 226 *et seq*; power of the caucus, 384 *et seq.*
Polybius, *quoted*, 73, 83
Population—cause of increase discussed, 38; over-population discussed: **Population and Food Supply**, 232–252
Ports—insanitary condition of old seaports, 42; delays to shipping, 376 *et seq.*
Postal charges, increased, 160
Potatoes—effects of control, 122
Poverty, 233 *et seq.*
Predestination, 268
Press—relations with the government: **The Power of the Press**, 383–91; censorship, 388
Prices, 108–30 *passim*, 246
Profits duty, excess, 151, 157, 161; position of shipowners, 378 *et seq.*
Protopopov, 138
Prussian militarism, 331
Public Retrenchment Committee, 150, 160
Purgatory, 259

Race-preservation, 248
Referendum—use in United States, 228
Reformation, the, 13

Repington, Colonel — prosecution, 388
Resurrection, the, 255
Revolutions—democratic character, 222
Rhondda, Lord—food control administration, 118 *et seq.*
Riddle of After-Life, The, 253–71
Roberts, late Lord, on Indian Army organization, 171
Robespierre, 198
Rocroy, 192
Rohan, Duc de, 403
Rome—influence on history and urban civilization, 27; religious influences, 32; speculative building in the 'eighties, 307
Ronsard, 275
Roosevelt, Mr. Theodore, 226
Root, Mr. Elihu, on American policy in the Philippines, 214
Rossi, Signor M. L., 316
Russell, Lady Ela—prosecution, 390
Russia—**Dominant Facts in Russia**, 131–45; democratic view of the Revolution, 223; over-population, 243

St. Alban's Abbey, 5
St. Omer, 195
St. Paul—doctrine of the Resurrection, 256
St. Quentin, 401
Sanitation—relation to industrial development, 40
Schmettau, 324
Science—and immortality, 253–71; place in theological study, 304
Senlis, 203
Shadwell, Dr. A., **Town Life—Old and New**, 25–48
Shell-shock, 352 *et seq.*
Shipbuilding, 360 *et seq.*
Shipping—food supplies and the control of tonnage, 112; **Merchant Shipping and State Control**, 359–81
Subsidies, 361
Shop-Steward system, 221
Simond, Louis, *Tour of Great Britain in* 1810, II, 44
Sixtus IV., Pope, 104–5
Skoropis-Ioltuhowski, 138
Smart, Prof. W., on *Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century*, 44
Soissons, 203
Soldier, The Disabled, 343–58
Sorcery—**Animism, Sorcery, and Spiritualism**, 49–67
Soul—immortality, 252–271; theories of origin, 268
Soviet, 141
Spartans—atonement for murder of Envoys of Darius, 73; surrender at Sphacteria, 76
Sphacteria, Surrender of Spartans at, 76
Spiritualism: **Animism, Sorcery, and Spiritualism**, 49–67; revival due to the war, 254
Stage. *See* **Theatrical Landmarks**
State, the—Prussian ideal, 323, 329; control of industry, 359–82 *passim*; extension of functions, 389
Stephen, Leslie—advice to Thomas Hardy respecting verse, 276
Stevenson, Dr.—birth-rate statistics, 24
Stolypin, M., 136
Strasburg—address to French National Assembly, 325
Stringher, Signor, 309, 316
Stubbs, Bp., *quoted*, 4
Stürmer, M., 137
Sucy-en-Brie, 396
Sugar—food control measures, 109, 133; increase of sugar duty, 159
Supremacy, Act of, 17
Syndicalism, 221
Synesius of Ptolemais, Bishop, 260

Tacitus, on London, 30
Taxation—war taxes, 147 *et seq.*; additional taxation urged, 165
Tea duty, 48, 159

Temple, Sir William, on government, 211, 216
Tennant, Mr. F. R., **The Theological Education of the Clergy**, 294–305
Theatrical Landmarks, 85–96
Theodore, Primate, 10
Theological colleges—training systems discussed, 294–305 *passim*
Theological Education of the Clergy, 294–305
Thucydides, *quoted*, 71, 74, 77, 79; condemnation of excesses in war, 79
Tilly, A. Wyatt, **The Riddle of After-Life**, 253–71
Tocqueville, on democracy, 290
Toole, John L., 94
Town Life—Old and New, 25–48
Trade unions—oligarchic character of organization, 219; movement to recover democratic control, 221
Treaties—evidence of Greek history, 76
Tree, Sir Herbert Beerbohm, 93, 95
Treitschke, *quoted*, 329
Tyler, Mr. Royall, on the Medici Archives, 98 *et seq.*

Ukraine, 143
Uniformity, Act of, 17
United States—declaration of independence, 212; and imperialism, 214; limitations of democracy, 224; judicial review of legislation, 227
Universities—changes in educational systems advocated, 294–305

Valenciennes, 192
Verdun, 404
Villers-Cotterets, 203

Wage Earners: income tax. *See* Income tax
War—Human aspirations for its abolition, 232; a check to over-population, 232–52 *passim*; immortality viewed in the light of, 266; Prussian view of its necessity, 330
Usages of War in Ancient Greece, 68–84
War, the Great:
Democracy and, 209
Finance of the War, the, 146–165
Food Control, Early Phases of, 108–130
France, Romance of the Battle-Line in, I., 188–208; II., 392–408
Shipping, effect on, 367, *et seq.*
Soldiers, disabled, treatment and care of, 343–58
Warwick, Countess of, on the birth-rate, 237
Wells, Mr. H. G., 233, 248
Wendel, Hermann, on Alsace-Lorraine, 331
Wheat, Government control over, 109 *et seq.*; the Royal Commission, 113
Williams, Mr. L. F. Rushbrook—*History of the Abbey of St. Alban*, 5
Wilson, Mr. Havelock, on Labour Party and war aims, 220
Wilton, Robert, **Dominant Facts in Russia**, 131
Wolf, George, on Alsace-Lorraine, 337
Wordsworth—and the 'industrial revolution,' 47; contrasted to Mr. Thomas Hardy, 287
Workmen's Compensation Acts, working of, 355
Wytton, Thomas, 100

Young, Arthur, *quoted*, 191, 193
Ypres, 191–2

Zemstvos, 135

Printed by Jarrold & Sons, Ltd., Norwich, England.

P
LE
E
147166
Author Edinburgh Review
Title Vol.227 Jan.-Apr. 1918.

University of Toronto
Library

DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU